![]() |
[Home]
[Databases]
[WorldLII]
[Search]
[Feedback]
Supreme Court of New South Wales |
Last Updated: 9 November 2004
NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT
CITATION: Forbat v Meriton Apartments
P/L [2004] NSWSC 1026
CURRENT JURISDICTION:
FILE
NUMBER(S): 50047/03
HEARING DATE{S): 25/10/04, 26/10/04, 27/10/04,
28/10/04
JUDGMENT DATE: 03/11/2004
PARTIES:
Istvan
Forbat
v
Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd
JUDGMENT OF: White J
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Not Applicable
LOWER COURT FILE
NUMBER(S): Not Applicable
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Not
Applicable
COUNSEL:
Plaintiff: In Person
Defendant: Mr M
Wood
SOLICITORS:
Plaintiff: N/A
Defendant: Richard de
Carvalho
CATCHWORDS:
CONTRACT - Claim for commission - Whether
plaintiff's endeavours resulted in defendant's purchase of the property - No
question of
principle.
ACTS CITED:
Bankruptcy Act 1966
(Cth)
Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 (Qld)
Property Agents and Motor
Dealers Act 2000 (Qld)
Property Stock and Business Agents Act 1941
(NSW)
Property Stock and Business Agents Act 2002 (NSW)
Interpretation Act
1987 (NSW)
DECISION:
Summons dismissed.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH
WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
COMMERCIAL
LIST
WHITE J
Wednesday, 3 November 2004
50047/03 ISTVAN FORBAT v MERITON APARTMENTS PTY
LTD
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: The defendant is a
property developer specialising in the construction of blocks of residential
apartments. The plaintiff has worked
as a consultant in the field of property
development. In these proceedings the plaintiff claims commission arising from
the purchase,
by companies related to the defendant, of a property on the Gold
Coast for $54,500,000. The commission claimed is 5%. The property
was
purchased from Sundale Group Pty Limited and has been called the Sundale
property. Contracts for its purchase were exchanged
on 8 October 2002. The
purchase was completed on 8 January 2003.
2 The agreement under which the
plaintiff claims commission was made in January 1994 between the plaintiff and
Mr Triguboff of the
defendant. It is recorded in a letter dated 18 March 1994
from Mr Spira, the general manager of the defendant, to the plaintiff.
It is in
these terms:
“I wish to confirm that our company is prepared to
pay you a commission of 5% on any deal which is consummated as the result
of
your endeavours.”
3 The defendant did not dispute that the 1994
agreement, or unilateral offer, continued to apply to dealings between the
plaintiff
and the defendant. The defendant did not contend that no commission
was payable because the property was acquired by subsidiaries
of the defendant
and not by the defendant itself. The principal issue was whether the purchase
of the Sundale property in 2002 was
consummated as a result of the
plaintiff’s endeavours.
4 If this question is answered favourably
to the plaintiff, the defendant contends that the plaintiff is precluded from
recovering
the commission because he does not hold a real estate agent’s
licence in either New South Wales or Queensland.
5 The plaintiff was
made bankrupt on 23 November 1999. He was discharged from bankruptcy on 1
December 2002. These proceedings were
commenced on 14 May 2003. One of the
grounds of defence was that the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sued
was vested in
the Trustee in Bankruptcy. On or about 2 October 2003 the Trustee
in Bankruptcy assigned to the plaintiff any cause of action which
the plaintiff
might have against the defendant as alleged in the proceedings which might have
vested in the Trustee. On the first
day of the hearing, the summons was amended
to plead the assignment of the cause of action from the Trustee in Bankruptcy to
the
plaintiff. Thereafter the defendant did not raise any issue under the
Bankruptcy Act.
