Re David John Roy Crompton and Repatriation Commission [1992] AATA 309; (1992) 28 ALD 98 (15 October 1992)

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Re: DAVID JOHN ROY CROMPTON
And: REPATRIATION COMMISSION
No. P 91/493
AAT No. 8316
Number of pages - 21
Repatriation
[1992] AATA 309; (1992) 28 ALD 98

COURT

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
VETERANS APPEALS DIVISION
The Hon. Mr Justice Rodney N. Purvis(1) (Presidential Member)

CATCHWORDS

Repatriation - Application to the Commission for increase in pension - application refused - application for review to Veterans Review Board of Commission's decision not forwarded - not received until after the statutory 3 months period had elapsed - Board nevertheless determined application validly made and considered the "application" and affirmed the Commission's decision - application then made to the Tribunal for review of Board's "decision" - jurisdiction of Tribunal to determine whether application to Board was validly made and as to whether the Board had power to hear substantive application and review decision of Commission - "made" to be equated with "lodged" - decision of the Commission affirmed and of the Board set aside

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 - s.29, s.44(1), s.57

Veterans Entitlements Act - s.135(5), s.136(1), s.174, s.175, s.176, s.177, s.139(2), s.15, s.19(5)

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act

Social Security Act - s.25

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321

Lamb v Moss (1983) 75 FLR 296

Ross v Costigan (1982) 59 FLR 184

Director-General of Social Security v Chaney [1980] FCA 87; (1980) 47 FLR 80

Ward v Nicholls 16 ALD 353

R v Balfour 17 FCR 26

Re McLeod and Repatriation Commission [1990] AATA 232; 21 ALD 579

Re Purnell and Repatriation Commission (1990) 14 AAR 63

Roberts v Repatriation Commission V89/715, 4 March 1992

Angus Fine Armour Australia Pty Limited v Collector of Customs [1988] FCA 339; (1988) 19 FCR 477

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic [1990] FCA 22; (1990) 21 FCR 193

Formosa v Department of Social Security [1988] FCA 291; 81 ALR 687

SLE Medical Pty Limited and Industry Research and Development Board (1988) 10 AAR 13

Re Secretary, Department of Social Security v Branch [1990] AATA 274; 21 ALD 351

Shortis v Secretary, Department of Local Government and Ethnic Affairs 23 ALD 396

Words and phrases - "decision", "forward", "lodge", "made"

HEARING

PARRAMATTA
15:10:1992

ORDER

The application by the veteran dated 5 November 1991 is dismissed. 2. The decision of the Veterans Review Board of 15 October 1991 is set aside. 3. The decision of the Commission under review is affirmed.

DECISION

THE ISSUE
The jurisdiction issue presently raised before the Tribunal is as to whether the Veterans Review Board has power to hear and determine an application for variation of an assessment of pension where such application is not made to it by or on behalf of the veteran within the time limit prescribed by s.135(5), and in accord with the provisions of s.136(1), of the Veterans Entitlements Act.

2. There was no issue raised as to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and determine the jurisdiction issue.

THE RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES
3. The issue arises for determination in the following circumstances:
The applicant (hereinafter referred to as the veteran) made application for an increase in pension on 24 November 1987. The application was refused by the respondent Commission on 12 December 1988. The decision refusing the application was received by the veteran on 21 December 1988, following which, and on 16 January 1989, he was seen by an officer of the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and an application seeking review of the decision of the Commission by the Board of Review was on that day completed and signed by the applicant. The officer placed the application form in an envelope, addressed the same to the Department of Veterans Affairs, and placed the envelope in an outward mail tray ready for postage. There was no evidence as to the envelope being in fact posted. The envelope with the application form in it was not received by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

4. Under date 24 May and 26 June 1989, letters were sent by the Legal Aid Commission to the Department of Veterans Affairs inquiring about the application for review. On being advised by the Department to the effect that the application had not been received, the Legal Aid Commission caused a copy of the application, having a date on it of 16 January 1989, to be forwarded to the Department, which copy was received on 20 July 1989.

