1418139 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 1785 (4 October 2017)

Last Updated: 23 October 2017

1418139 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 1785 (4 October 2017)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION: Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER: 1418139

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Pakistan

MEMBER: Rachel Westaway

DATE: 4 October 2017

PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne

DECISION: The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the following directions that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 04 October 2017 at 12:42pm
CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection visa – Pakistan – Social group – Marsia Khwa and Noha Khuan – Imputed political opinion – Imamia Student Organisation (ISO) – Race – Mohajir – Religion – Shiite Muslim
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5, 36, 65, 91R, 91S, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
2. The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Pakistan, applied for the visa [in] September 2013 and the delegate refused to grant the visa [in] October 2014.
3. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 21 March 2016 to give evidence and present arguments.
4. The applicant was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent. The representative attended the Tribunal hearing.

RELEVANT LAW

5. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

Refugee criterion

6. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).
7. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

8. Sections 91R and 91S of the Act qualify some aspects of Article 1A(2) for the purposes of the application of the Act and the Regulations to a particular person.
9. There are four key elements to the Convention definition. First, an applicant must be outside his or her country.
10. Second, an applicant must fear persecution. Under s.91R(1) of the Act persecution must involve ‘serious harm’ to the applicant (s.91R(1)(b)), and systematic and discriminatory conduct (s.91R(1)(c)). Examples of ‘serious harm’ are set out in s.91R(2) of the Act. The High Court has explained that persecution may be directed against a person as an individual or as a member of a group. The persecution must have an official quality, in the sense that it is official, or officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the country of nationality. However, the threat of harm need not be the product of government policy; it may be enough that the government has failed or is unable to protect the applicant from persecution.
11. Further, persecution implies an element of motivation on the part of those who persecute for the infliction of harm. People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors.
12. Third, the persecution which the applicant fears must be for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Convention definition - race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The phrase ‘for reasons of’ serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution. The persecution feared need not be solely attributable to a Convention reason. However, persecution for multiple motivations will not satisfy the relevant test unless a Convention reason or reasons constitute at least the essential and significant motivation for the persecution feared: s.91R(1)(a) of the Act.
13. Fourth, an applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be a ‘well-founded’ fear. This adds an objective requirement to the requirement that an applicant must in fact hold such a fear. A person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution under the Convention if they have genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.
14. In addition, an applicant must be unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country or countries of nationality or, if stateless, unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to return to his or her country of former habitual residence. The expression ‘the protection of that country’ in the second limb of Article 1A(2) is concerned with external or diplomatic protection extended to citizens abroad. Internal protection is nevertheless relevant to the first limb of the definition, in particular to whether a fear is well-founded and whether the conduct giving rise to the fear is persecution.
15. Whether an applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations is to be assessed upon the facts as they exist when the decision is made and requires a consideration of the matter in relation to the reasonably foreseeable future.

Complementary protection criterion

16. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).
17. ‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s.36(2A): s.5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in s.5(1) of the Act. There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s.36(2B) of the Act.

Section 499 Ministerial Direction

18. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration –PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

19. The issue in this case is whether the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.
20. The applicant came from Pakistan to Australia in as a student. He returned to Pakistan in August 2010 and [in] August 2011 to visit his mother because she was sick. The applicant applied for a student visa which was refused [in] August 2013. He lodged his application for protection [in] September 2013.
21. His original claims contained within the Department [file] can be summarised as follows:
    • He is a male from Pakistan, Mohajir and is a Shia Muslim
    • He opposes extremist groups and believes he is a target because of his religion and political activities. He claims that during the vast majority of his life he has been politically and religiously active in his community.
    • He claims to have been a member of the Imamia Student’s organisation (ISO). He is a Shia and claims to be imputed as pro-Shia and pro Mutahade Qaumi Movement (MQM) and a supporter of MQM.
    • He claims his father was politically active. He was a supporter of Tehreek eJafaria Pakistan (TJP) and held [positions] and since the 1980s the applicant has become an active member and by the early 1990s he became [an official] of one of the zones and [senior official] of the same zone in Karachi in 1992.
    • He is a member of Marsia Khwa and Noha Khuan – (he is a Shiite singer who recites Shiite clergy) and claims that his profile is further enhanced because of this.
    • He claims that former ISO colleagues and supporters of his have been killed and named a poet and Noha and Marsia Khuan with whom he worked who was killed in March 2013.
    • He claims that as an educated person and western returnee he will be targeted on return to Pakistan.
22. The Tribunal has had regard to the additional information supporting the applicant’s claims which he provided to the delegate at interview. He elaborated on his father’s activities with the TJP and said his father organised protests on behalf of the TJP (Tehreek-e-Jafferia) in 1997 and 1998. He said his father was warned by the Wahhabi people to stop these activities and leave the area. He also assisted his father with TJP activities. The delegate accepted that the applicant’s father joined the TJP in the late 1980s when it was considered a more moderate party. The delegate also accepted as plausible that the applicant’s father progressed to become a local level [official] and [a senior official] of a zone in Karachi and was involved in the collection and distribution of funds to poorer Shiite community members in his neighbourhood. The delegate accepted as plausible that the applicant’s father was involved in peaceful protests in 1997 and 1998 to defend Shiite rights after the SSP invaded homes and forced them to leave. The delegate accepted as plausible that the applicant joined ISO in 1997 and was a member of Marsia Khwa and Noha Khuan.
23. The applicant provided details of the activities he was involved in claiming he helped organise [activities] for ISO and that he worked with his father. ISO was considered to be closely linked to TNFJ which became TJP of which the applicant’s father was a member. The delegate accepted as plausible that they worked together to help Shiite people. .The applicant claimed that his father died from a gunshot in 2004. He said that the police believe the SSP were responsible. The delegate accepted this as plausible. The applicant claimed that he continued his activities with ISO and organised protests and in 2006 he became [an official] of the ISO at [a University]. He stated that ISO received threats from Wahhabi extremists and the applicant was told by ISO to stay away and he left his family for 25 days to remain out of sight. The delegate accepted this as plausible.
24. The applicant claimed that the ANP, SSP and LeJ worked together in 2008 and 2009 to target Shiites in Karachi. The delegate found no country information to support the claim that SSP were targeting designated members of ISO in 2008 and 2009. The delegate accepted as plausible that the applicant’s brother was seriously injured in Islamabad during 2009 in a random attack. The applicant stated that in 2013 members of ISO were targeted and killed by the TTP or Punjabi Taliban. The delegate accepted that Shiite professionals were being targeted but did not accept that ISO members were being targeted.
25. The applicant left Pakistan in 2009. He then stated that in 2013 his mother wrote to him warning him that ISO had sent a letter advising he should remain in Australia and his [brothers] based in Pakistan received a letter stating they should remain in hiding because of serious threats to their lives. The applicant provided the Department with a copy of his mother’s letter and a copy of the one from ISO. The delegate gave minimal weight to these. The applicant confirmed he had received threats in 2007 and 2008 but ISO never sent warning letters and did not treat it as serious. The applicant did not detail what the threat was. He stated his brothers moved and his mother lives with her daughter in law. The delegate accepted based on country information that by 2013 Karachi had come under the influence of the Taliban and there was an increase in violence
26. The delegate accepted the applicant and his family’s involvement in ISO and TJP and that he was a member of Marsia Khwa and Noha Khuan - singer of Shiite prayers. The applicant claims that he is educated and a western returnee. However, the delegate relied on available country information and was not satisfied that there is a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm should the applicant return to Pakistan. The delegate considered and again will face serious or significant harm if he returns to Pakistan. The delegate again relied on country information and did not accept this.
27. Prior to hearing the applicant supplied the Tribunal with a submission dated 16 March 2016. The submission summarised his claims stating he fears persecution regarding his race as a Mohajir, his religion as a Shia Muslim, his imputed political opinion as an opponent of Sunni extremist groups and his membership of a particular social group, namely Marsia and Noha Khuan. They are reciters of Shiite clergy. The submission contained country information and requested that the Tribunal consider material beyond DFAT reports and highlighted the South Asia Terrorism Portal and the increasing presence of extremist and terrorist groups and the increased recruitment activity of people by the IS, travel advice pertaining to Pakistan and the unreasonableness of relocation within Pakistan and the unwillingness of law enforcement agencies to provide protection to religious minorities.

