Lester and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] AATA 265 (16 April 2010)

Last Updated: 16 April 2010

Administrative Appeals Tribunal

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2010] AATA 265

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )

) No 2009/2778

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION		)
	Re		MARY GRACE LESTER

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal

Senior Member R W Dunne

Date 16 April 2010

Place Adelaide

Decision

The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

..............................................
R W DUNNE
(Senior Member)

CATCHWORDS

IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP – application for citizenship by descent – applicant’s father was British subject born in Australia, resided in Canada – father died before Australian citizenship could be conferred upon him under Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 on 26 January 1949 – purposive construction of s 16(3) of Australian Citizenship Act 2007 – application for citizenship refused by delegate – decision under review affirmed
Naturalisation Act 1903 s 3
Nationality Act 1920 ss 5(1), 6(1)(a)
Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 s 25
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 ss 4(2), 16(3)

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 15AA
Bermingham v Corrective Services Commission of New South Wales (1988) 15 NSWLR 292
R v Di Maria [1996] SASC 5882; (1996) 67 SASR 466
Parrett v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2002] FCA 716; (2002) 124 FCR 299
Wentworth Securities Limited v Jones [1980] AC 74
Mills v Meeking [1990] HCA 6; (1990) 169 CLR 214
Trevisan and Anor v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 29 FCR 157
R v L (1994) 49 FCR 534

REASONS FOR DECISION

16 April 2010

Senior Member R W Dunne

INTRODUCTION

1. The applicant (Mary Grace Lester) was born in Canada. She is a citizen of Canada and currently resides there. Her father (Paul Pentecost) was born on 13 January 1878 in North Willoughby, New South Wales. He died in Canada on 23 December 1931. On 16 February 2009, Mrs Lester applied to become a citizen of Australia by descent. On 3 June 2009, a delegate of the Minister (“respondent”) refused the application on the ground that Mrs Lester’s father did not become an Australian citizen, pursuant to s 16(3)(a) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (“2007 Act”), on 26 January 1949. Mrs Lester now seeks review of that decision.
2. At the hearing, Mrs Lester was represented by Simon Ower, of counsel, and Paul d’Assumpcao (from the office of the Australian Government Solicitor) appeared for the respondent. The Tribunal received into evidence the T documents lodged pursuant to s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Exhibit R1), together with the statutory declaration from Mrs Lester’s daughter, Ms Susan Layng (Exhibit A1).

ISSUE FOR THE TRIBUNAL

3. The issue for the Tribunal is whether the applicant’s father, who died on 23 December 1931, was an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949, so that the applicant is eligible to become an Australian citizen under s 16(3) of the 2007 Act.

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

4. For persons born prior to 26 January 1949, Australian citizenship was established as a concept on 26 January 1949. The then Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (which later became the Australian Citizenship Act 1948) (“1948 Act”) made provision for conferring Australian citizenship on persons born in Australia or with an Australian connection, who previously had been British subjects. Prior to the commencement of the 1948 Act a person in Australia was, pursuant to s 3 of the Naturalisation Act 1903 and s 5(1) of the Nationality Act 1920 (“1920 Act”), either an alien or a British subject.
5. The transitional provisions of s 25 of the 1948 Act conferred citizenship in appropriate cases. The section relevantly provided:

“25(1) A person who was a British subject immediately prior to the date of commencement of this Act shall, on that date, become an Australian citizen if:
(a) he was born in Australia and would have been an Australian citizen if section ten of this Act had been in force at the time of his birth;
(b) ...
(c) he was a person naturalized in Australia; or
(d) he had been, immediately prior to the date of commencement of this Act, ordinarily resident in Australia or New Guinea, or partly in Australia and partly in New Guinea, for a period of at least five years.
(2) ...
(3) A person born outside Australia and New Guinea-
(a) who was a British subject immediately prior to the date of commencement of this Act;
(b) whose father was a person to whom paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (1) of this section applies ; and
(c) entered Australia prior to that date,
shall on that date become an Australian citizen.”

