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[2014] NSWSC 484
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In the matter of HIH Underwriting Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd (in liquidation and subject to a scheme of arrangement) [2014] NSWSC 484 (29 April 2014)
Last Updated: 5 May 2014
Case Title:
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In the matter of HIH Underwriting Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd (in
liquidation and subject to a scheme of arrangement)
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Medium Neutral Citation:
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Hearing Date(s):
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18 March 2014 (oral hearing); 16 April 2104 (further written
submissions)
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Decision Date:
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29 April 2014
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Jurisdiction:
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Equity Division - Corporations List
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Before:
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Black J
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Decision:
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Catchwords:
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CORPORATIONS - winding up - winding up in insolvency - proceeds of contract
of reinsurance - application for orders under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s
562A(4) -whether claims made under scheme of arrangement affect the
characterisation of such claims as being claims to amounts payable under
relevant contracts of insurance - whether "just and equitable" to make orders
sought by plaintiffs.
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Legislation Cited:
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- Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 411, 555, 556, 562A, 562A(1), 562A(2),
562A(3), 562A(4), 562A(5), 562A(5)(a), 562A(5)(d), 562A(7) - James Hardie
Former Subsidiaries (Winding Up and Administration) Act 2005 (NSW)
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Cases Cited:
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Category:
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Principal judgment
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Parties:
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Amaca Pty Ltd (under NSW administered winding up) (First Plaintiff)
Amaba Pty Ltd (under NSW administered winding up) (Second Plaintiff) ABN
60 Pty Ltd (under NSW administered winding up) (Third Plaintiff) Messrs A G
McGrath & C J Honey as liquidators of the HIH Group of companies (First
Defendant) HIH Underwriting & Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd (in
liquidation and subject to a scheme of arrangement (Second Defendant)
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Representation
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- Counsel:
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Counsel: K Rees SC/T Hollo (Plaintiffs) R A Dick SC/R M Foreman
(Defendants)
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- Solicitors:
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Solicitors: Henry Davis York (Plaintiffs) Ashurst Australia
(Defendants)
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File Number(s):
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2013/378933
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JUDGMENT
- By
Amended Originating Process filed on 24 February 2014, the Plaintiffs, Amaca Pty
Ltd (under NSW administered winding up) ("Amaca"),
Amaba Pty Ltd (under NSW
administered winding up) ("Amaba") and ABN 60 Pty Ltd (under NSW administered
winding up) ("ABN 60") seek
orders under s 562A(4) of the Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth) as to the application of the proceeds of certain contracts of
reinsurance. The Plaintiffs are each regulated by the James Hardie Former
Subsidiaries (Winding Up and Administration) Act 2005 (NSW). Two of the
Plaintiffs, Amaca and Amaba, were involved in the manufacture and distribution
of a variety of products containing
asbestos until 1987.
- The
broad structure of the application reflects similar applications which have
previously been made by the Plaintiffs, including
those considered by Barrett J
(as his Honour then was) in Amaca Pty Ltd v McGrath as liquidators of HIH
Underwriting & Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 90; (2011) 82
ACSR 281 ("Amaca 1") which related to the policy years 1981/82 to
1982/83; by me in Amaca Pty Ltd (under NSW administered winding up) v McGrath
& Honey (as liquidators of the HIH Group of Companies) [2012] NSWSC 176;
(2012) 87 ACSR 625 ("Amaca 2") which related to the policy years 1989/90
to 1992/93; and by me in Amaca Pty Ltd (under NSW administered winding up) v
McGrath & Honey (as liquidators of HIH Group of Companies) [2012] NSWSC
1523; (2012) 92 ACSR 105 ("Amaca 3") which related to the policy years
1993/94 to 1995/96.