Oral evidence provided to the AAT at hearing:

28. The applicant confirmed he was born [in date] in Karachi, Pakistan.
29. The applicant has [siblings]. His mother died in 2014 and he claims his father was assassinated in 2004. He said he came to Australia because things were not good in Pakistan and he had threats from extremist organisations. He confirmed that he came to Australia on a student visa with the intention of studying a [course]. Following a period of study, he applied for another student visa which was refused. It was at this point in time that the applicant applied for a protection visa.
30. The applicant said his family preferred he remain in Pakistan however people working with him were being targeted so that is why it all came together at once and he applied for a student visa. He said that cumulative issues have resulted in him being targeted, namely being Urdu speaking, that he is a Mohajir and politically active.
31. The Tribunal asked the applicant about his political activities. He confirmed that he is an ISO member and organised social gatherings for students. He said his father was also politically active when he was alive and so he has followed in his father’s footsteps. He confirmed that he would seek donations around his neighbourhood in Karachi. He was doing this from the age of [age] or [age].
32. He confirmed that his association with ISO was through university but extended into activities in his neighbourhood. The type of activities included [various tasks]. The applicant confirmed that he would also assist all new students because Shia’s are targeted. He would assist in public holidays and special events. The applicant said he would assists with these activities after works. He confirmed that he would attend and assist ISO at least once a week and attend meetings on weekends and all of this activity was conducted after work hours. He described the office and said it was set up [with equipment] and [a number of] members would be there at any one time. He took on more responsibilities as he became older.
33. The applicant confirmed his brothers were not involved and that he was closer to his parents. The Tribunal asked the applicant about his father’s association with Tehreek e Jafaria Pakistan (TJP). The applicant said he would also collect donations and the TJP asked him to work with them around 1985-1986. His focus was community service. He would attend the TJP but more for social activities and marriages.
34. The applicant said that as soon as his father started to assist the TJP they had more resources. He said several incidents occurred during this time and he attributes it to the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) stating it wasn’t banned at that point. If there was a Shia community member or a targeted killing he would go to the protest on a main road. He said that people recognised him.
35. The Tribunal asked the applicant whether anything happened to him during this period and he said that there was a direct threat from [guys] on a bike. He said that they said to him that he must limit or reduce his activities or it will be harmful to him. He did not recognise these people. He said that they looked like Mullahs because they had beards. The applicant was asked when this event occurred and he responded “probably around 2001”. The Tribunal asked the applicant if the incident was reported and he said that he went to the police but there were no witnesses so he could not file a First Incident Report because nothing has happened.
36. The Tribunal asked the applicant if he modified his behaviour following the threat and he said no. However, he said that after 2-3 months another incident occurred in his area. He said there is a large Pashtun community and some SSP people went and broke things. The applicant claims he went to the police again but the police said they have told him to limit his activities. The applicant said he continued to remain active and he organised a large protest. The applicant said that the police made threats. He said they told them to wind up the protest. He said they didn’t and the protest went ahead. However, he said that during this period his brothers were sent away for around 25 days to a month for safety. They went and stayed at a friend’s house in Karachi and he went to another place. The Tribunal asked the applicant if he modified his behaviour then and he confirmed that he still went to work but he wore a helmet and rode a motor cycle and it was hard to identify him. He said he worked in a [shop]. The applicant’s sisters and mother remained in the family house.
37. The applicant said in 2011/12 his mother was also targeted. She had a [shop] and she raised money and she was involved in a community centre for [girls]. He said the SSP are very strong in the area where his mother’s shop is located. The Tribunal asked the applicant what happened and he said that a few students came and threw stones at a gate towards her house accused her of running a brothel. He said that they accused her because she is Shia. He said that she closed the [shop] and he confirmed that no one was hurt and everyone was safe. He also confirmed that his mother was not politically active and just involved in community services however he said that this demonstrated she was still targeted.
38. The applicant was asked about his father’s membership of the Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP). He claimed he had previously received threats because of his involvement and he said that one day his father was travelling by motor bike to his regular TJP meeting and was shot at by the SSP and died. The family were notified by the police. They were so stressed and panicked. He said that for 40 days they limited their activities and everyone was shocked but he became more determined to continue his support of the Shiite community with the help of ISO. He confirmed that his brothers were not that active.
39. The applicant claimed that the police knew the names of those involved but nothing ever came of it. He said that they kept calling the police but nothing happened. He claims maybe the police were scared too. He said that eventually his mother wanted to reduce the calls to the police. He said that at this point in time there was no threat to the applicant or his brothers through the community work they were involved in.
40. The applicant said that by 2007 and 2008 he started to notice an increase in targeted attacks against many ISO members. He said that as a response, they reduced the number of meetings and activities.
41. The applicant said that in 2009 they had a stall set up during the day and they hired trucks and provided food. He said they served [food and drinks] and it was complimentary. He said that they worked through the night and people opened fire on the stall. He said that there were [a number of] people there but they were ok. He confirmed that no one was hit. The Tribunal asked the applicant who did it and he said that it was [men] on bikes and they were wearing helmets. He said that the police were contacted but they couldn’t do anything.
42. The applicant said he was terrified and so he hid for a month or two before he came to Australia. The Tribunal asked the applicant how he managed to obtain a visa so quickly and he said that he had already applied for a visa to come to Australia. The Tribunal asked the applicant if there is any evidence of this attack. He said that there were no news reports and the people that were there all went into hiding as well.
43. The Tribunal asked the applicant about his return trips to Pakistan and he confirmed he has returned home twice. He said that he went to see his mother. He said that his mother was seriously ill. The Tribunal asked the applicant whether he was concerned for his safety and he said that stayed at his friend’s house. His friend was overseas. He confirmed that his friend’s house is also in Karachi. The Tribunal asked how far it was from his family home and he said that it is [distance] km away. He confirmed he spent 30 days there. He said he never left the house. He said that he wasn’t working and he just wanted to spend some time with her.
44. The applicant confirmed that following that visit he returned again to Pakistan. He was asked why he returned and he said it was for Eid. He said he has never been away from his family for such a long time. He said that his mother wanted him to come back and see her. The Tribunal asked the applicant why his mother would want him to return to Pakistan if he was in danger and he said that he never told his mother in detail about the incidents. He said that she knew about the shooting but in limited detail. He confirmed that the second visit was for 28 days. The applicant stayed at his friend’s house again.
45. The Tribunal queried the applicant stating it is difficult to accept that he never went outside and not even to attend the Mosque. The applicant said that he did go to the mosque. He said he went only once for the Eid prayers. The Tribunal asked the applicant about whether his relatives knew he was in Pakistan and he said that they knew later.
46. The Tribunal put to the applicant that it remains unconvinced that he could go to Pakistan on two occasions and not go outside and that his mother or brothers never told anyone that the applicant was in Pakistan. The Tribunal stated that it thought it implausible that the applicant’s mother would have encouraged him to go to Pakistan and visit her if she felt his life was in danger. He said he never told his mother the details about his claims. Whilst noting the applicant’s response that she was not fully aware of the dangers then it remains perplexing that she did not tell anyone that he was in Pakistan visiting and did not question why he remained in his friend’s home for a month and did not leave. The applicant said he agreed but he didn’t really need to tell her she just understood.
47. The applicant then said that he has a concern as he is a Shia and is Urdu speaking.
48. The applicant was asked about his interest in politics and whether he has continued to remain active even though he is in Australia. He confirmed that he has not kept up with any of his charity work in Australia. However, he said that he attends [a mosque].
49. The applicant said that he was a singer when he was in Pakistan and would recite Shia at neighbourhood events. He said that there would often be [a number of] people there. He said that singing makes him more visible. He has never sung in Australia. He said to the Tribunal that he has to sing. The Tribunal asked the applicant if he has any material to show the Tribunal of him singing and he said that he has no images of him singing.
50. The Tribunal noted the generalised violence that exists in Pakistan and asked the applicant to provide any comments pertaining to this and whether he feels threatened or concerned and he said that the possibilities are high as he would need to return to his own neighbourhood and could face such violence.
51. The Tribunal asked the applicant about his marriage and he said that he was married through Skype. He said that she is a family friend and they were known to each other in June 2013 and started talking and [in] April 2014 they were married through Skype. His wife is based in Karachi. She worked in a [company] and as of the time of the hearing he said that in the last [months] she works in a [company] as an [occupation].
52. The applicant confirmed he has no family in Australia. He studied a [degree] at [a university]. The applicant said that he had a job and he was the [officer of a company]. He said he has worked for [another company] and a [company] from [overseas].
53. The Tribunal asked the applicant if any of his family members have been targeted and he said that his brother has experienced harm in Pakistan but he stated it was a random terrorist attack.
54. The applicant explained that Pakistan is very dangerous and there are attacks happening constantly. He said that when he had the interview with the delegate there were many attacks occurring in Pakistan and he explained that this concerns him and this is why he has mentioned these news stories. He feels the situation there places him at great risk.
55. The applicant explained he has responsibilities in Pakistan but is afraid to return. He confirmed that he attends a [mosque]. He said that it is more professional than religious. They cry and sing for IAMAN.
56. The applicant said that he was very involved in [activities] for the Shiite community in Pakistan and this makes him a target. He said that he is afraid of ISIS and the global issues in play at the moment.
57. The Tribunal questioned the applicant about his current involvement and interest in the Shiite community and he confirmed that he makes personal donations.
58. The Tribunal asked the applicant about the general level of violence across Pakistan and asked the applicant about how this may impact him and discussed opportunities for relocation such as Lahore. The applicant said that he cannot live elsewhere in Pakistan. He said that violence is everywhere and identified the recent park attack on Christians [in] Lahore.
59. The applicant spoke of how easily identifiable he is as an imputed MQM member because he is Urdu speaking and will be profiled simply because of this. He said that he could easily be a target or identified as MQM. He claims Urdu speakers aren’t even considered Pakistanis. He claims he would find it difficult to find work. He stated that he now has a wife in Pakistan and she is based in Karachi and to relocate would be hard for her as she too has a career. He confirmed his wife speaks English but not as well as him.
60. He stated that ethnic racism is high. Survival is the problem. He said that he was brought up in Karachi and that is his home.
61. The Tribunal asked the applicant about his health and he confirmed that he does not have any health issues but stated that he is stressed because of his circumstances.
62. The Tribunal asked the applicant if he wished to provide any further information and he said that is all. The hearing concluded.
63. The applicant provided a further submission post hearing dated 6 April 2016. Contained within the submission was a request for the Tribunal to consider the recent attack on the park in Lahore and reiterating the applicant’s profile and the unreasonableness of relocation.
64. On 26 July 2017 the applicant provided a further submission to the Tribunal outlining the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan for Shias and the increase in blasphemy accusations.