6. Under the 1920 Act, “alien” was defined to mean a person who was not a British subject. “British subject” was defined as a person who was a natural-born British subject. Section 6(1)(a) then relevantly provided:

“6(1) The following persons shall be deemed to be natural-born British subjects, namely:
(a) Any person born within His Majesty’s dominions and allegiance; and
...”

7. Under s 16(3) of the 2007 Act, a person who was born outside Australia or New Guinea prior to 26 January 1949 to a parent who, on 26 January 1949, became an Australian citizen is eligible to acquire Australian citizenship, provided certain other requirements are satisfied. Section 16(3) relevantly reads:

“Persons born outside Australia or New Guinea before 26 January 1949
(3) A person born outside Australia or New Guinea before 26 January 1949 is eligible to become an Australian citizen if:
(a) a parent of the person became an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949; and
(b) the parent was born in Australia or New Guinea or was naturalised in Australia before the person’s birth; and
(c) if the person is or has ever been a national or a citizen of any country, or if article 1(2)(iii) of the Stateless Persons Convention applies to the person—the Minister is satisfied that the person is of good character at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application.”

8. For the purposes of the 2007 Act, a person became an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949 if they did so under the 1948 Act, as in force at that time. Section 4(2) of the 2007 Act reads:

“4 Australian citizen
...
Citizenship under the old Act
(2) If, under this Act, it is necessary to work out if a person was an Australian citizen at a time before the commencement day, work that out under the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 as in force at that time.”

BACKGROUND AND EVIDENCE

9. The factual background to this case is not in dispute. It is sufficient to state what follows. Mrs Lester was born in Kaslo, Canada on 19 June 1920. Her mother, Harriet Grace Pentecost (nee Nash), was born in England on 20 March 1889. On the material available, Harriet Pentecost was not an Australian citizen. Mrs Lester’s father was under age when he joined the British Army and served in Lucknow, India and then in the Boer War in South Africa. After the Boer War, he travelled around Africa then went to Canada, where he joined the British Columbia Provincial Police. At the end of World War 1, he met and married Mrs Lester’s mother in England in July 1919. Mr and Mrs Pentecost moved back to Canada, where Mrs Lester was born. Mr Pentecost passed away suddenly in December 1931.
10. In her statutory declaration (Exhibit A1), Ms Layng states:

“12. My mother is now 89 years of age and lives on her own due to the death of my father 10 years ago.
13. I am appalled (horrified) that my mother is not eligible for Australian Citizenship by Decent [sic] because her father is considered to have been a British subject. He was born in Australia along with all of his siblings and also had an uncle and several cousins in Toowoomba, Queensland. My grandfather was always proud of the fact that he was an Australian.”

11. In amplification of her statutory declaration, Ms Layng’s evidence was that her mother had strongly identified with Australia because she had always considered her father to be an Australian. Her mother had visited Australia to see her family for two months in 1986/1987 and again in 2000. She lived in Canada, but wished to come to Australia to live near her daughter and her grandchildren.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

12. Prior to the hearing, the respondent had filed and served its Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, setting out its contentions. However, no such statement (or outline of argument) had been filed and served by or on behalf of the applicant. On the day of the hearing, Mr Ower appeared, instructed by solicitors acting for the applicant.

