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High Court of Australia Transcripts |
2009] HCATrans 194 
(12 August 2009)
Last Updated: 17 August 2009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A6 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
TREVOR KINGSLEY FERDINANDS
Plaintiff
and
HIS HONOUR JUSTICE LANDER
First Defendant
HIS HONOUR JUSTICE MANSFIELD
Second Defendant
CHIEF OF ARMY
Third Defendant
Application for an order to show cause
HAYNE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM MELBOURNE BY VIDEO LINK TO ADELAIDE
ON WEDNESDAY, 12 AUGUST 2009, AT 10.48 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR T.K. FERDINANDS appeared in person.
MS S.J. MAHARAJ, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR A.M. SCHATZ for the third defendant. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
HIS HONOUR: As I understand it, Ms Maharaj, you have a summons of 4 June 2009 and at the same time there is, Mr Ferdinands, a summons for directions filed at the time of service of the originating process which is the summons of 7 April 2009 which would ordinarily come on for hearing at the same time.
MS MAHARAJ: That is correct, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
MS MAHARAJ: We have some short submissions to make, your Honour, five points - if we could put that to your Honour in summary.
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
MS MAHARAJ: The first point, your Honour, is that we seek a dismissal - - -
HIS HONOUR: Just before you come to that, can I just understand what the affidavit material is upon which the parties are relying. You rely, do you, on an affidavit of Gregory Camilos of 3 June 2009?
MS MAHARAJ: That is correct, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: There is then an affidavit of Mr Ferdinands of 25 June 2009, as well also, I think, an affidavit of 26 March 2009 which was filed at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. Is that right?
MS MAHARAJ: That is correct, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. Now, Mr Ferdinands, is there any objection to my reading the affidavit of Mr Camilos?
MR FERDINANDS: Yes, your Honour. Basically this morning I would like you to strike out the Australian Government Solicitor’s affidavits. The affidavits do not represent a true and accurate recording of the proceedings. Basically, what his Honour has got before him are gaping holes in the chronology of events. Thus, what we have is a pattern or a picture painted of me that I have not exercised due diligence when, in fact, if his Honour looks at the recent affidavit filed a few days ago, at 10 and 11, it talks about my conviction at the Army courts martial and then it jumps to Federal Court proceedings. Within that enormous gap there is no mention whatsoever of the board of inquiry process and all its processes that went to investigations, statements, recommendations and the like.
A second matter, in terms of not being able to understand the proper chronology of events, is I have written multiple letters to Chief of Army and he has refused to respond. The Australian Government Solicitor has not put those letters, my contact with this case and with Chief of Army, into the affidavit. So the affidavit you are reading is false, but it is also misleading. It gives you something, but it does not give you everything and that is basically why we are here this morning because if we go back 10 years ago and all the evidence was presented at the DFM trial there would not have been a conviction. We have the same pattern, the same abuse of process going on today, 10 years later.
So his Honour is asked to strike out the affidavits and I ask his Honour to rely upon my affidavit of 25 June 2009 quite specifically at paragraph 5 about the legality of these proceedings this morning. His Honour cannot act beyond his powers. His Honour cannot act beyond his jurisdiction. When the Australian Government Solicitor has breached my privacy, has not gone forward and done the right things according to law, then you have no obligation whatsoever to hear from them. They are outside of the law and now they seek to drag you into their voidable nature of these proceedings, which is highly illegal.
The privacy of information is a very serious matter. A lot of it goes towards medical information, patients and their dignity and their respect, but also goes towards my dignity, my respect and I am protected in law. So they accessed information illegally and now they rely on that information and that data, which is quite inadmissible, and they seek to strike out my claim on a summary dismissal. But I am asking his Honour to strike out their affidavits because they are false and misleading.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you, Mr Ferdinands. I will receive the affidavit of Gregory Camilos. Yes, Ms Maharaj.
MS MAHARAJ: Your Honour, we respectfully make five short points. The first point, your Honour, is that we seek a dismissal of the application for order to show cause filed on 7 April 2009 pursuant to rule 25.03.3(a) of the High Court Rules. We refer your Honour to the summons filed by my instructors on 4 June 2009 and the supporting affidavit which your Honour has accepted into evidence, and the affidavit of Mr Camilos annexes the two impugned decisions of Justice Lander at GC3 and Justice Mansfield at GC4.
