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Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia |
Last Updated: 1 August 2018
Azizi and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 2561 (23 July
2018)
File Number: 2018/2736
Re: Nima Azizi
APPLICANT
And Minister for Home Affairs
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal: Deputy President Rayment QC
Date: 23 July 2018
Date of written reasons: 23 July 2018
Place: Sydney
The reviewable decision is set aside and the matter is remitted to the respondent for consideration of the application for a visa with the direction that the discretion to refuse Dr Azizi’s application for a visa on character grounds is to be exercised in his favour.
....................................[SGD]....................................
Deputy President Rayment QC
MIGRATION – application for bridging visa – visa refused
– applicant found by delegate not to pass character test
– previous
Tribunal decision found that applicant passed the character test – no
circumstances relating to the applicant
had changed since previous decision
– delegate failed to treat previous Tribunal decision as normative –
previous decision
to be followed for consistency – no remaining issues to
consider – reviewable decision set aside and remitted with the
direction
that the discretion to refuse applicant’s application for a visa on
character grounds is to be exercised in his favour
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501
Azizi and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 669
Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Scott and the Commissioner for Superannuation (1986) 9 ALD 491
Singh (Migration) [2017] AATA 850
Pearce, Dennis, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2013)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President
Rayment QC
23 July 2018
When such a power is conferred upon more than one decision-maker, a tendency to inconsistency in making decisions may appear. There may be differences in the estimates made as to the risk of recidivism although, where experience in calculating such risks is comparable, variations will be a function of the known facts. Decisions will not appear to be inconsistent on that account, if the facts of each case are examined. But to some degree, each decision-maker will vary from another in his perception of Australia's interests, the effect of offending conduct, and the effect of a decision, one way or another, upon those interests. These are not generally matters of logical proof or evidentiary demonstration. After allowing for the variations in the facts of particular cases, the degree of inconsistency in decision-making will depend upon the extent of the disparity in the respective decision-makers’ perceptions of Australia's best interests and the way in which those interests are affected.
The creation of a jurisdiction in this Tribunal to review the decisions of the Minister, and the statutory requirement that the Tribunal be constituted by a presidential member sitting alone, results in the appointment of a number of presidential members to decide the cases brought to the Tribunal from decisions of the Minister under ss 12 and 13 of the Migration Act. The procedural advantages which the Tribunal enjoys in the production and testing of evidence frequently result in the Tribunal's findings of fact (including its estimation of the risks of recidivism) being different from the findings of the Minister, and that is an intended consequence of the vesting of the jurisdiction in the Tribunal. But the possibility of a presidential member of the Tribunal attributing to a particular kind of offending conduct a gravity different from the gravity attributed to the same conduct by another presidential member, or by the Minister, adds to the prospect of inconsistency in decision-making. In the deportation jurisdiction, the Tribunal (unlike the Tribunals of some countries) cannot be constituted by members drawn from a constant panel whose standards and values may provide a constant reference point for decisions. The Minister and each presidential member may perceive Australia's interests differently and may differ in their perception of the way in which offending conduct adversely affects those interests. Such differences will lead to inconsistency in making decisions.
Inconsistency is not merely inelegant: it brings the process of deciding into disrepute, suggesting an arbitrariness which is incompatible with commonly accepted notions of justice. In matters of deportation, which so profoundly affect the interests of the deportee and his family and which are of relevance to the community at large, inconsistency born of the application of differing standards and values should be reduced as far as it is possible to do so.
Although that was said in relation to a consideration of whether or not it was proper for the Minister to have a policy and to make his decisions by applying that policy, it can properly be applied also to decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. One effect of the Tribunal's decisions is to establish administrative norms; they enable legislation to be administered consistently. For the Tribunal to make decisions inconsistent with its own previous decisions adversely affects that process. Doubtless, in some instances, where a matter has been decided by the Tribunal without full argument or full consideration and it is necessary for the Tribunal in later proceedings to examine the matter fully, it may then properly reach a conclusion different from the previous decision. In that event, because the later decision is the first made upon a full consideration of the matter, it is clear to administrators that that decision should be followed rather than the previous decision. More rarely there may be instances where, notwithstanding that the Tribunal has reached a decision on a certain matter after full consideration, it is nevertheless manifest that there was an error in the reasoning which led to that decision. To adapt what was said by Isaacs J in Australian Agricultural Co v Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia [1913] HCA 41; (1913) 17 CLR 261 at 278 , it is not better that the Tribunal should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately right. Nevertheless, where a matter has been decided by the Tribunal after full consideration of competing arguments, the decision is one which is reasonably tenable and there have been no changes to the legislation and no new decisions of the High Court of Australia or the Federal Court which may be relevant, it seems to us that it would be extremely unhelpful for the Tribunal in subsequent proceedings to decide the matter in a manner inconsistent with that decision, particularly when the arguments advanced are substantially the same as those advanced in the previous case.
Second, and importantly in terms of its position in the administrative structure, the AAT performs a normative or systemic role. Many decisions of the AAT will have the significance of a test case for decision-makers. The ruling on one application may need to be applied to many like cases arising in the course of the agency’s general business. Consistency in treatment of like cases is a hallmark of good administration.
I certify that the preceding 18 (eighteen) paragraphs are a true copy of
the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President Rayment
QC
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.....................................[SGD]...................................
Associate
Dated: 23 July 2018
Date of hearing:
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23 July 2018
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Mr N Dobbie, Visa Immigration Specialists Australia
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Mr A Keevers, Sparke Helmore
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2018/2561.html