The Sundale Property
6 The
property in question was owned by Sundale Group Pty Ltd. Its managing director
was a Mr Chiu. Mr Frank Zaidan was its operations
director. The property is
located on the southern precincts of Southport on the Gold Coast, Queensland. A
shopping centre had been
constructed on the site but by 1997 it was essentially
vacant. The vendor was waiting for State and Local government approvals to
permit the site to be re-developed. In 1998 the Sundale Group obtained
approvals which allowed for a mixture of high-rise buildings
including
residential, commercial and hotel components. The 1998 development approval
allowed the construction of low-rise multi-unit
residential buildings of three
or four storeys; three towers from seventeen to thirty storeys for residential
units; a thirty-storey
motel; and a seventeen-storey building described as
“combined motel/commercial premises”.
7 The development
consent did not specify the number of units, or number of bedrooms, that could
be constructed.
8 On 26 August 1998 Mr Zaidan wrote to Mr Antonas who
was a land buyer employed by the defendant. Mr Zaidan had contacted Mr Antonas
to sound out the possibility of the defendant purchasing or becoming involved in
a joint venture with the owners of the site. In
his letter of 26 August 1998 Mr
Zaidan said that up to 816 bedrooms could be constructed within towers 1, 2 and
3 and that a total
of 1,629 bedrooms could be achieved for the whole site area.
Based on the zoning at that time, it appears that this would have included
bedrooms in the hotel and commercial components of the site. He indicated a
price per bedroom for the tower components and invited
a response from the
defendant.
9 In early 1999 Mr Zaidan, Mr Chiu, Mr Triguboff, and Ms
Arden-Wood who is the defendant’s sales representative on the Gold
Coast,
had a meeting to discuss the site. Mr Triguboff is the managing director and
founder of the defendant. He is the principal
decision-maker when it comes to
the defendant’s buying, or refusing to buy, land for
development.
10 Mr Triguboff was familiar with the Gold Coast area. From
about 1994 the defendant constructed eight blocks of residential apartments
in
the Main Beach area of the Gold Coast. It employed several full-time staff
based on the Gold Coast to sell Meriton Apartments
there. Mr Triguboff owned a
holiday apartment on the Gold Coast which he visited regularly and often drove
around looking for sites
and inspecting sites that were being offered for sale.
11 At the meeting in 1999 Mr Triguboff and Ms Arden-Woods inspected the
site with Mr Zaidan and Mr Chiu. They were taken to an apartment
owned by Mr
Chiu on level 19 of a building next door to the site. This provided a good
overview of the site and also approximately
inidicated what the view from the
developed site would be like.
12 In the period from January to March
2000 two firms of real estate agents in the Gold Coast, Ray White of Surfers
Paradise and Jones
Lang Lasalle, were jointly engaged by the Sundale Group to
market the site. During the marketing campaign from January to March
2000, Mr
Bell sent a full property package on the site to Mr Triguboff. This included a
marketing pamphlet prepared by the agents
which he sent to Mr Triguboff. The
document in question is a glossy brochure showing photographs of the surrounding
area and depicting
what the completed construction might look like. The
brochure described what development had been approved and the number of bedrooms
which could be constructed within the towers and low-rise
apartments.
13 The site was not sold during this marketing campaign. It
is common ground that by March 2000 Mr Triguboff had no interest in acquiring
more property on the Gold Coast. It is clear, however, that the
defendant’s officers were aware of the development opportunity
and had had
dealings with the vendor.
14 The reason for Mr Triguboff’s lack of
interest in acquiring more land on the Gold Coast was that it was his perception
that
the market for apartments on the Gold Coast was depressed. He regarded the
market as being very difficult for a developer. In order
to sell units in
Meriton’s Main Beach developments he was having to offer finance to
prospective purchasers of up to 80% of
the purchase price. This was well in
excess of Meriton’s standard policy of offering vendor finance for up to
30% of the purchase
price. Mr Triguboff emphasised that the cost of acquiring a
development site was only a small part of the overall cost of the development.
In 2000 he also considered that Southport had a terrible name for apartment
builders.
