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ATR15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1089 (20 May 2016)

Last Updated: 15 June 2016

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ATR15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR


Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Judicial review – application for leave out of time – visa cancelled – pursuant to s116(1)(e) of the Migration Act 1975 (Cth).


Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.116(1)(e), 367(2), 476, 477(2)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r.4.21(2)(b)(i)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.44.05

Cases cited:
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391
SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719
Tien & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1552; (1998) 89 FCR 80
Newall v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1624
WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2003) 75 ALD 630
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anor v Peko-Wallsend Ltd and Others [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 66 ALR 299
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16


Applicant:
ATR15

First Respondent:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent:
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number:
MLG 2482 of 2015

Judgment of:
Judge Harland

Hearing date:
29 March 2016

Date of Last Submission:
29 March 2016

Delivered at:
Melbourne

Delivered on:
20 May 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:
Ms Latif

Solicitors for the Applicant:
Victoria Legal Aid

Counsel for the Respondents:
Mr Goodwin

Solicitors for the Respondents:
Australian Government Solicitor


ORDERS

(1) That the time for the applicant to seek judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal dated 21 August 2015 be enlarged.
(2) A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing the decision of the Tribunal dated 21 August 2015.
(3) A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine the application made to it for review of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent dated 14 October 2014 2015 according to law.
(4) The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs.

NOTATION: These orders have been amended pursuant to rule 16.05(2)(e) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 to reflect the deletion of the number “2015” and insertion of the number “2014” in Order 3

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 2482 of 2015

ATR15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

AS CORRECTED

  1. The applicant applies for leave out of time for judicial review of the decision made by the Tribunal. As there has been some criticism of the way the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCC”) deals with applications for leave out of time I will state from the outset that both counsel sought the leave application and the substantive merits of the judicial review.

Background

  1. This matter has a lengthy and somewhat concerning history.
  2. The applicant is stateless. He was born in Myanmar and fled there when he was 3 years old.
  3. He travelled to Australia by boat in April 2012.
  4. The applicant applied for a protection visa in August 2012.
  5. In July 2014 the Refugee Review Tribunal found that the applicant was a refugee and remitted for consideration of the remaining criteria for a grant of a protection visa.
  6. The applicant was granted a bridging visa on 13 September 2012 whilst his application for a protection visa was being considered.
  7. The applicant’s bridging visa was cancelled on 10 October 2014. The applicant was taken into immigration detention where he remains.
  8. The applicant applied for a review of the cancellation decision on 14 October 2014. The Tribunal considered his application and affirmed the department’s decision to cancel his bridging visa.
  9. The applicant applied to the FCC for judicial review and was successful. The FCC quashed the decision and remitted for redetermination according to law noting that the second respondent erred when refusing the applicant’s request for an adjournment without considering its discretion under section 367(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and that this amounted to legal unreasonableness. The FCC orders were made on 20 February 2015.
  10. The applicant was invited to appear before the second Tribunal on 5 March 2015. The hearing was on 10 March 2015. The applicant had been transferred to immigration detention in Western Australia and the invitation was issued without taking into account the public holidays and the different time zone between Western Australia and Victoria. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision and again the applicant applied to the FCC for judicial review. Again the applicant was successful in orders were made on 1 July 2015 were made quashing the Tribunal’s decision and remitting the matter from redetermination according to law. This time the decision breached Regulation 4.21(2)(b)(i) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) by not providing sufficient notice for the hearing.
  11. The applicant was invited to attend a hearing before the third Tribunal on 9 July 2015. The applicant attended a hearing on 18 and 19 August 2015 and was assisted by his migration agent and a Burmese interpreter.
  12. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 24 August 2015.
  13. The applicant seeks to review that decision.
  14. The applicant has filed separate proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia with respect to his protection visa where despite him being found to be a refugee some two years ago a decision about whether or not he needs balance of the criteria for a protection visa has not yet been determined.
  15. The circumstances of this leading up to the cancellation of the applicant’s bridging visa are as follows.

