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Supreme Court of Western Australia |
Last Updated: 23 June 2023
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION : THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- CARTER [No 5] [2023] WASC 223
CORAM : DERRICK J
HEARD : 12 JUNE 2023
DELIVERED : 23 JUNE 2023
FILE NO/S : SO 6 of 2015
BETWEEN : THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Applicant
AND
BRENDON VAUGHAN CARTER
Respondent
Dangerous sexual offender - High risk serious offender- Periodic review - Whether respondent remains a high risk serious offender - Whether continuing detention order should be affirmed or rescinded - Whether community would be adequately protected if respondent released on a supervision order
Legislation:
Criminal
Code
(WA)
Dangerous
Sexual Offenders Act 2006
(WA)
High
Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020
(WA)
Result:
Supervision
order
made
Category:
B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant
|
:
|
B D Meertens
|
Respondent
|
:
|
D J McKenzie
|
Solicitors:
Applicant
|
:
|
State Solicitor's Office
(WA)
|
Respondent
|
:
|
David McKenzie
|
Case(s)
referred to in decision(s):
I am satisfied that the respondent remains a high risk serious offender. The level of risk has not significantly changed since the last review. The uncontested expert evidence is that a restriction order is necessary in the circumstances of this case.
However, there have been a number of changes that are relevant to the issue of whether that risk can be managed appropriately in the community. Amongst these are the treatment gains made in psychological counselling, the stabilisation of the respondent's mental illness and the availability of suitable accommodation. These factors improve significantly the respondent's prospects of being released on a supervision order. The major impediment, however, is the lack of assured funding for support workers. Without a minimum level of daily support there is a risk that the respondent would not cope with the pressures of living in the community, would become non-compliant with his medication, would decompensate and become ill, may resort to alcohol and illicit drugs and, as a result, would be at higher risk of reoffending. Accordingly, without having at least four to five hours of support per day, the risk of reoffending could not be adequately reduced and the protection of the community could not be ensured.
The obvious source of funding for core support is the NDIS. The respondent has a very serious chronic mental illness which affects his functional capacity. There would seem to be little doubt that he qualifies for assistance under the scheme. However, it appears that there is an inflexible policy not to assess a person who is detained in prison unless a certain release date is set by the court. In the case of prisoners who are serving a finite sentence it may be possible to provide a release date. However, this policy creates an impossible barrier in the case of an offender dealt with under the HRSO Act. Under the HRSO Act, the court cannot approve a supervision order unless satisfied that the risk of reoffending can be reduced to a level consistent with adequate protection of the community. In a case such as the respondent's, that means that the court must be assured that the support necessary to reduce that risk will be provided.
Of course the NDIA is not concerned with the risk of reoffending, its concern is with the provision of disability services. However, the two areas are not mutually exclusive. It is likely that if the respondent's disability needs are met to the recommended level this would also produce, as an incidental benefit, a reduction in the risk of re-offending. There appears to be some concern within the NDIA that the support sought for the respondent is related to re-offending risk and not disability support. With all due respect, that concern seems to be ill-founded and fails to appreciate that it is the respondent's disability (his mental illness and attendant deficits) that is one of the factors contributing to risk. Other contributors to risk are being addressed by a range of supports from other service providers, such as the Department of Justice, Uniting West and Community Mental Health Services. But the contribution required from the NDIS remains critical.
The fact is that unless the policy of the NDIA changes, the respondent's disability needs will continue to be met by the prison system. This is in neither his interests nor the public interest generally. If adequate core support is funded and made available for the respondent the likelihood is that he can be released on a supervision order. The refusal to assess him for such support means that he must continue to be detained in a prison.
Although there is a possibility that support services might be provided by the NDIS if a release date was set (that is a supervision order was approved), there is very considerable uncertainty as to whether or when that could occur. The level of uncertainty is such that I can have no confidence that if released the respondent would have the support the needs to ensure that his mental illness remains well-managed. The consequence of this for the risk of re-offending is such that I cannot be satisfied at this time that the community would be adequately protected by a supervision order.
For these reasons it was not possible to make a supervision order and at the conclusion of the review hearing I affirmed the continuing detention order.