The Plaintiff’s Involvement
15 In 1994 the
plaintiff successfully negotiated Meriton’s purchase of a development site
on Main Beach. Between 1994 and 1999
he was mostly resident overseas although
he continued to visit Australia from time to time. He learned of the marketing
campaign
for the Sundale site that was being conducted in early 2000. In May
2000 he made enquiries from one of the agents and ascertained
the Sundale site
was still available. In early June 2000 he telephoned Mr Spira, Meriton’s
general manager, and told him that
he had a great site for him to consider and
identified the disused Sundale shopping centre in Southport. Mr Spira told him
that
Sundale was not for them. The plaintiff was not deterred and asked to
speak to Mr Triguboff about the Sundale site. He was referred
by Mr Spira to Mr
Antonas.
16 Prior to meeting Mr Antonas, the plaintiff collected a
number of documents. He performed a title search of the property and a
company
search of Sundale Group Pty Ltd. He obtained an extract from the advertising
brochure to which I have previously referred,
which identified the potential
number of bedrooms that could be constructed in units in the different towers
for which approval had
been given. He prepared his own estimates of how many 1
bedroom, 2 bedroom and 3 bedroom units could be constructed in the high-rise
towers and the low-rise residential sections.
17 Mr Antonas met the
plaintiff in Mr Antonas’s office in mid June 2000.
18 Mr Antonas
gave evidence that he agreed to see Mr Forbat out of politeness because of his
apparent relationship with Mr Spira although
Meriton had no particular interest
in the Sundale property or the Gold Coast. They discussed the Sundale property.
Mr Forbat told
Mr Antonas that he thought that the likely selling price would be
under $20,000,000. The plaintiff left a copy of the coloured brochure
showing
the zoning approval with Mr Antonas. This was the same document that had been
prepared by the estate agents for their marketing
campaign in early 2000 which
had previously been supplied by those agents to Meriton. The plaintiff had
removed the agents’
names from the document.
19 The meeting with Mr
Antonas was short. Mr Antonas took the plaintiff to see Mr Triguboff in Mr
Triguboff’s office. According
to the plaintiff, the meeting with Mr
Triguboff lasted ten to fifteen minutes. Mr Triguboff could not recall any of
the detail from
the meeting. That is not surprising. I had the impression that
Mr Triguboff had many calls on his time. The meeting was more important
to the
plaintiff than it was to Mr Triguboff. I think it more likely that the
plaintiff would recall details of what was said than
would Mr Triguboff. Mr
Antonas also had little recollection of the meeting. He said it was very brief.
According to him, he took
the plaintiff to see Mr Triguboff as a public
relations exercise. That may have been Mr Antonas’s reason for
reintroducing
the plaintiff to Mr Triguboff. The fact remains however that the
plaintiff’s purpose in seeking the meeting was to attempt
to excite Mr
Triguboff’s interest in buying the Sundale site. Mr Antonas said that
there was an extremely brief discussion
about Sundale and that Mr Triguboff was
pretty negative.
20 In his affidavit the plaintiff deposed that he
provided a detailed commentary upon the advantages of the Sundale site: its
location;
the cost for which he believed it could be acquired; the history of
government approvals; the financial position of the vendor company;
the type of
offer that would need to be made to secure the property; the state of the market
on the Gold Coast; the terms of the
development approval; the number of bedrooms
which could be constructed on the site; and the possibility of the Council
approving
increases in the precinct height limit. No notes were taken at the
meeting. On any view, the meeting was very brief. The plaintiff’s
affidavit deposing to these matters was prepared more than three years after the
conversation occurred with Mr Triguboff. Whilst
I accept that the plaintiff is
likely to have a better recollection of the meeting than Mr Triguboff, I do not
accept that he was
able to recall the detail of the matters which he says he put
to Mr Triguboff. I have no doubt however that he spoke to Mr Triguboff
about
the advantages of Meriton acquiring the site. In what detail I cannot
say.
21 The plaintiff said that the conversation concluded by his saying
that, in the absolute worst-case scenario, Meriton could develop
part of the
land and sell off the rest for more than it had paid for it. According to him
Mr Triguboff then said that that was true,
that they could always flick it, and
that he said to the plaintiff, “Alright Steven I’ll buy it. Go
and do what you have to do and let me know.”
