Cowgill, Ex parte - Re MIMIA P19/2003 [2003] HCATrans 662 (4 April 2003)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Perth No P100 of 2002

In the matter of -

An application for Writs of Prohibition and Certiorari against THE HONOURABLE PHILIP RUDDOCK, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

Respondent

Ex parte -

SCOTT ERIC COWGILL

Applicant/Prosecutor

Office of the Registry

Perth No P19 of 2003

In the matter of -

An application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus against THE HONOURABLE PHILIP RUDDOCK, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

Respondent

Ex parte -

SCOTT ERIC COWGILL

Applicant/Prosecutor

GUMMOW J

(In Chambers)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM PERTH BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON FRIDAY, 4 APRIL 2003, AT 2.17 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR M.J. HAWKINS: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant, Mr Cowgill. (instructed by Law Access)

MR R.L. LE MIERE, QC: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent together with MR P.R. MACLIVER. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

HIS HONOUR: Now, the matter of P100 of 2002, there is a draft case stated which I understand is acceptable to both sides, is that so?

MR HAWKINS: Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: I now propose to sign and date the case stated. The question then reserved for consideration of the Full Court is: was section 501(2) of the Migration Act within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth to the extent that it authorised the respondent to cancel the applicant's visa on 9 January 2002.

That will be set down before the Full Court in Canberra on Tuesday, 17 June at the same time as another matter which raises cognate questions, both cases to be heard within the one day. It will be necessary for counsel to arrange some division of time between themselves for that to happen. Now, you have another application, do you?

MR HAWKINS: Yes, your Honour, we seek interlocutory relief. We request that Mr Cowgill be released from detention. At the moment he is held in immigration detention where he has been held since August last year.

HIS HONOUR: I notice that you are moving on what process?

MR HAWKINS: There is an application in P19 of 2003 dated 2 April.

HIS HONOUR: I have a draft order nisi in P19 of 2003 dated 20 March.

MR HAWKINS: There is a summons that was lodged on 2 April.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I have it. It seems to be talking about habeas corpus and to be quite confused. What is the jurisdictional basis of all of this?

MR HAWKINS: Section 31 of the Judiciary Act that permits the Court to make an order during the hearing of the process or as an interlocutory order, as I understand it. Section 23 of the Federal Court Act is in similar terms and the Full Courts of the Federal Court have held that section 23 of the Federal Court Act gives the Federal Court the power to order the temporary release pending determination of the substantive application.

HIS HONOUR: On what basis?

MR HAWKINS: Either by way of an interlocutory declaratory order - - -

HIS HONOUR: There is no such thing as an interlocutory declaration.

MR HAWKINS: Or by habeas corpus.

HIS HONOUR: How would habeas corpus help? Habeas corpus would order the production of the person of this gentleman before this Court for this Court to determine whether he was validly detained under the Migration Act, the question then being whether the relevant section, the validity of which in its application to him I have just stated a case for the Full Court.

MR HAWKINS: Yes, your Honour, the submission is that that demonstrates - - -

HIS HONOUR: Just a minute, just listen to me. So the Court would have to determine that on the return of the habeas corpus; I could not determine it because I will be sitting in the Full Court. So, it cannot be habeas corpus, can it? If you win in the Full Court you would have a lay-down case for habeas corpus thereafter. What you really seem to want is some form of injunction under section 75 of the Constitution, which has nothing to do with section 31, nothing to do with section 23 of the Federal Court Act. Now, what would be the basis for the injunction against the Minister under section 75? These matters have to be thought about very carefully before you come to the High Court, very carefully.

MR HAWKINS: Yes, thank you for drawing my attention to section 75. Your Honour, in my submission, section 75 of the Constitution still permits the High Court to exercise power under section 31 of the Judiciary Act to make an interim or temporary order for release pending determination of the - - -

HIS HONOUR: Wait a minute. What is the alleged illegality which the injunction restrains?

MR HAWKINS: If I can take your Honour to the case stated.

HIS HONOUR: Is the alleged illegality anything more than, though it may be significant, the question stated for the Full Court?