Circumstances leading to cancellation of the applicant’s visa

  1. The applicant attended the scheduled fortnightly meeting with his case officer at the Adult Migration Education Service office (“AMES”). Appearing at Court Book (“CB”) pages 10 to 12 is a detailed incident report. It summarised an incident taking place on 3.00pm on 7 October 2014 during this appointment where the applicant became angry about his visa, he was frustrated that it was taking so long to assess the balance of his visa application after being found to be a refugee. He referred to other friends who had come to Australia on protection visas the same time as him who had been granted their visas. The applicant said that he was experiencing financial hardship and the case manager observed that the client’s anger increased. The applicant made comments in English “I hate Australian’s [sic] and I want to join Isis the Islamic States group and kill Australian’s [sic]” and “if I see Tony Abbott somewhere I will kill him”.
  2. The case manager records that he advised the applicant that his comments were very serious and could be regarded as a breach of the code of conduct he signed. It records that the applicant responded “I don’t care nothing is important to me anymore.” The case manager continued the fortnightly assessment and referred him to emergency relief services with respect to his financial difficulties.
  3. The case manager then records talking to the team leader at 4.30pm that day. The team leader spoke to the program manager the next day who also reported the incident to the director of the ASAS program. The team leader reported the incident to the incident report hotline. The case was reallocated to another case worker due to conflict of interest.
  4. The notice of intention to consider cancellation of the applicant’s bridging visa appears at CB 13. It refers to the power to cancel pursuant to section 116 of the Migration Act. The letter highlights section 116(1)(e). That section has since been amended.
  5. The applicant was given the letter and decision and advised to give a written response as to why his visa should not be cancelled and states at CB 14 that the applicant must respond in writing within 20 minutes of receiving the letter.
  6. The letter states that his written response will be taken into account in that the decision maker will consider matters such as:
    1. The purpose of the applicant’s travel and stay in Australia;
    2. The extent of the applicant’s non-compliance with any visa conditions;
    3. The degree of hardship which may be caused to the applicant and his family if his visa is cancelled;
    4. The circumstances in which the ground for cancellation arose;
    5. His behaviour which set to the Department now and on previous occasions.
  7. It is hard to imagine how anyone in the applicant’s position even if English was his first language would be in a position to provide a meaningful response to that letter in a 20 minute timeframe.
  8. The letter confirming the cancellation of his visa appears at CB 16 and 18. It records that the applicant was interviewed on 10 October 2014 that his comments were taken into account. The decision confirmed the cancelation of his visa. The decision records that the applicant initially admitted to an interpreter that he made threats but that he had said those things out of frustration with the visa application process and that he was not serious. He denied making threats against the Prime Minister. After the interpreter left he changed his statements saying that the interpreter did not interpret correctly denied making any threats against Australia and denied saying that he wanted to join a terrorist group.
  9. The decision maker accepted the advice from AMES and accepted that the applicant stated that he wanted to join a known terrorist organisation:

Out of time application

  1. The applicant filed his current application for judicial review 6 weeks out of time.
  2. Pursuant to section 477(2) of the Migration Act an applicant must file an application for judicial review within 35 days of the migration decision being made. The FCC has a discretion to extend the time pursuant to s.477(2) which states:
  3. Rule 44.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) provides that:
  4. The applicant filed his application for judicial review on the November 2015. This makes his application to 6 weeks out of time.
  5. He has satisfied section 477(2)(a) of the Migration Act. The applicant relies on an affidavit filed by his solicitor on 8 March 2016. She gives the following explanations:
    1. She describes the difficulties in obtaining instructions from immigration detainees in general but particularly when immigration detainees held in remote detention because of limited access to telephones and computers and difficulties in ensuring that clients receive documents. She says detainees can be transferred between centres without notice and all of these factors contribute to delay;
    2. She refers to the workload pressures on legal aid solicitors with limited resources;
    3. She then gives specific evidence about the applicant’s circumstances. The applicant had been transferred from Yongah detention centre in remote Western Australia to Maribyrnong immigration detention centre in order to give evidence at the hearing of the third Tribunal hearing. It understood that he was due to be transferred back to Western Australia within two days of the decision. She visited him in detention the day after she received the decision. Her client was very distressed about the outcome of the decision and she thought he was mentally unwell. The applicant instructed her to make enquiries about the status of his protection visa. She says it was difficult to take instructions and give him detailed legal advice about the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision and possible grounds for judicial review because of his remoteness and level of distress;
    4. She was unwell and out of the office on 26 and 27 August 2015 and 2 and 3 September 2015;
    5. On around 3 September 2015 she conducted a merits assessment of the decision and formed the view that there were reasonable prospects of success. Victoria Legal Aid guidelines require a second opinion as to the merit and she sent an email to Ms Latif of Counsel requesting her opinion;
    6. Between 3 September 2015 and 10 October 2015 she unsuccessfully sought information about the progress of the applicant’s protection visa;
    7. The applicant contacted her on 9 October 2015 to advise her that he had been moved to Christmas Island detention centre in the early hours of the morning without notice and that all his documents and most of his clothing had gone missing. She describes the difficulties she had in contacting him in getting documents to him and receiving them back from Christmas Island;
    8. The applicant was very distressed about this transfer to Christmas Island she was again concerned about his mental health and as a result she had difficulty obtaining instructions from him at the time;
    9. Between 15 September 2015 and 29 October 2015 she continued to make enquiries with senior department case managers as to the status of the applicant’s outstanding protection visa application but was unable to get a substantive response;
    10. The applicant telephoned her on 5 November 2015 and told her that he was in hospital after being attacked by another detainee and was in seclusion. She says given this development and her lack of success in getting a response about the progress of his protection visa she decided it was in his best interest to file an application for judicial review as soon as possible. She filed the application for judicial review the next day.
  6. The first respondent resists the application for leave to be granted out of time. In written and oral submissions the first respondent’s counsel was critical of the applicant’s explanation for delay raising the following issues:
    1. The applicant’s solicitor does not say when she received advice from counsel;
    2. The applicant has not provided an adequate explanation for the delay and in particular with respect to the period between 3 September and 28 September 2015;
    3. The application is not signed by the applicant and so the inference could be drawn that his solicitor was not authorised to sign the application on his behalf. This consistent with the applicant signing a request to be removed from Australia.
  7. The respondent makes the point that the prescribed period in the legislation should not be lightly dispensed with. It is not simply a matter of forming the view that 6 weeks is a relatively short delay. Rather the Court must consider the factors set out in s.477(2) and the principles set out in numerous authorities including MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 and SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719. I accept that submission.
  8. The first respondent argues that he is prejudiced by having to commit resources to defend an application where no adequate explanation has been provided. The applicant says in response to this that it is not a matter of prejudice but simply the by-product of litigation. In some circumstances this could amount to prejudice between where the delay is lengthy, there is a lack of adequate explanation for delay and the merits of the case are weak. In this case the first respondent has prepared submissions with the respect to the out of time application and the substantive issue together and the matters were heard together. Unless the proceedings are vexatious or so unmeritorious they should not be dismissed on the first return date. It cannot be correct that merely having to respond to an application is prejudicial as that would stifle a person’s right to commence litigation which would be the antithesis to our legal system. None of those factors are applicable in this case.
  9. Contrary to the first respondent’s submissions I find that the applicant has provided a detailed explanation for the delay. The reasons are not merely generic but also relate the applicant’s particular circumstances. It has to be seen in the context of a person who was found to be a refugee but has been waiting for more than two years for that application to be finalised, who is distressed and in detention. In the circumstances of his case it was reasonable to follow up on the status of his protection visa before filing an application of judicial review given the delay in having that application finalised and the number of times his case has already been remitted to the Tribunal. The difficulties of contacting and taking instructions from a detainee are obvious. Whilst initially he was in a local detention centre he was soon moved to a remote one and the difficulties are compounded there. This was exemplified by the difficulties during the hearing. The applicant was to attend the hearing via videolink from Christmas Island. The video did not work at all. He was able to attend by telephone but that connection was lost part way through the hearing and could not be reconnected. His legal representatives had foreshadowed with him that that could happen and had instructions to proceed.
  10. The respondent’s legal representative submitted that it could be assumed that the applicant’s solicitor did not have authority to file the application for judicial review. This was because of the solicitor saying that she thought it was in her clients’ best interests to file the application after her client was attacked by another detainee and because the applicant did not sign the application.
  11. The first respondent’s solicitor filed an affidavit on 22 March 2016 and annexed a request for removal from Australia form signed by the applicant on 24 September 2015. Significantly the form indicates that he did not discuss it with his legal representative and did not need an interpreter. The second annexure is a withdrawal of request for removal form where he indicates he did discuss it with his legal representative and did have the assistance of an interpreter. That form is dated 25 November 2015.
  12. The allegation against the applicant’s solicitor is a serious one as it suggests misconduct on her part. A careful examination of the annexures to the respondent’s solicitors reveals that it would be dangerous to assume that the applicant’s solicitor had any knowledge of her client’s request to be removed from Australia. She says in her affidavit that he has expressed a wish at times to be sent to Cambodia and other countries. She says this has arisen in the context of his distress at being in detention and having been successful before the FCC twice before.
  13. The criticism that the applicant did not sign the application is entirely without merit. The form itself clearly provides for either the applicant or the legal representative to sign the form. If she had insisted that her client sign the form there would have been further delay in getting the form to him, having the content of the form interpreted to him, having him sign and return it.
  14. I find it is in the interests of justice to grant the applicant leave to proceed out of time. As the merits of his claims were fully argued before me I will address the merits in the next section.

