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Kukulka v Google LLC [2020] FCA 1229 (25 August 2020)
Last Updated: 25 August 2020
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kukulka v Google LLC [2020] FCA 1229
File number(s):
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Judgment of:
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Date of judgment:
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Catchwords:
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application
to serve originating application seeking preliminary discovery outside Australia
pursuant to Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 10.41 to 10.44 –
proposed method of service by email – whether the proceeding is of a kind
mentioned in r 10.42
– whether the prospective applicant has a prima facie
case for all or any of the relief claimed
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Legislation:
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Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil or Commercial Matters. Opened for signature 15 November 1965.
Entered into on 1 November 2010. Articles 5, 10
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Cases cited:
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Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2006]
FCAFC 116; (2006) 154 FCR 425
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Division:
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General Division
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Victoria
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Other Federal Jurisdiction
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Number of paragraphs:
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Solicitor for the Prospective Applicant:
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Mr Mark Stanarevic of Matrix Legal
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ORDERS
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MICHAEL KUKULKAProspective
Applicant
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AND:
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THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
- Pursuant
to rr 10.42, 10.43 and 10.44 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the
Prospective Applicant has leave to serve:
(a) the originating application filed on 22 June
2020;
(b) the affidavit of Mark Stanarevic affirmed on 22 June 2020;
(c) the affidavit of Michael Kukulka affirmed on 10 August 2020; and
(d) a copy of this order;
upon the Respondent in the United States of America, by sending it by email
to internationalcivil@google.com,
conditional upon an acknowledgement of receipt being provided to the Prospective
Applicant.
- The
matter is listed for a case management hearing on 30 September at
2:15pm.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ANASTASSIOU J:
A INTRODUCTION
- The
Prospective Applicant, Michael Kukulka, is a professional Gold Dealer and
Operations Manager of Melbourne Gold Buyers and Brisbane
Gold Buyers, who relies
on the internet to attract customers across Australia. He seeks leave to serve
an originating application
and accompanying documents upon the Respondent,
Google LLC, which is based in the United States of America, pursuant to
Part 10 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The originating
application is brought under r 7.22 of the Rules and seeks orders requiring
Google to provide preliminary
discovery.
- The
preliminary discovery is sought in relation to all documents or things in
Google’s possession or control relating to the
identity of an unknown
person who posted an allegedly defamatory Google review in relation to Mr
Kukulka’s business interests,
under the name ‘Nick Wood’. The
Prospective Applicant seeks this order so that he can identify the party or
parties
involved in publishing the review and so that he may bring defamation
proceedings against that individual or those individuals.
- For
the reasons set out below, I consider it appropriate to grant leave to Mr
Kukulka to serve the originating application and accompanying
documents on
Google under rr 10.42, 10.43 and 10.44 of the Rules by sending those documents
by email to Google at internationalcivil@google.com.
Nevertheless, I have made an order that service by email is conditional on, and
will not be effective until, there is an acknowledgement
of receipt by the
Respondent.
- I
reach this conclusion notwithstanding that this approach requires me to make an
order for substituted service under r 10.24, as
service by email would not
ordinarily be permitted under r 10.43(3). I consider it appropriate to do so
because:
(a) the current state of the COVID19 pandemic means that
there are delays and impracticalities associated with international registered
post, the ordinary method of service relied on in analogous proceedings; and
(b) the originating application and accompanying documents are likely to come to
the Respondent’s attention, given that Google
is a multinational
corporation with a history of responding to similar applications at the email
identified above.
B CONSIDERATION
- Rules
10.43(2) and 10.44(1) provide that a party may apply to the Court for leave to
serve an originating application or other document, respectively, on
a person in
a foreign country in accordance with the “Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil or Commercial Matters”
held at the Hague on 15 November 1965 (the Hague Service Convention).
Before leave may be granted to serve an originating application or other
document on a respondent outside Australia, the Court
must be satisfied of four
matters set out in r 10.43(3) and (4):
(a) the application must be accompanied by an affidavit
which states the foreign country where the person is to be served, the proposed
method of service and, if the Hague Service Convention applies, that the
proposed method of service is permitted by the Hague Service
Convention (r
10.43(3));
(b) that the Court has jurisdiction in the proceeding (r 10.43(4)(a));
(c) that the proceeding is of a kind mentioned in r 10.42 (r 10.43(4)(b));
and
(d) that the applicant has a prima facie case for all or any of the relief
claimed in the proceeding (r 10.43(4)(c)).
- In
satisfaction of these requirements, the Prospective Applicant relied on orders
previously made by this Court in similar applications.