22 These
statements were denied by Mr Triguboff and the last quoted statement was denied
by both Mr Triguboff and Mr Antonas. I do
not think it matters whether or not
Mr Triguboff acceded to the proposition that Meriton could sell part of the site
if it did not
wish to develop it. However, the assertion that Mr Triguboff said
that he would buy the site and that the plaintiff should go and
do what he had
to do to acquire it, if accepted, would indicate that the plaintiff had changed
Mr Triguboff’s mind about the
desirability of buying the Sundale
site.
23 I think it improbable that in the brief meeting the plaintiff
would have succeeded in changing Mr Triguboff’s mind about
buying the
Sundale site. He had no new information about the site than that which had
already been made available to Meriton. Mr
Triguboff was unlikely, in my view,
to have paid any regard to the opinions of the plaintiff in relation to the
prospects for development.
Meriton was a major, perhaps the major, property
developer on the Gold Coast. Mr Triguboff had much more experience and
expertise
than did the plaintiff. His decision whether or not to purchase was
fundamentally determined by his assessment of the market. He
was not influenced
in making that assessment by the views of any individual agent, let alone of the
plaintiff who was not closely
familiar with the Gold Coast area having been
resident for most of the previous six years outside Australia. I accept Mr
Triguboff’s
denial of the statement attributed to him that he told the
plaintiff that he would buy the property and that the plaintiff should
go and do
what he had to do.
24 It does not follow that Mr Triguboff told the
plaintiff that he was not interested in buying the Sundale site. He may well
have
given the plaintiff the impression that if the plaintiff could negotiate a
deal with the vendor and present it to Meriton, he might
be prepared to look at
it then. There is no express evidence to that effect as the plaintiff pitches
his case higher and the defendant
contends that the plaintiff was brushed off.
However it can be inferred from the steps which the plaintiff took after his
meeting
with Mr Triguboff and from what Mr Antonas said to him in later
telephone conversations.
Plaintiff’s Actions After the Meeting
with Mr Triguboff
25 The plaintiff was prompted to devise strategies
with Mr Maguire, a real estate agent in Queensland, to try to coax the vendor
into
committing to a contract or to a price. On instructions from the
plaintiff, Mr Maguire made an offer of $12,000,000 for the site
in the name of
Dr Sam’s Australia. Mr Maguire described this as being a unit trust whose
principal was Mr Richard Forbat,
the plaintiff’s son. The name was used
by Mr Maguire to conceal Meriton’s involvement as Mr Maguire and the
plaintiff
thought that the price would go up if the vendor knew that Meriton was
involved. Mr Chiu rejected the offer. He told Mr Maguire
that he already had
an offer from a person, whose identity he did not reveal, for $18,000,000. He
showed Mr Maguire a draft contract
for that price whilst hiding the name of the
purchaser.
26 This was the only negotiation with the vendor to acquire
the site which was carried out by the plaintiff or anyone acting on his
instructions.
27 The plaintiff obtained various documents from Mr
Maguire. They were: a copy of the decision of the Planning and Environment
Court
setting out the conditions of development approval; some conceptual design
prepared by a firm of architects for the site showing
the possible location of
the tower buildings and car park, the number of one, two and three-bedroom units
in each of the towers that
could be built and the number of storeys of the
towers; and a valuation performed by firm of valuers called Landmark White
valuing
the site at $18,850,000 which Mr Maguire obtained from Mr Chiu. The
plaintiff said he sent these documents to the defendant.
28 The defendant
said that it had no record of receiving these documents and its officers said
they had no recollection of having
received them. It is clear that at least one
page of the executive summary of the valuation was sent by facsimile to the
defendant
on 16 August 2000. The page sent by fax set out the valuer’s
opinion of the market value of the property as being $18,850,000.