The applicant’s claims

  1. The applicant relies on the following grounds for judicial review:
    1. The second respondent misconstrued the term “good order” as it appears in s.116(1)(e) of the Migration Act and thereby made a legal error amounting to jurisdictional error. The Tribunal erred in its construction of the term “good order” by:
      1. Failing to conduct an assessment of the risk to the good order of the Australian community that took account of all relevant considerations;
      2. Misconstruing or misapplying relevant jurisprudence;
      1. Defining “good order” narrowly and focusing only on the words spoken constituting a threat, not the context in which the threat was made.
    2. The second respondent erred by failing to consider relevant considerations bearing upon the exercise of the discretion to cancel a visa under s.116(1)(e): compare Procedural Advice Manual 3 on the exercise of the power to cancel visas. The applicant refers to and repeats paragraph 1(a)-(c) and says further, the Tribunal also failed to consider:
      1. The applicant’s express claim to have been assaulted, detained in isolation and left unable to access medical attention whilst in immigration detention;
      2. The applicant’s claims about the circumstances in which the threat was made;
      1. The applicant’s claims and integers of claims cumulatively.
  2. Section 116(1)(e) contains a two limb approach. The first limb is to find whether or not grounds for cancellation exist. The second limb is to exercise the discretion as to whether or not to cancel the visa. The applicant argues that the Tribunal erred in both limbs.
  3. Both counsel agree that there are only two authorities which address s.116(1)(e) as it stood. Tien & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1552; (1998) 89 FCR 80 (“Tien”) is a decision of Goldberg J. He observed that the phrase ‘good order’ is not defined in the Migration Act.
  4. The factual circumstances in Tien were very different to the circumstances here. Mr Tien had a very long stay temporary business visa. His visa was cancelled after an immigration officer found that Mr Tien’s travelling companion was travelling with false documents using a false name and Mr Tien had documents in his possession which included documents showing his travelling companion’s real name.
  5. Goldberg said at pages 93-94:
  6. Goldberg J held that the provisions in s.116(e) are mandatory for good reason given that this provision is invoked by the Department when it is seeking to take immediate action to cancel a person’s visa.
  7. Branson J in Newall v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1624 (“Newell”). In this case the applicant was granted an electronic visitor visa. He expressed concern to the Australian High Commission in London that he was not asked about his status and told them that he had been convicted of a crime in the United Kingdom and spent 3 years in prison. His visa was cancelled pursuant to s.116(1)(e). Branson J quoted Goldberg J and agreed with his construction of good order.
  8. Branson J found that the applicant was inviting the court to engage in a merits review. The applicant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact of the murder of his parents and was still on parole. It was open to the delegate to find that the presence of the applicant in Australia might be a risk
  9. The Tribunal noted that there was no audio recording of the AMES interview and that the AMES case officer was not available to give evidence. The Tribunal noted inconsistencies in the applicant’s claims about the threat at various points and found aspects of his evidence lacked credibility.
  10. The Tribunal recorded that the applicant’s case manager was concerned about the applicant’s deteriorating mental health. The Tribunal observed that it did not have any expert medical evidence about the applicant’s mental health but that this would go to the applicant’s moral culpability rather than the question of risk.
  11. The Tribunal accepted that applicant was feeling frustrated at the time he made the threats and spoke calmly when he made them. The applicant had not made threats before. Whilst the applicant said he was joking he knew, or ought to have known the threats were grave.
  12. At [29] the Tribunal referred to Tien and Newall and found:
  13. The Tribunal found that the grounds for cancellation existed and then considered whether or not to exercise the discretion as to whether or not to cancel the visa and concluded that the applicant’s circumstances were not such that the Tribunal should not exercise its discretion not to cancel the visa.