As will emerge from the outline below of the statutory framework under the DSO Act and [the Act], the concepts and criteria with which the court is concerned in determining an application of this kind are substantially the same under both statutes. Although I have reached that view on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the provisions of both statutes, having regard to the context of the provisions within the statutes and the objects underlying the statutes, the construction is confirmed, in my opinion, by the second reading speech made to the Legislative Assembly in respect of theHigh Risk Offenders Bill 2019
by the Honourable Attorney General. The Attorney informed the House that the bill was intended to 'extend the Supreme Court's ability to make a continuing detention order or supervision order to serious violent offenders in the same manner as the provisions contained in the [DSO Act]'. He went on to say:
'In doing so, this bill fully preserves the provisions that apply in respect of dangerous sexual offenders in the [DSO Act].'
Whether or not that has been achieved remains to be seen upon analysis of the provisions. However, in my opinion, as the concepts and criteria in both statutes are substantially the same, the jurisprudence established in respect of the DSO Act remains relevant in construing and applying [the Act], with appropriate adaptation in cases involving non-sexual offences.
The purpose of this Part is to ensure that an offender's detention under a continuing detention order is regularly reviewed.[21]
Review of detention under continuing detention order
(1) On a review under section 66 of an offender's detention -
(a) if the court does not find that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it must rescind the continuing detention order; or
(b) if the court finds that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it must -(i) affirm the continuing detention order; or(ii) subject to section 29, rescind the continuing detention order and make a supervision order.
(2) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (1)(b)(i) or (ii), the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community.
An offender is a high risk serious offender if the court dealing with an application under this Act finds that it is satisfied, by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability, that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the offender to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence.
In choosing between an indefinite detention order or a supervision order, the fact that the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community does not exclude other considerations. The use of the word 'adequate' indicates that a qualitative assessment is required. In considering whether a supervision order would adequately protect the community, account must be taken of conditions which can be placed on a supervision order so as to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the rehabilitation of the respondent and his care and treatment. The [DSO Act] does not require that there be no risk of reoffending. Such a requirement could never be met and would mean no person to whom the [DSO Act] applies would ever be released. The question is whether the risk is reduced to a reasonably acceptable level that ensures adequate protection of the community. That requires a weighing of the nature and degree of risk in the context of methods for the management and reduction of that risk. If, after considering all the evidence, the court is left in doubt as to whether the conditions of a supervision order would adequately protect the community, because the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the court must expressly decline to rescind the continuing detention order.
(a) any report prepared under section 74 for the hearing of the application and the extent to which the offender cooperated in the examination required by that section;
(b) any other medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other assessment relating to the offender;
(c) information indicating whether or not the offender has a propensity to commit serious offences in the future;
(d) whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour by the offender;
(e) any efforts by the offender to address the cause or causes of the offender's offending behaviour, including whether the offender has participated in any rehabilitation programme;
(f) whether or not the offender's participation in any rehabilitation programme has had a positive effect on the offender;
(g) the offender's antecedents and criminal record;
(h) the risk that, if the offender were not subject to a restriction order, the offender would commit a serious offence;
(i) the need to protect members of the community from that risk;
(j) any other relevant matter.
(1) A court cannot make, affirm or amend a supervision order in relation to an offender unless it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the order as made, affirmed or amended.
(2) The onus of proof as to the matter described in subsection (1) is on the offender.
The clear intention of the review process is to allow for the possibility of a change of circumstances. Detention under the DSO Act is not a punishment for past offending, rather it is a protective mechanism designed to prevent the risk of future serious sexual offending from being realised. If circumstances change such that the risk of reoffending reduces or can be better managed in the community, then the continuing need for detention must be considered.Matters specified in s 7(3) of the Act
The risk of reoffending may change over time. It may be affected by age, health or the successful completion of treatment. The availability of new technology or resources in the community may also affect whether the risk of reoffending can be managed on a supervision order.
The justification for making a detention order is the existence of an unacceptable risk of serious sexual offending that cannot be adequately controlled by conditional release. However, detention also serves the purpose of allowing treatment and care in a secure environment: s 17 DSO Act. This confirms an obligation on the part of the prison authorities to facilitate change by offering programs and access to counselling.