5. On 8 May 1990, the Veterans Review Board, under the hand of its Deputy Registrar, informed the Deputy Commissioner, Department of Veterans Affairs, to the following effect:
"Re David John Crompton

.....
On 8 May 1990, a panel of the Veterans Review Board decided that
the application for review signed by the applicant on 16 January 1989
and forwarded to the Department on the same date by the Legal Aid
Commission was a valid application.
When the Legal Aid Commission advises it is ready to proceed, the
matter will be listed for hearing by the Board."

6. The "application for review" came before a Veterans Review Board on 15 October 1991. The Board considered the application as if it had been a valid application and affirmed the decision under review. In its reasons for decision, the Board inter alia said:

"On 28 June 1989, the veteran's application for review of this
pension assessment (Commission decision of 12 December 1988) was
received by the Department of Veterans Affairs .. However, it has been
determined that the original application for review was in fact
forwarded on 16 January 1989 and had not been located by the
Department. The application is therefore determined to be a valid
application for the purposes of S.135 of the Act."

7. It was under date 5 November 1991 that the applicant made application for review by the Tribunal of the "decision of 15.10.91 affirming Repat. Commission decision of 12.12.88".

THE LEGISLATION
8. The application made by the veteran to the Board was one seeking a review of a decision referable to the assessment of the rate of pension payable, and on the refusal of the respondent to increase such rate of pension on the decision of the Commission being affirmed by the Board, the applicant then sought to appeal to the Tribunal. The relevant provisions of the Veterans Entitlements Act are as follows:

"S.135(5) An application under ss.(1)..... to the Board to review
a decision of the Commission:
(a).....
(b).....
(c) refusing to increase the rate of a pension;
.....
may be made within three months after service on the person to whom
the decision relates of a copy of that decision in accordance with
ss.34(2), but not otherwise.
.....
S.136(1) An application to the Board for review:
(a) shall be in writing; and
(b) shall be made by forwarding the application to, or delivering the
application at, an office of the Department in Australia;
and may set out a statement of the reasons for the application.
S.139(2).....
S.174(1) In this Part (Part X - Review of decisions by Administrative
Appeals Tribunal) unless the contrary intention appears "reviewable
decision" means a decision in respect of which application may be made
to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under s.175.
.....
S.175(1) Where a decision made by the Commission has been reviewed by
the Board upon a request made under s.135 and affirmed, varied or set
aside, then, subject to s.29 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
Act 1975, application may be made to the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal for a review:
(a) of the decision of the Commission that was so affirmed;
(b) of the decision of the Commission as so varied; or
(c) of the decision made by the Board in substitution for the decision
so set aside.
as the case may be."

GROUNDS RAISED
A Reviewable Decision
9. It was submitted on behalf of the veteran that the "finding" by the Board as to validity of the application to it is not a "decision" within the meaning of s.175 of the Veterans Entitlements Act and is not a reviewable decision within the meaning of s.174 of the Act. Hence, there is no jurisdiction conferred upon the Administrative Appeals Tribunal enabling it to decide whether the Veterans Review Board did or did not itself have jurisdiction enabling it then to deal with the application.

10. Assuming that there is a reviewable decision, the question then to be determined is as to whether it is competent for the Tribunal to hear and determine an application for review where there is a defect in a statutory requirement necessary to be complied with as a matter precedent to the application being so heard and determined.

The Relevant Decision
11. There was argument as to whether the decision by the Veterans Review Board as to a "valid application" having been made to it, was one made on 8 May 1990 or 15 October 1991, for on the former date, the Deputy Registrar of the Board said in a letter that the Board had decided that the application for review was a "valid application", and on the latter date, the Board in its published decision said, "the application is therefore determined to be a valid application for the purposes of s.135 Act".

12. There is not any material before the Tribunal, other than the letter of 8 May 1990, referable to the decision said to have been made on that day.

13. A decision as to validity was one necessarily to be made by the Board in order that it could proceed to deal with the substantive application that it took to be before it. S.135 of the Act restricted the making of applications for review of assessment to those applications of the relevant kind made "within three months after service" of a copy of a decision "but not otherwise". The Board would not have the requisite jurisdiction in the absence of compliance with the statutory requirements.