THE APPLICANT’S ARGUMENT

13. The applicant’s argument is that, in construing the provisions of s 16(3)(a) of the 2007 Act, a purposive construction, as appears from s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (“Interpretation Act”), should be applied. Such a purposive approach may involve construing legislation with the effect that certain words appear in the legislation, even though those words are not expressly there: Bermingham v Corrective Services Commission of New South Wales (1988) 15 NSWLR 292, R v Di Maria [1996] SASC 5882; (1996) 67 SASR 466, Parrett v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2002] FCA 716; (2002) 124 FCR 299. The purposive approach has been described as implying, or “reading in”, words into legislation.
14. The purpose of the 2007 Act may be ascertained from its provisions. The Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the 2007 Act established that the 2007 Act is a consolidation of the 1948 Act. In considering the purpose and objects of the 2007 Act, it is permissible to consider the 1948 Act. In doing this, the purpose of the 1948 Act and the 2007 Act is to create a status of Australian citizenship. From the provisions of the 1948 Act, it appears Parliament intended to identify classes of persons who were, or were eligible to become, Australian citizens.
15. The result produced by a strict or literal construction of s 16(3)(a) of the 2007 Act is at odds with the purpose and context of both the 2007 and the 1948 Act. There is nothing in either the 2007 Act or the 1948 Act which suggests that Parliament sought to deliberately exclude persons whose parents died prior to 26 January 1949.
16. In applying the purposive approach referred to in Bermingham (supra), the process would involve construing the word “became” in s 16(3)(a) of the 2007 Act as meaning or encompassing the meaning “became or, if dead, would, but for his death, have become”.

THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT

17. Like the applicant, the respondent’s argument is that a purposive approach is to be adopted in the construction of s 16(3) of the 2007 Act. In the absence of an objects or a purpose clause in the 2007 Act, the specific purpose of s 16(3) may be ascertained by reference to the Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Australian Citizenship Bill 2005 which, at page 23 of the Memorandum, points to the history of s 16(3).
18. The respondent further contends that s 16(3) of the 2007 Act defines a class of people who are eligible for citizenship by descent. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of s 16(3) set out the criteria for determining whether a person has a sufficient relationship with Australia to be eligible for citizenship by descent. Paragraph (a) sets out the first requirement for eligibility. It requires that a parent of the person became an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949. A person became a citizen, relevantly in the present case, if the person satisfied the criteria in s 25(1) of the 1948 Act (which commenced on 26 January 1949). It was also the contention of the respondent that the applicant accepts that, if a “British subject” was dead on 26 January 1949, then, at law, citizenship could not be conferred on that person.
19. The terms of s 16(3) do not operate in relation to persons who had a parent who was not an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949. By specifying a date in s 16(3), Parliament evinced an intention that the provision covered descendants of those persons who became citizens on 26 January 1949 under the 1948 Act. Parliament in effect established a “cut-off” date for eligibility for citizenship by descent under s 16(3) of the 2007 Act.

CONSIDERATION

Was the applicant’s father, who died on 23 December 1931, an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949, so that the applicant is eligible to become an Australian citizen under s 16(3) of the 2007 Act?

20. Expressed in terms that specifically apply to her, under s 16(3) of the 2007 Act, Mrs Lester is eligible to become an Australian citizen if:

(a) her father (Mr Pentecost) became an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949;

(b) Mr Pentecost was born in Australia; and

(c) the Minister (or the Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the Minister) is satisfied that she is a person of good character.

For the purposes of the 2007 Act, Mr Pentecost would have become an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949 if he had done so under the 1948 Act, as in force at that time. He died on 23 December 1931 and thus, on a literal construction, he did not become an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949. It follows that Mrs Lester is not eligible to become an Australian citizen under s 16(3) of the 2007 Act.

21. The applicant’s contention is that a purposive construction should be adopted and, if this is done, s 16(3)(a) of the 2007 Act applies to Mr Pentecost. In reading s 15AA of the Interpretation Act, it provides:

“15AA Regard to be had to purpose or object of Act
(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.”

Such a purposive approach has been described as implying, or “reading in” words into legislation, such as s 16(3)(a) of the 2007 Act. Mr Ower referred to the decisions in Bermingham (supra), Di Maria (supra) and Parrett (supra) in support of the applicant’s contention.