If the risk changes or resources improve to enable more efficacious conditions then the need for detention may dissipate. In these circumstances continuing detention may be unjust.
The review process is intended to ensure that detention only continues where necessary. It mitigates the otherwise potentially draconian effect of imprisoning people for crimes that they have not committed. Reviews are not, therefore, merely a welfare check, rather they are an exercise of judicial power to affirm, vary or rescind a detention order. Continuing detention should not be ordered unless that course is justified by the circumstances existing at the time of the review. The court should choose the order that is least invasive of the person's right to be at liberty, whilst ensuring an adequate degree of protection of the community.
There are a number of similarities between the first and last offences. They both involved a young adult female with whom the respondent was already acquainted. Both offences involved a degree of deceit and force....
The second and third offences of indecent dealing do not follow the same pattern, insofar as they involved a child and there was no suggestion of physical force. These differences must be a matter of some concern because they show that the respondent's offending has some diversity and will not, therefore, necessarily be predictable in the future.
The purpose of a legislative regime, such as the DPSO Act or the HRSO Act, is discernibly distinct from the imposition of retribution or deterrence pursued by the criminal law. To the extent that detention or supervised release is part of the legislative regime, the character of the curtailment of the liberty of the individual offender under the regime can be seen to be protective rather than punitive because any curtailment of liberty must be supported by the risk evaluation contemplated by s 7 of the HRSO Act. In that evaluation, considerations of retribution and deterrence, central to sentencing by way of punishment under the common law, have no part to play. In addition, any curtailment of liberty must be no greater than is necessary adequately to protect the community from the demonstrated unacceptable risk of harm to the community...
Further, authorise police officers from the Western Australian Police Force (WA Police Force) to access any cloud-based platforms or services associated with the devices you use, and examine the internet accounts at any time for the purposes of monitoring your online behaviour (absent any investigation for any offence). I understand and acknowledge WA Police Force will use passwords or tokens located within my devices to access any cloud-based platforms and services and that a password may not be required. By authorising this I understand and acknowledge a police officer from the WA Police Force may change the password(s) to these accounts so I will no longer have access.
ANNEXURE A
2. Report to, and receive visits from, a CCO as directed by the court;
6. Not commit a serious offence during the period of the Order;
7. Be subject to electronic monitoring under section 31.
a) To obtain urgent medical or dental treatment for yourself;
b) For the purpose of averting or minimising a serious risk of death or injury to the respondent or another person;
c) To obey an order issued under a written law (such as a summons) requiring your presence elsewhere;
d) At the direction of a CCO or Police Officer.
45. Not possess, or purchase, or consume or use alcohol;
47. To provide a valid sample for testing pursuant to condition 46;
a) For the purpose of averting or minimising a serious risk of death or injury to yourself or another person;
b) For a purpose, and for a duration approved in advance by a CCO;
c) On the order of a CCO or Police Officer.
a) The contact is authorised in advance by the CCO and such contact is supervised at all times by an adult approved in advance by the CCO;
b) The contact is necessary to complete a commercial transition and limited to the minimum contact required to complete the transaction, and another adult is present.
('Contact' under this condition and the following two conditions means any form of interaction or communication whether by word, gesture, expression or touch and whether in person, in writing, by telephonic or electronic means, but does not include the bare minimum of interaction or communication necessary between an adult and child to promptly arid civilly terminate any inadvertent or uninvited interaction or communication);
I
certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the
Supreme Court of Western Australia.
JP
Research Associate to the
Honourable Justice Derrick
23 JUNE 2023
[1]
Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v Carter [2015] WASC
413.
[2]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 2] [2016] WASC
374.
[3]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 3] [2018] WASC
420.
[4]
Act, s 2(1)(a).
[5]
The term 'commencement day' is defined for the purposes of the provisions
contained in pt 10 of the Act (s 122 - 125) to mean 'the
day on which the
section comes into operation'. The 'day on which this section comes into
operation' is, by virtue of proclamation,
26 August 2020: Act s 2(1)(c).
[6]
Act, s
123.