MR HAWKINS: Yes, we say underlying that question is the question of whether or not a non-citizen who is a British subject is within the aliens power.

HIS HONOUR: I realise that.

MR HAWKINS: And if the person is not an alien, then we say that detention is illegal because the Migration Act does not apply.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I realise that. That is no wider a question than is yet to be determined.

MR HAWKINS: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: And that brings me, does it not, to what Sir Anthony Mason said in the Castlemaine Tooheys Case [1986] HCA 58; 161 CLR 148 at 155 to 156. Now the detention under 196 is founded upon the assumption as to the validity of the decision under 501.

MR HAWKINS: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: Now, it is in that context that one reads what Sir Anthony Mason said at 155 to 156, in particular the last sentence:

In the absence of compelling grounds, it is the duty of the Court to respect, indeed, to defer to, the enactment of the legislature until that enactment is adjudged ultra vires.

It makes it very hard to get an interlocutory injunction where there is a pending debate about constitutional validity; the alleged constitutional invalidity being the relevant alleged illegality which founds a jurisdiction under 75(v).

MR HAWKINS: The argument that I wanted to put in the main, your Honour, is not - - -

HIS HONOUR: Just a minute. Do you accept that that is the relevant legal framework?

MR HAWKINS: With this caveat, with respect, and that is we are not seeking to challenge the constitutional validity of section 196.

HIS HONOUR: I realise that.

MR HAWKINS: What we are saying is the section does not apply.

HIS HONOUR: I realise that, because it cannot apply because there has been no valid order under 501.

MR HAWKINS: Yes, that is correct.

HIS HONOUR: I understand that. So it comes back to the validity of 501.

MR HAWKINS: Not, with respect, the validity of 501 but whether 501 applies to a person who is not an alien.

HIS HONOUR: I realise that. On its face, it does, but we are just chasing words at the moment. It comes back to the constitutional question reserved for the Full Court, does it not?

MR HAWKINS: I am reluctant to concede that, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Well, I do not see why you would want to be reluctant. It is the fact.

MR HAWKINS: Certainly the Full Court - - -

HIS HONOUR: Do not worry about any decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court. They are not construing section 75(v). The questions I have to be satisfied with are the sort of questions that Acting Chief Justice Mason was talking about in Castlemaine Tooheys. Now, if you want some time to think about that, tell me, but that is what had to be taken on board before this application was launched.

MR HAWKINS: Yes, your Honour, I do want some time to take instructions on that.

HIS HONOUR: It is a decision of this Court which bears directly upon this sort of subject and I expect legal representatives to be aware of it before they launch these proceedings. Now, do you wish time to consider it?

MR HAWKINS: Yes, I do.

HIS HONOUR: How long?

MR HAWKINS: If I could have 30 minutes, please?

HIS HONOUR: Yes, very well. I will adjourn until 3.00 pm.

AT 2.28 PM SHORT ADJOURNMENT

UPON RESUMING AT 2.56 PM:

HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Hawkins.

MR HAWKINS: Thank you, your Honour, for that chance to consider Castlemaine Tooheys. Does your Honour have before you a copy of the decision in Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs 176 CLR? It concerned the interpretation of section 54R of the Migration Act.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, it was held invalid.

MR HAWKINS: Yes. His Honour the Chief Justice at page 13 held that section 54A did not preclude the making of an interlocutory order. That is about 60 per cent down the page.

HIS HONOUR: So?

MR HAWKINS: His Honour Justice Toohey at page 51 also was of the opinion, just above the heading "The Convention, the Protocol and the Covenant", having read down section 54A, was of the opinion that it did not prevent:

an interlocutory order for release from custody in accordance with accepted principles governing the grant of interlocutory relief.

HIS HONOUR: That is the point. The accepted principles are Castlemaine Tooheys.

MR HAWKINS: In Castlemaine Tooheys his Honour the acting Chief Justice at page 155 referred to the Canadian decision that your Honour has taken me to, Morgentaler v Ackroyd, and said, after setting out a passage halfway down the page:

It may be that the last sentence in the passage quoted from Morgentaler v Ackroyd states the position too strongly against - - -

HIS HONOUR: I have read that too.