Nationality

65. The applicant provided a copy of his Pakistan passport. The Tribunal is satisfied that he is a national of Pakistan.

Country Information

66. The Tribunal has had regard to the independent country information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on Pakistan in making its decision. The Tribunal has considered the submission provided by the applicant and notes the reports on random attacks on Shias and non Shias as well as targeted attacks on Shia community gatherings and known places of worship. The Tribunal has also noted the applicants requested to consider with caution reports that violence and attacks have reduced as the submission states that there appears to be an increase in percentage terms of attacks against Shias.

DFAT Country Information Report, Pakistan, 15 January 2016

67. Pakistan is ethnically and linguistically diverse. Punjabis are the largest linguistic group (45 per cent), followed by Pashtuns (15 per cent), Sindh’s (14 per cent) and Seraikis (8 per cent). There are also smaller ethnic groups of Mohajir (Urdu-speaking immigrants from India, 7.5 per cent), Baloch (3.5 per cent) and Hazara (less than one per cent). Urdu and English both have status as official languages. However, only eight per cent of the population speaks Urdu as a first language. Punjabi and Seraiki (a variant of Punjabi), Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi and Brahui are major regional languages. With the exception of large urban centres, many Pakistanis tend to live within ethnically homogenous communities.
68. Corruption in Pakistan is widespread. Transparency International’s (TI) 2014 Corruption Perception Index ranked Pakistan 126 out of 175 countries. Eighty-two per cent of those surveyed for a 2013 TI report viewed Pakistan’s police force as the country’s most corrupt institution, followed by public officials (81 per cent) and political parties (76 per cent). By contrast, participants regarded religious institutions as the least corrupt (27 per cent).