14. There was not any basis for concluding that the provisions of the Act referable to a constitution of a Board had been other than complied with prior to the letter of 8 May 1990, and that the decision referred to in it had not been duly made. However, even if this not be so, the Board, on 15 October 1991, did consider the matter, noted findings of fact, and determined that the application was valid. The Tribunal does not consider it necessary to further consider the question as to whether there were two decisions and as to whether the Tribunal can review the earlier and the later of such decisions. A decision was made as to validity on 15 October 1991, if not on 8 May 1990, and the Board proceeded to deal with the application.

Whether the Finding as to Validity was a "Decision"
15. The question then to be answered is as to whether it is competent for the Tribunal to consider the finding as to validity in the context of satisfying itself as to its own jurisdiction.

16. It was submitted on behalf of the veteran that the determination as to validity by the Board was not a "decision" of the Board which had affirmed the decision of the Commission reviewable under s.175 of the Veterans Entitlements Act. The reviewable matters there set forth "included" the decision of the Commission that was so affirmed, and the determination as to validity, it was said, could not fall within the meaning of the words used in the statute.

17. "Reviewable decisions" are defined by s.174(1) of the Act as meaning decisions "in respect of which application may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under s.175". Consequently, it is necessary to determine whether a decision is one in respect of which an application can be made within the meaning of s.175(1) before it can be said that that decision is amenable to the review provisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act. So far as the Veterans Entitlements Act is concerned, it is only in respect of decisions falling within s.175(1) that application for review may be made to the Tribunal.

18. It was said on behalf of the veteran that the finding as to validity by the Board was an administrative or procedural decision which, be it defective, would not preclude the Tribunal from hearing the substantive application. The only decision, it was said, that the Tribunal has power to review is the Commission's decision, not a decision as to whether the matter was properly before the Board. Reference was made to Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321 where at 337, Mason C.J., in considering the ambit of the concept of decision, said:

"The policy arguments do not, in my opinion, call for an answer
different from that dictated by the textural and contextual
considerations. That answer is not a reviewable "decision", is one
for which provision is made by or under a statute. That will
generally, but not always, entail a decision which is final or
operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the
issue of fact falling for consideration. A conclusion reached as a
step along the way in a course of reasoning leading to an ultimate
decision would not ordinarily amount to a reviewable decision unless
the statute provided for the making of a finding or ruling on that
point so that the decision, though an intermediate decision, might
accurately be described as a decision under an enactment ..... "

and at 338:

"..... the interpretation of "decision" which I favour is not as
broad as that preferred by the Federal Court in Lamb v Moss (1983) 75
FLR 296. There the Full Court of the Federal Court ..... after
reviewing the authorities, which the Court said revealed "some
inconsistency" stated at 318 "in our opinion there is no limitation
implied or otherwise which restricts the class of decision which may
be reviewed to decisions which finally determine rights or obligations
or which may be said to have an ultimate and operative effect".
My view is more in accord with the tentative opinion expressed earlier
by Ellicott J. in Ross v Costigan (1982) 59 FLR 184 at 197, when he
said that, "It may well be that the word "decision" means an ultimate
or operative determination, not a mere expression of opinion or a
statement which can of itself have no effect on a person". However, I
would not wish for myself to place emphasis on the words "of itself"
in this statement. To say that a reviewable decision is an ultimate
or operative determination does not mean that antecedent conclusions
or findings which contribute to the ultimate or operative decision are
beyond reach. Review of an ultimate or operative decision on
permissible grounds will expose for consideration the reasons which
are given for the making of the decision and the processes by which it
is made."

19. The subject determination as to validity would seem to me to fall within what was there described as an "antecedent conclusion or finding" contributing to the ultimate or operative decision, for without the finding as to validity, the Board could not proceed to the making of an ultimate or operative determination.

20. In Director-General of Social Security v Chaney [1980] FCA 87; (1980) 47 FLR 80 at 100, Deane J., in considering the meaning to be ascribed to the word "decision" where used in s.44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act in relation to an appeal to the Federal Court, said:

"The word "decision" is a word of indeterminate meaning. In some
contexts, it can refer to the mental process of making up one's mind.
In the context of judicial or administrative proceedings, the word
would ordinarily refer to an announced or published ruling or
adjudication. In such a context, the word "decision" may be apt to
include the determination of any question of substance or procedure
including, for example, rulings on procedural questions such as
whether particular evidence should be received, or the meaning of the
word may be limited to determination effectively resolving an actual
substantive issue. When the word "decision" has the last mentioned
limited meaning, it can refer to any such determination, whether final
or intermediate ..... or be limited to referring only to a
determination which effectively disposes of the matter in hand ....."

21. It is necessary for the Board (s.139(2) ), in reviewing a decision, to satisfy itself with respect to, or determine, "all matters relevant to the review". One such matter is that the application is or is not validly before it. In Ward v Nicholls 16 ALD 353, Wilcox J., when considering an inter-relationship between the Board and the Tribunal, said at 361:

"It would be a very odd situation if the position were as
perceived by .....; that is to say, if the appointed first instance
reviewer, the Veterans Review Board, erroneously found that it had no
jurisdiction and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal - which is set up
by statute to review on their merits decisions of that Board - was
then precluded from considering for itself whether the Board in fact
had jurisdiction and if so, what decision it should have made. There
would be a lacuna in the system of administrative review,
disappointing to those who had laboured to set up the comprehensive
system which appears to be provided by the statute. I cannot think
that this is right. I think that the true position is that the
Veterans Review Board is always in the position of the Commission;
and that whatever decision it makes, that decision is subject to
review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal."

22. It seems to me that the same position must apply in the subject matter, be it that the Board in this instance found that it did have jurisdiction, not, as in Ward v Nicholls (supra), that it did not have jurisdiction.

23. The subject determination was one, in my view, of substance and relevant to the review, for without such a finding, the matter could not properly proceed.

"Declaration" as to Validity - merely a defect or interim procedure
24. It was further submitted on behalf of the veteran that the "declaration" as to validity was merely a "defect" which would leave an administrative decision good in law unless and until it is declared otherwise (R v Balfour 17 FCR 26 at 33); that it was an "interim procedural" decision, a matter concerning the "legality" of the Board's actions within the meaning of Re McLeod and the Repatriation Commission [1990] AATA 232; 21 ALD 579.

25. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is precisely in aid of determining the validity or correctness of the earlier decision of which the finding as to validity was an integral part.

26. I have earlier in these reasons indicated the view I hold as to the nature of the decision as to validity made by the Board. It is one of substance, if not an antecedent conclusion or finding.

Request made under S.135
27. Be it that I am of the opinion that the determination of the Board as to validity is a decision subject to review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, nevertheless, it is competent to consider s.175 of the Act in the context of the matter or prerequisites enabling a decision to come before the Tribunal.

28. S.175 of the Veterans Entitlements Act enables the Tribunal to entertain an application for review where a decision made by the Commission "has been reviewed by the Board upon a request made under s.135" and affirmed, varied or set aside. Thus, if the decision of the Commission was not reviewed by the Board following a request made under s.135, but following a request made in some other way, then it would not be competent for the Tribunal to entertain it. It would not be a reviewable decision within the meaning of s.174.

29. Even if, then, the determination as to validity was not a decision capable of being itself reviewed (and I am of the opinion that it is so reviewable), this would not preclude the Tribunal from determining whether it had jurisdiction under s.175 to deal with an application for review of a finding of the Board that it was not competent for it, the Board to have made.

30. If the request for review by the Board was not made pursuant to s.135, that is, not in accord with the prerequisites of s.135, then it was not a reviewable decision properly to be brought to the Tribunal.

REVIEW OF APPLICATION TO VETERANS REVIEW BOARD BY THE VETERAN
Was the application duly "made"
31. The application of the veteran, although bearing date 16 January 1989, was not, on the evidence before the Tribunal, received by the Department of Veterans Affairs until 20 July 1989.

32. S.136 of the Veterans Entitlements Act requires that an application to the Board for review shall be in writing and "shall be made by forwarding the application to or delivering the application at an office of the Department in Australia". The application being one for an increase in rate of pension, it is to be so made within three months after service on the person to whom the decision relates, of a copy of the decision of the Commission, "but not otherwise". There is no discretion conferred upon the Board to extend the time.

33. The veteran's application commenced as one pursuant to s.15 of the Act, and a decision was made by the Commission pursuant to s.19(5) of the Act. The decision was one as to assessment of rate of pension.

34. The Veterans Review Board is only able to make a decision if there has been a valid application made to it. The method of making an application is prescribed by s.136 of the Veterans Entitlements Act. The method of making an application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is set out in s.175 of the Act and s.29 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act as modified by s.176 of the Veterans Entitlements Act. S.177 of the Veterans Entitlements Act makes provision for effective dates of payment of pension or increased pension, and s.177(2) (a) stipulates the consequences of an application being made within three months after service. The word "made" where used in s.177 is to be equated with the word "lodged" in s.29(1) (d) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act (Re Purnell and Repatriation Commission (1990) 14 AAR 63 at 67; Roberts and Repatriation Commission V89/715, 4 March 1992. There is not any reason why the word "made" where used in other sections of the Veterans Entitlements Act, viz, s.135 and s.136, should not attract the same meaning as it does in s.177, that is, be equated with the word "lodged". Thus, an application for review of a decision by the Commission must be "lodged" by forwarding the application to or delivering the application at an office of the Department in Australia. The meaning to be ascribed to the word "lodged" where it appears in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Angus Fine Armour Australia Pty Limited v Collector of Customs [1988] FCA 339; (1988) 19 FCR 477. At 488, Northrop J. said:

"The word "lodge" when used as a verb has a number of meanings.
In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the relevant meaning is a) to place
deposit. A number of examples are set out including to put and leave
in a place of custody or security ..... to lodge money in the hands of
a banker ..... to deposit in court or with an official a formal
statement of (an information, complaint, objection etcetera). Thus
in s.68 in the Act the word lodged is used in the sense of placing or
depositing a document at the office of the Registry or a Deputy
Registrar. ..... Whether the lodging is done by post or by depositing
the document at the office, a concept of acceptance is required in a
sense similar to that required with respect to the presentation of a
document. There must be a physical acceptance of the document by an
officer of the Registry. Thus if an application is posted but not
delivered to a Registry, the application is not lodged. In all
probability, it is lodged when it is received at the office of the
Registry. Similarly a document deposited on a counter at the office
of a Registry may not be lodged but if taken by an officer or in other
words received by that officer, it is accepted for lodging."

35. An application, in order to be "made", must be lodged with the Board within the time prescribed by s.136 of the Veterans Entitlements Act. The veteran's application was not lodged with the Board until July 1989.

36. As with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, so with the Veterans Review Board, the same is a creature of statute and its jurisdiction is determined by statute. The Board has power to review decisions in respect of pensions and allowances pursuant to s.135 of the Act, whereas s.136 provides for the procedure necessary for the making of an application.

37. The jurisdiction of the Board to review decisions which it has power to review arises upon the making to it of an application for review.

38. The Tribunal is of the view that in the subject matter, the Veterans Review Boar did not have a valid application before it in relation to a decision which it had power to review. There is, as has already been mentioned, no discretion in the Board to extend the period of time provided in s.135. Strict compliance with the time prerequisite is necessary.

39. As was said in Roberts and the Repatriation Commission (supra) at para. 25:

"The Veterans Entitlements Act provides for the payment of
pensions and other benefits to veterans and certain other persons.
the payment of pensions and benefits is not open ended in that
veterans must satisfy certain eligibility criteria. A system of
review involving the Veterans Review Board and the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal has been set up under the Act. Time limits are set
in s.57A for internal review, s.135 for review by the Veterans Review
Board, and s.176 for review by the Tribunal. At all levels of the
review system then, Parliament has evinced an intention based on
public policy that veterans should not have an unlimited time in which
to pursue their claims."

With respect, I agree with the views there expressed by O'Connor J.

40. In this case, the time limit for lodging an application with the Veterans Review Board is three months. Either an application is lodged in that time or it is not. The limits placed on the time in which a veteran might seek review of a decision by the Commission are not subject to extension, and fit in with the legislative framework of the operation of effective dates of payment of pension or increased pension (see s.177 of the Veterans Entitlements Act).

41. Thus, on the factual material before the Tribunal, the application by the veteran was not made to the Board in accord with the time limits prescribed by the Veterans Entitlements Act. The Veterans Review Board should have declared or stated that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DETERMINATION
42. It was submitted on behalf of the veteran that there were other avenues open to the Commission in aid of a review being had of the finding by the Board as to validity, such as an application under the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act.

43. I consider for the reasons earlier set forth that whilst it might have been competent for an application to have been made under the provisions of the AD(JR) Act seeking a declaration as to invalidity, nevertheless power is conferred on the Tribunal to determine whether it has jurisdiction and to entertain an application such as that the subject of these proceedings (See Ward v Nicholls (supra)).

44. Indeed, in the absence of the veteran seeking a review by the Tribunal of the decision of the Board, there would have been no point in the Commission seeking a decision under the Judicial Review legislation, as the Board, be it in the absence of jurisdiction, had affirmed the Commission's decision.

ESTOPPEL
45. It was further submitted on behalf of the veteran that in the event of an appeal lying from the decision of 8 May 1990 that the respondent did not exercise such right of appeal, but sought to raise the issue in order to preclude the substantive relief sought by the applicant, viz, a special rate of pension, being granted. It was thus said that the respondent was estopped from seeking to raise the jurisdiction point at this time. The respondent could have raised the issue of jurisdiction, it was submitted, before the Veterans Review Board on 15 October 1991. It did not do so, and should now be estopped from doing so on the hearing of the substantive application.

46. It is clear that the generally accepted proposition seems to be that the doctrine of estoppel cannot prevent the performance of a statutory duty or the exercise of a statutory discretion. (Roberts and the Repatriation Commission (supra); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic [1990] FCA 22; (1990) 21 FCR 193).

47. There is no right by estoppel to extend the authority of a decision-make beyond that granted by statute. As was said by Davies and Gummow JJ. in Formosa v Department of Social Security [1988] FCA 291; 81 ALR 687 at 695:

"The present case is a case of right and obligation rather than
discretion. If a claimant to an aged pension satisfies the criteria
specified in s.25 of the Social Security Act for qualification, and if
a claim is made in accordance with s.159, then in the ordinary course
the claim should be determined in favour of the claimant and subject
to the determination of the rate of the pension, there is no area for
the exercise of discretion by the decision-maker. But if there has
been no claim for that pension which complied with s.159, then the
grant or payment of the pension shall not be made ..... the effect of
the estoppel sought to be established in the present case would be, as
we have said, to lift the prohibition imposed by s.158(1) and extend
the authority of the decision-maker beyond that given by the statute.
This cannot be achieved by an estoppel ....."

48. The provisions of the Veterans Entitlements Act are analogous to the provisions of the Social Security Act 1947. An estoppel cannot be raised to permit the Tribunal or the Board, each of which stands in the shoes of the decision-maker, to act in a way contrary to the legislation. The powers of the Tribunal and of the Board cannot be extended in this way.

DECISION
49. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the substantive application for review of the decision as to assessment of the Commission, this by reason of the Veterans Review Board not itself being seized of jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for review of the decision of the Commission made on 12 December 1988.

50. There was no jurisdiction in the Veterans Review Board to hear and determine the application, and the decision purported to have been made by the Board on 15 October 1991 must in the circumstances be set aside. (See SLE Medical Pty Limited and Industry Research and Development Board (1988) 10 AAR 13; Ward v Nicholls and others (supra); Re Secretary DSS and Branch [1990] AATA 274; 21 ALD 351; Shortis v Secretary, Department of Local Government and Ethnic Affairs 23 ALD 396).

51. Accordingly, the application by the veteran dated 5 November 1991 is dismissed. The decision of the Veterans Review Board of 15 October 1991 is set aside. The decision of the Commission under review is affirmed.