MR HAWKINS: We say here there are exceptional circumstances that apply and that is the liberty of Mr Cowgill, a person who, according to the High Court decision in Taylor is not an alien. He is not a citizen but he is not an alien.

HIS HONOUR: No, that is not right. That is the question to be decided. That is what you say. You may be right but that is the question to be decided and that is what we have stated the case about. If we do not get to an understanding of that, we are not going to progress anywhere, Mr Hawkins.

MR HAWKINS: Your Honour, there is a case that is not on my list of authorities. It is the Full Court decision in the matter of Te 77 ALJR 1.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I know about Te.

MR HAWKINS: I rely on the summary given by their Honours Justices Kirby and McHugh of the Ex parte Taylor.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Well, other members of the Court had a different view.

MR HAWKINS: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: That is why we are reassembling on 17 June.

MR HAWKINS: Yes, your Honour, but at the moment, there is a decision of four Judges of the Court that recognises the position of Mr Taylor as being a non-alien, non-citizen. Mr Cowgill's case is that he falls within - - -

HIS HONOUR: Yes, but not the position of your client.

MR HAWKINS: As I understand Taylor, it applied to any person who was in Australia before 1987. Mr Cowgill arrived in 1977, so we say that - - -

HIS HONOUR: Anyhow, I know what you say and that is why I have stated the case and I am not going to express any concluded view on the matter.

MR HAWKINS: We are not requesting that you express a concluded view, your Honour, we are asking for an interlocutory order pending the determination - - -

HIS HONOUR: On the ground that there is an apprehended illegality. What other exceptional circumstances do you rely on and then I will ask what Mr Le Miere says about it all.

MR HAWKINS: The deprivation of liberty, which the High Court has frequently said is a basic and fundamental right.

HIS HONOUR: That depends on whether the deprivation is legal or not.

MR HAWKINS: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR HAWKINS: But that deprivation is something for which there could be no redress to Mr Cowgill if he is held to be illegally detained.

HIS HONOUR: I am not sure about that.

MR HAWKINS: Conditions could be set on his release that safeguard the interests of the community if he is released and so the community interests can be safeguarded and Mr Cowgill's interests can be safeguarded if there is an order for interim or temporary release, but if there is not, then Mr Cowgill's interests cannot be safeguarded.

HIS HONOUR: What do you say about your delay, which is very serious it seems to me at the moment?

MR HAWKINS: Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: This gentleman has been legally represented since last August, is that not so?

MR HAWKINS: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: This application is made a few weeks ago, why?

MR HAWKINS: On that I have no instructions, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: I see.

MR HAWKINS: But if it was wrong - I cannot think of the term at the moment but it is not a condemnation sense - but for the application to be late then it would compound the wrong or compound the error to keep him there. It is not as if anyone has acted to their detriment in detaining Mr Cowgill and keeping him detained. It is not as if any rights of the Commonwealth have been affected by the delay. Mr Cowgill's rights have been adversely affected but the Commonwealth's rights have not. The Commonwealth has been asked to agree to release Mr Cowgill and the Commonwealth has refused, so the delay - - -

HIS HONOUR: The Commonwealth would have no power to release him.

MR HAWKINS: The Commonwealth is not prejudiced by any delay - - -

HIS HONOUR: The Commonwealth would have no power to release him absent a court order.

MR HAWKINS: I accept that, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: You accept that. So you cannot criticise - - -

MR HAWKINS: But the Commonwealth - - -

HIS HONOUR: Just a moment; we will not get anywhere if you do not listen to what I say to you.

MR HAWKINS: I am sorry, your Honour, I have trouble hearing.

HIS HONOUR: Therefore you cannot complain that you asked the Commonwealth and they refused you. It is not to the point. They could not have accepted.

MR HAWKINS: Your Honour, there is a difficulty in that I cannot hear at times when your Honour speaks and so I am not aware whether or not your Honour has finished speaking, which is why it appears that at times I am interrupting and I apologise for that.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, go on.