22. In Bermingham, McHugh JA said (at 302):

“The Interpretation Act 1987, s 33, directs the Court to give legislation the
construction which promotes its purpose or object. In Kingston v Keprose
Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 404, I set out in some detail (at 421-424) the
principles applicable in giving legislation a purposive construction. The
passage is too long to set out at length. But in the course of that judgment I
pointed out that the grammatical meaning of a provision is not to be taken
to represent Parliament's intention as to its meaning when the context or the
purpose of the provision raises a real doubt about the applicability of the
grammatical meaning. If purpose or context do raise a real doubt as to
whether Parliament intended the grammatical meaning to apply, a court is
entitled to depart from that meaning. Moreover, if the grammatical meaning
gives rise to injustice or anomaly, it may strengthen the conclusion that the
Parliament did not intend the grammatical or literal meaning to apply.
Once the court concludes that the grammatical meaning does not accord
with the purpose of the legislation, ‘... it is often legitimate, because it is
necessary, to put a strained interpretation upon some words which have
been inadvertently used’: Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton
Publishing Co Ltd [1938] Ch 174 at 201. But as the cases to which I referred
(at 422-423) in Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd show, it is not only when
Parliament has used words inadvertently that a court is entitled to give
legislation a strained construction. To give effect to the purpose of the
legislation, a court may read words into a legislative provision if by
inadvertence Parliament has failed to deal with an eventuality required to be
dealt with if the purpose of the Act is to be achieved.” [Emphasis added]

23. McHugh JA then referred to the principles formulated by Lord Diplock in Wentworth Securities Limited v Jones [1980] AC 74 at 105-106 concerning the circumstances in which a court may read words into a legislative provision to give effect to its purpose. The necessary conditions for such a process are described by McHugh JA in Bermingham as follows:

“... First, the court must know the mischief with which the Act was dealing. Secondly, the court must be satisfied that by inadvertence Parliament has overlooked an eventuality which must be dealt with if the purpose of the Act is to be achieved.
Thirdly, the court must be able to state with certainty what words Parliament would have used to overcome the omission if its attention had been drawn to the defect.”

24. In Parrett, Madgwick J examined the scope of the purposive approach mandated by s 15AA of the Interpretation Act. In doing so, he referred to the comments made by Dawson J in Mills v Meeking [1990] HCA 6; (1990) 169 CLR 214. There, Dawson J offered the following explanation of the effect of s 35(a) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) and, by implication, s 15AA of the Interpretation Act. He observed (at 235):

“[T]he literal rule of construction, whatever the qualifications with which it is expressed, must give way to a statutory injunction to prefer a construction which would promote the purpose of an Act to one which would not, especially where that purpose is set out in the Act. Section 35 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act must, I think, mean that the purposes stated in Pt 5 of the Road Safety Act are to be taken into account in construing the provisions of that Part, not only where those provisions on their face offer more than one construction, but also in determining whether more than one construction is open. The requirement that a court look to the purpose or object of the Act is thus more than an instruction to adopt the traditional mischief or purpose rule in preference to the literal rule of construction. The mischief or purpose rule required an ambiguity or inconsistency before a court could have regard to purpose: Miller v. The Commonwealth [1904] HCA 34; (1904) 1 CLR 668 at p 674; Wacal Developments Pty. Ltd. v. Realty Developments Pty. Ltd. [1978] HCA 30; (1978) 140 CLR 503 at p 513. The approach required by s.35 needs no ambiguity or inconsistency; it allows a court to consider the purposes of an Act in determining whether there is more than one possible construction. Reference to the purposes may reveal that the draftsman has inadvertently overlooked something which he would have dealt with had his attention been drawn to it and if it is possible as a matter of construction to repair the defect, then this must be done. However, if the literal meaning of a provision is to be modified by reference to the purposes of the Act, the modification must be precisely identifiable as that which is necessary to effectuate those purposes and it must be consistent with the wording otherwise adopted by the draftsman [or woman]. Section 35 [or a section such as s 15AA] requires a court to construe an Act, not to rewrite it, in the light of its purposes”. [Emphasis added]