29 Mr
Antonas said that he never received any schematic drawings or feasibility
studies from the plaintiff. However I accept the
plaintiff’s evidence
that such documents were delivered to Meriton. Nonetheless they were not used
by the defendant. It is
probable that after 30 August 2000 they were discarded.
30 In July and August 2000 the plaintiff telephoned Mr Antonas on a
couple of occasions to talk about Sundale. During this period
the plaintiff met
Mr Antonas again in his office. He wanted to discuss a site in Kent Street
which he proposed the defendant consider
acquiring. Mr Antonas told the
plaintiff that Mr Triguboff had told the plaintiff to concentrate on Sundale and
to leave Sydney
to Meriton.
31 After Mr Chiu had rejected the
$12,000,000 offer put to him by Mr Maguire, the plaintiff instructed Mr Maguire
to prepare a draft
contract for the purchase of the site for $14,000,000. He
asked Mr Maguire to leave the buyer’s name blank but to provide
for a
price of $14,000,000 with a 10% deposit and a 30 day “cooling-off
period”. His intention in doing this was to
have the draft contract later
made out in the name of the shelf company and to procure from Meriton a cheque
for a deposit, although
not one drawn on a Meriton company. He proposed to send
a signed copy of the contract and a cheque for the deposit to Mr Maguire
so that
Mr Maguire could present it to Mr Chiu. He anticipated that Mr Chiu would
reject the document but that Mr Maguire could
then invite Mr Chiu to insert in
the document the price which he required. In this way he hoped to commit Mr
Chiu to a price below
$20,000,000 for the property without disclosing
Meriton’s involvement.
32 Whether this elaborate scheme would
have worked will never be known. The draft contract was delivered to Meriton on
25 August
2000. The plaintiff discussed it with Mr Antonas on 29 August. Mr
Antonas did not recall receiving the document from the plaintiff
but I prefer
the plaintiff’s recollection of this event. However on the next day, 30
August 2000, Mr Antonas told the plaintiff
that Mr Triguboff had decided not to
buy Sundale and that it had been put on the backburner. This was the end of the
plaintiff’s
involvement in the defendant’s acquisition of the
Sundale site, except for his having made sporadic inquiries about what was
happening.
33 The plaintiff did minimal work on the project. The
negotiations with the vendor got nowhere before he was told on 30 August that
Mr
Triguboff had decided not to buy the property and that it was put on the
backburner. The documents which the plaintiff supplied
to Meriton were not used
by Meriton and they would have been of no value to Meriton in its later
acquisition of the site in 2002.
34 The thrust of the defendant’s
evidence was that the plaintiff’s approach in June 2000 was completely
dismissed. I
have not accepted that. I consider that the work which the
plaintiff did after that meeting, the delivery of documents by the plaintiff
to
the defendant, the fact that Mr Antonas told the plaintiff to concentrate on
Sundale, and his later having told the plaintiff
that Sundale had been put on
the backburner, are not consistent with the plaintiff’s initial approach
having been dismissed
as out of hand. On the other hand, I do not accept the
plaintiff’s contention that as a result of his presentation to Mr
Triguboff
in June 2000 he had changed Mr Triguboff’s mind about buying the
Sundale site. Rather, the defendant waited until shortly
after the plaintiff
presented a draft contract before then dismissing his approach. I am satisfied
that as at 30 August 2000 Mr
Triguboff did not want to buy the Sundale site.
That was for the reasons to which I have already referred in paragraph
4.
35 The plaintiff cross-examined Mr Triguboff upon a statement which he
made to a journalist about his philosophy in acquiring property.
Mr Triguboff
accepted that in February 2000 he had said that his approach was to buy land
cheap when the market was bad and then
wait until the market was really bad and
then buy more land so that it could be bought cheaply. Mr Triguboff also said
that Meriton
bought land all the time to provide continuous work to its
builders. Although this was part of his general philosophy, he said that
he
regarded the market for apartments in Surfers Paradise at that time as being
catastrophic, and that in 2000 he did not want to
buy any land there. I accept
this evidence. It is consistent with his conduct.