MR HAWKINS: The short submission is the Commonwealth is not prejudiced by the delay and so that delay should not affect the exercise of your Honour's discretion.

HIS HONOUR: It is prejudiced in the sense that its laws are not being executed and the task of the Executive Government is to maintain and execute the laws made by the Parliament and there is a public interest in that happening.

MR HAWKINS: My comment on prejudice was not so much the exercise of laws in the sense that your Honour has just referred to, but in the sense of suffering a loss, as it were, because of the delay in the application, an adverse effect. I appreciate, your Honour, that there is a prejudice to the public in the sense of a public interest, that a person has been detained when the person need not have been detained and may well have been unlawfully detained, but, as your Honour has said, the question of whether or not the detention is unlawful will not be decided by the Court until the hearing of the case stated.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Is there anything else, Mr Hawkins?

MR HAWKINS: No, your Honour, apart from repeating that there is this personal liberty that in Williams v The Queen was said by their Honours Justices Mason and Brennan:

Personal liberty was held by Blackstone to be an absolute right vested in the individual by the immutable laws of nature and had never been abridged by the laws of England "without sufficient cause" . . . The right to personal liberty cannot be impaired or taken away without lawful authority and then only to the extent and for the time which the law prescribes.

Your Honour, I cannot put it any better on behalf of Mr Cowgill than the Full Court of the Federal Court did in VFAD at paragraphs 104 to 115. Unless there is anything else in which I can assist your Honour - - -

HIS HONOUR: Well, I will see what Mr Le Miere says. Thank you.

MR HAWKINS: Thank you.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Le Miere.

MR LE MIERE: May it please your Honour. In relation to the principle that Acting Chief Justice Mason set out in the Castlemaine Tooheys Case, we submit, there are no compelling grounds in this case. Further, having regard to the legislative scheme of the Migration Act relating to the cancellation of visas and the detention and removal from Australia of the person concerned, the Court should not in any event as a discretionary matter order the interlocutory release of the applicant unless there were compelling reasons to do so. So far as delay is concerned, that matter, your Honour, should be seen in the context that the substantive matter, the case stated, is now set down for hearing on 17 June. So the hearing of the matter is now only some two and a half months away.

Your Honour, in exercising the power under section 501(2) to cancel a visa, the Minister has a responsibility to the Parliament and to the Australian community to protect the community from criminal or other reprehensible conduct and to cancel visas held by non-citizens whose actions are so abhorrent to the community that they should not be allowed to remain within it.

We submit that in considering whether the applicant should be released into the Australian community pending the constitutional challenge, it is significant that the Minister has personally made a decision that the applicant should not remain part of the Australian community and that factor should be given weight in considering whether the applicant should be released into the Australian community pending the substantive hearing in June.

As we have said, the purpose of cancelling a visa under section 501 of the Migration Act is to protect the safety and welfare of the Australian community as well as to exercise a choice on behalf of the Australian community as a whole as to who should be allowed to remain within the community. In deciding whether the applicant should be released from detention pending the determination of his substantive application the protection of the Australian community and members of the community is a primary consideration. The expectation of the Australian community that persons in Australia obey Australian laws is also an important consideration.

Your Honour, in that regard the materials show that the applicant has a long criminal record. It is set out in the papers. His record includes having served terms of imprisonment for burglary, driving without a licence, reckless driving, stealing a motor vehicle, driving under the influence, wilfully misleading a police officer, failing to give his name and address to police, breach of bail conditions, burglary with intent, criminal damage, stealing, possession of cannabis and escaping legal custody.

The applicant finished serving his latest terms of imprisonment on 22 August of last year. Since then he has been in immigration detention. We submit that his conduct during that time, that is since he has been in immigration detention, gives reason for concern that he poses a danger to the Australian community, or a segment of it, if he is released into the community pending the substantive hearing. In that regard, your Honour, I wish to read the affidavits of William Frederick John Martin - - -

HIS HONOUR: Before you do that - that will open up an area of factual debate, will it not?