25. As is clear from its wording, the task under s 15AA of the Interpretation Act is to seek to discover the underlying purpose or object of the legislation or the provision being interpreted. As both Mr Ower and Mr d’Assumpcao pointed out, the 2007 Act does not contain either an objects or a purpose clause. However, it seems clear that the purpose of the 2007 Act, as was the case with the 1948 Act, is to create a status of Australian citizenship. The Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Australian Citizenship Bill 2005 refers to the more specific purpose of s 16(3) of the 2007 Act. The Revised Explanatory Memorandum (at page 23) somewhat clumsily explains the history of s 16(3) as follows:

”Subclause 16(3) refers to persons who are born outside Australia or New Guinea before 26 January 1949, ie: prior to the commencement of the old Citizenship Act. It provides that a person born outside Australia or New Guinea before 26 January 1949 is eligible to become an Australian citizen if:
(a) a parent of the person became an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949; and
(b) the parent was born in Australia or New Guinea or was naturalised in Australia before the person’s birth; and
(c) the Minister is satisfied that the person is of good character at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application.
This provision is the equivalent of section 11 of the old Act. Section 11 complemented former subsection 25(3) which provided a person became a citizen by operation of law to a person born outside Australia before 26 January 1949 whose father became a citizen on that date, by providing for persons born outside Australia before 26 January 1949 whose mother became citizens on that date.”

26. Mr Ower submitted that, from a reading of the 1948 Act, Parliament intended to identify different classes of persons who were, or were eligible to become, Australian citizens. Those classes were:

(a) a class of persons who are members of the Australian community and therefore are Australian citizens;

(b) a class of persons who have sufficient links (such as descent or marriage) to other members of the Australian community to become Australian citizens; and

(c) a class of persons who are able to perform certain acts (such as residence) to qualify for a grant of Australian citizenship.

The Tribunal agrees that this classification accurately describes those persons who are or are entitled to become Australian citizens.

27. Mr d’Assumpcao submitted that the ordinary meaning of s 16(3) of the 2007 Act is clear. It defines a class of persons who are eligible for citizenship by descent by establishing the criteria to be met as set out in paragraphs (a) to (c) of the section. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of the section demonstrate Parliament’s express intention to set the boundaries for eligibility. They establish a benchmark for determining whether a person has a sufficient relationship with Australia in order to be eligible for citizenship by descent. Section 16(3)(a) sets out the first of the three specific eligibility requirements. It requires that a parent of the person became an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949. A person became a citizen, relevantly in this case, if the person satisfied the criteria in s 25(1) of the 1948 Act (which commenced on 26 January 1949). By specifying a date in s 16(3), it is clear that the provision is intended to cover descendants of those persons who became citizens on 26 January 1949 under the 1948 Act. Parliament effectively established a “cut off” date for eligibility for citizenship by descent under s 16(3). To confirm the position, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Nationality and Citizenship Bill 1948 reads:

“Part IV – Transitional Provisions
Clause 25 – this clause will determine what persons now living are to become Australian citizens automatically upon commencement of the Act.” [Emphasis added]

28. Mr Ower submitted that a strict construction of s 16(3)(a) is at odds with the purpose and context of both the 2007 Act and the 1948 Act. He said there is nothing is either the 1948 Act or the 2007 Act which suggests that Parliament sought to deliberately exclude persons from the class described in paragraph 26(b) above, whose parents died prior to 26 January 1949. He argued that the facts in Mrs Lester’s case demonstrate the unfairness of such a construction, which he said is highlighted by considering the position of an Australian-born parent who died on 25 January 1949. On a literal construction, the child of such a person would not be able to become an Australian citizen.
29. Regrettable as this may seem, this is what s 16(3)(a) of the 2007 Act literally means. As was made clear by Dawson J in Mills v Meeking (supra), s 15AA of the Interpretation Act does not permit the Courts (or Tribunals) to ignore the actual words of the statute. The applicant is proposing that the literal meaning of s 16(3)(a) should be modified by reference to the purposes of the 2007 Act. In the Tribunal’s view, the modification proposed is not precisely identifiable as that which is necessary to effectuate the purposes suggested by the applicant. Nor is it consistent with the wording otherwise adopted by the draftsman in s 16(3)(a) itself.
30. The view taken by Dawson J was echoed by Burchett J in the Federal Court in Trevisan and Anor v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 29 FCR 157 and later by Burchett, Miles and Ryan JJ in the Full Federal Court in R v L (1994) 49 FCR 534. In Trevisan, Burchett J said (at 162):