Events After
2000
36 Between the end of 2000 and October 2002 there were three
significant changes. The first and most significant was that Mr
Triguboff’s
perception of the market for apartments on the Gold Coast
changed. By 2002 he also thought that Sundale was a good area to go into
because other developers had been building successfully in areas north of
Southport.
37 The second significant change was to the development
approval for the Sundale site. The principal changes were the approval of
four
high towers for residential development, “low rise” residential
development of up to ten storeys, and changes to
the commercial space. The Gold
City Council resolved to approve the new terms on 19 July, 2002.
38 The
third significant change was that the vendor entered into a joint venture with
another developer called Austcorp for the development
of the site. Although the
evidence about the terms of that joint venture is sparse, I infer that
Austcorp’s approval, as well
as the vendor’s approval, was required
before a sale of the property could proceed.
39 In July or August 2002
Mr Triguboff instructed Meriton’s staff on the Gold Coast to look out for
a suitable development site.
In July or August 2002 Ms Arden-Wood introduced Mr
Triguboff to a Mr Pearsall on the Gold Coast who worked for a real estate and
development company called Inland Pty Ltd. Unsurprisingly, Mr Pearsall
encouraged Mr Triguboff’s interest and took him to
look at a number of
sites. There were five such sites including the Sundale site. Mr Pearsall was
aware of the changes to the terms
of the development consent and suggested to Mr
Triguboff that it was worth having a closer look at that site. He also believed
that
the relationship between the joint venture partners was not healthy at the
time and said so to Mr Triguboff. Mr Pearsall brought
in a Mr Bonifant, an
estate agent at Surfers Paradise. Mr Pearsall negotiated with Mr Chappell of
Austcorp and asked Mr Bonifant
to speak with Mr Chiu. They each had separate
meetings with Austcorp and Sundale Group Pty Ltd. They procured an agency
agreement
from Sundale Group Pty Ltd and Austcorp authorising them to negotiate
the sale of the property.
40 Mr Pearsall then flew to Sydney and made a
presentation about the site to various officers of Meriton including Mr
Triguboff, Mr
Spira and a Meriton land buyer, Mr Wall. On 5 September 2002 Mr
Pearsall recommended that Meriton make an offer of $50,500,000 for
the property.
Mr Triguboff authorised an offer of that amount. Following that offer, which
was made at some time prior to 9 September
2002, there were further negotiations
on price through Mr Pearsall which resulted in the vendor accepting the price of
$54,500,000.
Contracts for sale were negotiated between lawyers for Meriton and
for the vendor. Contracts were signed on 8 October 2002.
41 The
plaintiff had no involvement in any of the activities which took place in 2002
in relation to the acquisition.
Was the Deal Consummated as a Result
of the Plaintiff’s Endeavours?
42 Essentially the
plaintiff’s case was that it was his meeting with Mr Triguboff in June
2000 that changed Mr Triguboff’s
attitude to buying the Sundale site.
Before he met with Mr Triguboff, Mr Triguboff had no interest in acquiring more
property on
the Gold Coast and had no interest in land at Southport in general
or the Sundale site in particular. According to the plaintiff,
after his
presentation to Mr Triguboff, Mr Triguboff was willing to buy the site when the
time was right. Cost was not a major criterion
because it was a small part of
the total development costs. According to the plaintiff, Mr Triguboff waited
until 2002 for whatever
reasons seemed good to him and then arranged for the
acquisition of the site without involving the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the
plaintiff
says that he provided the spark which ultimately led to the defendant
acquiring the property. Hence he says that the deal was consummated
as a result
of his endeavours.
43 To accept that submission I would have to reject Mr
Triguboff’s evidence about his attitude in 2000, after he met the
plaintiff,
about purchasing land on the Gold Coast and at Southport. I would
have to attribute to the plaintiff an extraordinary power of persuasion
in a
brief meeting with Mr Triguboff, which at best took ten to fifteen minutes, when
the plaintiff had made no contact with the
vendor and where he had no
information about the vendor, or about the site, which Meriton did not already
know.
