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Carmody & Garner [2013] FCCA 49 (17 April 2013)

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Carmody & Garner [2013] FCCA 49 (17 April 2013)

Last Updated: 3 May 2013

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CARMODY & GARNER

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Final arrangements for child aged 13 – child has special needs – high level of conflict between parties – allegations father has exposed child to neglect and family violence – child has not spent time with father since he allegedly assaulted child – police charges laid against father but charges dismissed – father has not participated effectively in proceedings but has attended court regularly – father withdrew from proceedings at final hearing stage – weight to be given to family report – best interests – should parties share parental responsibility.


Cases cited:
B v B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (1997) FLC 92-755
Russell & Russell & Anor [2009] FamCA 28
Bartel & Schmucker (No 3) [2012] FamCA 1094

Applicant:
MS CARMODY

Respondent:
MR GARNER

File Number:
ADC 1188 of 2009

Judgment of:
Judge Brown

Hearing date:
8 April 2013

Date of Last Submission:
8 April 2013

Delivered at:
Mt Gambier

Delivered on:
17 April 2013

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:
In person

Counsel for the Respondent:
Mr Noble

Solicitors for the Respondent:
Sills Lewis

Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer:
Ms DuBarry

Solicitors for the Independent Children’s Lawyer:
Legal Services Commission of South Australia

ORDERS

(1) The child [X] born [in] 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “the child”) live with the mother.
(2) The mother have sole parental responsibility for the child.
(3) The child spend time with the father subject to the child’s wishes.
(4) In the event that the child is hospitalised, due to a serious accident or illness, the mother is to use her best endeavours to advise the father, as soon as she practically can, of the circumstances of the child’s accident or illness and the location of the hospital where the child has been admitted as a result of such serious accident or illness.
(5) In the event that the mother learns of the father’s permanent postal address, she is directed to provide such address to the principal of the child’s school, who is authorised by this order to provide to the father copies of the child’s end of semester school reports, as they are produced, provided that the father pays any costs arising in relation to such provision.
(6) The parties are restrained and an injunction issues restraining each of them from changing the child’s surname unless the parties agree to such change in writing.
(7) The mother provide the principal of the child’s school with a copy of these reasons for judgment together with a copy of the family report of Ms N dated 23 October 2012.
(8) The order for the appointment of the independent children’s lawyer herein be discharged.
(9) All applications be otherwise dismissed.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Carmody & Garner is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).


FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT ADELAIDE

ADC 1188 of 2009

MS CARMODY

Applicant


And


MR GARNER

Respondent


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. Ms Carmody “the mother” and Mr Garner “the father” are the parents of [X] born [in] 1999. These proceedings deal with final arrangements for [X]’s care.
  2. The parties concerned have been in dispute, with one another, over [X]’s parenting, for a considerable period of time. The mother originally commenced proceedings, in this court, in March of 2009.
  3. In conjunction with these initial proceedings, an order was made for [X] to be independently represented in the case and for a family report to be prepared as a matter of urgency. As things have turned out, there have now been three such reports. That is an indication of the complexity of [X]’s family circumstances, over a number of years.
  4. [X]’s representative is Ms Rebecca Reed, an experienced family lawyer, currently in the employ of the Legal Services Commission of South Australia. Ms Reed is to be regarded as a party to the proceedings, of equal importance in them as the mother and father.
  5. [X] is a child with special needs. In the past, Ms Reed has obtained a number of medical reports, in respect of [X], which have been tendered into evidence. In the early stage of proceedings, Ms Reed arranged for two family assessment reports to be prepared by Ms B, a psychologist, in June and January of 2010.
  6. These reports led to the parties reaching a consensual arrangement for [X]’s care, on a final basis, in early 2010. This arrangement has broken down, giving rise to this second set of proceedings.
  7. [X] has an intellectual disability. In addition, he was diagnosed with attention deficit disorder at age four and epilepsy at age six. Prior to February 2009, [X] had experienced recurrent seizures, as many as two per week, which had resulted in frequent admissions to the Women’s & Children’s Hospital.
  8. At present, [X] lives with his mother. There are currently no formal arrangements in place for [X] to spend time with his father or interact with him in any way whatsoever. It has not always been so.
  9. On 18 February 2010, with the agreement of the independent children’s lawyer, final consent orders were made in respect of [X]’s care. Pursuant to those orders, the parties held equal shared parental responsibility for [X], who was to live with his father and spend time with his mother regularly, on alternate weekends and for half of each school holiday period.
  10. These orders were in line with recommendations made by Ms B in the second of her family assessment reports. In addition, the orders bore the notation that there were no current domestic violence restraint orders pertaining to the parties and a charge of criminal assault against the father, in respect of Ms Carmody, had been dismissed in January 2010.
  11. The relationship between the parties began in 1994 and lasted approximately ten years. They separated when [X] was aged around five years. It is an understatement to say relations between the parties are currently strained.
  12. During the parties’ relationship, they each maintained separate households. They have never been married. After they separated, they continued to live in close proximity to one another in [W], in suburban Adelaide. Between the date of their separation and early 2009, [X] lived mostly with Ms Carmody and saw Mr Garner for variable periods of time.
  13. On 26 February 2009, [X] ran to Mr Garner’s home and thereafter refused to return to Ms Carmody’s residence. Ms Carmody attempted to retrieve [X] and an unpleasant altercation ensued. Later Mr Garner was charged with assaulting Ms Carmody.
  14. From the date of this incident, [X] continued to live with Mr Garner. Ms Carmody was concerned that Mr Garner was influencing the child against her. Given [X]’s special needs, it is her case that [X] is particularly susceptible to such influence, particularly in connection with gifts and treats.
  15. It is also her position that Mr Garner has behaved in a violent fashion towards her in the past and the alleged assault of February 2009 was the most recent of many to which she had been subjected at
    Mr Garner’s hand.
  16. Ms Carmody is deaf, as a result of adult onset hearing loss. She also suffers from tunnel vision. She was born with spina bifida and has scoliosis of the back. As a consequence of her disability, she is in receipt of a government pension.
  17. Mr Garner has had a limited education, leaving school at year 8 level. He is now fifty three years of age. He is not currently employed but worked [omitted], for approximately twenty years. He has had other casual employment. Currently he too receives a government pension, as a consequence of his status as carer for an adult son, from a previous relationship, who suffers from a disability.
  18. Prior to 2009, it seems to be the case that Ms Carmody found [X]’s behaviour at times to be challenging. She described him as being regularly violent at school. She also reported that [X] had threatened her with a knife. [X] had been prescribed dexamphetamine in respect of his behavioural problems.
  19. In the context of her first report, Ms B interviewed [X]. [X] presented as being strongly aligned with his father. He also refuted any suggestion that Mr Garner had assaulted Ms Carmody in his presence. In her report, Ms B provided the following evaluation:
  20. Ms B’s first report was ordered to be prepared as a matter of urgency. It arose against the background of [X] decamping from his mother’s household, where he had predominantly lived for a lengthy period of time. It was also clear, at this stage, that [X] was a child with very significant special needs.
  21. Ms B’s initial recommendation led to a formalisation of the arrangement whereby [X] lived with his father predominantly.
    Ms Carmody apparently accepting that it was not likely to be helpful to force [X], against his strongly stated views, to return to live in her household.
  22. It remained her view that Mr Garner was influencing [X] against her. It was her position that [X] was very susceptible to such influence because of his intellectual disability. She has consistently categorised Mr Garner as a violent person, who lacks the skills to parent a child of [X]’s age and background adequately.
  23. In her second and updating report, Ms B recommended that the situation whereby [X] live predominantly with his father continue. She also recommended that [X] spend significant periods of time with his mother. This was workable because the parties were still living a few blocks apart from one another. This was the background to the consent orders of early 2010.
  24. The mother commenced the current round of proceedings on 12 December 2011. She seeks orders that [X] should live with her and she should have sole parental responsibility for him. Her application was precipitated by a further altercation, between the parties and which also involved [X]. It occurred in August of 2011.
  25. Ms Carmody deposed that she had visited [X], at Mr Garner’s home, on 29 August 2011, to collect some of the child’s clothing. It was also her position that she took this opportunity to raise her concerns with Mr Garner that [X] had not been attending school regularly.
  26. It is her case that Mr Garner became angry with her and threatened to punch her. During this altercation, [X] intervened, telling his father to “leave my mother alone”. Thereupon she deposes Mr Garner punched and kicked [X], causing the child bruising to his torso.
  27. Following this incident, Mr Garner was charged with a species of assault on [X] by police. He pleaded not guilty to the charge in question, which was ultimately dismissed in the [omitted] Magistrates’ Court. It seems [X] was not able to give evidence.
  28. Originally, it was a condition of Mr Garner’s bail that he not approach either the mother or [X]. Necessarily, this rendered the earlier consent order inoperative. Against this background, particularly the serious nature of the alleged assault on [X], on 10 January 2012, I suspended the earlier court order and made an interim order that [X] live with his mother.
  29. In support of her application, Ms Carmody has raised other concerns, regarding the period of time [X] was in the predominant care of his father. In summary, she alleges as follows:
  30. Essentially, the mother asserted that the father had subjected [X] to serious neglect and abuse and had exposed him to a serious level of family violence. She also asserted that [X] had not been properly fed by his father, who preferred to attend to his own social interests. Given [X]’s level of disability, it is her position that is it is self apparent that he is not in a position to obtain his own meals or attend to his own hygiene.
  31. [X] has not interacted with his father since August of 2011. It is the mother’s position that [X] has expressed no desire to see his father and contrary to what happened in the past, has stopped running off to Mr Garner’s house, when there has been some disagreement between him and his mother.
  32. Mr Garner has represented himself throughout this second round of proceedings. He has attended court punctually at each mention of the matter. However, he has not complied with directions for the filing of answering material.
  33. Given his background, I appreciate that it is very difficult for
    Mr Garner to engage with the formal processes of the court. It is likely that he finds it difficult to express himself in writing. In addition, for reasons that are not entirely clear to me, despite my requests that he obtain legal representation, he has steadfastly refused to do so.
  34. The only documents Mr Garner has filed in the proceedings were filed on 16 March 2012. It seems to be the case that he has photocopied the mother’s application and where the word “mother” appears in it, he has replaced it with the word “father”. His affidavit in support of this response is handwritten and is largely composed of the statement “not true” in reference to the numbered paragraphs of the mother’s affidavit.
  35. Against this background, I ordered that Ms Reed be reappointed, as the independent children’s lawyer and that a further family assessment report be prepared to examine [X]’s current situation, particularly what his views were in respect of the possibility of re-engaging with his father. For obvious reasons, it seemed appropriate that there be some independent and expert appraisal of the allegations that [X] had been subjected to serious neglect, whilst in his father’s care.
  36. Throughout the proceedings to date, Mr Garner has consistently stated his view that Ms Carmody is manipulating [X] against him and he himself has not behaved inappropriately towards [X]. He has told me that he thinks Ms Carmody has concocted her claims of abuse of neglect to advance her claims to regain [X] and to blacken his reputation.
  37. Against this background, it is self apparent that there was little, if any, scope for the parties themselves to agree on ongoing arrangements for [X]’s care. The level of mistrust and hostility between them is extreme. Accordingly, the matter was fixed for final hearing on 8 and 9 April 2013.
  38. Ms Carmody has filed an affidavit in support of her application for final orders. Mr Garner has not. The family report was prepared by Ms N. Arrangements were made for her to attend court on 8 April to provide evidence and to be cross-examined, if appropriate, at the final hearing stage.
  39. Mr Garner attended at court on 8 April. I asked him if he had read Ms N’ report. He replied “no comment”. When pressed further about whether he had any view about He further stated that he was “not interested” in the case.
  40. Given his regular attendance at court, I indicated to Mr Garner that this was not my impression of him. I said that it seemed to me that he was very interested in everything to do with [X]. In response to this, he said that “she can have him”. He also indicated that he was pursuing some other matter, presumably regarding Ms Carmody and [X] with his “barrister”.
  41. Although Mr Garner was somewhat agitated, he was neither threatening nor impolite to me. I asked him if he had any questions of Ms N. He said “no”. In this context, I told him that, in the absence of cross-examination, I was likely to accept Ms N’ recommendations, particularly given that he had not filed any fresh affidavit material.
  42. Following this interchange, my recollection is that Mr Garner left the court room. He did not subsequently return. Against this background, counsel for the mother, Mr Noble, supported by counsel for the independent children’s lawyer, Ms DuBarry applied to have the matter finalised on an undefended basis.
  43. I acceded to this request but determined that, given the complexity of [X]’s family situation, I would hear some evidence from Ms N. She was asked questions by both Mr Noble and Ms DuBarry. In addition I asked her some questions myself.

The mother’s application

  1. The mother seeks the following orders, as outlined in her counsel’s case outline document, prepared on her behalf:
  2. Ms DuBarry opposes any order deposing parental responsibility for [X] solely in Ms Carmody’s care. In addition, it was her case that there was no reason, related to [X]’s best interests, requiring the extensive injunctions sought by the mother.
  3. In support of her application, the mother relies on a further affidavit of herself filed on 22 February 2013. This affidavit, together with the family report of Ms N, dated 23 October 2012, constitute the major aspects of the evidence before me. In addition, as earlier indicated, Ms N gave some further oral evidence.

The mother’s case

  1. Ms Carmody was born [in] 1961. She alleges that Mr Garner is a frequent and heavy drinker. It is her case that, during the parties’ ten year relationship, he was frequently physically violent towards her.
  2. Against this background, when [X] was aged approximately five years of age, she decided that she would no longer continue her relationship with Mr Garner and thereafter she stopped going to his home. [X] continued to live mainly with her. It is her case that she is the most consistent figure in his life.
  3. Currently, it is Ms Carmody’s position that Mr Garner no longer lives in [W]. She does not know where he is living currently as he refuses to disclose his address to her. From her perspective, this is a further reason why it is impractical for her and Mr Garner to share parental responsibility for [X].
  4. It is Ms Carmody’s case that, prior to the incident of 2009, she was concerned that Mr Garner was lackadaisical in respect of the provision of [X]’s medication to him. This medication included not only behavioural drugs, but also anti-seizure medication, relating to his epilepsy. Her evidence is that it was very difficult, if not impossible, for the parties to discuss rationally and calmly issues to do with the administration of medication to [X] and the general management of his health.
  5. As previously indicated, it is her case that [X] was significantly neglected, when he came into his father’s predominant care. It is her case that she reluctantly agreed to the earlier court orders and found it difficult to obtain legal aid to change them, notwithstanding her concerns that [X] was being subjected to significant neglect by his father.
  6. It is Ms Carmody’s case that she and [X] live in a comfortable three bedroom Housing Trust home where [X] has his own bedroom. He is currently attending [H] School, where he is in a special class. His recent report indicates that he is doing well at school currently.
  7. It is Ms Carmody’s evidence that [X] is happy and well settled in her care and has no wish to see his father. She describes [X] as a more mature child than he was at the time of Ms B’s various reports. It is Ms Carmody’s case that [X] is now more than capable of articulating his views.
  8. In essence, Ms Carmody deposes that [X] lives in a happy and well tended home with her, where he is well looked after. It is also her case that, due to the parties’ lengthy and violent history with one another, it is both impossible and certainly impracticable for them to exercise joint parental responsibility for [X].
  9. It is also her case that she remains fearful of Mr Garner, whom she characterises as a violent and unstable person. Against this background, it is her case that it is clearly in [X]’s best interests to make the final orders sought by her.

The report of Ms N

  1. Ms N impressed me as a sensitive and sensible expert witness. In her report, she has made the following recommendations:
  2. Mr Garner took part in the family report process. He denied the allegations against him to Ms N, who described him as being “focussed” on his intention to sue Ms Carmody for “slander, false allegations and defamation”.
  3. In addition, Ms N reported that Mr Garner stated that “he would not attend a trial “stuff them”, and that “if I want to see him ([X]) I’ll go get him, she (Ms Carmody) broke the Court Order 11 times, I’ll do the same”. He stated that he would take [X] from Ms Carmody and take him straight to a Police Station “to check for bruises”.
  4. Although these statements are capable of being interpreted as being threatening, Ms N did not take them as such. She agreed with my characterisation of them as being the comments of a person who was “disempowered”. Ms N said she did not feel frightened of
    Mr Garner. She did not doubt his love and affection for [X].
  5. In interview with Ms N, both Mr Garner and Ms Carmody confirmed that they did not communicate in any way with one another.
    Ms Carmody complained that Mr Garner did not listen to her point of view. As outlined above, it was clearly Ms N’s impression that
    Mr Garner remains antagonistic towards and suspicious of
    Ms Carmody.
  6. Ms N summarised her interview with [X], in her report, as follows:
  7. In answer to questions from me, Ms N stated that the emphasis, in her recommendations, was on protecting [X] from being subjected to further neglect and abuse. Given [X]’s manner of presentation towards her, she did not believe that his complaints about mistreatment, at his father’s hand, were likely to be as a result of any manipulation or inducement emanating from Ms Carmody. In short, Ms N accepted [X]’s account of being mistreated by his father as being true.
  8. However, like me, Ms N does not doubt Mr Garner’s love for and interest in [X]. In these circumstances, it was her evidence that the court should do whatever it could to “leave the door open” for
    Mr Garner and [X] to re-engage with one another, at some time in the future.
  9. However, she conceded that it was unlikely that such re-engagement would occur until such time as Mr Garner developed some level of insight into his responsibility for the current situation. Ms N believed that Mr Garner would require extensive professional and personal support to develop such insight, which he was unlikely to be able to access at the present time.
  10. The recognition of Mr Garner’s love and interest for [X] provided the rationale for Ms N to recommend that the parties have shared parental responsibility for him. However, she conceded in cross-examination that there were likely to be significant difficulties arising from any attempt by Mr Garner and Ms Carmody to exercise such responsibility, the chief of which being their longstanding antipathy for one another and their inability to communicate.
  11. Notwithstanding this recommendation regarding the equal allocation of parental responsibility, Ms N provided the following evaluation in the case:
  12. This statement, when coupled with her evidence regarding her past involvement with Mr Garner, provided the basis for the injunctions sought in respect of the father. Ms Carmody concedes that there has not been any recent incident of conflict between her and Mr Garner since [X] came into her care. In addition, she concedes that
    Mr Garner has not attended at [X]’s school since that time.
  13. In summary, Ms N accepted [X]’s account of being subjected to ill treatment by his father. In these circumstances, it was her recommendation that [X]’s best interests would be served by him continuing to live predominantly with is mother. In addition, it was her view that the court should respect [X]’s strongly expressed view not to engage with his father in future.
  14. In all the circumstances of this case, I have no cause to question this opinion, which accords with my own impression of the evidence. Whatever orders the court ultimately makes, the focus must remain on protecting [X] from any future incidents of neglect and abuse.

The legal principles applicable

  1. Part VII of the Family Law Act deals with orders relating to children. Before making any particular parenting order, the court must regard the best interests of any child concerned as the paramount consideration [Family Law Act section 60CA].
  2. The matters which the court must take into account, in deciding how a child’s best interests are to be served, are set out in the Family Law Act at section 60CC.
  3. Section 60CC creates two classes of considerations, which apply to the court’s determination of how a child’s best interests will be determined in proceedings before it. They are designated as primary considerations and additional considerations.
  4. There are two primary considerations, which are set out in section 60CC(2)(a) and (b), namely:
  5. Prior to recent legislative amendments, these considerations were not formally ranked in regards to one another. They have been referred to, in a number of the decisions of the Family Court, as twin pillars, the importance of which depends on the circumstances of the case concerned.
  6. However, as a result of the insertion of section 60CC(2A) into the Act, the Court is now directed, in applying the primary considerations, to give greater weight to section 60CC(2)(b), which is the primary consideration relating to the need to protect children from physical or psychological harm, from being subjected to or exposed to family violence.
  7. The rationale for the amendment, which has resulted in section 60CC(2)(a), is to safeguard children from coming to harm as a result of being exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence. In the words of the relevant explanatory memorandum: “Where child safety is a concern this new provision will provide the Court with clear legislative guidance that protecting the child from harm is the priority consideration.”
  8. The evidence is unequivocal that [X] has been exposed to family violence. He reports it to Ms N. The evidence also indicates, in my view, that he has been subject to neglect, particularly educational neglect.
  9. The two primary considerations are stressed by section 60B(1) of the Act, which sets out the principles and objects of the legislation as it relates to children. They include the following:
  10. The principles, which underpin these objects, are set out in s.60B(2) and are as follows:
  11. Other criteria, relating to how a Court is directed to consider how the best interests of any child concerned may be served by any order which the Court makes, are set out in section 60CC(3). These criteria are categorised as additional considerations.
  12. Pursuant to section 60CC(3)(m) the court is empowered to have regard to any other fact or circumstance which it considers relevant. This ensures that the infinite variety of individual children’s circumstances may be addressed in any order which the court makes.
  13. Although the court is directed to consider many factors, in discharging its duties under Part VII of the Act, the best interests of the children concerned remain paramount. The court’s duty is to deliver individual justice, for the child affected, in every case.[1] In this sense, the court’s inquiry is a “positive one tailored to the best interests of the particular children and not children in general ...”[2] As such the various factors, in section 60CC, are inclusive but not exclusive of one another.[3]
  14. The additional considerations include such matters as any views of the child concerned, subject to the maturity of the child concerned; the parental insight of the parties concerned; the capacity of the parents to supply the educational and emotional needs of any relevant child.
  15. I accept Ms N’s evidence that [X] has a well formed preference to continue living with his mother and not to spend any time with his father. It is also her view that the mother has the superior parental capacity and is much better place to supply [X]’s educational and emotional needs.
  16. There is a presumption that it is in a child’s best interests for his or her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility [see section 61DA]. This presumption relates to the allocation of parental responsibility, not to the allocation of time which a child spends with each of his or her parents.
  17. The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has engaged in abuse of the child or family violence has occurred. The presumption may also be rebutted if the Court finds that it would not be in the best interests of the child for it to be applied.
  18. Abuse is defined in the Act and it is a concept relating primarily to assault, including sexual assault on a child. Both parties assert that the other has assaulted the children in this matter. I am not able to resolve those issues satisfactorily. At this stage, it appears to me that this must be a case that is focused more on neglect.
  19. Neglect is not a concept formally defined in the Act. Its meaning must be gleaned, I think, from an examination of the objects which underpin Part VII of the Act, which is the part which deals with the arrangements of the care of children. These principles include the following:
  20. Clearly, [X] will not achieve his full potential, either as a child or as an adult, if he is robbed of the opportunity to attend school regularly. He will not be able to read and write adequately. He will not be able to do arithmetic. If he is a socially and academically isolated child he may not be able to regulate his behaviour appropriately. Such deficits may blight his subsequent adult life.
  21. The evidence indicates that [X] did not attend school regularly whilst he was in his father’s care. Due to his level of disability, [X] is a vulnerable child. As such he is perhaps more at risk than other children, in the event that he becomes disconnected with the formal education process.
  22. In my view, a child not attending school as required, without proper excuse, fits within the definition of neglect provided by the Act. As such, I am satisfied that Mr Garner has exposed [X] to neglect.
  23. For self-apparent reasons, a failed education is not conducive to an adult having a successful later life. These are important matters to my mind. It is my view that the duty to ensure a child attends school properly and has a regular education is one of the most fundamental responsibilities of being a parent. In my view the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr Garner failed, in this aspect of parental responsibility, for [X].
  24. I am told [X] enjoys school, particularly drama and singing. He is doing better, at school, since coming into his mother’s care. He also seems to be attending school as required. It is important for him to have regular school attendance habits and to learn social skills through interaction with his peers. These matters are fundamental to his well being.
  25. In addition, on the basis of [X]’s statements to Ms N, there is evidence to indicate that Mr Garner failed in another significant aspects relating to [X] care in turns of his nutrition and hygiene. Whilst in Mr Garner’s care, [X] put on excess weight, which has discomforted [X]. He complains that he had to get his own meals.
  26. In my view, on the basis of these disclosures, which did not appear to Ms N to be anything other than genuine and spontaneous on [X]’s part, I find that [X] has been subject to neglect, whilst in his father’s predominant care.
  27. It also seems that [X] was exposed to family violence directly at the hands of his father. On this basis, it would not be in [X]’s best interests for the presumption arising under section 61DA to be applied to his care.
  28. The principles contained in Part VII are to be to the forefront of the court’s mind in its overall assessment of the evidence available to it and what orders should ultimately be made. The court is urged to ensure that children receive adequate and proper parenting from their parents and to devise mechanisms to achieve such an end.
  29. As Cronin J has observed in Bartel & Schmucker (No 3)[4] adequacy and propriety of parenting are very subjective and must be affected by the parents’ physical, emotional and financial capacities and circumstances. In this context, Cronin J said as follows:
  30. How responsibility for the parenting of a child is formally conferred upon a person, in proceedings conducted under the Family Law Act, is through the making of a parenting order. Parental responsibility, in relation to a child, means all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children [section 61B].
  31. The court has authority conferred upon, through the provisions of Part VII of the Family Law Act, to alter the conferral of parental responsibility on any parent or parents, which arises by reason of their status as parents of any child concerned. This is done through the mechanism of a parenting order.
  32. A parenting order is an order which deals with such issues as the persons with whom a child should live; spend time and communicate with; and the persons, who should have responsibility for making decisions, both significant and otherwise, about a child and the degree of consultation necessary to implement such decisions [section 64B(2)].
  33. Pursuant to section 65C of the Act, a child’s parents; the child him or herself; a child’s grandparents; or any other person concerned with the child’s care, welfare or development; may apply for a parenting order. Accordingly, the applicants have legislative authority to seek the orders, which they do.
  34. In addition, as a consequence of the provisions of section 65D, the court is empowered to make whatever parenting order it considers “proper”. Pursuant to section 64B parental responsibility can be allocated to two or more persons. Clearly this provision, when considered in the light of the objects and principles underlying Part VII, contained in 60B, is supportive of the concept of parents sharing parental responsibility and meeting their responsibilities concerning their children’s care, welfare and development.
  35. I acknowledge that Mr Garner is interested in [X]’s care, welfare and development but it is clear that he has not been involved in these matters, in any way, since [X] came into Ms Carmody’s exclusive care. He has not been to [X]’s school to talk to his teachers; he has not participated in or observed any of [X]’s extramural activities; he has not consulted with any [X]’s medical practitioners.
  36. As such, for a significant period of time, he has not discharged any of the duties or responsibilities relating to the parenting of [X] nor has he exercised any of the powers and authority naturally conferred upon him as [X]’s father. Since August of 2011, Ms Carmody alone has exercised all necessary authority and duties to parent [X]. In this sense, it is clear that the parties have not shared any of the responsibilities pertaining to [X]’s parenting for some time.
  37. I am satisfied that this situation has come about because, when Mr Garner was exercising authority for [X], pursuant to the earlier order, he did so neglectfully and uninsightfully. Although, it is a regrettable finding to make, I am satisfied that he did not behave responsibly in his role as a parent.
  38. It is also self apparent that the parties have no capacity to communicate at all with one another, let alone respectfully or constructively. In his comments to Ms N, Mr Garner indicated his intention to sue Ms Carmody for slander. This may be bluster. But nonetheless, Mr Garner’s perception is that Ms Carmody is an enemy, who must be countered.
  39. To my mind, this is the context in which the application of parental responsibility, to the parties in this case, must be considered. In Bartel & Schmucker (No 3) Cronin J said as follows regarding the nature of parental responsibility:
  40. It is, to my mind, axiomatic that there is no prospect of Mr Garner and Ms Carmody engaging in any process of joint parenting of [X], as the evidence currently stands. Ms N concedes that this is the case and Mr Garner has demonstrated it by his parting comment to the court “she can have him”. Notwithstanding this state of affairs, both Ms N and the independent children’s lawyer urge against the door being shut permanently against Mr Garner playing some form of active and meaningful role in [X]’s life.
  41. The rationale for the proposal, advanced by Ms N, regarding the sharing of parental responsibility, rests solely on the possible consequence of Mr Garner perceiving that he has been permanently excised from discharging any form of role whatsoever, in the remainder of [X]’s life and he will therefore be deterred from re-engaging with [X] at some indeterminate time in the future and the loss of this opportunity will be detrimental for [X].
  42. An order which provides for shared parental responsibility requires that the parties to it to consult with one another and make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision about major long-term issues to do with the child or children concerned [section 65DAC].
  43. Major long-term issues is defined in section 4 of the Act and includes issues to do with a child’s education; religious and cultural upbringing; the child’s health; the child’s name; and changes to the child’s living arrangements that would make it significantly more difficult for the child concerned to spend time with a parent.
  44. Pursuant to section 65DAE, parents (or other relevant persons) do not have to consult on matters, which are not concerned with long term issues, when the child is spending time with one or other of them. This is to ensure that the myriad decisions, which have no long term significance concerning a child and which need to be made on a day to day basis, by both of the child’s parents, can be made.
  45. Ms N agrees with my assessment that the parties cannot jointly exercise parental responsibility for [X], in any effective or meaningful sense, because they do not communicate in any whatsoever. Every interaction between them has the potential to end in violence. This unfortunate situation is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, unless Mr Garner has a significant shift in his attitude towards
    Ms Carmody.
  46. Ms N considers such a shift unlikely to occur unless Mr Garner has extensive support and counselling. In my view, it is apparent from his attitude to these proceedings that Mr Garner is not amenable to receiving such assistance. The extreme level of mistrust and hostility between the parties is not likely to abate any time soon.
  47. Accordingly, in the current difficult circumstances which prevail in this case, I do not think that it is likely to be helpful to [X] for his parents to share parental responsibility for him, even for the largely symbolic purposes of trying to assuage Mr Garner’s sensibilities or of providing an inducement for him to change his attitudes in respect of parenting in future. Cronin J said of the concept of parental responsibility that it:
  48. Sadly, the evidence available to me indicates that Mr Garner has not provided an environment for [X], which has been conducive to him enjoying the safety and security of childhood. The parenting
    Mr Garner has provided to [X] was not, in my view, calculated to assist him to reach his full potential as an adult.
  49. There has been nothing joint or consensual about the parties’ parenting of [X] for a very long time. At least since the mother commenced these proceedings in 2009, their respective positions have been polarised by conflict and disputation. [X], by reason of his special needs, is a vulnerable child. For these reasons, I have come to the conclusion that it would not be in [X]’s best interests for his parents to share parental responsibility for him.
  50. I accept that Mr Garner loves [X]. Accordingly he is likely to be concerned if any misfortune befalls him and want to know about it. He is also likely to be interested in what [X] is doing in life and proud of any achievements which he may accomplish. The question therefore arises as to what information can be conveyed to Mr Garner, about [X]’s progress in life and the means by which such information is disseminated to him.
  51. Ms Carmody has deposed that she remains frightened of Mr Garner, who has been charged with assaulting her in the past, as he has in respect of [X]. Although Ms N herself was not frightened of
    Mr Garner and he has always presented courteously to me, he presents as a man in “with a chip on his shoulder” who seeks to bring Ms Carmody to account, in some unspecified way, in the future.
    Mr Garner’s behaviour does not always seem to be predictable, as most recently demonstrated by his withdrawal from these proceedings. I can thus understand why Ms Carmody is frightened of Mr Garner.
  52. However, there has been no complaint of actual violence, harassment or other insult between the parties for some time now. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the injunctions sought by the mother are too far ranging. Nonetheless, the potential for conflict to erupt between the parties remains high.
  53. Accordingly, it is my view that it would be imprudent for me to make the type of order, which would otherwise authorise Mr Garner to attend at [X]’s school for occasions routinely attended by parents, such as school concerts, parent/teacher interviews, sports days and the like or, more importantly, to require the mother to inform him of these types of events.
  54. In any event, Ms Carmody does not know where Mr Garner currently lives. He seems to wish to keep this issue concealed from her. In addition, there will be no concrete orders regulating [X] spending time with his father. In these circumstances, any order mandating a communication book is essentially meaningless. Similarly, it is difficult to see, at this juncture, how the mother can provide the father with copies of school report, school photographs and the like.
  55. Mr Garner’s conduct, when he withdrew from the final hearing, saying words to the effect of “you can have him” to my mind effectively absolve the mother from having to provide extensive information to Mr Garner about [X]’s care.
  56. I appreciate that, in future, it may well be the case that [X] becomes curious about his father and will yearn for some contact from him. For those reasons, Ms N urged that there be a “chink in the door” for Mr Garner. The rationale for this proposal is laudable, but the impetus for it must come from Mr Garner himself.
  57. I will however direct that Ms Carmody use her best endeavours to advise the father, as soon as she practically can, in the event that [X] is hospitalised due to a serious accident or illness. I would hope that this type of serious misfortune, for [X], would transcend the bitterly conflicted circumstances of the parties. It is only natural that Mr Garner would want to know if his son was in harm’s way.
  58. In addition, if Ms Carmody becomes aware of Mr Garner’s postal address, I will direct that she provide it to the principal of [X]’s school so that the principal can forward copies of [X]’s end of semester reports to Mr Garner, through the authority of this order, provided that Mr Garner pays any cost arising. Again, I accept that Mr Garner is likely to be interested in [X]’s scholastic performance, at least in general terms.
  59. Given [X]’s special circumstances and given the high level of conflict which has existed between the parties up until this stage, it is sensible that the principal of [X]’s school be provided with a copy of these reasons for judgment and Ms N’ report. I will make an order to this effect.
  60. Ms N’s recommendations that Ms Carmody liaise with Disability SA and facilitate [X]’s attendance at the Women’s & Children’s Hospital are entirely sensible. However, in the circumstances of this case, I see no need to make the specific orders, given that I propose making an order that the mother have sole parental responsibility for [X].
  61. Finally, I will make the injunction that the parties be restrained and an injunction issue restraining each of them from changing [X]’s surname, unless the parties otherwise agree in writing.
  62. For all these reasons, the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and thirty-one (131) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Brown


Date: 17 April 2013


[1] See B v B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (1997) FLC 92-755
[2] See B v B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (ibid) at 84,220
[3] See Russell & Russell & Anor [2009] FamCA 28 at [141] per Ryan J
[4] Bartel & Schmucker (No 3) [2012] FamCA 1094 at [13]
[5] Ibid at [18]
[6] Ibid at [21]


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