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Dhawan v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 1335 (29 May 2020)

Last Updated: 29 May 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DHAWAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR
[2020] FCCA 1335


Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Student (Temporary)(Class TU) visa – reinstatement application – where acceptable explanation – where insufficient merit in judicial review application – application dismissed.


Legislation:
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.13.03C, 16.05
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cls.500.211, 500.212 of sch.2

Cases cited:
Abebe v The Commonweath [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510
Bains v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 649
Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 600
CAL15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344
Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2014] FCAFC 1; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (20074) [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392
MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 530
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1265
SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 35
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80


Applicant:
SAURABH DHAWAN

First Respondent:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Second Respondent:
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number:
PEG 276 of 2019

Judgment of:
Judge Kendall

Hearing date:
27 May 2020

Date of Last Submission:
27 May 2020

Delivered at:
Perth

Delivered on:
29 May 2020

REPRESENTATION

Applicant:
In person

Counsel for the First Respondent:
Ms E Tattersall

Second Respondent:
Submitting appearance, save as to costs

Solicitors for the Respondents:
Sparke Helmore


ORDERS

(1) The application in a case filed 18 April 2020 be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH

PEG 276 of 2019

SAURABH DHAWAN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This matter was first listed for hearing on 7 April 2020. On that occasion the applicant did not make an appearance. The Court dismissed the application pursuant to r.13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (the “Rules”) and ordered the applicant to pay the Minister’s costs.
  2. On 18 April 2020, the applicant filed an application in a case with a supporting affidavit seeking to have the orders made on 7 April 2020 set aside.
  3. On 27 May 2020, the Court heard submissions from the parties as to whether the application should be reinstated. The parties appeared by telephone.
  4. The Court had before it the applicant’s application for judicial review dated 22 July 2019, an affidavit from the applicant dated 21 July 2019, a Court Book numbering 139 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), an affidavit of Georgina Roberta Ellis affirmed 18 March 2020, an outline of written submissions from the Minister dated 18 March 2020 and the application in a case and accompanying affidavit from the applicant dated 18 April 2020.

Background

  1. On 22 July 2019, the applicant filed an application for judicial review in this Court seeking judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) dated 24 June 2019. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of the first respondent (the “Minster”) to not grant the applicant a Student (Temporary)(Class TU) visa (the “visa”).
  2. The applicant is a citizen of India. He first arrived in Australia on 7 August 2014 on a Higher Education Sector (TU-573) student visa (CB 76).
  3. On 11 September 2016, the applicant applied for the visa the subject of this application (CB 1-35). The applicant indicated that he wished to study a Certificate III in Commercial Cookery, a Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery, a Diploma of Hospitality Management and a Bachelor of Business (Management).
  4. On 26 October 2016, the applicant was asked by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection to provide further information (CB 37-42). In response, the applicant provided two further documents to the Department (CB 43-69).
  5. On 6 December 2016, a Ministerial delegate refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 70-77). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was a “genuine temporary entrant” and, accordingly, found that cl.500.212 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the “Regulations”) was not met.
  6. On 9 December 2016, the applicant applied for a review of the delegate’s decision at the Tribunal (CB 78-79).
  7. On 13 April 2018, the applicant was invited to provide information to the Tribunal. The requested information was set out in a “Request for Student Visa Information” questionnaire (CB 84-92).
  8. On 26 April 2018, the applicant provided a completed questionnaire to the Tribunal (CB 93-102).
  9. The applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 13 June 2018 (Ms Ellis’ Affidavit). At the hearing, the applicant provided academic documents from the Australian Technical College of Western Australia (CB 106-113).
  10. On 27 May 2019, the Tribunal invited the applicant to comment on or respond to information the Tribunal had received which indicated that the applicant did not hold a current confirmation of enrolment (CB 121-122). On 10 June 2019, the applicant responded as follows (CB 127):
  11. Attached to the applicant’s statement of 10 June 2019 was a Letter of Offer and Acceptance from the Australian Technical College of Western Australia. The letter indicated that it was “conditional” and “subject to successful outcome of MRT” (Ms Ellis’ Affidavit).
  12. On 24 June 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant the visa.

Tribunal’s Decision

  1. The Tribunal began by outlining the background to the application and the materials that it had before it (at [1]-[8]).
  2. At [9]-[11], the Tribunal stated:
  3. The Tribunal then set out the criteria to be met in order to be granted the visa. Importantly, the Tribunal outlined the relevant enrolment criterion at [12]-[15].
  4. At [16]-[19], the Tribunal stated:
  5. In light of the above, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant the visa.