44 I see no basis for rejecting Mr Triguboff’s evidence about
his perception of the Gold Coast market in 2000 and the change
to his perception
in 2002. I do not consider that the plaintiff changed Mr Triguboff’s
attitude to buying property on the
Gold Coast or to buying the Sundale site in
2000. The reasons for Mr Triguboff’s change of attitude were his
perception in
2002 that the market had changed and the fact that the development
approval for the site had been changed so that more residential
apartments could
be built without delays.
45 It follows that the defendant’s
acquisition of the Sundale property was not the result of the plaintiff’s
endeavours.
46 Even if I had accepted the plaintiff’s contention
that in June 2000 he succeeded in changing Mr Triguboff’s mind about
the
Sundale site, I would still not have been satisfied that the acquisition of the
property in 2002 was the result of the plaintiff’s
endeavours. I would
not regard his actions as being an effective cause of the defendant’s
acquiring the site in 2002. (L J Hooker Ltd v W J Adams Estates Pty Ltd
[1977] HCA 13; (1977) 138 CLR 52 at 59, 67, 86; Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty
Ltd [2001] HCA 2; (2001) 202 CLR 351 at 358, 361, 376-377, 388-389). Indeed, I would not
even accept that what the plaintiff did was a step, without the taking of which
the purchase would not have been effected. Without the plaintiff’s
involvement Mr Triguboff’s interest would still have
been aroused in 2002
and matters would have proceeded in 2002 as they did.
47 There were many
things that brought about the purchase in 2002. The most important was the
change in Mr Triguboff’s perception
of market conditions. Also important
was the work which Mr Pearsall did in suggesting to Mr Triguboff that the time
was then ripe
for Meriton to acquire sites on the Gold Coast, Mr
Pearsall’s taking Mr Triguboff back to the site, his liaising with Mr
Wall,
his marketing presentation to the defendant’s officers in Sydney,
his negotiations with Mr Chappell of Austcorp, his arranging
with Mr Bonifant to
liaise with Mr Chiu, and his conduct of the negotiations between the defendant
and Sundale Group Pty Ltd on price.
Even if the plaintiff had excited Mr
Triguboff’s interest in the site in June 2000, his endeavours were
insignificant compared
with what was done by Mr Pearsall in 2002 to bring about
the purchase.
48 The changes after 2000 to which I have referred in
paragraphs 36-38 above also show that there was no causal nexus between the
steps the plaintiff took to interest Mr Triguboff in acquiring the Sundale
property in June 2000 and the acquisition of the property
by subsidiaries of the
defendant in 2002.
49 For these reasons the plaintiff’s claim
fails. It is not necessary to consider the defences based upon the fact that
the
plaintiff did not hold a real estate agent’s licence in either New
South Wales or Queensland. It is sufficient to record that
the
plaintiff’s conduct which was alleged to constitute the carrying on of
business of a real estate agent took place in New
South Wales and not in
Queensland. The plaintiff submitted that because his conduct did not take place
in Queensland, the Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 (Qld) and the
Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) were inapplicable.
(Freehold Land Investments Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd [1970] HCA 31; (1970) 123
CLR 418; Colbron v St Bees Island Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 1107; (1995) 56 FCR 303 at 311-312).
He submitted that the Property Stock and Business Agents Act 1941 (NSW)
and the Property Stock and Business Agents Act 2002 (NSW) were
inapplicable as they applied to persons carrying on business as an agent for the
purchase, sale or other disposition of
land in New South Wales.
(Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 12(1)(b)). I do not find it necessary
to decide these questions.
50 For these reasons the amended summons is
dismissed.
51 Counsel for the defendant invited me not to deal with the
question of costs in this judgment. I will hear the parties separately
on
costs.
******
LAST UPDATED: 08/11/2004
AustLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2004/1026.html