The second point, your Honour, we make is that it is well established that jurisdictional error has to be established before prerogative relief of the type sought here, which is mandamus, together with the ancillary relief sought here, certiorari, will go.
The third point we make, your Honour, that it is clear upon looking at the documents filed by the plaintiff that no jurisdictional error is alleged by the plaintiff and the application is therefore untenable and must be dismissed.
The fourth point we make, your Honour, is in short that Justice Lander upon remitter by Justice Crennan dismissed the application to show cause because, first, there was no explanation for the substantial delay of 10 months, which was in excess of the time prescribed by the High Court Rules, 25.06.1, to challenge the termination decision which was made on 3 November 2004 and secondly, Justice Lander held that there were no prospects of success of the application.
The application, Justice Lander found, sought to impermissibly and collaterally attack two convictions on which the decision to terminate was based, amongst other matters. Justice Lander further found that the plaintiff was attempting a merits review of the decision to terminate and this was again not permissible before his Honour.
The fifth point we make, your Honour, is that Justice Mansfield correctly, we say, found that there was no error made by Justice Lander and dismissed the appeal that was before him. In these circumstances, your Honour, we say that on no view of the matter it could be said that any jurisdictional error is disclosed and we would seek a termination of the application to show cause today. Those are our submissions.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you, Ms Maharaj. Yes, Mr Ferdinands.
MR FERDINANDS: Thank you, your Honour. If I can go back to my affidavit this morning of 25 June and I rely upon that, your Honour, and I ask his Honour to read that. Quite clearly in relation to Justice Lander saying there is no sufficient explanations for the delay, as I have expressed this morning there was a board of inquiry process. That is what Chief of Army ordered and that is what I relied upon. That process went on and it went on and it went on. It may have gone on for all of the 10 months until the board of inquiry process completed to which I then asked Chief of Army for the board of inquiry, the documentation and the like and he refused to give me any information.
Now, from that point then I have then come to the Federal Court of Australia. So I relied on Chief of Army to do the right thing at the board of inquiry process, to access information and evidence which was not tendered at my original DFM and subsequent conviction, but I did not understand whether the board of inquiry had the powers to set aside a conviction – set aside the judgment and quash the conviction and I sought explanation. Today, still today, I have received no response.
After the board of inquiry process and I cannot find anywhere what the board of inquiry process actually is – whether it is actually a process off the Defence Force magistrate’s appeal, whether it is a process within the Federal Court of Australia Act or what, I actually do not know what it is. I naturally assumed it was a judicial process. That is what I assumed. So having been told nothing else, that this is not a judicial process, this is something else, I would not have bothered with a board of inquiry process. If I had known everything was going to be kept secret from me, then what is the point in me going there. It does not make sense, it is not logical.
So they are some of the reasons which are exempt, totally left out of the Australian Government Solicitor’s affidavit and it presents something which is quite misleading to say that I did nothing and then all of a sudden I decided to appeal a decision to the Federal Court.
The only reason, the only reason his Honour is here today is to establish two very fine, crucial points in law. The first one is breach of the privacy legislation and that is, as I have said in 5, the Australian Government Solicitor has accessed information which is inadmissible. That information was then used by the decision-maker, Brigadier C.J. Appleton, at Royal Military College, Duntroon, and when he looked at that information, information which was quite inadmissible, information which he did not show me so I could not respond to it, but he said he had it. So that is where Brigadier Appleton as the decision-maker is wrong in law.
Justice Lander and Justice Mansfield had a duty to ask the Australian Government Solicitor, “I’ve just seen something here in the documentation which shows a transfer of information which is under the Privacy Act and the basic 14 principles requires a consent form. Do you have that consent form? Are these proceedings legal or are they, in fact, voidable and is the decision-maker, Brigadier C.J. Appleton, wrong in law?” If Justice Lander and his Honour Justice Mansfield do not ask the basic questions, then the error multiplies. So those questions were not asked. So the proceedings went along.
I tried to explain quite clearly and this is the second point that his Honour is asked to rule on this morning and that is Henderson’s Case. It is quite significant, your Honour. The Chief of Army has litigated this matter before. He litigated it at the Defence Force Disciplinary Tribunal. The Army prosecutor, Gary Hevey, rose to his feet and he said in his submissions for penalty and punishment, he said “He should be thrown out of the Army on the conviction”. The Defence Force magistrate, Neville Morecombe, shook his head and he said, “No, no, no”.
That particular episode, based on all the merits that Chief of Army had at my Defence Force magistrate trial, that constitutes Henderson’s Case. That is precisely what his Honour Wigram has said when he says you come to court, you bring the whole of your case and that is it. Once it is litigated it is end of story.
Now, you cannot, as I explained to Justice Lander and Justice Mansfield, you cannot dress up something. You cannot redesign it. You cannot redesign the wheel essentially and you cannot redesign an application for termination and that is what they did in the notice to show cause. So he filed a notice to show cause on me and I hit back with an order to show cause on him. So they are the only two very significant key points that are very crucial to the case.
The case does not go forward because of those two points. One is there a substantial breach in inadmissible evidence. Quite clearly he is wrong in law. What he did was entirely wrong and it has to be declared so. But the other thing is his Honour has to stand up for Wigram. His Honour has to stand up for Henderson’s Case and say, “Look, you’ve litigated it once and now you’re coming in again on a notice to show cause and the notice to show cause has been dealt with on its merits at the trial level”.
There are other issues I have raised there, your Honour, which stem from the trial. I just wanted to read to you something very significant about the Crown relying upon the police conviction. It goes towards MacPherson v The Queen [1981] HCA 46; (1981) 147 CLR 512 and it specifically says the procedure of the criminal courts is designed to produce as fair a trial as practicable in the circumstances of each case. Where an accused person is unrepresented a particular burden is placed on the trial judge to ensure that the trial is fair and, if through want of legal representation, some error occurs in the conduct of the trial which occasions a substantial miscarriage of justice a conviction must be set aside. It then goes on to say, “But the rhetoric that a trial must be fair before a conviction can properly be recorded is true only to the extent that unfairness leads to a miscarriage of justice”.
So essentially the Australian Government Solicitor has a conviction from an Adelaide Magistrates Court hearing when I was a police officer in the city watch house in Adelaide. When I was charged I had to represent myself. I was abandoned by the Police Association of South Australia. But it is quite clear that what has happened there is there have been errors and I have tried to work through all of those errors on my own as what we call a litigant in person - on my own, unrepresented, having discovered that the magistrate made errors.
Then when I took the matter to the Supreme Court of South Australia, the justice, his Honour Justice Brian Martin who is now the Chief Justice of the Northern Territory, he directed me – he said this is a matter of unfair dismissal. He directed me to the industrial courts and the Industrial Commission. So he made an error because I then brought that matter to the High Court of Australia in Ferdinands v Commissioner of Public Employment and there were varying decisions by five Judges on that matter.
That was a procedural matter. It was an administrative law matter. It was not a final matter based on the conviction. It was whether or not during my appeal processes I had been unfairly dismissed and obviously everybody knows that the jurisdiction is well within the Police Act and that is where the power rises and falls, with the Commissioner of Police to appoint or not to appoint, and also to terminate an appointment.
So if I go back to MacPherson v The Queen (1981) I rely upon the errors that I have found in the magistrate’s conviction as a substantial miscarriage of justice. I need to work through that. There are an enormous amount of other proceedings that sort of come in between. It does not seem to be a straight road between one court to the next to the next. There seems to be an enormous flow of time, money, resources. This today is clearly what I am talking about.
When you have already litigated a matter the matter is dead. You cannot, every two or three years, every four or five years, bring a matter back into court because Wigram has stated once you bring the whole of your case to court – correction, once you go to court, you bring the whole of your case to court and it has been adjudicated upon. So to relitigate this matter is unlawful.
In my affidavit of 25 June under rule 25.03.3 I have asked that this honourable Court with all orders including at 9, your Honour, I have asked that this honourable Court go ahead and revoke Chief of Army’s notice of termination. This morning, the Australian Government Solicitor has sought to be struck out as the third defendant. I can only say to his Honour - - -
HIS HONOUR: Now, I think, Mr Ferdinands, you should understand the application to be to terminate the whole action, the whole proceeding, not simply the involvement of Chief of Army but to terminate the whole proceeding. Do you understand that?
MR FERDINANDS: Okay. Well then I rely upon what I have said in my affidavit at para 5 and also at para 6 that – at para 6 I have said that the Crown case cannot proceed due to the high degrees of illegality, unlawfulness, wrongfulness and serious professional misconduct. So they want to strike it all out, they want to say what they did in the termination was lawful, was correct and in accordance with law and I am telling his Honour this morning it was not in accordance with law. It was something which was done outside of the jurisdiction of the decision-maker and the decision-maker himself was wrong in law.
So I ask his Honour not to strike out the proceedings whatsoever, not to strike them out whatsoever because the Australian Government Solicitor in these matters has acted illegally and the termination is voidable in law because the decision-maker is wrong in law. Thank you, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you, Mr Ferdinands. Yes, Ms Maharaj, do you wish to reply?
MS MAHARAJ: Simply, your Honour, that none of the authorities pointed to by Mr Ferdinands or the submissions that are made are to the point that the fatal defect is that no jurisdictional error is pointed to.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you.
On 7 April 2009, Trevor Kingsley Ferdinands commenced proceedings in this Court by application for an order to show cause directed to the Honourable Justice Lander, the Honourable Justice Mansfield and Chief of Army. The first two defendants have filed submitting appearances. Chief of Army has appeared in the proceeding and now applies for summary termination of the proceeding.
To understand the issues that arise in the matter it is necessary to record some matters of history. This proceeding between Mr Ferdinands and Chief of Army is not the first proceeding between those parties in the courts. In February 2003, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia delivered reasons for judgment in a matter instituted by Mr Ferdinands in 2002. In delivering the reasons of the Full Court, Justice Spender recorded some matters of history which it is convenient to take up in explanation of the issues that now fall for my decision.
In November 1999, Mr Ferdinands, then a corporal in the Australian Army, was convicted by a Defence Force magistrate on one count of assaulting an inferior contrary to section 34 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) and was sentenced to a reduction in rank to the rank of private. In April 2001, Mr Ferdinands filed a notice of appeal from that conviction invoking section 21(1) of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955, though the time for appealing from the decision of the Defence Force magistrate had by then long since expired.
In August 2001, the President of the Defence Force Discipline Tribunal refused an extension of time within which Mr Ferdinands might appeal to that Tribunal against the orders made by the Defence Force magistrate. Mr Ferdinands lodged a notice of appeal a fortnight later against the refusal of extension of time and in August 2002, the Defence Force Disciplinary Tribunal granted the extension of time in which to appeal from the initial refusal of the Tribunal to grant extension of time, but dismissed that appeal.
In the course of its reasons the Tribunal recorded a number of considerations going to whether the extension should be granted, but also had regard to whether the finding of guilt made by the Defence Force magistrate was unsafe and unsatisfactory and concluded that no miscarriage of justice had occurred.
Mr Ferdinands sought to appeal against the orders made by the Defence Force Discipline Tribunal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia and the reasons delivered by Justice Spender on behalf of the Full Court on 11 February 2003 were reasons for the conclusion that the appeal which Mr Ferdinands had filed against the decision of the Defence Force Tribunal should be dismissed with costs and that a notice of motion which Chief of Army had filed should be granted.
Thereafter, in May 2006, Mr Ferdinands filed an application for order to show cause in this Court seeking, amongst other relief, constitutional writs against the delegate of Chief of Army relating to the plaintiff’s termination from service in the Australian Army, a termination that had occurred in consequence of his conviction by the Defence Force magistrate for the offence I have earlier described.
In May 2007, Justice Crennan of this Court remitted the proceeding which had been commenced by Mr Ferdinands to the Federal Court of Australia and in doing so made plain that a question remaining open for consideration was whether the time limits imposed by rules 25.06.1 and 25.06.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 were to continue to apply to the proceedings upon remittal to the Federal Court of Australia or whether there should be an extension of time within which Mr Ferdinands might commence proceedings for the relief which he sought.
In that regard it is important to notice that the Rules of this Court provide in rule 25.06.1 that an application for:
An order to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue . . . shall not be granted unless the application for the order is made not later than six months after the date of the judgment, order, conviction or other proceeding –
which it is sought to quash and rule 25.07.2 provides that:
An application for an order to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue to a judicial tribunal to hear and determine a matter shall be made within 2 months of the date of the refusal to hear or within such further time as is, under special circumstances, allowed by the Court or a Justice.
On their face the proceedings which had been instituted by Mr Ferdinands in this Court, and which were remitted by Justice Crennan to the Federal Court of Australia, had been commenced well out of time.
Proceedings on their remitter to the Federal Court of Australia came before Justice Lander of that court and, on 3 December 2008, his Honour ordered that the application for an extension of time to file the proceeding to show cause should stand dismissed, the proceeding itself should be dismissed and Mr Ferdinands should pay the costs of the respondent.
Being dissatisfied with that decision, Mr Ferdinands sought leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Lander and, on 20 January 2009, Justice Mansfield of the Federal Court of Australia ordered that the application for leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Lander made on 3 December 2008 was refused with costs.
It is the two orders, made in the one case by Justice Lander and in the other by Justice Mansfield, which are the orders which Mr Ferdinands seeks to challenge by the proceeding instituted in this Court in April 2009. In his application for order to show cause, Mr Ferdinands describes the relief which he claims as being:
1. The first act of the relief claimed is that extension of time is allowed for mandamus of Lander J judgment. The reasoning being the extension of time is not discretionary for any judicial officer of the Commonwealth when there has been a serious miscarriage of justice, and a deliberate failure by the courts to accept the principle in law of justice between the parties;
The grounds stated in the application for order to show cause are stated at length. It is, however, necessary that they be reproduced in full lest it be suggested that I have in some respect failed to appreciate both the breadth and depth of the grounds which Mr Ferdinands contends warrant the grant of the relief which he seeks. The grounds are described as follows:
1. That the notion of extension of time cannot be used to harbour evil intent, keep dark secrets, protect criminal activity and unprofessional conduct by one party against another has been promoted by Lander J and Mansfield J giving strength and confidence to those who seek to misuse the court’s processes or invoke the court’s processes for an ulterior motive.
2. Mansfield J failed to uphold the common law of this country when he did not declare an abuse of process by Chief of Army and Department of Defence in accordance with Henderson v Henderson [1843] EngR 917; (1843) 3 Hare 100 and state that this was an abuse of process and further that this matter has already been litigated;
3. Mansfield J failed to adapt extension of time to mean, and only mean the five key grounds raised in TK Ferdinands v Chief of Army argument, namely that extension of time shall now mean time is extended to an applicant where there is an anomaly in the original proceedings or any proceedings thereafter, and an allegation of fraud and other crimes is raised within the case, and the applicant has a long and maintained association with the case with the respondent, and a claim of poverty-stricken and severe economic hardship and any health issues. It shall also take into consideration the underperformance or dishonesty or deceit of the presiding judicial officer or officers within, or of, the case
4. Mansfield J engaged in prejudice and bias when he failed to check the facts for himself and use all enabling powers given to him by the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Federal Court of Australia rules to order the respondents in TK Ferdinands v Chief of Army and the Department of Defence to produce for examination the following key documents, namely:
I interpolate, Western Australian University Regiment –
and, crucial witnesses, namely:
5. Mansfield J failed to apply and uphold Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) and the words “fraud and other crimes” as stated in cf. Reg. v. Bell; Ex parte Lees [1980] when clearly indicating that documents do have legal professional privilege except when those documents are attached to or are a part of or consist greatly of, “fraud and other crimes”, such as a conspiracy or a collusion.
6. Mansfield J failed to support the Notice of Show Cause process including seeking materials from the Board of Inquiry and other relevant materials that would have supported the Notice of Alibi. This has led to a real denial of natural justice on the appeal;
7. Mansfield J failed to protect the court as described by Lord Scarman in 1979 when he clearly stated every court is ‘in duty bound to protect itself’ and he has failed to identify a sham or a scam, and failed to halt a sham or a scam by making orders for evidence, and greater evidence: inter alia; he failed to distinguish between proper legal proceedings and oppression and persecution.
8. Mansfield J failed to separate himself from the Crown’s brazen attack upon me, and was influenced by race, colour, political opinion, legal status, power, wealth and influence when he knowingly and deliberately ignored my legal argument in the Notice of Show Cause, and ignored my submissions in the DFM Morecombe judgment and penalty.
9. Mansfield J failed to understand the prosecution and subsequent appeal matters as vexatious and malicious and thus denied me an opportunity to gather evidence and put an Orr v. Holmes [1948] argument legally to the court, which would have facilitated my return to the Army.
10. Lander J failed in his hearing failed to adhere to the law and did oppose all efforts and attempts by the plaintiff to expose Chief of Army and the Department of Defence for their sham trial and thus he faces the same allegations and charges as Mansfield J in 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8 of the Form 12 Notice of Show Cause in that he failed to perform a statutory duty and uphold the law.
As I indicated at the start of these reasons, Chief of Army as the defendant which has entered other than a submitting appearance and has, if any party has, interest to defend the process brought by Mr Ferdinands, seeks to have the proceeding dismissed as demonstrating no arguable ground for grant of the relief which Mr Ferdinands seeks.
In answer to that application, Mr Ferdinands has sworn an affidavit of 25 June 2009 in which he seeks to support his contention that relief of the kind which he seeks is available. I have, of course, read that affidavit as also have I read Mr Ferdinands’ affidavit sworn on 26 March 2009 filed at the same time as he filed his application for an order to show cause.
It is not easy to attempt any summary of the matters advanced in the two affidavits I have mentioned. Nor is it possible to identify any of the points which are made in those affidavits as being of greater significance to Mr Ferdinands’ argument than other points which he seeks to make. It would neither be necessary nor appropriate for me to set out in these already detailed reasons for judgment the affidavits which he has sworn in full.
In oral argument today, Mr Ferdinands made a number of points. In essence, as I understood it at least, he sought to say that what might on its face appear otherwise to be an unexplained delay in his challenging the decisions that have been taken initially by the Defence Force magistrate, and subsequently by a delegate of Chief of Army in terminating his service in the Australian Army and the various decisions of tribunals and courts that I have earlier mentioned is to be explained by reference to the interjection in that process of a board of inquiry process by the Army in connection with some or all of those matters.
Even accepting entirely for the purpose of argument that some or all of the time that has elapsed in these matters has been occupied in that fashion it remains important, nonetheless, to recognise that the decisions which Mr Ferdinands seeks to challenge by the process now before me are decisions of the Federal Court concerning whether extensions of time should be granted for bringing proceedings initially instituted in this Court. Mr Ferdinands points to no matter which would provide any arguable basis for concluding that this Court should now grant relief of the kind which he seeks directed to the quashing of either the order of Justice Lander or the order of Justice Mansfield.
The various matters that have been mentioned through the affidavits and in the initiating process in this Court in no case raise any arguable basis for a grant of the relief which is sought. That being so, it follows that the proceedings should stand dismissed. I will order that the application for an order to show cause is dismissed. It must be dismissed with costs.
MR FERDINANDS: Could I just ask you a question, your Honour?
HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Ferdinands, you may ask.
MR FERDINANDS: Yes, thank you, your Honour. Just a quick point so that everybody in this country understands. You are saying that the privacy of an individual is wholly and solely irrelevant and that the transfer of private information between government departments of individuals is allowable in law and that that person does not need to have any consent or any knowledge of such actions undertaken by the government, whether it be State, federal or Territory.
HIS HONOUR: My reasons for judgment, Mr Ferdinands, speak for themselves. I do not propose to add to them. Call the third matter for hearing.
MR FERDINANDS: Just a simple yes or no, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Sit down, Mr Ferdinands. You may leave the Bar table. Call the third matter.
AT 11.41 AM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED
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