Proceedings in this Court

  1. As noted, the applicant did not appear on 7 April 2020. The Court attempted to contact the applicant on his mobile telephone number but was unsuccessful. As a precaution, the Court also had the matter called three times outside of the courtroom. In the circumstances, the Court dismissed the application for non-appearance.
  2. The applicant now seeks reinstatement.
  3. The application in a case does not identify the basis upon which the applicant seeks that the orders of 7 April 2020 be set aside. Nonetheless, the Court infers that he is referencing r.16.05(2)(a) of the Rules which allows the Court to reinstate an application if orders are made in the absence of a party.
  4. The applicant’s affidavit filed with the application in a case indicates that the applicant attempted to dial into the number provided to him on two occasions. The record shows that the applicant dialled the correct number. The applicant states that he entered the guest passcode. It appears, however, that the applicant did not enter the hash key (as had been indicated in the email sent to him).
  5. On 9 May 2020, the applicant emailed Chambers as follows:
  6. A response was sent indicating that the applicant should contact the Minister to obtain consent for an adjournment if that is what the applicant was seeking. Otherwise, it was explained, the matter would remain listed for hearing.
  7. The matter came on for hearing of the application for reinstatement on 27 May 2020. The applicant appeared before the Court without representation. The Court asked the applicant whether he still sought an adjournment. He first indicated that he was ready to proceed and did not pursue an adjournment. During the course of the hearing, the applicant then indicated that he did want an adjournment. For reasons explained below, the Court refused that adjournment.
  8. The Court explained to the applicant that the matters it generally considers in a reinstatement application include, but are not limited to:
    1. whether there was a reasonable excuse for the party’s absence from the hearing in which the substantive application was dismissed;
    2. the length of any delay in seeking reinstatement and the existence and nature of any prejudice which might flow to the Minister from reinstatement. To the extent there is any prejudice, the Court will consider the extent to which that prejudice can be mitigated by other relief such as costs; and
    1. whether the applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success in relation to the substantive application.
(MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 530)
  1. The Court will outline the applicant’s submissions, and the Minister’s submissions in response, below.

Adjournment Request

  1. The applicant sought an adjournment on the basis that he is suffering financial hardship, wishes to retain a lawyer, has moved to Adelaide and cannot return to Perth for a hearing. At the hearing, the applicant reiterated that he needs an “immigration lawyer” and that it was his “right”.
  2. The Court was not satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that the hearing be adjourned.
  3. The Court’s reasons for denying the request for an adjournment are as follows:
    1. the applicant’s substantive application was dismissed for non-appearance on 7 April 2020. At that time the applicant had not retained a lawyer. His affidavit suggests that he was prepared to appear by himself on that occasion and without the assistance of a lawyer;
    2. there is no guarantee that the applicant will retain a lawyer, particularly given his alleged financial hardship. There is no evidence that he has sought to retain a lawyer though the applicant did state that he could not find a “competent” lawyer. The utility of an adjournment in the circumstances is not sufficiently high;
    1. contrary to the applicant’s submissions, there is also no right to legal representation in migration proceedings: Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1265;
    1. the applicant was able to appear by telephone from Adelaide. The Court has been conducting all hearings by audio/visual conferencing as a result of the current health crisis and has done so successfully. The applicant, again, appears to have been prepared to proceed by this method on the day of the substantive hearing. There is no need for him to travel to Perth from Adelaide;
    2. the applicant’s substantive application, at present, is dismissed and a reinstatement application should be heard quickly. If it is not, this has the effect of encouraging litigants not to attend on their court date and prolong the review process by filing an application for reinstatement at a later date; and
    3. there is currently one sitting Judge in the Perth registry of this Court. Matters have been listed until early 2021 and there is limited, if any, capacity for the Court to hear the interlocutory matter within a reasonable period. If the Court were to grant the adjournment, it would be contrary to the efficient administration of justice.
  4. For these reasons, the request for an adjournment is denied.

Reinstatement Application

Explanation and Delay

  1. The applicant’s explanation is that he attempted to dial into the Court, but was unsuccessful. The Minister submitted that the applicant’s evidence does not indicate on what day the applicant allegedly made the phone calls nor why the applicant did not answer when the Court contacted him or why he did not contact the Court immediately as he was asked to do if he experienced difficulties.
  2. While arguably lacking in detail, the Court is prepared to accept the applicant’s explanation. The Court considers that the applicant attempted to dial into the hearing on 7 April 2020, however the applicant did not dial in as directed (by failing to enter the “hash” button). The Court is prepared to find that the applicant’s explanation is acceptable.
  3. The delay in applying for reinstatement is 11 days. This is not significant. It is also the case that the applicant emailed the Registry the afternoon of the hearing stating that he had been unsuccessful when trying to dial in.
  4. As the delay is not significant, it cannot be said that it caused significant prejudice to the Minister. The Minister, in any event, conceded there was no prejudice.
  5. Overall, these matters weigh in favour of reinstatement.