“Section 15AA requires a court to prefer one construction to another. Such a requirement can only have meaning where two constructions are otherwise open. The section is not a warrant for redrafting legislation nearer to an assumed desire of the legislature. It is not for the courts to legislate; a meaning, though illuminated by the statutory injunction to promote the purpose or object underlying the Act, must be found in the words of Parliament. As Bowen C.J. said in Re The News Corporation Ltd (1987) 70 ALR 419 at 428:
‘A(n) ... important rule in this context is that embodied in s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 requiring the court to lean towards the construction that will promote the purpose of the Act. In the end the task of the court is to ascertain and to enforce the actual commands of the legislature (Scott v Cawsey [1907] HCA 80; (1907) 5 CLR 132 at p 155). This will best be achieved by studying the words used and the context and the purpose or object underlying the Act.’
...”

31. Of greater importance, the modification proposed by the applicant does not satisfy all the necessary conditions described by McHugh JA in Bermingham (supra). In considering the conditions in the present case, the Tribunal is not satisfied that, by inadvertence, Parliament has overlooked the situation where the parent of the person who is seeking citizenship by descent died (or may have died) before 26 January 1949. In the Tribunal’s view, and as submitted by Mr d’Assumpcao, Parliament has effectively established a “cut off” date or benchmark for eligibility for citizenship by descent under s 16(3) of the 2007 Act. Moreover, and again adopting the words of McHugh JA in Bermingham, the Tribunal is unable to state “with certainty” what words Parliament would have used to overcome the omission if its attention had been drawn to the potential pre-26 January 1949 death defect.
32. There will, no doubt, be cases where a Court (or a Tribunal) will be satisfied that, by inadvertence, Parliament has overlooked an eventuality which must be dealt with by “reading in” words if the purpose of an Act (or a provision in an Act) is to be achieved. Such was the case with Parrett (supra) with the context of the Farm Household Support Act 1992 there considered and Mr Parrett’s particular circumstances. However, in the Tribunal’s opinion, this is not the case with the present application for citizenship. The Tribunal appreciates that Mrs Lester is 89 years of age and it has sympathy for the fact that she wishes to come to Australia to live near her daughter and her grandchildren. However, the Tribunal is bound to give effect to the clear language of s 16(3)(a) of the 2007 Act, even though the result may appear anomalous or unfair.
33. In paragraph 18 of these reasons, reference is made to a concession which the respondent asserts was made by the applicant that, if a “British subject” (such as Mr Pentecost) was dead on 26 January 1949, then, at law, citizenship could not be conferred on him. If this was the case, it follows that Mrs Lester would not be eligible to become an Australian citizen under s 16(3) of the 2007 Act. The Tribunal finds it difficult to accept that, knowingly, such a concession was made by the applicant. In any event, given the findings made by the Tribunal relating to the operation of s 16(3)(a) in Mrs Lester’s case, the concession (even if made) is of no practical effect.

CONCLUSION

34. As the applicant’s father was not an Australian citizen on 26 January 1949, the applicant is not eligible to become an Australian citizen under s 16(3) of the 2007 Act.

DECISION

35. For the reasons outlined above, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
    

I certify that the 35 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member R W Dunne

Signed: ............J Coulthard..........................................

Associate

Date of Hearing 19 January 2010

Date of Decision 16 April 2010

Counsel for the Applicant Mr S Ower

Solicitor for the Applicant McDonald Steed McGrath Lawyers

Advocate for the Respondent Mr P d'Assumpcao

Solicitor for the Respondent AGS