- The
application concerns ten amounts received by HIH Underwriting & Insurance
(Australia) Pty Ltd (in liquidation and subject
to a scheme of arrangement)
("HIHUI") from reinsurers, two of which relate to receipts in respect of policy
claims and eight of which
relate to commutations of policies. These amounts
relate to the policy year 1980/81, which has not previously been considered by
the Court, 1981/82 and 1982/83 which were dealt with in Amaca 1, and
1985/86 which also has not previously been considered by the Court. The
Plaintiffs seek orders that ss 562A(2) and 562A(3) of the Corporations
Act should not apply to those amounts, which should instead be paid to
Amaca, after deducting expenses of and incidental to getting in
the receipts
agreed as 2.5% of the receipts, and deducting any dividends paid in respect of
the receipts. In substance, the orders
sought would have the result that
reinsurance monies totalling $13,968,228 received by the liquidators of HIHUI
would be paid directly
to Amaca rather than distributed among all insurance
creditors of HIHUI.
1980/81 policy year
- The
Plaintiffs provided a helpful summary of the history of the other applications
in respect of other policy years. An application
in respect of the 1979/1980
policy year was brought but discontinued, since it ultimately was not necessary
for the Plaintiffs to
obtain an order under s 562A of the Corporations
Act in respect of that year. Nonetheless, the Plaintiffs read an affidavit
of Ms Narreda Grimley dated 28 June 2011 filed in that application.
Ms Grimley
has, from 2005 to date, been successively the General Manager of Amaca Claim
Services, the Chief Operating Officer and
subsequently the General Manager of
the Asbestos Injuries Compensation Fund. That affidavit provides background to
the dealings between
James Hardie and HIHUI in the next year, 1980/81, which is
in issue in this application. The position changed in one respect between
1979/80, when CE Heath Underwriting Agencies (Australia) Pty Ltd was the named
insuring entity, and 1980/81 onwards, when HIHUI was
the named insuring entity,
subject to the reinsurance arrangements which I will address
below.
- The
Plaintiffs also rely on the affidavits of Ms Grimley dated 17 December 2013 and
Mr Dennis Langlands dated 13 February 2014 in
respect of their application
concerning the 1980/81 policy year. I have referred to Ms Grimley's role above.
Mr Langlands was involved
as a broker for the James Hardie Group in obtaining
insurance cover in the 1980/81 policy year and has previously given evidence
in
earlier proceedings in respect of the Plaintiffs' claims upon the HIH Group.
- Ms
Grimley's affidavit refers to earlier affidavits including that of Mr Dallas
Booth sworn on 22 July 2010 in earlier proceedings,
which deals with the history
of the Plaintiffs and the circumstances in which the Asbestos Injuries
Compensation Fund was established
and funded. She also exhibits three folders of
documents relating to the placement of insurance by the Plaintiffs, reinsurance
of
those policies and related correspondence in the policy years commencing 31
March 1980 and 31 March 1985. The chronology of events
in relation to the
1980/81 policy year that emerges from Ms Grimley's affidavit and the exhibited
correspondence indicate that CE
Heath Underwriting Agencies (Australia) Pty
Limited approached CE Health London in respect of cover for the Plaintiffs in
March 1980,
at a time that the Plaintiffs were not then committed to placing
cover with the CE Heath Group (the predecessor to the HIH Group).
Instructions
were given to proceed with placement of cover on 31 March 1980 and CE Heath
London sought commitments from the London
market from at least that date and
through April 1980, some of which were given as direct insurance and some as
reinsurance cover.
The cover was placed by late April 1980, with 74.75% placed
as direct insurance and 25.25% as reinsurance.
- Ms
Grimley's evidence is that James Hardie Industries Ltd (now known as ABN 60, the
Third Plaintiff) ("James Hardie") held $50 million
liability insurance cover for
the policy year from 31 March 1980 to 31 March 1981, made up of a primary layer
and two excess layers.
The second excess layer of $30 million in excess of $20
million was insured, to a total of 74.75%, directly by a number of international
insurers and is not in issue in this application. The remaining 25.25% of the
second excess layer was placed with HIHUI and the whole
of that layer was
reinsured with several reinsurers. Receipts from three of those reinsurers,
Gerling Globale General & Reinsurance
Co Ltd, Imperio Companhia De Seguros
and Union Atlantique de Reassurances SA, are in issue in this application.