Merits

  1. The determinative factor here will be whether there is merit in the substantive application.
  2. In CAL15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344 at [4]- [6], Justice Mortimer (in the context of considering the merits of an application for reinstatement) explained as follows:
  3. To determine whether the substantive application has merit, the Court must assess whether any of the grounds of review in the judicial review application are “arguable”.
  4. The applicant’s application for judicial review contains three “grounds” as follows:
  5. The applicant’s affidavit provided as follows:
  6. The applicant appeared without legal representation. Noting the remarks of the Federal Court in Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 600 at [9] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented party to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review), the Court gave the applicant an opportunity to outline orally what he thought the Tribunal “did wrong”.
  7. To assist the applicant, the Court explained to him what this Court “can and cannot do”. The Court explained that its task is limited to assessing whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. Further, it was explained that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions of this sort, they most commonly include, but are not limited to, the following categories:
    1. where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question: Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 (“Craig”) at 198;
    2. where the decision-maker ignores relevant material: Craig at 198;
    1. where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material: Craig at 198;
    1. where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures: SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at [207]- [208];
    2. where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias: SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]; and
    3. where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2014] FCAFC 1; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]- [28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44].
  8. It was also explained to the applicant that this Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal’s decision or grant him the visa he now seeks. Rather, the role of the Court is restricted to determining if the Tribunal made a material error in arriving at the decision it arrived at: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.
  9. Against this background, the applicant submitted that the “college” did not give him the opportunity to explain why he should continue to study, it simply cancelled his enrolment. They told him that he had to have a visa before he would be properly enrolled and he went to many other colleges who told him the same thing. This is why the “conditional offer” was provided instead of a confirmation of enrolment. The Court addressed this in the context of ground 1 below.
  10. The applicant’s grounds of review are lengthy. The Court has done its best to address the issues raised in the grounds of review below.

Ground 1

  1. The applicant states that:
  2. This passage appears to take issue with the delegate’s decision and the fact that applicant did not have a chance to explain to the delegate why there was a gap in the applicant’s studies between January 2015 and October 2015. The applicant goes on to explain why there was a gap in his studies and says that that he believes that he satisfied the criteria.
  3. The Court does not have jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision: s.476(2) and (4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”). Hence, the applicant’s explanation as to why he met the requirements of cl.500.212 at the time of the delegate’s decision is irrelevant to these proceedings.
  4. The applicant also states:
  5. In relation to the applicant’s statement that he was “misguided” by friends and did not have family who could give him guidance on certain matters, the Court does not consider this to amount to an allegation of fraud as per SZFDE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 35. Further, the applicant was represented by a migration agent before the delegate and the Tribunal. The applicant ought to have relied on his migration agent (as opposed to his friends or family) for advice or guidance. No arguable error arises in this regard.
  6. The final part of ground 1 states:
  7. The Court considers this to be an assertion that the applicant was denied procedural fairness. The applicant also made submissions to this effect at the hearing when asked by the Court what he thought the Tribunal did wrong.
  8. The Tribunal specifically referred to the applicant’s conditional offer and the applicant’s claim that he was unable to obtain a confirmation of enrolment without evidence of his visa (at [9]-[11] and [16]). The Tribunal rejected this explanation (at [17]) because, at the time of the hearing (which occurred over one year prior to the Tribunal making its decision), the applicant did, in fact, hold a confirmation of enrolment (notwithstanding he was in the midst of a review with the Tribunal and did not have a visa). Hence, it was clear that the applicant could receive an unconditional offer and his visa status did not prevent him from being “confirmed” as “enrolled in a course”.
  9. Further, it was not relevant why the applicant was not enrolled. It was only relevant whether he was enrolled. Hence, the fact that he was not allowed an opportunity to explain “why” is of no consequence.
  10. Insofar as the applicant is suggesting that the Tribunal prevented him from giving evidence, the Court notes that the hearing lasted for more than one hour (CB 115-118). The applicant was represented by a migration agent who was present at that hearing and the Tribunal’s reasons make specific reference to the evidence the applicant provided during that hearing (at [9] and [16]). The Court is satisfied that the applicant was given a chance to present his case.
  11. The applicant had a meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceedings before the Tribunal and was provided procedural fairness in accordance with div.5 of pt.5 of the Act.
  12. Finally, the Court notes that, to the extent the applicant may be claiming that the Tribunal was “biased”, there is no evidence to support this assertion. An allegation of bias must be distinctly made and clearly proven: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507. In the circumstances of this case, there is nothing to suggest that the Tribunal demonstrated actual or apprehended bias during the course of the hearing.
  13. Ground 1, accordingly, raises no arguable case.

Ground 2

  1. The first part of ground 2 provides as follows:
  2. The applicant, unfortunately, has misunderstood the Tribunal’s role.
  3. It is not the Tribunal’s role to assist the applicant to meet the visa criterion and obtain an enrolment: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (20074) [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12 at [43]. It is for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that he meets the relevant criterion: Abebe v The Commonweath [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187].
  4. Put another way, it is not for the Tribunal to grant the applicant the visa so that the conditional letter of offer can be “converted” to a confirmation of enrolment. Rather, the Tribunal has to be satisfied that there is a confirmation of enrolment. Without that evidence, the Tribunal is required to refuse the visa.
  5. There is no merit in this assertion.
  6. The applicant further states in ground 2:
  7. For the reasons already given above in relation to ground 1, the Court is satisfied that the applicant had an opportunity to provide evidence and advance arguments at the Tribunal hearing. Relevantly, the Tribunal specifically referred to the applicant’s evidence about the conditional enrolment application.
  8. The applicant continues:
  9. Again, for the reasons given in relation to ground 1 above, the Court is satisfied that the Tribunal complied with the obligations of procedural fairness.
  10. To the extent that the applicant is saying that he wanted the Tribunal to give him a “chance” to provide a confirmation of enrolment, the Court notes that the Tribunal did so:
    1. when it invited the applicant to attend the hearing, the invitation expressly stated what was required (i.e., a copy of the current offer of enrolment);
    2. when the applicant was at the hearing and it asked him about his enrolment status; and
    1. in the letter issued pursuant to s.359A of the Act advising the applicant that it appeared he was not enrolled in a course and this would be a reason for refusing the visa.
  11. The applicant had a number of “chances” to provide a confirmation of enrolment. There is nothing on the materials to suggest that the applicant, or his migration agent, requested an adjournment or an extension of time in which to provide any further information or obtain an enrolment. Rather, the applicant’s position was that he could not obtain such information. Hence, there was no reason for the Tribunal to consider exercising the discretion to adjourn.
  12. Ground 2 raises no arguable case.

Ground 3

  1. In ground 3, the applicant states that he has a strong view that he has been denied natural justice. Again, for the reasons provided in ground 1, the Court is satisfied the applicant was provided with procedural fairness.
  2. The applicant continues:
  3. While the applicant may hold “a strong view” that the Tribunal should have considered, and found him to be, a genuine student, the Tribunal was not required to do so. The Tribunal was not required to consider whether the applicant was a genuine student as it was satisfied that the applicant did not a hold a confirmation of enrolment as was required by cl.500.211(a) of the Regulations. Having failed to satisfy that criterion, the Tribunal had to refuse the visa. It did not matter whether or not the applicant was a genuine student. He did not hold a confirmation of enrolment and the visa had to be refused.
  4. Ground 3 does not raise an arguable case.

Otherwise

  1. The Court notes that the applicant’s affidavit makes reference to the Tribunal’s decision not being “fair”. The Court refers to its consideration relating to the obligations of procedural fairness above.
  2. In its duty to the self-represented litigant, the Court has remained astute and alert to the possibility of any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision that may raise an arguable case: MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392. The Minister noted that in the invitation to attend the hearing, the applicant was advised that he should provide:
(Ms Ellis’ Affidavit)
  1. The Tribunal appears to have represented to the applicant in the invitation that an “offer of enrolment” could meet the requirements of the visa. This is incorrect. Clause 500.211 of the Regulations (as it applied at the time), read as follows:
  2. It is plain from the legislation that an offer of enrolment is not sufficient.
  3. While the Tribunal’s invitation misstated what was required, the Court does not consider it misled the applicant such that he was denied procedural fairness. Here, even if it could be said that the invitation was “misleading”, this did not result in the denial of a proper opportunity to be heard and it cannot be said that “but for” the statement the outcome of the proceedings might have been different: Bains v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 649.
  4. Here, the Tribunal’s letter issued under s.359A made clear that what was required was a confirmation of enrolment and that, if the applicant did not hold one, he would not meet cl.500.211 of the Regulations (CB 121). In the Court’s view, even though the invitation to attend the Tribunal hearing suggested otherwise, the applicant was placed on notice that he required more than a “letter of offer” by the subsequent invitation to comment. The applicant responded to that letter. It cannot be said there was a denial of procedural fairness.
  5. The Court has otherwise reviewed the Tribunal’s decision and is satisfied that no arguable error otherwise arises
  6. The applicant’s application for judicial review and the applicant’s affidavit does not identify any jurisdictional error. The Court has otherwise been unable to identify any error in the Tribunal’s decision.
  7. The application, accordingly, is without merit.

Conclusion

  1. While an acceptable explanation, minor delay and lack of prejudice weigh in favour of reinstatement of the application, the lack of merit in the substantive application is such that the application should not be reinstated.
  2. The application for reinstatement is, accordingly, dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighty-nine (89) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Kendall

Associate:

Date: 29 May 2020


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