The first limb

  1. The applicant argues that the Tribunal erred when interpreting good order by taking Newell’s Case to mean that the risk of an adverse reaction to the visa holder’s presence in Australia. The applicant argues that this is goes beyond what is stated in Tien and Newall.
  2. In my view, reading Goldberg J’s decision and the Tribunal’s decision, it is not a fair reading to focus on the phrase risk of adverse reaction because this follows on from considering the good order of the Australian community. The Tribunal has not misapplied or gone beyond Tien and Newall rather it has applied the test to the facts before it. As illustrated by the different facts in the two cases there will be different facts to apply to the provision. The public aspect to good order is precisely what Goldberg J applied and what the Tribunal applied here.
  3. The applicant argues that the Tribunal erred in ignoring the surrounding circumstances and the context in which the threats were made and argues that these are relevant to the assessment of risk.
  4. The first respondent argues that the Tribunal did not interpret good order too narrowly and did consider the surrounding circumstances. It is clear from reading the decision that the Tribunal did identify the the context in which the threats were made and considered the material including the email from the applicant’s former case worker who wrote that it was out of character for the applicant.
  5. At [22] of the Tribunal’s decision when assessing good order and quoting from the two cases the Tribunal member concluded that the risk is about “the risk of adverse reaction by certain members of the Australian society based to the applicant’s presence in this country rather than on the concern about the applicant’s likely or possible conduct.” In my view that is an appropriate assessment consistent with Newall’s Case.
  6. It is not difficult particularly in light of recent world events and the Lindt café enquiry that if the Australian public were to be aware of the threats the applicant uttered that in some quarters there would be unrest and a risk to safety and good order of the Australian community. It is not all sections of the Australian community. Some may well be swayed by the applicant’s personal circumstances, including his refugee status, his distress and mental health, others would not. One only has to look at media reports in the recent times (reasonable or not) to imagine how sections of the public would react. It is important to note that there is no suggestion in the section 116(1)(e) itself (as it then was) nor in either of the Federal Court decisions that reasonableness factors into this consideration. It does not refer to a reasonable member of the public.
  7. It is also noteworthy that there is no qualifier to the term risk in this context unlike in the family law context where a judicial officer is required to assess whether there is an unacceptable risk to a child’s welfare in circumstances of abuse or violence for example.
  8. The Tribunal properly applied the legislation and authorities. The first ground is not made out.

The second limb

  1. Turning to the second ground, the applicant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider the integer of the applicant’s claim with respect to hardship if his visa was cancelled.
  2. The first respondent argues that the Tribunal is not required to take into account any particular consideration in exercising its discretion about whether or not to cancel the applicant’s visa. This ignores the fact that the Department has published its Procedures Advice Manual PAM3 general visa cancellation powers. The Tribunal states it considered at [31] of its decision. It is clear from the following paragraphs that it did have regard to those guidelines
  3. The Tribunal refers to the circumstances including the purpose of the visa holder’s travel and stay in Australia. The Tribunal correctly identifies the fact that the applicant came to Australia for protection and has been found to be person to whom Australia owes protection. It then refers to the bridging visa and says “There is no indication that the cancellation of the Bridging visa will of itself adversely affect the assessment of the remaining criteria for the Protection visa.” The issue of assessing the remainder of the applicant’s protection visa is a matter for the Department. Those criteria include health, security and character checks.
  4. The Tribunal then goes on to consider hardship. It refers to the fact that the applicant has already been in detention for many months and will remain in detention until his protection visa is finally determined. The Tribunal says there is no material to indicate when that might be processed. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant is Stateless and has been found to be a person to who Australia owes protection. It then records that the remaining criteria is yet to be considered. The only issue before the Tribunal was whether or not to affirm the delegate’s decision to cancel the bridging visa. The protection visa application is not before it and it cannot second guess what another forum might do.
  5. The Court must be careful not to overstep its bounds in conducting a judicial review. It is not about the Court substituting its own opinion or about considering that it would have reached a different conclusion. This would be an error on the Court’s part.
  6. The real issue turns on whether or not the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s specific claims with respect to his experiences in detention. The claim with respect to the assault is brief. It appears at CB 93 [2] of the applicant’s statutory declaration. It is clear that the Tribunal did have regard to the statutory declaration because it refers to other parts of it. It is well established that the Tribunal is not obliged to refer to every piece of evidence before it.[1] The issue is whether or not the applicant’s claim about his treatment in detention, if considered could have materially affected the outcome.[2]
  7. The decision of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16 is also applicable here. The Tribunal was assessing hardship and considered remaining in detention as a hardship. The applicant made a specific claim about his individual circumstances in detention.
  8. It is not enough to refer to the fact that the applicant will remain in detention. The section of the decisions with respect to discretion is on 6 paragraphs. There is no mention about the assault in detention. This is a clear omission particularly in light of the Tribunal’s consideration of the hardship of detention generally. It gives the impression that the Tribunal has not given specific consideration to the applicant’s claims and evidence before it. By failing to refer to this the inference is that the Tribunal overlooked that claim which make have affected the outcome.
  9. I am satisfied that the Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error. I must quash the decision and remit the matter to the Tribunal. I am very aware that this means that a fourth Tribunal will need to consider this issue but that is unavoidable.
  10. As the applicant has been successful I will order that the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

I certify that the preceding seventy (70) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Harland

Associate:

Date: 20 May 2016


The above reasons for Judgment have been amended to reflect the following changes:

  1. At [36] the word “not” has been added between the words “did” and “discuss” in line 4.
  2. At [38] the words “..’s solicitor” deleted from line 1.


[1] See WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [46].
[2] See Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anor v Peko-Wallsend Ltd and Others [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 66 ALR 299.

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