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[2021] FCA 297
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Sydney Criminal Lawyers v Google LLC [2021] FCA 297 (29 March 2021)
Last Updated: 29 March 2021
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sydney Criminal Lawyers v Google LLC
[2021] FCA 297
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Judgment of:
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Date of judgment:
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Catchwords:
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE –
application to serve originating application seeking preliminary discovery
outside Australia pursuant to Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 10.41 to
10.43 (the Rules) – whether the application meets the requirements of r
10.43 of the Rules – service
in accordance with the Hague Service
Convention – whether service by post is permissible – leave granted
to serve originating
application outside Australia
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Legislation:
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Cases cited:
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Carroll & Richardson - Flagworld Pty Ltd v PayPal Australia Pty
Limited [2020] FCA 371
Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56; (2002) 210 CLR
575
Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Hague Service Convention
(Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 2006)
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Division:
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General
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Registry:
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New South Wales
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National Practice Area:
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Other Federal Jurisdiction
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Number of paragraphs:
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Solicitor for the
Prospective Applicant:
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Mr. D Garan of Berrigan Doube Lawyers
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ORDERS
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SYDNEY CRIMINAL LAWYERSProspective
Applicant
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AND:
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GOOGLE LLCProspective Respondent
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THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
- Pursuant
to rr 10.42 and 10.43 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the
prospective applicant has leave to serve:
(a) the originating application filed on 29 January
2021;
(b) the affidavit of Ugur Nedim affirmed on 29 January 2021;
(c) the affidavit of Daniel Garan affirmed on 10 March 2021; and
(d) a copy of this order.
upon the respondent in the United States of America, in accordance with
Article 10(a) of the “Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters” done at The Hague
on 15 November 1965, by sending them
by international registered post, with an
acknowledgement of receipt to be provided to the prospective applicants, to the
respondent’s
address at:
Google LLC
C/O Custodian of Records
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, California 94043
United States of America
- There
be no order as to costs.
- The
matter be listed for a case management hearing on 27 April 2021 at
9:30am.
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
- The
prospective applicant, Sydney Criminal Lawyers, by originating application dated
29 January 2021 seeks an order pursuant to r
7.22 of the Federal Court Rules
2011 (the Rules) that the prospective respondent, Google LLC (Google), give
discovery of all registration information of the Google accounts
of five
specified identities and the IP addresses of the logins to the respective Google
accounts, to the extent that such information
or data is in the possession of
and reasonably available to Google. The prospective applicant alleges that it
has been defamed as
a result of what are said to be false reviews published on
Google. Preliminary discovery is sought to identify the unknown prospective
respondents so that proceedings can be brought against them.
- The
matter was listed for case management hearing on 11 March 2021, during which the
prospective applicant sought leave to serve the
originating application filed on
29 January 2021 on the prospective respondent. The applicant had not provided
draft proposed orders,
and after discussion indicated that they sought orders
similar to those made in Kabbabe v Google LLC [2020] FCA 126. I made
orders that the prospective applicant file brief written submissions in support
of the application by 18 March 2021, with
the matter to be determined on the
papers.
- The
prospective applicant applies for leave, pursuant to rr 10.41 - 10.43 of the
Rules, to serve an originating application outside
of Australia.
- The
prospective applicant relies on the following affidavits:
(1) the affidavit of Ugur Nedim affirmed on 29 January
2021; and
(2) the affidavit of Daniel Garan affirmed on 10 March
2021.
- For
the reasons given below, it is appropriate to make the order to grant leave to
the prospective applicant to serve the proceeding
on Google in the United States
of America (USA) in accordance with Article 10(a) of the “Convention on
the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters” done at The Hague on 15 November 1965 (the Hague
Service
Convention).
Consideration
- Rule
10.43(2) provides that a party may apply to the Court for leave to serve an
originating application on a person in a foreign country in accordance
with the
Hague Service Convention. Before leave may be granted to serve an originating
application on a respondent outside Australia
the Court must be satisfied of
four matters set out in r 10.43(3) and (4):
(1) the application must be accompanied by an affidavit
which states the name of the foreign country where the person is to be served,
the proposed method of service and, if the Hague Service Convention applies,
that the proposed method of service is permitted by
the Hague Service
Convention: r 10.43(3);
(2) the Court has jurisdiction in the proceeding: r 10.43(4)(a);
(3) the proceeding is of a kind mentioned in r 10.42: r 10.43(4)(b); and
(4) the applicant has a prima facie case for all or any of the relief claimed in
the proceeding: r 10.43(4)(c).
- The
relevant principles are well known and were recently summarised in similar
factual applications by Murphy J in Kabbabe v Google LLC [2020] FCA 126
at [3]- [16] (Kabbabe) and my decision in Seven Consulting Pty Ltd v
Google LLC [2021] FCA 203 (Seven Consulting).
- I
am satisfied of the four matters identified above.
First criteria
- The
prospective applicant relies on the affidavit of its solicitor, Mr Garan
affirmed on 10 March 2021, which establishes, inter alia,
that the USA is a
contracting party to the Hague Service Convention.
- The
Hague Service Convention contemplates several channels for service in the
Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Hague Service Convention
(Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 2006)
(Practical Handbook): AIA Australia Ltd v Richards [2017] FCA 84
at [7] (AIA Australia). Allsop CJ observed:
The “main channel of transmission” is
service under Article 5 of the Hague Service Convention through the
“Central
Authority” of the receiving State. The Convention also
permits service through several “alternative channels”:
Practical
Handbook at [183].
- The
prospective applicant proposes to serve the documents by sending them by
international registered post, which is one of the alternative
channels: namely
service by post pursuant to Art. 10(a). As Allsop CJ noted in AIA
Australia at [13], the Practical Handbook states at [196] that
“transmission ... through postal channels [referred to in Art 10(a)]
includes service of process upon the
addressee”.
- It
is uncontroversial that the service of documents by international registered
post is compliant with Art. 10(a), this Court having
granted leave on a number
of previous occasions for service in that manner: see Kabbabe at [8],
citing Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Power Assets Holdings Ltd
(previously known as Hongkong Electric Holdings Ltd) [2013] FCA 708; (2013)
96 ATR 51 at [15]- [22]; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Cheung Kong
Infrastructure Holdings Ltd [2013] FCA 707; (2013) 96 ATR 44 at [15]- [22];
Bell v Steele [2011] FCA 1390; (2011) 198 FCR 291 at [13] and [16];
Ahmed v Al-Hussain Pty Ltd t/as The Cheesecake Shop [2018] FCA 1741 at
[17].
- In
Kabbabe Murphy J observed at [9]:
In Water Splash Inc v Menon 581 U.S. (2017) at 12
the US Supreme Court held that the Hague Service Convention does not prohibit
service of process in the USA
by direct post to the respondent, and there is
nothing in the materials before the Court to indicate that the USA objects to
direct
postal service of legal process under the Convention. The Practical
Handbook states at [204] that a comprehensive list of objecting States is
available on the website of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference
on
Private International Law. Having reviewed that website, it states that the USA
does not object to service under Art. 10(a).
I proceed on that
basis.
- As
I did in Seven Consulting, I also proceed on that basis.
Second criteria
- There
can be no issue that the Court has jurisdiction to hear an application for
preliminary discovery pursuant to r 7.22.
Third criteria
- The
proceeding falls within one or more of the categories or descriptions set out in
r 10.42, with the prospective applicants relying
on proceedings based on a cause
of action arising in Australia: Item 1 of the Table in r 10.42, proceedings
based on a tort committed
in Australia: Item 4 of the Table in r 10.42, and
proceedings based on, or seeking the recovery of, damage suffered wholly or
partly
in Australia caused by a tortious act or omission (wherever occurring):
Item 5 of the Table in r 10.42. I am satisfied that an application
for
preliminary discovery under r 7.22 is a proceeding based one or more of the
categories or descriptions set out in r 10.42.
- I
note that a defamatory statement made online is taken to be
“published” for the purposes of an action in defamation
when and
where it is downloaded: see Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002]
HCA 56; (2002) 210 CLR 575. That a review was visible to the public in the NT
and ACT, along with the rest of Australia, has previously
been found to be
sufficient to establish that the Court is likely to have jurisdiction to hear
the prospective claim: Kabbabe at [16]; Colagrande v Telstra
Corporation Limited [2020] FCA 1595 at [15]; Boyd v Automattic, Inc
[2019] FCA 86 at [47]- [49]. It follows in this matter that the Court is
likely to have jurisdiction to hear the prospective claim.
Fourth criteria
- On
the evidence relied on I am satisfied that the prospective applicant has a prima
facie case for preliminary discovery pursuant
to r 7.22(1): r 10.43(4)(c).
- Rule
7.22 provides that a prospective applicant may apply to the Court for an order
to require a person to discover to the prospective
applicant any document or
thing in the person’s control relating to the description of the
prospective respondent. It is intended
to provide a person with a means of
obtaining information as to the identity of a party against whom the person
wishes to commence
a proceeding, in circumstances in which the person is unable
to do so because of a lack of sufficient information about that party’s
description to enable an originating application to be filed: Carroll &
Richardson - Flagworld Pty Ltd v PayPal Australia Pty Limited [2020] FCA 371 at [3]; Kabbabe at [13], citing
Cape Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v Iannello [2009] FCA 709 at [63]- [64]
which relates to the predecessor rule.
- Rule
7.22 requires that the prospective applicant satisfy the Court:
(1) there may be a right for the prospective
applicant to obtain relief against the prospective respondent; and
(2) the prospective applicant is unable, notwithstanding having made reasonable
inquiries and taken any other steps reasonably required
in the circumstances, to
ascertain the description of the prospective respondent; and
(3) another person, the respondent to the application for preliminary discovery,
knows or is likely to know that description, or
has or is likely to have, or has
had or was likely to have had, control of a document that would help ascertain
that description.
see Kabbabe at [14], citing Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd [1999]
FCA 1584; (1999) 96 FCR 1 at [31]- [34] (Hooper).
- A
prospective applicant for preliminary discovery is not required to demonstrate
the existence of a prima facie case against the prospective
respondent; it is
enough if the prospective applicant can show that he or she may have a
right to obtain that relief: Kabbabe at [16], citing Hooper at
[33]. That said, as noted above, this application is for leave pursuant to r
10.41 - 10.43 of the Rules, to serve an originating
application outside of
Australia which requires as one of its preconditions, that the applicant has a
prima facie case for all or
any of the relief claimed in the proceeding: r
10.43(4)(c).
- The
prospective applicant is a law firm specialising in criminal law. The
prospective claims relate to five reviews which have been
identified in the
affidavits referred to above at [4].
The evidence establishes that there is a prima facie case for the reviews being
fake, and that arguably damage is likely to have
resulted. The evidence
establishes that these reviews were published on Google and that steps have been
undertaken by the prospective
applicant with Google to remove the reviews, which
to date have been unsuccessful.
- Having
regard to the affidavit of Ugur Nedim affirmed 29 January 2021 and the affidavit
of Daniel Garan affirmed 10 March 2021, I
am satisfied that the prospective
applicant has made reasonable inquiries and taken other steps reasonably
required in the circumstances,
but have been unable to ascertain the description
of the person or persons responsible or believed to be responsible for authoring
or publishing the reviews. The prospective applicant has been in communication
with Google about producing the required information.
I consider that Google is
likely to have or have had control of a document or thing that would help
ascertain the description of
the person or persons responsible or believed to be
responsible for authoring or publishing the reviews.
Conclusion
- Accordingly,
I make the orders sought.
I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24)
numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the
Honourable Justice
Abraham.
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Associate:
Dated: 29 March 2021
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