Several other insurers,
including AMP Fire & General Insurance Co Ltd
("AMP") and AFIA (World Wide) Insurance ("AFIA"), each held shares of that layer
and receipts from AMP and AFIA are also in issue in this application. Ms
Grimley's affidavit exhibits contracts of reinsurance for
the relevant year and
correspondence relating to that year.
- Mr
Langlands gives evidence as to his contact with the HIH group in 1980 in respect
of cover for the 1980/81 policy year and that
his understanding was that the
Australian market did not have the capacity to write the higher layers of cover
and that the HIH group
would obtain that cover from the London market. Mr
Langlands also gives evidence of his understanding, consistent with that he held
in respect of other policy years, that the HIH group did not have significant
capacity to write that cover itself; that he did not
expect that the HIH Group
would itself be able to write any of the $30 million in excess of $20 million
layer for the 1980/81 policy
year; and that he understood that the entire
premium paid by James Hardie would be forwarded by the HIH Group to the London
market,
less a commission. It does not seem to be entirely clear, but it is also
not material for present purposes, whether the commission
was dealt with by
deduction from the amount paid by James Hardie and remitted to the reinsurers,
or was an amount rebated by the
reinsurers when they were given the reinsurance
business. In either case, the commission was sourced from the premiums received
by
the London market participants.
- The
Plaintiffs also rely on the affidavit of Mr Rod Waites dated 20 August 2010,
which was read in Amaca 1 and again read in these proceedings, in respect
of the 1980/81 policy year. Mr Waites' evidence was that during the 1980s, the
James
Hardie Group's then insurance manager travelled regularly with its
insurance broker to meet with Mr Waites in Melbourne and underwriters
in London
in respect of the relevant insurance cover. Mr Waites also referred to the
practice by which, when CE Heath London was
unable to place insurance directly,
it placed it as facultative reinsurance in order to secure a 100% placement, and
by which HIHUI
"fronted" for any portion of insurance which was facultatively
reinsured and did not charge a premium but obtained a commission on
the
placement of the risk. The term "fronted" or "fronting" is used in this context
without any pejorative meaning.
- Several
features of the arrangements in this year provide a factual basis for an order
under s 562A(4) of the Corporations Act. The relevant reinsurance
contracts were obtained by HIHUI solely in respect of the cover obtained by the
Plaintiffs. In this year,
as in the years considered in Amaca 1, Amaca
2 and Amaca 3, the insurance contracts under which HIHUI provided
cover to the Plaintiffs can readily be matched with the reinsurance contracts
in
favour of HIHUI. HIHUI entered into those reinsurance contracts for the purpose
of providing cover for the Plaintiffs that HIHUI
would not have been able to
provide without that reinsurance and where several of the reinsurers could not
have insured the Plaintiffs
directly. The insurance provided by HIHUI was
plainly dependent on the provision of reinsurance cover, since it was plainly
understood
that HIHUI did not itself have the capacity to provide that cover
other than with back-to-back reinsurance arrangements. The premiums
paid by the
Plaintiffs to HIHUI were identical to the premiums paid by HIHUI to the
reinsurers, apart from HIHUI's commission to
which I referred above. The James
Hardie Group was also aware, through its broker, of the arrangements by which
the risk nominally
undertaken by HIHUI had in fact been placed in the London
market by facultative reinsurance contracts obtained for that purpose.
1981/82 and 1982/83 policy years
- The
Plaintiffs also rely in this application on evidence read in previous
proceedings concerning the 1981/82 and 1982/83 policy years,
since several of
the commutations in issue extend to those policy years. The position in these
years was considered in detail by
Barrett J in Amaca 1 and the Court has
subsequently made several further orders in respect of distributions relating to
those years on a basis consistent
with his Honour's judgment. Ms Grimley's
affidavit refers to evidence read in Amaca 1 including the affidavits of
Mr Booth sworn 3 August 2010 relating to the 1981/82 policy year; the affidavit
of Mr Waites sworn 20
August 2010 relating to the 1981/82 policy year; the
affidavit of Mr Booth sworn 3 August 2010 relating to the 1982/83 policy year;
a
second affidavit of Mr Waites also sworn 20 August 2010 relating to the 1982/83
policy year; and the affidavit of Mr Langlands
sworn 3 December 2010 relating to
the 1981/82 and 1982/83 policy years.
- Mr
Waites' evidence indicated that many reinsurers who participated in insuring
James Hardie in the 1981/82 policy year were not permitted
to write direct
insurance, but only to cover risk as facultative reinsurance and HIHUI's role in
"fronting" the insurance was necessary
to their providing the relevant cover. He
refers to correspondence, in March 1981, concerning the ability to use
facultative reinsurance
behind HIHUI if necessary to place the cover and notes
that he had authority to agree to the use of the facultative reinsurance market
on behalf of HIHUI and that:
"Use of the facultative reinsurance market involved [HIHUI] fronting the risk
without carrying any of the insurance risk itself."
He also notes that another HIH entity would obtain a commission on the
placement of the risk. In the 1981/82 policy year, HIHUI's
records confirmed
that it had remitted the premiums paid by Minet, as James Hardie's broker, to CE
Heath London, less a 7.5% commission
that it retained for acting as an
intermediary between James Hardie and the London-based insurers and reinsurers.
- Mr
Langlands evidence, in his affidavit sworn 3 December 2010 in respect of the
1981/82 policy years, is that he expected all of the
insurers to be London or
overseas-based insurers arranged by CE Heath London, and did not expect any
Australian insurer in the HIH
Group to be an insurer on any part of the policy,
although he indicates that he was aware that it was common for companies within
the HIH Group to front for another insurer such as a London insurer and he would
have assumed, had he seen a reference to HIH on
a policy slip, that it was
"solely acting as a fronting source for London insurers/overseas
insurers".
- Mr
Waites' evidence is also that, although he did not discuss with CE Heath London
whether the James Hardie Group's insurance for
the 1982/83 year should be placed
as direct insurance or as facultative reinsurance, and he understood that that
was subject to market
capacity, his understanding was also
that:
"Where a direct insurance placement was not possible due to a lack of
capacity in the market, CE Heath London placed the remaining
portions of the
James Hardie Group's insurance account as facultative reinsurance of [HIHUI] in
the 1982/83 year of account, just
as it had done in the 1981/82 policy
year."
He refers to documentation recording that parts of several layers were signed
by a "domestic", which he notes was a reference to cover
"fronted" by HIHUI.
- In
Amaca 1, Barrett J summarised the matters which he considered had the
result that there was no difficulty, in the 1981/82 and 1982/83 years,
in
matching the insurance contracts under which HIHUI granted cover to the
Plaintiffs with the reinsurance contracts written in its
favour and supported
findings that HIHUI entered into those contracts to provide cover which it could
not itself provide and which
the reinsurers could not directly provide and a
conclusion (at [78]-[79]) that:
"The reinsurance was the means by which the reinsurers provided, through
[HIHUI] the insurance the plaintiffs required. The reinsurance
was obtained for
the express purpose of fulfilling the plaintiffs' needs.
On that basis, the reinsurance proceeds derived by [HIHUI] ought properly be
regarded as part of what [HIHUI], as insurer, was committed
to provide to the
plaintiffs upon and by reason of their sustaining the relevant loss."
- I
have had regard to the evidence read as to those years in this application and I
gratefully adopt Barrett J's description of the
process adopted in those years,
which was consistent with that evidence. That evidence supports the view that
the dealings between
James Hardie, HIHUI and the London reinsurers in those
years had the features noted above in respect of the previous year which in
turn
provide the factual basis for the making of a further order under s 562A(4) of
the Corporations Act in respect of those years, consistent with the
orders previously made by the Court in respect of those years.
1985/86 policy year
- The
position in respect of the 1985/86 policy year has not previously been
considered by the Court and is at issue in this application.