MR LE MIERE: Yes. I would expect it would, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: I think your interest might be better served by proceeding with what you were doing.

MR LE MIERE: If it please your Honour. I will not read those affidavits.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR LE MIERE: We say that there is reason for concern as we have indicated - - -

HIS HONOUR: In other words, you rely upon the criminal record as appears from the documents annexed to the stated case.

MR LE MIERE: Yes, your Honour, and both the extensive nature of it and the recency of it, and there is a further matter that we would draw attention to, and that is that there is a risk that the applicant will not be available for deportation or removal from Australia if and when his substantive application is determined against him. His criminal record, which is attached to the case stated as your Honour has indicated, includes resisting arrest on two separate occasions, failing to stop when called upon, wilfully misleading a police officer, failing to give name and address to police, giving a false name and address, breach of bail conditions on at least two separate occasions, a false bail undertaking and escaping legal custody.

The fact and nature of those offences gives rise to a serious risk -concern that he may not be available for deportation and, of course, the policy of the Act through sections 189 and 196 of the Act, have the effect that - - -

HIS HONOUR: Well, it is said against you, I think, that Mr Hawkins says that there could be erected some regime of surveillance or control during release which would minimise chances of unavailability of Mr Cowgill for deportation if he lost in the Full Court.

MR LE MIERE: It is for that reason, your Honour, that I draw attention to the previous convictions that include matters such as breaching bail conditions, escaping legal custody. In the normal course of events, perhaps in other circumstances, the Court may have some measure of confidence that bail conditions would be effective to ensure that the person was available for removal or deportation if his application should not be successful. We submit that given the nature and extent of the offences that I have indicated, in relation to breaching bail conditions, escaping legal custody, and other offences involving deceiving or misleading police officers and the like, the Court can have no confidence in relation to bail conditions.

Of course, whatever reporting conditions are made only have the effect of, as it were, drawing to the attention of the authorities that the applicant has breached the conditions. If he fails to report at a particular time, it may be too late at that time. So it is for that reason we draw attention to those matters. If it please, your Honour, those are the matters we draw to the Court's attention.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Yes, Mr Hawkins.

MR HAWKINS: Your Honour, I was just seeking to obtain instructions as to whether Mr Cowgill would agree to an order for home detention. In Western Australia the Criminal Code permits, although the Criminal Code does not apply here, but there is a system of home detention that has been set up and has operated for some time which could - - -

HIS HONOUR: That would involve the operation of the State authorities, would it not?

MR HAWKINS: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: Well, there is some difficulty in that, I think.

MR HAWKINS: Your Honour, if I can take your Honour to the affidavit of Mr Cowgill sworn 18 March in P19 of 2003. As you may note from - - -

HIS HONOUR: 18 March?

MR HAWKINS: 18 March in P19.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I have it.

MR HAWKINS: If I can draw your Honour's attention to paragraph 6 and through to 10, you will see that Mr Cowgill's circumstances and his family's circumstances have changed dramatically since 1999.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I see that.

MR HAWKINS: Your Honour, I rely on what Mr Cowgill has said there as to his intention. In terms of proposed conditions of release, I do not know if these proposed conditions have been sent to the High Court in Canberra. I am instructed by the Commonwealth that they have not, but they include giving Mr Peter Corbould from the Australian Government Solicitor his telephone number; a condition that he resides at a named place in Rockingham and that he reports to DIMIA in person two days each week and by telephoning daily.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR HAWKINS: And that he personally guarantees to attend all court events relating to the application and to attend at DIMIA on the day the judgment is intended to be handed down in the substantive application with liberty to apply to revoke any order. The document that I have was handed to me by the Commonwealth but neither Mr Le Miere nor I know who drafted it.

HIS HONOUR: I see. Yes, very well. Anyway, I have the substance of it.

MR HAWKINS: Thank you. May it please the Court.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you. I will take a short adjournment.