For instance, in
Kabbabe v Google LLC [2020] FCA 126, Murphy J made orders
and gave reasons to the effect that the above requirements were satisfied in
analogous circumstances. Justice
Murphy made similar orders on 23 April 2020 in
proceeding number VID 94 of 2020 (Garde-Wilson v Google
LLC), though detailed reasons were not provided.
- The
only material difference in the present application is that the Prospective
Applicant submitted that it was not presently practicable
to effect service on
the Respondent by international registered post, due to the current global
pandemic, and orders should be made
for substituted service by email under r
10.24. For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the making of those
orders is appropriate,
subject to the fact that service will not be deemed
effective until the Prospective Applicant obtains an acknowledgement of receipt
from the Respondent.
B.1 Proposed method of service
- The
affidavit of Mr Stanarevic, deposed on 22 June 2020, provides that the
Respondent corporation is based in the United States of
America and is a party
to the Hague Service Convention. The proposed method of service is by email to
internationalcivil@google.com,
an email which the Respondent has a history of responding to in similar
preliminary discovery proceedings arising in this Court.
- It
is undisputed that the Prospective Applicant has leave to serve the relevant
documents by international registered post, on the
basis that doing so would be
compliant with Art 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention: see e.g. Kabbabe
at [5]-[9] (Murphy J). However, in this instance, the Prospective Applicant
submitted that, due to the current global COVID-19 pandemic,
there have been
delays with the postal service and it would be impracticable to effect service
by these means in the rapidly changing
global environment. Accordingly, the
Prospective Applicant proposes to serve the Respondent by email, relying on the
provisions
for substituted service in r 10.24. For the reasons that follow, I
agree with that approach.
- In
AIA Australia Ltd v Richards [2017] FCA 84, Allsop J at [7]
explained that the Hague Service Convention contemplates several mechanisms, or
channels, for service. One such
channel includes transmission through
international registered post: AIA Australia at [12]-[13] (Allsop J).
However, the Hague Service Convention does not expressly provide for service by
email, which is in many
ways unexpected given that the Convention dates back to
1965: Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Hague Service
Convention (Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 3rd edition at [245]).
- Of
course, technology has evolved since that time and there is overseas
jurisprudence which suggests that it may be possible to effect
service by email.
This includes, for example, situations where service by other means is
impossible and there is a reasonable probability
that service by email would
bring the document to the other party’s attention: see e.g. Practical
Handbook at [265]-[268].
- While
I am not satisfied that service by email would necessarily be permitted by the
Hague Service Convention in the present circumstances,
I need not decide the
issue in this application. This is because the Prospective Applicant is
applying for substituted service under
r 10.24. That rule therefore forms the
analytical framework through which to consider whether service is permitted.
- On
its face, r 10.24 appears to provide for substituted service in a domestic
context, whereas r 10.49 relates to substituted service
outside Australia.
These rules differ insofar as substituted service under r 10.49 is only
available where an attempted service,
in accordance with a convention, the Hague
Convention or the law of a foreign country, was not successful. Conversely, r
10.24 applies
in circumstances where it is not practicable to serve a document
on a person in a way required by the Rules. In any event, it has
been held in
this Court, in analogous circumstances, that an order for substituted service
may be made under either r 10.24 or r
10.49: Australian Information
Commission v Facebook Inc [2020] FCA 531 at [66] (Thawley J).
- I
therefore proceed on the same basis as Thawley J in Australian Information
Commission v Facebook, considering whether it would be impracticable to
effect service on Google by international registered post, without substantial
difficulty. I consider that it would be, and an order for substituted service
should be made under r 10.24, for the following reasons.
- Firstly,
we are in the midst of a global pandemic, where service by international
registered post might be substantially delayed or
otherwise impractical. While
the present state of the pandemic may subside in due course, it is not possible
to predict that with
any confidence or certainty when that will occur: see e.g.
Australian Information Commission v Facebook at [75] (Thawley J). To
this end, Mr Stanarevic, solicitor for the Prospective Applicant, attests to
delays in international certified
mail in affidavits dated 22 June 2020 and 17
August 2020, based on his experience in proceedings of a similar nature.
- Second,
I am satisfied that the Respondent has a history of responding to similar
requests for preliminary discovery at internationalcivil@google.com
and the originating application and accompanying documents are likely to come to
the Respondent’s attention. In fact, it seems
highly probable, if not
certain, that the relevant and necessary people at Google will be made aware of
the documents, again for
the reasons deposed in the affidavits of Mr Stanarevic
referred to above.
- Third,
notwithstanding the views expressed above, I have made service by email
conditional upon the Respondent acknowledging it has
received the email. This
provides a further assurance that service will be validly and properly effected.
- If
there were to be any doubt about the position expressed above as to the
suitability of relying on substituted service, I would
nevertheless be minded to
exercise the discretion afforded to me by r 1.34 of the Rules to dispense with
requirements in r 10.43
to otherwise permit service by email, on the conditions
I have described above.
B.2 Court’s jurisdiction in the proceedings
- It
is uncontroversial that this Court has jurisdiction to hear an application for
preliminary discovery under r 7.22 of the Rules
in a proceeding relating to
alleged defamation. The requirement in 10.43(4)(a) is satisfied.
B.3 Proceeding of a kind mentioned in r 10.42
- It
is similarly apparent that the proceeding is of a kind mentioned in r 10.42, as
it is proceeding based on a cause of action arising
in Australia. I have
reached this conclusion because:
(a) the audience of the allegedly defamatory imputation
is based in Australia;
(b) the Prospective Applicant is an Australian resident and any loss of
reputation would be suffered wholly or partly in Australia;
and
(c) on the balance of probabilities, the google review was published by an
Australian resident. I draw this inference because it
refers to dealings which
must have occurred in Australia.
B.4 Prima facie case for relief
- I
am also satisfied that there may be a prima facie case for preliminary discovery
under r 7.22. Rule 7.22(1) requires that to obtain an order, the Prospective
Applicant must satisfy the Court that:
(a) there may be a right for the Prospective Applicant
to obtain relief against the prospective respondent;
(b) the Prospective Applicant is unable to ascertain the description of the
prospective respondent, notwithstanding reasonable inquiries
having been
undertaken in the circumstances; and
(c) another person knows, or is likely to know, the description of the
prospective respondent, or has, or is likely to have had,
control of a document
or information that would help ascertain that description: Hooper v Kirella
Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1584; (1999) 96 FCR 1 at [31]- [34].
- It
is important to recognise that the obligation on the Prospective Applicant at
this stage is not onerous. The Prospective Applicant
only needs to show that he
may have a right to obtain relief for the alleged defamatory imputations.
This threshold is reached in the present circumstances, where
the identified
Google review alleges, by implication, that Mr Kukulka is negligent and unfit to
be a Gold Dealer and Operations Manager.
While those aspersions are not cast
against him personally, they can be attributed to him as a member of a limited
class of persons
involved with the Melbourne Gold Company and Brisbane Gold
Company: Taylor v Network Ten (Perth) Pty Ltd [1999] WASC 264 at
[10]- [12], [23] (Stone J).
- I
am also satisfied, based on the affidavit of Mr Stanarevic dated 22 June 2020,
that Mr Kukulka has made reasonable inquiries with
Google and taken other
appropriate steps to identify the prospective respondent or respondents, but has
been unable to ascertain
that description. Those inquiries need not be
exhaustive and I am comfortable that Mr Kukulka has made reasonable attempts to
have
Google remove the review or identify the reviewer: see also Kabbabe
at [17] (Murphy J).
- Further,
I consider it likely that Google has, or have had, control of a document or
thing that would assist the Prospective Applicant
to ascertain the description
of the prospective respondent, which may include:
(a) the subscriber information for an anonymous account
under the name ‘Nick Wood’;
(b) the name of the users of that account;
(c) the IP address or addresses and associated information relating to that
account;
(d) any phone numbers associated with that account;
(e) any location metadata associated with that account; and
(f) any other Google accounts including their full name and email address and
identifying details which may have originated from
the same IP address during a
similar time period to when the account was accessed to post the relevant Google
review: see also Kabbabe at [18] (Murphy J).
B.5 Residual discretion
- I
note for completeness that the Court retains a residual discretion to refuse
relief even where the requirements for service outside
Australia are satisfied:
Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd (2006) 154
FCR 425 at [3] (Black CJ and Finkelstein J) cited in Australian Information
Commission v Facebook at [58] (Thawley J). However, I do not consider that
the present circumstances give rise to any basis to refuse leave on
discretionary
grounds.
C CONCLUSION
- Accordingly,
I have made orders for the Prospective Applicant to serve the originating
application and accompanying documents on the
Respondent by email at internationalcivil@google.com,
conditional on an acknowledgement of receipt being provided.
I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) numbered paragraphs are a true
copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice
Anastassiou .
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Associate:
Dated: 25 August 2020
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