Security Situation

69. Pakistan continues to face security threats from terrorist, militant and sectarian groups. Since the commencement of the assertive counter-terrorism military operation Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014, however, Pakistan military operations against terrorist and militant groups in FATA and Karachi have substantially reduced the level of generalised and sectarian violence throughout the country. This trend increased over the course of 2015. Credible sources have reported a 75 per cent reduction in the number of sectarian and terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan from September 2014 – September 2015. Militant groups – particularly the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – are divided and disrupted, and no longer have access to safe-havens in Khyber and North Waziristan Agencies. The Pakistan Military has indicated an intention to remain in North Waziristan for some years to come. However, DFAT understands that militant sleeper cells remain in many urban centres and continue to target state and civilian infrastructure. The rugged terrain and porous borders in Pakistan’s tribal areas and between Pakistan and Afghanistan present ongoing challenges for maintaining security and enforcing the state’s writ.
70. The Taliban insurgency and the war on terrorism have claimed more than 57,000 lives since 2001. Conflict in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa remains an important factor for internal displacement and external migration. Approximately 1.6 million people were displaced by security operations in Pakistan’s north-west region from January-September 2015, for example. Many of these Temporary Displaced Persons (TDPs) have begun to voluntarily return to the FATA because of improvements in security.
71. The security situation varies between Pakistan’s provinces and autonomous regions. Punjab remains relatively free of sectarian and generalised violence. The level of violence is greater in Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA, and varies depending on the location of Pakistan military operations. Urban centres also tend to be more secure than rural areas, with the exception of Karachi. This includes ‘cantonments,’ or secured areas, although militant groups have also specifically targeted these areas.
72. Organised and violent crime, such as robbery and kidnapping for ransom, occurs throughout Pakistan. This is exacerbated by the proliferation of licenced and un-licenced small arms in Pakistan. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Pakistan’s homicide rate was the highest in South Asia in 2012 (7.7 per 100,000 people). While exact figures are not available, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which has expanded to encompass paramilitary Ranger operations in Karachi, has substantially reduced the level of serious crime – including homicide – throughout Pakistan.

Militant groups

73. The most potent militant group in Pakistan remains the TTP – a loose network of Sunni militant groups which have splintered since the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-Azb . Although they are ideologically aligned, the TTP maintains an identity distinct from the Afghan Taliban, which is widely accepted to have an operational base in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province.
74. The TTP has carried out a number of high profile attacks against government security forces, political rivals, civilian infrastructure, and non-Sunni minorities throughout Pakistan. This includes direct attacks using small arms, suicide bombings, car bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as complex attacks using a combination of these tactics. For example, the TTP has claimed responsibility for attacks against the Pakistan military’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi in 2010; a naval station in Karachi in 2011; Karachi Airport in June 2014; a military-run public school in Peshawar in December 2014; and an Air Force base camp in Peshawar in September 2015. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP), there were 3,682 fatalities from terrorist-related violence in 2015. This included 940 civilians; 339 security forces personnel; and 2,403 insurgents.
75. There have also been numerous incidents of religious, sectarian and communal violence in Pakistan. In some cases, this violence is mutual, with different religious groups acting as belligerents. However, DFAT assesses that minority groups are disproportionately affected by sectarian violence in Pakistan (see also ‘Religion’, below). There is no evidence to suggest these groups specifically target women or children. A number of Sunni militant groups operate throughout Pakistan, including Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM). Shia militant group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) is the main perpetrator of violence against Sunnis. All of these groups are banned but continue to operate illegally in Pakistan. While Operation Zarb-e-Azb has substantially reduced the level of sectarian violence between these groups, they maintain a presence throughout Pakistan, particularly in Karachi, Quetta and parts of Punjab. According to SATP, there were 276 fatalities from sectarian violence in 2015.
76. A number of militant groups based in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) continue to conduct cross-border attacks, which are a source of tension between India and Pakistan. On 18 September 2015, for example, Pakistan military forces killed five militants attempting to infiltrate the Line of Control in AJK.
77. Since the 1950s, separatist militant groups have fought for an independent state in Balochistan. As part of their campaign, Baloch militant groups regularly target government security forces, Punjabi settlers and gas pipelines in Balochistan. The Pakistan government has reduced violence in all areas as a result of Operation Zarb-e-Azb and the Karachi Operation.
78. Despite occasional media reports of minor militant groups claiming allegiance to Islamic State (IS), such as TTP splinter group Jundullah, and arrests of alleged IS members, there is no credible evidence of an active or organised IS presence in Pakistan. DFAT assesses such claims are rhetorical or aspirational in nature.

Race/Nationality

79. Pakistan is an ethnically diverse nation, home to a number of distinct groups usually divided along linguistic lines. Section 28 of Pakistan’s Constitution provides that ‘any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture shall have the right to preserve and promote the same and, subject to law, establish institutions for that purpose.’ Although Pakistan’s Constitution and legislative framework do not explicitly discriminate against particular ethnic groups, ethnicity has been a source of communal tension throughout Pakistan’s history. For example, the steady migration of Pashtuns from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA to Karachi has directly contributed to violence between the armed wings of major political parties, including the Mohajir-based Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Sindhi-based Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), and the Pashtun-based Awami National Party (ANP), as well as the TTP. In Balochistan, separatist groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) have targeted and killed ethnic Punjabi settlers and others as part of their campaign for independence.

Religion

80. Article 20 of Pakistan’s Constitution provides that ‘subject to law, public order, and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice, and propagate his religion.’ Article 36 guarantees ‘the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and Provincial services.’ The Constitution also establishes Islam as the state religion and requires all laws to conform to Islamic principles. Articles 41 and 62 of the Constitution state that the President and Prime Minister must be Muslim.
81. There is no reliable, official, information on the size of religious groups in Pakistan. However, an estimated 95 per cent of Pakistanis identify as Muslim. Sunnis are generally estimated to account for approximately 75 per cent of the population and Shias a further 20 per cent. Other minorities, including Christians, Hindus and Ahmadis, constitute most of the remaining five per cent of the population. Pakistan is also home to smaller populations of Sikhs, Bahais, Parsis and Buddhists.
82. With the exception of Pakistan’s Ahmadi community, most Pakistanis are able to practice their religion freely, although opportunities for religious freedom are generally greater in large urban centres than rural areas. Attacks against religious ceremonies and places of worship remain the greatest impediment to freedom of worship in Pakistan. On this basis, DFAT assesses that there is generally a low level of official discrimination in Pakistan on the basis of religion. However, there is a moderate level of societal discrimination, including in the form of nepotism within religious communities and the use of blasphemy laws.

Politically motivated violence

83. Politically motivated violence occurs throughout Pakistan but is most prevalent in Karachi between members of the MQM, ANP, PPP, and Sindhi nationalist parties. Many of these registered parties maintain armed wings. This pattern of violence is the result of complex demographic, economic and political changes in Karachi.
84. Since September 2013, paramilitary operations aimed at dismantling extensive militant and politico-criminal networks in Karachi have reduced the number of militant attacks and lessened the activities of criminal syndicates. According to official statistics, there has been a 73 per cent reduction in the number of target killings and 85 per cent reduction in the number of kidnapping for ransom incidents in Karachi in 2015 (target killings peaked at 73 in December 2013, compared with less than 10 in June 2015; and there were 174 reported kidnapping cases in 2013, compared with only 10 from January-July 2015). Although the Ranger operation recently entered its second phase, DFAT does not yet have sufficient information to assess the sustainability of this downward trend.

Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)

85. The MQM is a Karachi-based secular political party which advocates the rights of ‘Mohajirs’, or Urdu-speaking Muslim migrants and their descendants from India. As well as Karachi, the MQM has power bases in the Hyderabad and Nawabshah districts of Sindh Province. Because of the concentration of its membership in these areas, the MQM exercises considerable political influence in local political affairs, including for appointments to government positions.
86. The MQM regularly participates as a coalition partner in the provincial and federal governments despite political differences with its coalition partners. Although the MQM did not immediately join the government at the provincial or federal levels following general elections in 2013, former senior MQM member, Dr Ishrat-ul Ebad, is the current Governor for Sindh.
87. The MQM’s representation of Karachi’s Urdu-speaking community often brings it into conflict with the Sindhi-backed PPP and Pashtun parties. The MQM also continues to oppose the ongoing migration of Pashtuns to Karachi. Since 2013, however, paramilitary Ranger operations have increasingly focused on the MQM’s criminal networks in Karachi, substantially reducing this inter-party conflict. On 11 March 2015, an MQM worker was killed during a paramilitary raid on MQM headquarters; on 4 August, Pakistani Rangers formally requested that MQM hand over 187 alleged target killers, a claim denied by MQM leadership; and on 10 August, Rangers arrested six alleged MQM target killers in Karachi. As part of this crackdown, security forces have subjected MQM members to regular identity checks throughout Karachi.
88. Militant groups such as the TTP have periodically attacked MQM members because of differences between the MQM’s secular ideology and the Islamist creed of militant groups. For example, the TTP claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on an MQM camp in the Orange Town area of Karachi on 21 November 2014, which injured 20 MQM members. According to the Centre for Research & Security Studies (CRSS), 26 MQM members died from January-June 2015. This is a 30 per cent reduction in the number of fatalities over the corresponding period in 2014. The MQM has also acted as a belligerent in this violence as part of its broader campaign to control infrastructure and industry in Karachi.
89. DFAT assesses that MQM members are subject to ongoing violence in some parts of Karachi. However, the overall risk of violence has reduced since the publication of the DFAT Country Report (dated 14 April 2015), and parts of the city such as Azizabad remain relatively free from politically-motivated, terrorist and sectarian violence.

Western influences

90. Western influence is pervasive in many parts of Pakistan, particularly in large urban centres. Western films and music are widely available (though in many cases subject to censorship) and western-branded chains operate throughout Pakistan. Both Urdu and English are recognised as official languages, and English is taught in many schools and is widely spoken among Pakistan’s elite. Many Pakistanis have relatives in western countries and many more aspire to migrate abroad. Those living abroad return to Pakistan frequently to visit relatives. DFAT assesses that individuals are not subject to discrimination or violence on the basis of having spent time in the West.

State Protection

91. Pakistan’s laws and Constitution provide for state protection of people’s property, lives, places of worship and religious beliefs. However, DFAT assesses state protection in Pakistan is limited by resources shortages, personal means and, in some cases, political will.
92. Pakistan’s Army and paramilitary forces regularly conduct counter-insurgency operations in the FATA and remote parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to increase government control in these areas. According to International Crisis Group (ICG), 49,000 people were arrested on terrorism-related charges between the commencement of the National Action Plan (NAP) in December 2014 and May 2015. Despite the relatively high number of arrests, however, successful prosecutions of those responsible for politically-motivated or sectarian violence are rare. This is because of the ineffectiveness of police investigations, as well as the debilitating effect of threats to judges and witnesses, who are not protected by witness protection programs.
93. ICG also notes that only a small number of those arrested under the NAP belong to extremist groups. Although the NAP proposes legal and constitutional amendments to the criminal justice system, there is no clarity about priorities, timelines or resources.
94. Provincial governments across Pakistan also routinely provide protection for Shia Ashura processions during Muharram. This includes issuing licenses for Ashura processions, closing roads along procession routes, establishing police cordons to search those attending Ashura processions, and disabling mobile phones during Ashura processions to prevent remotely-detonated IED attacks.
95. In some cases, police have arrested alleged blasphemy perpetrators to protect them from communal violence. In August 2012, for example, police in Islamabad took a 14 year-old Christian girl, Rimsha Masih, into protective custody to protect her from a mob threatening to kill her for allegedly burning pages filled with Quranic passages. The Islamabad High Court subsequently dropped the charges against Ms Masih. The Government of Punjab also helped Christian residents from Joseph Colony in Lahore rebuild homes damaged in a mob attack in March 2013.

Police

96. Pakistan’s provinces and autonomous regions are directly responsible for law and order. Consequently, police forces are supervised at the provincial level, although the Federal Government has jurisdiction over police and paramilitary forces in Islamabad, as well as Levies and Khasadars in the FATA. There are approximately 430,000 personnel in the Pakistan Police Force.
97. The police forces of each province act independently of each other, and there are no nationwide benchmarks in terms of training standards and coordination. The Police Act 2002 sought to reform the police by institutionalising oversight by public representatives and an independent prosecution service. However, Parliament diluted these provisions in a series of amendments to the Act in 2004.
98. Although there are variations in the effectiveness of individual police forces in Pakistan, their capacity to maintain law and order is generally limited by a lack of resources; poor training; insufficient and outmoded equipment; and manipulation by superiors, political actors and the judiciary. Common perceptions of police corruption undermine public confidence in the country’s police forces.
99. Police-generated ‘First Information Reports’ (FIRs) are generally the first step in criminal prosecutions. Police have 14 days to investigate cases after seeking a magistrate’s approval to detain suspects. In practice, however, investigations often take longer, particularly for complex cases. Although
100. Pakistan’s provinces and territories have independent prosecution services, police are exclusively responsible for investigations and consequently have a substantial influence on the outcome of individual cases.

Treatment of Returnees

101. The Passports Act 1974 governs entry and exit from Pakistan. Pakistani citizens require a valid passport to enter or exit Pakistan. Penalties under the act include inprisonment for up to one year, a fine, or both.
102. In practice, returnees generally leave Pakistan for interim destinations on valid travel documents and consequently do not commit immigration offences. Those who return voluntarily with their own, valid travel documents are processed like any other Pakistani citizen returning to Pakistan. Only those who return involuntarily, on charter flights, or who have emergency travel documents are likely come to the attention of authorities at airports. This includes involuntary returnees from the Gulf states, who are often victims of trafficking or labourers and workers whose visa status has changed because of local policies in these countries.
103. Returnees are responsible for arranging their own onward transportation from their point of entry to Pakistan, sometimes with the assistance of organisations like the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In the two years to September 2015, the IOM facilitated the return of over 11,000 people to Pakistan under its Assisted Voluntary Returns and Reintegration Program, the majority from Europe. Involuntary returnees or their families will, in many cases, have taken on debt to finance their onward travel, particularly those who have travelled by sea. These individuals may experience financial difficulties as a result of being unable to secure unemployment or repay debts incurred in travelling abroad.

DFAT Thematic Report, Shias in Pakistan, 15 January 2016

Recent History

104. Differences between Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan have their origins in early Islamic history. Most Muslims in the 7th century AD (now known as Sunnis) believed Abu Bakr was the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad. A smaller group (now called Shias) supported an alternative successor – Ali. These sectarian divisions cemented with Ali’s murder in 661 AD and the death of Hussain (Ali’s son) in the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD. These events feature prominently in present-day Shia religious rituals and practices. Shias commemorate the death of Hussain on the tenth day of the month of Moharram, for example.
105. Before the 1980s, sectarianism in Pakistan was generally less divisive than ethnic, tribal and linguistic differences. However, in 1974, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto declared Ahmadis to be non-Muslims. Ten years later, President and former General Zia ul-Haq issued Ordinance prohibiting Ahmadis from self-identifying as Muslims. Although some Shias supported this move, a number of Sunni groups called for the government to extend the prohibition to Shias. The promulgation of the zakat, a compulsory religious tax based on Sunni law, inflamed sectarian tensions further (although Shias were later exempted from paying the zakat).
106. Separate international and regional developments in the late 20th and early 21st centuries have contributed to the emergence of extremist Islamist and other militant groups in Pakistan: the Iranian revolution; Iran-Iraq War; Soviet military action in Afghanistan; NATO military operations in Afghanistan from 2001; and on-going conflict between India and Pakistan in Kashmir have all inflamed differences between Pakistan’s Sunni and Shia communities.
107. Pakistan is ethnically and linguistically diverse. Despite being a majority Muslim state, the population is characterised by significant religious and sectarian diversity. Approximately 95 per cent of Pakistan’s population of 190 million is Muslim. Seventy-five per cent of Pakistan’s Muslims identify as Sunni and 20 per cent as Shia.
108. The majority of Pakistan’s Shia community adheres to the Twelver (athna ashariya) school of thought. There are smaller Shia sub-sects of Nizari Ismailis, Daudi Bohras and Sulemani Bohras.
109. Sunni Islam in Pakistan is divided between the Barelvi majority (an estimated 60 per cent of Sunnis) and a Deobandi minority (around 35 per cent of Sunnis). While both groups follow the same basic principles of Islamic thought (the Hanafi School), Deobandis adhere to a more orthodox interpretation of Islam. A smaller number of Sunnis (around five per cent) follow the Ahle Hadith (Salafi) school. According to International Crisis Group, the majority of militant groups (particularly anti-Shia groups) operating in Pakistan follow, or claim to follow, a form of Deobandi or Salafi Islam.
110. Sufism (a more mystical interpretation of Islam that involves saint and shrine devotion) is widespread in South Asia, including Pakistan. Many Barelvi Sunnis and Shias venerate Sufi saints and shrines.
111. The Shia population is spread throughout Pakistan. Although Shias do not constitute a majority in any of the country’s four provinces, Shias do form a majority in the autonomous region of Gilgit–Baltistan. Significant numbers of Shias are located in Peshawar, Kohat, Hangu and Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); in and around Quetta and the Makran coastline in Balochistan; in parts of southern and central Punjab; and throughout Sindh. Large Shia communities live in urban centres throughout Pakistan, including Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Peshawar, Multan, Jhang and Sargodha. Although some Shias live in enclaves in these cities, Shia and Sunni communities are generally well-integrated.
112. Shias are represented across most of Pakistan’s ethnic, linguistic and tribal groups. Of these, Hazaras are a predominantly Shia ethnic group, mostly of the Twelver Sect. Hazaras are believed to have settled in Afghanistan’s central highlands in the 13th century and have successively migrated to Pakistan. There are up to 900,000 Hazaras in Pakistan. Approximately 700,000 Hazaras live in and around Quetta, mostly in their own communities in Hazara Town (also known as Brewery Road) and along Alamdar Road towards Mehrabad. An estimated 1200-1500 Hazaras are integrated with the broader Shia community in Parachinar, Kurram Agency. There are also Hazara communities in large urban areas including Karachi (up to 15,000), Lahore, Multan, Islamabad and Peshawar.
113. A range of other Shia communities in Pakistan also have specific tribal/ethnic identities. These communities include the Turis, Bohris, Baltis, and some clans within the Bangash Pashtun tribe.

Distinguishing Features

114. Most Pakistani Shias are not physically, linguistically or legally distinguishable from Pakistani Sunnis. For example, Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) issues Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs) that do not identify cardholders by sect. Shias are often identifiable by common Shia names such as Naqvi, Zaidi and Jafri, while Sunnis and Shias both use names such as Syed and Hussain. Similarly, ethnic and tribal names can reveal a person’s tribal or sectarian affiliation as Hazara, Bangash or Turi, as can their address if they are from a predominantly Shia area.
115. Some sources have told DFAT that Bangash Shias may be physically distinguishable from other Pashtuns. These differences are reportedly less significant than those between Hazaras and other Shia groups because of Hazaras’ Eurasian origins. The same sources indicate that Bangash and Turi accents are easy to distinguish from other Pashtun groups. Recent Hazara arrivals from Afghanistan are unable to legally acquire CNICs because they are not Pakistani citizens. This can limit their access to government and other services.
116. Sunni and Shia mosques in Pakistan are clearly distinguishable: these mosques usually have visibly different exteriors and are identifiable by name. Shia mosques also feature different Muslim iconography, including the Shia sword, horses, images of Ali and Hussain, and ‘U-shaped’ crescent moons. Shia and Sunni mosques also have different prayer times, and worshipers use different hand positions while praying.
117. Shias are most prominent during Shia religious festivals and pilgrimages to Iran. Shias participating in ‘Ashura’ processions during Moharram often administer forms of self-harm such as flagellation, which can leave permanent marks.

Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed)

118. DFAT assesses there are no barriers preventing Shias from participating in democratic processes. A broad range of political, ethnic and religious interests are represented in Pakistan’s political system. Pakistanis tend to vote according to ethnic and local or feudal ties rather than religious or sectarian allegiances. In the 2013 election, for example, no religious party received more than five per cent of votes. Although sectarian divisions can play a role in political developments, the sectarian affiliations of individual politicians are often unknown.
119. Shias are well represented in parliament and regularly contest elections for mainstream parties. Shias have historically supported mainstream parties such as the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which also has a number of prominent Shia leaders. In the 2013 general elections, a number of Shias voted for Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) also has a significant Shia following.
120. There is less support for sectarian political parties such as the Sunni Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami (F) party and the exclusively Shia Majlis-e-Wahdutul Muslimeen (MWM) party. According to the Middle East Institute, MWM has perpetrated acts of violence against former political party and militant group Sunni Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jammat (ASWJ). MWM seeks, inter alia, to curb human rights violations against the Shia population. Historically, separate Sunni and Shia parties have also operated under the same peak political organisation, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which held power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from 2002-08.
121. The Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) has historically represented the interests of Hazaras in Pakistan. In the 2013 elections, the MWM won one seat in a predominantly Hazara electorate in the Balochistan Provincial Assembly. Hazaras have also been members of other parties, including the Balochistan National Party (BNP) and PPP, and Hazara politicians have been elected to local government positions, the Balochistan Provincial Assembly and Pakistan’s National Assembly. For example, prominent Hazara politician Qazi Mohammad Essa founded the Balochistan Muslim League.

Banned Groups

122. The Government of Pakistan has proscribed 60 Sunni and Shia militant groups. Banned Shia groups include the Tehreek-e-Jafaria (TJP), Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria Moosavi (TNFJ) and Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP). The SMP is the main perpetrator of violence against Sunnis in Pakistan.

Community Groups

123. There are many Shia student, community and charity networks. The largest Shia student group, the Imamia Student Organisation (ISO), was established in 1972 to offset the influence of student groups linked to Sunni political parties. An estimated 50-70 per cent of all Shia students are members of the ISO, which operates in all four provinces, as well as Gilgit–Baltistan and AJK. The ISO addresses national issues, including foreign interference in Pakistan. It also advocates for, and provides services to, Shia students. The ISO functions as a feeder organisation for mainstream Shia parties.

Types of Violence

124. Pakistan continues to face security threats from terrorist, militant and sectarian groups. However, since the commencement of the counter-terrorism military operation Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014, Pakistani military operations against terrorist and militant groups in the FATA and Karachi have substantially reduced the level of generalised and sectarian violence throughout the country. This trend has increased over the course of 2015. Credible sources have reported a 75 per cent reduction in the number of terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan from September 2014 – September 2015. Another source, the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), said there were 77 per cent less target killings and 57 per cent less terrorist attacks in the first six months of 2015 than in the corresponding period in 2014 (there were 411 target killings and 150 terrorist attacks over this period in 2015, compared with 1,242 target killings and 346 terrorist attacks over the same period in 2014). CRSS and others attribute this decline to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, as well as the 20-point National Action Plan on counter-terrorism.
125. Sectarian attacks have historically targeted individuals, places of worship, shrines and religious schools. Although this violence has affected all religious and sectarian groups, Shias represent a higher proportion of those attacked and killed. According to CRSS, for example, 58 per cent of fatalities from sectarian violence (122 of 212 deaths) from January-June 2015 were Shia. The majority of these casualties were from large-scale attacks rather than target killings. Generalised violence includes violence associated with government security operations; serious criminal acts; and inter-ethnic, tribal and politically-motivated violence.
126. DFAT assesses there is a low risk of sectarian violence for most Shias in Pakistan and a moderate threat of sectarian violence for prominent Shias such as high-profile professionals. Although Shias are more prominent during Ashura processions, heightened state protection measures during these celebrations mitigate the threats associated with this greater exposure.

Terrorist Attacks

127. Shias continue to face a threat from anti-Shia and militant groups, particularly Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) or Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jammat (ASWJ). Most of these networks have broad agendas, which include strong anti-Shia sentiments. Various Pakistani Taliban groups operating under the banner of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have also claimed responsibility for attacks on Shias.

Militant Groups

128. The LeJ is the main perpetrator of anti-Shia violence in Pakistan. The LeJ is a collection of loosely coordinated cells linked to other militant networks including the TTP. Originally based in the Punjab as an offshoot of the SSP, the LeJ aims to establish an Islamist Sunni state in Pakistan. It also seeks to have Shias declared ‘non-believers’ and to eliminate other religious groups including Jews, Christians and Hindus. The LeJ has claimed responsibility for a large number of attacks upon the Shia community, particularly Hazaras in Quetta and other Shia groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Karachi. In an open letter in November 2012, LeJ leaders declared their intention to ‘abolish the impure sect’ of ‘Shias and Hazara Shias’. Pakistan designated the LeJ as a terrorist organisation in 2001. While CRSS notes that LeJ did not claim responsibility for any attacks between June 2014 and September 2015, credible sources have told DFAT the LeJ remains intact and has sleeper cells in major urban centres across Pakistan.
129. Shia militant groups such as Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP) have attacked Sunnis, although credible sources have told DFAT there has been an overall decline in Shia militancy. The SMP was responsible for target killings of Sunnis in Karachi and Quetta in 2014. Pakistan labelled the SMP a terrorist organisation in 2001.
130. There has been occasional violence against members of the Shia Imamia Student Organisation (ISO). In December 2010, for example, an IED attack at Karachi University killed several ISO members and militants attacked a procession of ISO members in 2012. While the ISO does not openly support militant activity, credible analysts suggest that a number of Shia militant groups are offshoots of ISO. It is difficult to accurately gauge the threat level to ISO activists, who are most active on university campuses rather than geographic areas where radical Deobandi groups are active. Islamabad-based think tanks have told DFAT that ISO activists and militants in Karachi mostly engage in reprisal attacks rather than target killings. The same sources indicate that ISO activists in Khurum and Kohat face the same level of threat as other Shia activists.
131. Pakistani authorities have increasingly scrutinised the activities of the LeJ, SSP, TTP and SMP since their designation as terrorist organisations. Although this has resulted in the arrest of prominent militant leaders and activists, capacity constraints have limited the effectiveness of subsequent prosecutions (see ‘Violence by Province’ below and ‘State Protection’ in the 15 January 2016 Country Report on Pakistan).
132. DFAT understands that prominent militant groups such as the TTP have splintered and no longer have access to safe havens in North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies.

Travel Security

133. Travel in parts of Pakistan can be dangerous for all Pakistanis regardless of sectarian, religious or ethnic affiliations. Travellers in remote areas of Pakistan are at greater risk of criminal or militant violence because they are further away from security forces. Many roads in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA fit this profile.
134. Militants have historically targeted routes used by Shia pilgrims, including Hazaras – particularly those travelling to Iran through Balochistan. These attacks have occurred in Mastung, Bolan, Taftan, Khuzdar and Awaran. In 2014, for example, at least 29 Shia pilgrims were killed and a further 35 wounded when their bus was attacked on the Quetta-Taftan highway in Mastung district. Shias in these attacks are identifiable by their Shia names (displayed on their Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs)) or flagellation marks if asked to raise their shirts.
135. DFAT understands that alternatives exist for pilgrims to travel by air rather than road. It is possible to arrange charter air travel from Peshawar to Parachinar or via scheduled services from Quetta to other parts of Pakistan, for example. However, the cost and availability of these modes of transport operate as a barrier to those who are less wealthy.

State protection

136. DFAT assesses that Pakistani authorities are broadly willing to protect Shia communities. The National Action Plan to counter terrorism seeks to combat extremism and sectarianism, while Operation Zarb-e-Azb has resulted in a significant decline in the number of sectarian attacks. During Moharram, provincial authorities and the Federal Ministry of Interior cooperate with local Shia communities to provide security for participants in Ashura processions. Security authorities have told DFAT that official security for Shia mosques and Ashura processions is provided on a case-by-case basis depending on the threat level and availability of resources. These security measures include shutting down mobile phone services and deploying police forces (plain clothed and uniformed) to patrol areas surrounding processions. The Government of Pakistan has introduced a ban on the use of loudspeakers at mosques for hate speech during periods of heightened sectarian differences such as Ramadan. Although authorities have arrested a number of people for violating this ban and have reportedly begun to register Madrassas, DFAT does not yet have sufficient information to assess the effectiveness of these measures. The Army also generally operates at a heightened state of readiness at these times.
137. However, capacity constraints limit the federal and provincial governments’ abilities to protect the Shia community, which is large and widely dispersed. Although Pakistani authorities continue to capture and prosecute members of sectarian groups, conviction rates remain low.
138. Shia communities frequently make provisions for their own security. This includes physical security of Shia mosques, self-protection ‘scout’ units and lines of security to search those attending Ashura processions.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

139. The applicant presented as a credible witness and was able to answer questions with authority and ease and a depth of understanding, detail and clarity which provided further weight to the plausibility of his overall claims. The applicant’s claims have been consistent and he has provided reasonable explanations to concerns put to him by the Tribunal.
140. The Tribunal accepts based on the applicant’s identification documents and evidence provided at hearing that he is a Mohajir Shiite Muslim who speaks Urdu and that he was born in Karachi in Pakistan.
141. The Tribunal accepts as plausible that the applicant’s father was involved with the Tehreek e Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) and assisted in the collection and distribution of funds to Shiite community members in need and organising protests in 1997 and 1998 on behalf of the TJP outside of homes invaded by the SSP and that he did not engage in terrorist or violent activities. It also accepts that he held [positions] and by the early 1990s he became [an official] of one of the zones and [senior official] of the same zone in Karachi in 1992. The Tribunal relies on relevant country information for the period in time which the applicant claims his father was involved and also the applicants detailed oral evidence.
142. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant has had an ongoing interest in politics and was an active member of the Imamia Student’s organisation (ISO) from 1997 and held the position of [senior official] of the [university] branch from 2006 that because it is closely aligned with the TJP and the applicant’s father was involved in the TJP that he assisted them too and was a supporter of TJP. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant was involved in organising protests and [other] activities for ISO in his capacity as [senior official] and as an ordinary member. The Tribunal relies upon the applicant’s oral evidence and country information to support this finding.
143. The applicant spoke with detail about how he would recite Marsia Khwa and Noha Khuan and about [someone] who was also a poet [and] who was later killed. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant would recite Marsia Khwa and Noha Khuan in private and public as a trusted Shia and the Tribunal accepts that this would increase the applicant’s profile.
144. Based on the country information available and the applicant’s oral evidence and submissions, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant would be identified as Mohajir Shiite Muslim because he speaks Urdu and because of his name. The Tribunal acknowledges that Mohajir (Urdu-speaking immigrants from India) represent a minority in Pakistan of approximately 7.5 per cent of the population and that those that identify as Shias would make up 25% of the population. The Tribunal finds that the applicant is part of an ethnic minority group in Pakistan.
145. The applicant claims that he is imputed to be pro Mutahade Qaumi Movement (MQM) because he is politically active and an Urdu speaking Mohajir from Karachi. The Tribunal accepts that this is plausible. The Tribunal has considered the DFAT report noting MQM’s representation of Karachi’s Urdu-speaking community often brings it into conflict with the Sindhi-backed PPP and Pashtun parties. Militant groups such as the TTP have periodically attacked MQM members because of differences between the MQM’s secular ideology and the Islamist creed of militant groups and that DFAT assesses that MQM members are subject to ongoing violence in some parts of Karachi. However, the overall risk of violence has reduced and some areas remain relatively free from politically-motivated, terrorist and sectarian violence. The Tribunal notes that attacks against MQM members have generally been targeted attacks of members at meetings. The applicant whilst supporting MQM has not claimed to be a member.
146. In regards to threats and violence against the applicant’s family members, the Tribunal relies upon country information and the applicant’s detailed oral evidence accepts as plausible that around 2001 when he was assisting his father with TJP activities he had a direct threat from [men] on a bike that looked like Mullahs who told him to reduce his activities or it will be harmful to him.
147. The Tribunal also accepts as plausible that SSP people went and destroyed things in a targeted campaign against his local community and that in 2011/12 his mother’s clothing boutique was targeted and students threw stones at it and accused her of running a brothel because she is Shia.
148. The Tribunal accepts based on the evidence on file and evidence taken at hearing that the applicant’s father was killed by gunshot by the SSP in a targeted attack.
149. The Tribunal accepts as plausible that in 2013 his mother received a letter from ISO advising he should remain in Australia and his [brothers] based in Pakistan received a letter stating they should remain in hiding because of serious threats to their lives. The Tribunal accepts the applicant had a profile in his area as a former ISO [senior official] and his identity would have been known. As set out above, there was a significant amount of violence in 2012 in Karachi at that time before operation Ranger was introduced.
150. Whilst the applicant states that he will be targeted because he is an educated person, failed asylum seeker and western returnee, the Tribunal notes that the country information before it does not support this claim and the Tribunal does not accept this.
151. The Tribunal acknowledges that DFAT assesses there is a low risk of sectarian violence for most Shias in Pakistan and a moderate threat of sectarian violence for prominent Shias and low level official discrimination but moderate societal discrimination. However the Tribunal has considered the applicants father had a profile as a [TJP] member which alone was sufficient to have him killed in a targeted shooting. The applicant was a former [senior official] of ISO at [the university] which would increase his profile significantly. Furthermore he would recite Shiite clergy in public which again would build his profile. He is an Urdu speaking Mohajir which places him in a minority. Whilst individually the applicant’s claims do not cause the Tribunal to accept he faces a real chance of serious harm, the Tribunal finds that cumulatively his profile is such that he does face more than remote chance.

Future harm

152. The Tribunal accepts the applicant had a profile in Karachi as a supporter and campaigner for the Shia community, a former [senior official] of the ISO at [the university] and a supporter of the TJP and the son of a former active and recognised member of the TJP who was killed because of his support. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant said his father’s death made him more determined to help his community. He is part of a minority group, namely Urdu speaking Mohajirs and Shias. The Tribunal accepts the applicant identifies as a member of this minority group and that has had a family history of supporting the Shia community as a member and leader in ISO and a supporter of TJP and a singer of Marsias and Noha Khuans and that his interest, commitment and involvement would continue if he was to return to Pakistan.
153. As discussed with the applicant, the security situation in Karachi has improved significantly since the high levels of violence occurring in 2012. In 2013, a paramilitary Ranger operation commenced in Karachi aimed at eradicating criminal organisations linked to political parties. Political, ethnic and sectarian violence has continued to occur in Karachi however the number of fatalities from such violence in 2015 reduced in 2015 by 50% from 2014. The Express Tribune, 14 September 2015 published Taliban ‘no-go zones’ liberated in Karachi’, and reported that former Taliban no-go areas in Karachi have been liberated. However DFAT also states that in regards to politically motivated violence, it does not yet have sufficient information to assess the sustainability of this downward trend.
154. The Tribunal accepts however that the applicant is politically active in his district and actively engaged in promoting Shia causes and supporting the community. Furthermore the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is from a family who is known to be TJP supporters. As such, the Tribunal accepts he may be identified and susceptible to threats and attacks from extremists in Karachi in the future.
155. The Tribunal accepts there is more than remote chance the applicant may be threatened or otherwise harmed, including serious physical harm if he continues his political and religious activities in Karachi. The Tribunal accepts such harm amounts to serious harm and that it is systematic and discriminatory in nature. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant’s race - Mohajir, religion – Shiite Muslim, political opinion –former member and [senior official] of ISO and supporter of TJP and being of an ethnic minority which may impute him as a supporter of MQM and his membership of a particular social group namely Marsias and Noha Khuans cumulatively are the essential and significant reasons for the harm.
156. The Tribunal is satisfied that adequate state protection will not be available to the applicant. Whilst the government has taken steps to crack down on extremism the capacity of the police and authorities to protect the applicant is limited by resource shortages, poor training, personal means and in some cases, political will. The Tribunal has relied upon country information in regards to this finding.
157. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant will be susceptible to such harm anywhere in Pakistan. He is a member of a minority group who can be easily identifiable and who has a profile and whose father had been killed for similar reasons. Internal relocation is not a reasonable or viable option.
158. In summary, in relation to the refugee criterion, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a refugee criterion reason.

CONCLUDING PARAGRAPH

159. For the reasons given above the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. Therefore the applicant satisfies the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).

DECISION

160. The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the following directions that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act

Rachel Westaway
Member