AT 3.19 PM SHORT ADJOURNMENT

UPON RESUMING AT 3.50 PM:

HIS HONOUR: There is set down for consideration by the Full Court on 17 June 2003 the following question, was section 501(2) of the Migration Act within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth to the extent that it authorised the respondent to cancel the applicant's visa on 9 January 2002?

The cancellation was made in purported exercise of the power conferred by section 501(2) and was exercised by the Minister personally. The applicant has a long criminal record for various offences. They include resisting arrest, false bail undertaking, breaches of bail undertakings and escaping legal custody. On his release from prison, the applicant was taken into immigration detention where he is presently kept pursuant to section 196 of the Act.

If the Full Court answers in the negative the question reserved for its consideration then it will follow that the applicant must succeed in his application for substantive relief in matter No P100 of 2002. By an application now made in matter No P19 of 2003, the applicant seeks in advance of any such favourable determination by the Full Court on the question reserved an order that the respondent release him from immigration detention.

The relief sought is injunctive in character and interlocutory in nature. Jurisdiction is attracted by section 75(v) of the Constitution but the question becomes one of identifying the illegality to which the interlocutory injunctive relief would be directed. That suggested illegality has at its root the contentions respecting the support by the aliens power of section 501(2) in its application to Mr Cowgill.

The applicable principles in such circumstances were explained by Acting Chief Justice Mason in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia [1986] HCA 58; (1986) 161 CLR 148. The particular passage appears at pages 155 to 156:

In Canada the courts have taken the view that only in exceptional circumstances will an interlocutory injunction be granted to restrain enforcement of a statute challenged on constitutional grounds. In Morgentaler v Ackroyd Linden J said:

" . . . the balance of convenience normally dictates that those who challenge the constitutional validity of laws must obey those laws pending the court's decision. If the law is eventually proclaimed unconstitutional, then it need no longer be complied with, but until that time, it must be respected and this court will not enjoin its enforcement. Such a course of action seems to be the best method of ensuring that our society will continue to respect the law at the same time as it is being challenged in an orderly way in the courts. This does not mean, however, that in exceptional circumstances this court is precluded from granting an interim injunction to prevent grave injustice, but that will be rare indeed."

This approach was subsequently applied in Ziegler v Hunter, and Pacific Trollers Association v Attorney-General (Canada).

It may be that the last sentence in the passage quoted from Morgentaler v Ackroyd states the position too strongly against the plaintiff who seeks an interlocutory injunction in Australia. The decisions in this Court to which I have already referred demonstrate that there are a variety of situations in which the Court, on a proper balance of convenience, will restrain enforcement of a statute in aid of a plaintiff's constitutional right. In arriving at a balance of convenience the Court will take into account the seriousness of the conduct enjoined by the statute and the damage to the public interest that may be caused by restraining its enforcement. And in some cases the balance of convenience may be affected by the Court's perception or evaluation of the strength of the plaintiff's case for invalidity. But, subject to these qualifications there can be no reason to doubt the correctness of the general thrust of the comments in the passage which I have quoted. In the absence of compelling grounds, it is the duty of the Court to respect, indeed, to defer to, the enactment of the legislature until that enactment is adjudged ultra vires.

What then are the compelling grounds in this case of the nature to which Acting Chief Justice Mason referred? The applicant points to his undoubtedly important interest in his personal liberty but the conjunction of section 501 and section 196 of the Act represents a legislative judgment upon countervailing considerations. The validity of that legislative assessment should be reserved until the Full Court rules on the matter.

I also take into account the unexplained delay in making this application. The applicant has had legal assistance since August 2002: see the transcript for 21 October in that year in matter P100 of 2002. The later matter with this application in P19 was instituted as recently as 20 March 2003.

The applicant referred to the possibility of the imposition of a regime with terms placed upon his release, including reporting requirements and the like. However, the respondent points to the past criminality of the applicant, in particular, with reference to the details given above by me, as supplying countervailing considerations as to the worth of any such regime.

In all the circumstances, the application for interlocutory relief should be refused. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. I certify for counsel. The costs of this application will be the costs in matter P100 of 2002.

I now adjourn.

AT 3.56 PM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED