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Supreme Court of Victoria - Court of Appeal |
Last Updated: 27 October 2014
COURT OF APPEAL
JUDGES:
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WHERE HELD:
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DATE OF HEARING:
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DATE OF ORDERS:
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DATE OF JUDGMENT:
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24 October 2014
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MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
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DPP v Abela [2013] VCC 762
(Judge Cannon)
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CRIMINAL LAW – Application for leave to appeal against conviction – Indictment on Commonwealth offence signed by Victorian prosecutor who had not been delegated the powers of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions pursuant to Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 31 – Appeal allowed – Conviction quashed.
CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) offences – Adequacy of reasons for CCE sentences – Structural arguments as to sentences discouraged – Comparison with non-CCE sentences unhelpful – R v Arundell [2003] VSCA 69 and R v Grossi [2008] VSCA 51; (2008) 23 VR 500, applied – Manifest excess not made out – Appeal dismissed.
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APPEARANCES:
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Counsel
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Solicitors
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For the Appellant
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Mr C T Carr
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James Dowsley & Assoc
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For the Crown
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Mr P J Doyle
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Mr Craig Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
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REDLICH JA:
1 Following a plea of guilty in the County Court, on 6 June 2013 the appellant, Jason Abela, was sentenced to a total effective sentence of six years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of three and a half years’ imprisonment in respect of a total of 33 offences, one of which was an offence against a law of the Commonwealth. All the others (including one summary offence) were State offences.
2 On 11 September this year, for reasons to be published, the Court —
(i) granted the appellant leave to appeal against his conviction on the Commonwealth charge, allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction;
(ii) granted the appellant leave to appeal against sentences imposed on charges 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 25 on the indictment, but dismissed the appeal.
3 These are our reasons.
4 The Commonwealth offence (charge 2) was that the appellant made counterfeit money contrary to s 6 of the Crimes (Currency) Act 1981 (Cth). The ground of appeal was that the indictment had been signed by a Victorian prosecutor who was not at any relevant time delegated the powers of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions pursuant to s 31 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth). In consequence, it was contended, the indictment was not validly made, and in those circumstances the conviction could not be maintained.[1]
5 Counsel for the Crown has properly conceded that this ground was made out.
6 The application for leave to appeal against conviction on charge 2 was accordingly granted, the appeal allowed, and the conviction quashed.
7 There could not be a new trial unless and until an indictment signed by a delegated prosecutor was filed. Counsel agreed, notwithstanding s 277(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, that neither of the orders there contemplated was in point. Counsel for the appellant noted that, notwithstanding apparent difficulty in so ordering, an order simply quashing conviction had in the past been made by this Court under the provisions of the Crimes Act 1958. In the absence of full debate, we made an order consistent with the Court’s past practice.
The sentence application
8 Until the day before the matter was listed for hearing, the appellant relied upon a single ground in pursuit of his application for leave to appeal against sentence:
Fresh evidence is sought to be tendered of events occurring since sentencing which demonstrate the true significance of facts which were in existence at the time of sentence.
9 The fresh evidence related to the circumstance that the appellant had given evidence at the committal hearing of two co-offenders, a matter which was only in prospect when he was sentenced, and which the judge concluded she could not take into account when sentencing him. It was contended that, such evidence having been received, the appellant fell to be sentenced afresh.
10 But then notice was given of intention to seek leave to add a ground as follows:
The sentences on charges 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 25 are manifestly excessive.Particulars
(i) Charges 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21 & 25 involved the theft of trucks bobcats or excavators valued at between $70,000 and $115,000.
(ii) Though charges 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 & 25 attracted a maximum penalty of 20 years, the gravity of those offences was not of an entirely different [sic] to the other theft offences.
(iii) In particular, charge 27 involved a value of $140,000 and a degree of criminality otherwise relatively similar to charges 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 & 25, yet attracted a sentence of only 20 months, whereas charges 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 & 25 attracted sentences of between 2 years and 2 years and 6 months.
(iv) The applicant had limited prior convictions, made admissions when interviewed, pleaded guilty, and had provided assistance to the police.
11 At the hearing —
(i) we granted the appellant leave to amend his notice of appeal to rely upon the new ground (ground 2);
(ii) appellant’s counsel abandoned all reliance upon the original ground. We were invited to, and we did, put the fresh evidence ground to one side;
(iii) contrary to his written case, counsel conceded that the quashing of the conviction on charge 2 did not re-open the sentencing discretion generally;[2] and
(iv) counsel then pursued two quite distinct arguments under cover of ground 2. The first was simply that sentences on the eight charges were manifestly excessive. The second was that the judge’s sentencing remarks revealed an error in approach to sentencing the appellant as a continuing criminal enterprise offender for continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) offences — that is, in sentencing the appellant on charges 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 25.
12 The second argument was, in truth, an allegation of specific error; but no objection was taken by counsel for the Crown to it being pursued.
Circumstances
13 The appellant committed 32 offences of dishonesty on 16 different occasions in the period between 22 November 2011 and 11 September 2012. They were burglaries, thefts, the obtaining of property by deception, handling stolen goods, and dealing with property suspected of being the proceeds of crime. In a number of instances, the thefts were associated with the burglaries. The scale of the thefts was very large. An incomplete tally of the value of property stolen exceeded $1 million. Although much of the stolen property was eventually recovered, the shortfall — again it was incomplete — was in the order of $226,000. The value of the property stolen, or otherwise the subject of the dishonesty offences, was so great because items which were stolen included trucks, excavators, bobcats, business takings and a valuable coin collection. On eight charges, because of the value of items stolen, the appellant was sentenced as a continuing criminal enterprise offender.[3] Thus, the maximum penalty for those thefts was 20 years’, rather than ten years’, imprisonment.
14 The sentencing judge detailed the offending in her comprehensive sentencing remarks. Having regard to the ground eventually pursued, it is necessary to set out the relevant portion of her Honour’s remarks.[4] We append, in respect of each offence, the sentence which the judge imposed, including any order for cumulation.
Charges 1 and 28 — theft of Polaris quad bike and obtaining property by deception — sale of the bike
Sentence: Charge 1 — 6 months’ imprisonment; Charge 28 — 6 months’ imprisonment (1 month cumulated)....
Charges 3 and 4 — burglary and theft — Van Cruiser Caravans
Sentence: Charge 3 — 5 months’ imprisonment; Charge 4 — 5 months’ imprisonment (1 month cumulated).Charges 5 and 6 — burglary and theft — Diamond Blinds
Sentence: Charge 5 — 12 months’ imprisonment; Charge 6 — 12 months’ imprisonment (2 months cumulated); Charge 7 — 3 months’ imprisonment.Charges 8 and 9 — burglary and theft — Henley Properties
Sentence: Charge 8 — 5 months’ imprisonment; Charge 9 — 5 months’ imprisonment.Charge 10 — theft of bobcat
Sentence: 16 months’ imprisonment (2 months cumulated).Charges 11, 12 and 13 — thefts from REDS Concreting
Sentence: Charge 11 — 10 months’ imprisonment; Charge 12 — 1 month imprisonment.Charge 13 — theft of bobcat
Sentence: 11 months’ imprisonment (2 months cumulated).Charges 14, 15 and 16 — thefts of truck and excavator
Sentence (as CCE offender, for CCE offences — see Sentencing Act 1991 s 6H(1) and sch 1A, para (1)(a)):Charge 14 — 2 years and 3 months’ imprisonment (3 months cumulated); Charge 15 — 3 years’ imprisonment (base sentence); Charge 16 — 2 years’ imprisonment (3 months cumulated).
Charges 17, 18 and 19 — thefts of truck, trailer, bobcat and excavator — CJB Excavations
Sentence (as CCE offender on Charges 17 and 19):Charge 17 — 2 years’ imprisonment (3 months cumulated); Charge 18 — 13 months’ imprisonment (1 month cumulated); Charge 19 — 28 months’ imprisonment (3 months cumulated).
Charges 20 and 21 — theft of tray truck and excavator — REDS Concreting
Sentence (as CCE offender):Charge 20 — 30 months’ imprisonment (4 months cumulated); Charge 21 — 28 months’ imprisonment.
Charges 22 and 23 — burglary and theft — Mambo Restaurant
Sentence: Charge 22 — 12 months’ imprisonment (1 month cumulated); Charge 23 — 12 months’ imprisonment.Charges 24 and 25 — theft of mesh, tilt tray truck
Sentence (as CCE offender on Charge 25):Charge 24 — 6 months’ imprisonment (1 month cumulated); Charge 25 — 2 years and 3 months’ imprisonment (3 months’ cumulated).
Charges 26 and 27 — burglary and theft from Graham Gold & Coins
Sentence: Charge 26 — 20 months’ imprisonment; Charge 27 — 20 months’ imprisonment (3 months cumulated)....
Charges 29 and 30 — burglary and theft of lawn mower — Southern Obedience dog club
Sentence: Charge 29 — 6 months’ imprisonment; Charge 30 — 6 months’ imprisonment.Charge 31 — handling stolen goods — truck rims and tyres
Sentence: 2 months’ imprisonment.Charge 32 — handling stolen goods — various items
Sentence: 15 months’ imprisonment (2 months cumulated).Summary Charge — dealing with property suspected of being proceeds of crime
Sentence: 6 months’ imprisonment (1 month cumulated).
Submissions
15 For the purposes of both the simple manifest excess submission and the submission that the judge’s sentencing remarks were infected by specific error, appellant’s counsel relied upon the same factual analysis. Essentially, as will be seen, it involved the making of comparison between sentences which the judge imposed for CCE offences and sentences which her Honour imposed for some only of the non-CCE offences. The comparisons which counsel made took no account of orders which the judge made for cumulation. Those orders affected many of the CCE and non-CCE sentences to which counsel drew our attention.
16 Counsel began his factual analysis by pointing to the sentence which the judge imposed on charge 27. He noted that it was for theft of coins valued at $140,000, that the coins had not been recovered, and that the victim had suffered much personal and business hardship. He compared the sentence imposed for this theft with the sentence for CCE offences imposed by the judge on charges 20 and 21. The value of the equipment stolen had been $195,000, but the equipment had been located and returned to its owners.
17 Counsel next drew attention to the sentences imposed on charges 17, 18 and 19. Charge 17 involved the theft of a truck valued at $90,000 and a trailer valued at $25,000. Charge 18 related to the theft of a bobcat worth $45,000. Charge 19 related to the theft of an excavator valued at $80,000. All that equipment was stolen at the one time. All of it was recovered. The appellant was sentenced on charges 17 and 19 as a CCE offender; but not so with respect to charge 18. Counsel submitted that the sentence imposed on charge 18 stood in stark and unexplained contrast with the sentences imposed on charges 17 and 19. He contended that each of the latter was impermissibly great.
18 Counsel also drew attention to the sentences imposed on charge 24 — theft of mesh, value $6,000; and on charge 25 — theft of truck, value $70,000. The mesh had been lost, but the truck had been recovered. Yet, counsel observed, sentence on charge 24 had been six months’ imprisonment, whilst the sentence on charge 25, for a CCE offence, had been 27 months’ imprisonment.
19 Finally, counsel drew attention to the sentences imposed on charges 14, 15 and 16. The stolen truck which was the subject of charge 14 was valued at $74,000. It had been recovered, but there was $12,000 damage. The excavator the subject of charge 15 had been purchased for $94,000. It had also been recovered, but there was damage of $25,000. The bobcat, valued at $84,049, had been rented. It had not been recovered. Its owner had recouped about 50 per cent of its value from an insurer. Counsel submitted that the sentences imposed on charges 14 and 15 for CCE offences were very heavy, particularly as the items had been recovered. He also compared the sentence imposed on charge 16 — two years’ imprisonment — with the sentences which the judge imposed for other thefts of bobcats: on charge 10, 16 months’ imprisonment; on charge 13, 11 months’ imprisonment; and on charge 18, 13 months’ imprisonment. He observed that the bobcat which was the subject of charge 10 had not been recovered. Presumably, the bobcat the subject of charge 13 had not been recovered either, because the owner had been paid out by an insurer. The bobcat the subject of charge 18 (one of three items of equipment stolen at the time) had not been recovered and an insurance payout had been made. Counsel submitted that the other sentences for thefts of bobcats showed that the sentence on charge 16 had been impermissibly great; and he submitted also that the reason for the heavy sentence on charge 16, where the appellant was sentenced as a CCE offender, had not been explained as was required.
20 With respect to alleged specific error, counsel submitted that when a judge imposes sentences for offences, some of which are CCE offences and others of which are not, the judge must explain why and to what extent the facts of the CCE offences have led to the imposition of greater sentence on those charges (assuming that is what has happened) than on the non-CCE charges. He relied upon observations by Vincent JA in R v Arundell,[5] referred to by Redlich JA in R v Grossi.[6]
21 Counsel for the Crown submitted that it was inherently unlikely that the judge had automatically increased the sentences for the CCE offences only because the maximum penalty for those offences was doubled. That had not been the gist of submissions made to the judge on the plea. Rather, the prosecutor had submitted in writing that:
The primary consequence of sentencing an offender as a continuing criminal enterprise offender is that the applicant may become liable to an increased maximum penalty[7]
in respect of a CCE offence; and that:
However, the maximum penalty remains only one of a number of considerations in determining the appropriate sentence and the judge retains a discretion as to whether a greater sentence should be imposed where the maximum penalty on a charge is increased because it is a continuing criminal
enterprise offence: [Grossi [2008] VSCA 51; (2008) 23 VR 500] (cited in Judicial College of Victoria Commentary 2013).
22 So also, counsel for the Crown submitted, appellant’s counsel below, having been asked by the judge whether she had to have regard to the doubled maximum penalty, agreed that this was so, and submitted that it was ‘a factor’ but that it did not ‘override all of the other factors’ which the judge had to take into account.
23 Counsel for the Crown further submitted that the correct approach described by counsel was demonstrably the approach which the judge took. Her Honour had said this in her sentencing remarks:
24 Counsel then submitted that the judge had carefully analysed the circumstances in which the various offences had been committed. The individual sentences, he submitted, were explicable. The sentence on charge 15 had been the heaviest sentence imposed, not because the items stolen had been the most valuable, but because of the impact which the theft had on the victim’s business. Further, when sentencing the appellant for CCE offences, the judge had rightly referred to the threat which the appellant posed to the community because of his ‘prolific and unconscionable offending’, often with a degree of planning, his offending causing ‘tremendous hardship’ to others.[8] Further again, counsel submitted, the orders for cumulation both with respect to CCE and non-CCE offences had been consistently modest. The judge, evidently, had given due regard to totality.
Arundell and Grossi
25 In Arundell,[9] the appellant committed a number of offences of obtaining property by deception. Some of them were CCE offences, others not. The judge imposed sentences of 48 months’ imprisonment for all the CCE offences and sentences of 36 months’ imprisonment for all the non-CCE offences
26 The issues of principal importance in Arundell were, first, whether two offences, having been committed before pt 2B of the Act came into operation on 1 July 1998, could be taken into account as ‘qualifying’ offences; and second, whether an offender fell to be sentenced as a CCE offender for a CCE offence upon or after the commission of a third qualifying offence. The way in which Vincent JA resolved those questions is not of present relevance.
27 His Honour, however, made two observations of present relevance. First, he stated that:
Parliament has, through the enactment of Part 2B, expressed an intention to deter those who demonstrate preparedness to engage in repeated predatory behaviour, affecting through the commission of offences of the kind presently under consideration, the economic welfare of individual victims and the general community.[10]
28 Second, and critically for the appellant’s argument, his Honour said this:
The more difficult question which arises in this matter is whether the exercise of the sentencing discretion by his Honour miscarried, by what appears to have been, the effecting of an automatic increase in the penalties imposed on those counts as a consequence. As I have earlier indicated, there was no discussion of the manner in which the provisions of Part 2B should apply in the particular circumstance. The sentencing judge did not address the matter in his remarks and the sole basis of distinction between the penalties imposed on the various counts appears to have been whether the amount involved fell on one side or the other of the figure of $50,000. In the absence of any reasons to explain the difference in the penalties imposed, I consider that serious doubt must exist as to whether proper regard was had in the circumstances of the particular matter before the Court in the determination of what, if any, differential was required between the sentences handed down for the offences subject to an increased maximum penalty and those which were not.[11]
29 In that case, in respect of offences committed in an identical way, uniform penalties had been imposed for CCE offences and lesser uniform penalties for non-CCE offences. Absent any other explanation by the judge, it was an irresistible inference that the penalties for the CCE offences had been automatically increased because they were of that character and because, being of that character, the maximum penalty was doubled.
30 In Grossi,[12] the appellant was charged with many thefts. As the trusted employee of the victim, she had unlawfully drawn cheques and had, in one way or another, credited the amounts of the cheques into bank accounts which she held. She was charged with a number of rolled up counts and also on counts of thefts of individual amounts. In the case of a number of the latter thefts, the sentencing judge concluded that the applicant fell to be sentenced as a CCE offender. In respect of those counts, he imposed an aggregate sentence. In respect of the non-CCE offences, he imposed an aggregate, but lesser, sentence.
31 A number of issues arose for consideration on the appeal, which are beside the point for present purposes.[13] It is, however, necessary to refer to what was said by Redlich JA as follows:
The learned sentencing judge grouped together counts 9 to 17 and count 19 as the appellant was a continuing criminal enterprise (‘CCE’) offender and these counts were CCE offences as defined in s 6H of the Act. Under cover of ground 6 it was submitted on the appellant’s behalf that his Honour had fallen into error in fixing an aggregate sentence of five years on those counts which were continuing criminal enterprise counts as opposed to the aggregate sentence of three years imposed on the ‘rolled up counts’. Relying upon R v Arundell[14] counsel for the appellant submitted that it was impermissible to automatically increase the penalty simply on account of the fact that an offender was guilty of a continuing criminal enterprise offence. It was submitted that his Honour had fallen into error in this way in the present case, no reason having been given by his Honour for the difference of two years between the two aggregate sentences. Counsel for the appellant drew attention to the fact that a number of the individual offences making up the aggregate sentence which consisted of rolled up counts, involved much larger sums of money than the continuing criminal enterprise offences comprising the second aggregate sentence. In this regard the circumstances appear to be indistinguishable from those considered in Arundell, as the difference in penalties there also appeared to rest solely upon the fact that the offences were continuing criminal enterprise counts.The maximum penalty prescribed by Parliament for an offence provides authoritative guidance as to its relative seriousness and is prescribed for the worst class of the offence in question.[15] The increase will be relevant whenever the increase shows that Parliament regarded the previous penalties as inadequate. Even in cases where the new maximum is only of general assistance, it becomes the ‘yardstick’ which must be balanced with all other relevant factors.[16] But it does not necessarily follow that offences should attract an increased sentence because the maximum penalty has been increased. Thus, in Arundell, Vincent JA, with whom the Chief Justice and Cummins AJA agreed, regarded the absence of any reasons to explain the difference in the penalties imposed as raising a serious doubt as to whether proper regard had been given to what differential, if any, was required between those offences which were subject to an increased maximum penalty and those which were not. But that is not to say that the amount involved in a continuing criminal enterprise count will not in a particular case provide a sufficient justification, without more, for the imposition of an increased penalty. Here it was not disputed by the respondent that this, and the other errors to which I have referred required the re-opening of the sentencing discretion. We would do so if satisfied, as s 568(4) of the Crimes Act 1958 requires, that a different sentence should have been imposed.[17]
32 Both Arundell and Grossi were cases in which a judge imposed very different, and in substance uniformly different,[18] sentences for CCE and non-CCE offences which had been committed by the offender in identical circumstances. In each instance the judge said nothing to explain ‘what, if any, differential was required’ between the sentences imposed for the CCE and non-CCE offences. It was to be inferred that the judge had automatically increased the sentences for the CCE offences only because the maximum penalty was greater.
33 In our opinion, what was said in Arundell and Grossi, in those distinctive circumstances, cannot be understood to mean, in a case where —
(i) discrete and different sentences are imposed for many offences;
(ii) the different circumstances of every offence are described;
(iii) the impact of particular offending upon the victim is outlined;
(iv) circumstances in mitigation are fully described; and
(v) principles relevant to sentencing the offender, including the maximum penalty applicable to the various offences, are identified;
that it is then necessary for the judge to explain why the sentence for each CCE offence differs from the sentence imposed in respect of each non-CCE offence. The judge’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence in the case of a particular offence will be explained by his or her synthesis of the matters to which we have just referred. To conclude that more should be required of a judge would invite, as occurred in submissions in this case, argument of a structural kind which this Court has consistently discouraged.[19]
34 So approached, the judge’s sentencing remarks in the present case disclosed that her Honour considered the circumstances of the particular offending to which each charge related, the impact of that offending upon the victim, and circumstances of mitigation. Her remarks also show that her Honour was alive to the purpose of the CCE provisions of the Act, and how they operated with particular force in the case of CCE offences committed by this prolific offender who apparently gave no consideration to the effect of his offending upon his victims. In that connection, the fact that there was a double penalty for CCE offences was a relevant sentencing consideration.
35 Criticism made by appellant’s counsel of particular sentences which the judge imposed for CCE and non-CCE offences not only involved argument of a structural kind, it also tended to proceed from the position that some sentences for non-CCE offences were ‘correct’ or at the high end, for which reason sentences imposed for CCE offences were inexplicably and impermissibly severe. But that reasoning was flawed, because it began with an assumption which could not be made. The assumption was equally available that particular sentences for non-CCE offences were lenient. Moreover, the argument which fastened upon the sentence on charge 27 — see [16] above — had its own problems. There is really no doubt that the appellant should have been sentenced as a CCE offender on that charge; in which case, having account of its particular circumstances, a greater sentence might have been expected.
36 With respect to the argument that sentences for the CCE offences were manifestly excessive, appellant’s counsel again mainly sought to compare the sentences imposed on those charges and sentences imposed for some non-CCE offences. Again, the comparison was not useful, because it assumed that the sentences for the non-CCE offences were either ‘correct’ or at the high end. No such assumption could be made. If it could be assumed that those sentences were ‘within range’ — this doubtful assumption deriving from, or being supported by, the fact that the Crown did not appeal them as being manifestly inadequate — it does not follow that each of them was not very lenient.
37 Her Honour, understandably, described the appellant’s offending as ‘most serious’ and being such as to require denunciation, and to make relevant both general and specific deterrence. Those conclusions particularly resonated in the case of the CCE offences. The appellant presented a particular danger to the community, against which it had to be protected as best sentence could do.
38 We should highlight several matters bearing upon sentence for the CCE offences.
39 First, the appellant was sentenced in the Magistrates’ Court for a number of offences on 7 August 2012, but soon thereafter committed some of the offences for which he stood to be punished. That was an aggravating circumstance in respect of those offences. It also emphasised the need to protect the community from the appellant — a matter particularly relevant to punishment for the CCE offences.
40 Second, having been referred to a psychologist in 2011, the appellant did not follow up in any consistent way a suggested need for treatment with respect to ‘depressive symptoms, drug use and addictive issues, as well as stress’. He committed all of the offences on the indictment after his consultations with the psychologist in May and August 2011. Further, a consultation on 10 May 2012 was followed by commission of all the CCE offending. His careless attitude to what was said to be a need for treatment bore upon his apparent disregard for his victims, and the need to protect the community from him.
41 What, then, stood in mitigation?
42 First, the appellant had no criminal history, other than the offending the subject of the Magistrates’ Court sentence in August 2012. That offending was apparently part of the spree of which the offences now under consideration were the larger part.
43 Second, the appellant had pleaded guilty at an early stage.
44 Third, the appellant was still quite young.
45 Fourth, the appellant had a fair work history.
46 Fifth, the appellant was involved in a relationship breakdown in 2010. The judge was prepared to accept that — (a) this had an effect upon his mental state; (b) in time it led to him resuming abuse of drugs — particularly ‘ice’; (c) he was a drug abuser at time of offending; and (d) his offending was in part explained by his need for money to feed his drug habit.
47 Sixth, the appellant had formed a new and continuing relationship which had some beneficial features.
48 Seventh, the judge was prepared to accept that the appellant was suffering from a depressive illness at time of sentence, which would make his life in prison comparatively harder.
49 Eighth, the judge was prepared to conclude that the appellant had prospects of rehabilitation, although she described them as ‘fair at best’.[20]
50 The judge made, in our opinion, a number of findings favourable to the appellant which another judge, faced with the same material, might well not have made. In particular, the judge accepted that at time of offending the appellant had been a substance abuser, and that this explained to a degree — although it did not justify — his offending. In that connection, her Honour understandably remarked that the appellant’s account of his abuse of ‘ice’ at the time of his offending starkly contrasted with the professional way in which he went about his then chosen occupation as a thief. That said, the judge’s findings were not challenged by the Crown.
51 Having regard to all the circumstances to which the judge referred in her sentencing remarks, a few of which we have highlighted, we concluded that all of the sentences which the judge imposed for CCE offences were readily explicable. None of them, in our view, was outside the range available in the sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. But if we had been persuaded that the sentences imposed on one or more of the CCE offences had been manifestly excessive, and if it had become necessary to sentence the appellant afresh, we are quite satisfied that the total effective sentence which we imposed upon the appellant would not have differed from the effect of the sentences imposed by the judge; and we would not have fixed a different non-parole period.
[1] Ravarotto v The Queen [2012] VSCA 263.
[2] Smith v The Queen [2012] VSCA 5 , [1] (Ashley JA), [41]–[48] (Weinberg JA).
[3] See Sentencing Act 1991 pt 2B (‘the Act’).
[4] DPP v Abela [2013] VCC 762 (‘Sentencing Remarks’). We have slightly amended some headings to charges/groups of charges.
[5] [2003] VSCA 69, [28] (‘Arundell’).
[6] [2008] VSCA 51; (2008) 23 VR 500, 512–13 [44]–[45] (‘Grossi’).
[7] Emphasis in original.
[8] Sentencing Remarks, [72].
[10] Ibid [22].
[11] Ibid [28].
[12] [2008] VSCA 51; (2008) 23 VR 500.
[13] Thus, it is not in point that in R v Roussety [2008] VSCA 259; (2008) 24 VR 253 a five member bench rejected, by majority, one aspect of the conclusion of the majority in Grossi pertaining to the operation of pt 2B.
[14] [2003] VSCA 69, [26]–[27].
[15] Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357; R v Sibic [2006] VSCA 296; (2006) 168 A Crim R 305.
[16] R v AB (No 2) [2008] VSCA 39; (2008) 18 VR 391, 406 [51]; DPP (Vic) v Aydin [2005] VSCA 86, [10]–[12] (Callaway JA) as to the variable factors that bear upon the significance of an increased maximum.
[17] Grossi [2008] VSCA 259; (2008) 24 VR 253, 512–13 [44]–[45], citing R v Palmieri [1998] 1 VR 486, 490 (Brooking and Hayne JJA); R v Wright [2008] VSCA 19, [46].
[18] In Arundell, many uniform sentences (they differed only depending upon whether the offence was of a CCE or a non-CCE kind) were imposed. In Grossi, the CCE and non-CCE offences were aggregated, and different aggregate sentences were imposed.
[19] See, eg, Lipp v The Queen [2013] VSCA 384, [13] (Redlich JA and Lasry AJA); Hoy v The Queen [2012] VSCA 49, [18]–[21] (Redlich JA, Nettle JA agreeing).
[20] Sentencing Remarks, [120].
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