[7]
I will say more about the relevant provisions of the Act in due course. At this
point it suffices to say that the provisions of
the Act relating to reviews do
not operate significantly differently to the way in which the corresponding
provisions of the DSO
Act
operated.
[8]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 4] [2021] WASC
186.
[9]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 4] [50] -
[56].
[10]
Exhibit
1.
[11]
Exhibit 1, vol 1,
189.
[12]
Exhibit 1, vol 1,
171.
[13]
Exhibit 1, vol 1,
186.
[14]
Exhibit 1, vol 2, 323. Dr Wynn Owen is a 'qualified expert' as defined in s 3
of the Act. His report was prepared and obtained
pursuant to s 67(1) of the Act
in accordance with s 74 of the
Act.
[15]
Exhibit 1, vol 2,
336.
[16]
Exhibit 1, vol 2,
351.
[17]
Exhibit 1, vol 2,
298.
[18]
Exhibit 2.
[19]
The State of Western
Australia v ZSJ [2020] WASC 330
[30] - [31].
[20]
Garlett v The State of
Western Australia [2022] HCA 30 [55], [103], [104],
[106].
[21]
The respondent is an 'offender' for the purposes of the relevant provisions of
the Act: Act, definition of 'offender' and 'serious
offender under restriction'
in
s 3.
[22]
Act, s 3 and s
26(1).
[23]
Act, s 3 and s
27(1).
[24]
Any further references to a 'serious offence' or to 'serious offences' should be
read as references to a serious offence or serious
offences as defined in the
Act.
[25]
The State of Western
Australia v Rao [2019] WASC 93 [28] - [29];
The State of Western
Australia v ZSJ
[44].
[26]
Garlett v The State of
Western Australia
[72].
[27]
Act, s
68(1)(b).
[28]
Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; (2008) 38 WAR 307 [28];
The State of Western
Australia v West [No 6] [2019] WASC 427 [24];
The State of Western
Australia v ZSJ
[47].
[29]
The State of Western
Australia v West [No 6]
[24]; The State of Western
Australia v ZSJ
[47].
[30]
Italiano v The State of
Western Australia [2009] WASCA 116 [46];
The State of Western
Australia v Newland [2018] WASC
344 [12];
GBT v The State of Western
Australia [2019] WASCA
40 [21];
The State of Western
Australia v West [No 6]
[22]; The State of Western
Australia v ZSJ [45];
Garlett v The State of
Western Australia [73],
[226].
[31]
Garlett v The State of
Western Australia [73], [227]. As Quinlan CJ recognised in
The State of Western
Australia v D'Rozario [No 3] [2021] WASC 412 [21] there may be rare
situations in which a court will find that it is not necessary to make a
restriction order notwithstanding
a finding that the offender poses an
'unacceptable risk', for example, where other external restraints (such as a
post-sentence supervision
order under the
Sentence Administration Act 2003
(WA)) are sufficient to ensure
adequate protection of the community from the
risk.
[32]
Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [2007] WASCA 206; (2007) 35 WAR 297 [63];
GBT v The State of Western
Australia [21]; The
State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [22];
The State of Western
Australia v ZSJ [45];
Garlett v The State of
Western Australia [73], [226] - [228],
[279]
[33]
Garlett v The State of
Western Australia
[84].
[34]
Director of Public
Prosecutions for Western Australia v Williams [63] - [64];
Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v Decke [2009] WASC 312 [14];
The State of Western
Australia v Newland [21];
The State of Western
Australia v West [No 6]
[26]; The State of Western
Australia v ZSJ [51];
Garlett v The State of
Western Australia [106].
[35] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v DAL [No 2] [2016] WASC 212 [33]. Also adopted in The State of Western Australia v Narkle [2019] WASC 404 [13] and The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [26].
[36]
The State of Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235 [24];
The State of Western
Australia v Patrick [No 5] [2022] WASC 61 [56];
Garlett v The State of
Western Australia [85], [229] -
[230].
[37]
Garlett v The State of Western Australia [102],
[231].
[38]
Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [52];
The State of Western
Australia v West [No 6] [29];
The State of Western
Australia v ZSJ [56] - [58];
The State of Western
Australia v Patrick [No 4] [2020] WASC 48
[109]-[111].
[39]
The State of Western
Australia v ACJ [2021] WASC 219 [416];
Garlett v The State of
Western Australia [103] - [104],
[233].
[40]
The State of Western
Australia v Paul Douglas Allen also known as Paul Alan Francis Deverell
[No 5] [2019] WASC 359 [7] - [11].
[41]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [29] -
[34].
[42]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [25] -
[28].
[43]
Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit 1, vol
2,
357).
[44]
Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit 1, vol
2,
357).
[45]
Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit 1, vol
2,
357).
[46]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter
[8].
[47]
Psychiatric Report prepared by Dr Wynn Owen (exhibit 1, vol 2, 325); Treatment
Progress Report prepared by Ms Korda (exhibit 1, vol
2,
340).
[48]
Treatment Progress Report prepared by Ms Korda (exhibit 1, vol 2,
340).
[49]
Psychiatric Report prepared by Dr Wynn Owen (exhibit 1, vol 2,
325).
[50]
Psychiatric Report prepared by Dr Wynn Owen (exhibit 1, vol 2, 325); Treatment
Progress Report prepared by Ms Korda (exhibit 1, vol
2,
340).
[51]
Psychiatric Report prepared by Dr Wynn Owen (exhibit 1, vol 2,
325).
[52]
Psychiatric Report prepared by Dr Wynn Owen (exhibit 1, vol 2,
326).
[53]
Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit 1, vol
2,
361).
[54]
Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit 1, vol
2,
355).
[55]
Exhibit 1, vol 1, 171 - 185; Exhibit 1, vol 1, 186 - 188; Exhibit 1, vol 2, 298;
Treatment Progress Report prepared by Ms Korda (exhibit
1, vol 2, 340 -
341).
[56]
Exhibit 1, vol 1, 171 -
185.
[57]
Treatment Progress Report prepared by Ms Korda (exhibit 1, vol 2, 341);
Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit
1, vol 2,
355).
[58]
Exhibit
2.
[59]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [36] - [41];
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 2] [12] - [15]; Treatment Progress Report prepared
by Ms Korda (exhibit 1, vol 2, 338).
[60]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 2] [18] -
[23].
[61]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 2]
[36].
[62]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 3] [26] -
[27].
[63]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 3]
[27].
[64]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 4] [51].
[65]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 4]
[28].
[66]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 4]
[30].
[67]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 4]
[30].
[68]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 4]
[31].
[69]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 4]
[32].
[70]
The State of Western
Australia v Carter [No 4]
[33].
[71]
Treatment Progress Report prepared by Ms Hamlett-Waller (exhibit 1, vol 1, 189);
Treatment Progress Report prepared by Ms Korda (exhibit
1, vol 2, 338 -
340).
[72]
ts 340, 12 June
2023.
[73]
Exhibit 1, vol 2,
323.
[74]
ts 322 - 339, 12 June
2023.
[75]
Exhibit 1, vol 2,
336.
[76]
ts 339 - 347, 12 June
2023.
[77]
Exhibit 1, vol 2,
351.
[78]
ts 347 - 356, 12 June
2023.
[79]
Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [178].
[80] The State of Western Australia v Carter [76] - [77].
[81]
ts 316 - 317 and 357, 12 June 2023.
[82]
ts 316 - 320 and 357 - 360, 12 June 2023.
[83]
ts 320 and 363, 12 June 2023.
[84]
ts 320 and 363 - 364, 12 June 2023.
[85] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [55].
[86]
Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [62].
[87]
The State of Western
Australia v Jonsson [No 3] [2019] WASC 463
[147].
[88]
The State of Western
Australia v Jonsson [No 3] [148] - [149];
The State of Western
Australia v JXK [No 3] [2023] WASC 23
[184].
[89]
Although counsel did not identify the relevant decision I assume the decision is
that of Fiannaca J in The
State of Western Australia v CA [No 3] [2023] WASC 144 [199], [212],
[234].
[90]
Community Supervision Assessment Report, (exhibit 1, vol 2, 362; ts 353, 12 June
2023.
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