Ms Grimley's
affidavit also deals with insurance cover held by James Hardie for the 1985/86
policy year, for the period from 31 March
1985 to 31 March 1986 which was
subsequently extended to 31 May 1986, and was comprised of $75 million of
liability insurance made
up of a primary layer and five excess layers, of which
only the first $50 million of cover extended to asbestos cover. An amount
of
4.65% of the third excess layer was subscribed by HIHUI and wholly reinsured by
Transatlantic Reinsurance Company Ltd ("Transatlantic")
and an amount of 5.30%
of the fourth excess layer of $25 million in excess of $25 million was
subscribed by HIH, part of which was
reinsured by Transatlantic.
- Ms
Grimley's affidavit exhibits contracts of reinsurance for the relevant year and
correspondence relating to that year. It is plain
from that correspondence that
there were significant difficulties in obtaining reinsurance cover in that year
and James Hardie was
closely involved in addressing those issues. Attempts were
made in that year, given the difficulties of obtaining cover, to generate
capacity in the Australian market, but HIHUI again did not accept any economic
exposure in respect of the cover and, by July 1985,
HIHUI had confirmed that it
was willing to "front" for a further reinsurer but that there was no Australian
support in respect of
the highest layer of the cover then sought.
- The
Plaintiffs also rely on the affidavit of Mr Langlands dated 13 February 2014 in
respect of this policy year. Mr Langlands' evidence
is that the same general
procedure was involved in organising James Hardie's cover for the policy year
commencing 31 March 1985 as
in earlier years. He gives evidence, consistent with
the correspondence that is also in evidence, of the difficulty in obtaining
cover in that year due to a lack of capacity in the London and overseas markets
generally and specifically in relation to asbestos
cover. He also refers to a
direct meeting between the lead London underwriter and James Hardie's Managing
Director and a representative
of James Hardie's insurance broker, Minet
Australia, in respect of issues in obtaining cover in that year. Mr Langlands'
evidence
is that in that year, his understanding was that the premium paid by
James Hardie would again be directed to the London market, with
HIHUI again
taking a commission. Mr Langlands also refers to a request made by CE Heath
London that the brokers seek to generate
some capacity in the Australian market,
and he notes that he could not find anyone in the Australian market willing to
write the
relevant cover. Mr Langlands notes his understanding in 1985 that
London or overseas markets would be the only markets that would
be prepared to
insure James Hardie given its connection with asbestos and that he did not
expect that an HIH entity would retain
any of the risk for the 1985 policy year,
and he also notes that he was aware in that year that an HIH entity would be
"fronting"
a portion of the 1985/86 policy.
- Again,
several features of the arrangements in this year provide a factual basis for an
order under s 562A(4) of the Corporations Act. Again, the relevant
reinsurance contracts were obtained by HIHUI solely in respect of the cover
obtained by the Plaintiffs and the
insurance contracts under which HIHUI
provided cover to the Plaintiffs can readily be matched with the reinsurance
contracts in favour
of HIHUI. Again, HIHUI entered into those reinsurance
contracts for the purpose of providing cover for the Plaintiffs that HIHUI
would
not have been able to provide without that reinsurance and where several of the
reinsurers could not have insured the Plaintiffs
directly. Again, the insurance
provided by HIHUI was plainly dependent on the provision of reinsurance cover,
since it was understood
that HIHUI did not itself have the capacity to provide
that cover other than with back-to-back reinsurance arrangements, and that
position was emphasised by the difficulty in obtaining cover in that year. The
premiums paid by the Plaintiffs to HIHUI were identical
to the premiums paid by
HIHUI to the reinsurers, apart from HIHUI's commission to which I referred
above. The James Hardie Group
was again aware, through its broker, of the
arrangements by which the risk nominally undertaken by HIHUI had in fact been
placed
in the London market by facultative reinsurance contracts obtained for
that purpose.
Scope of s 562A of the Corporations Act
- Section
562A(1) of the Corporations Act provides that the section applies
where:
"(a) a company is insured, under a contract of reinsurance entered into
before the relevant date, against liability to pay amounts
in respect of a
relevant contract of insurance or relevant contracts of insurance; and
(b) an amount in respect of that liability has been or is received by the
company or the liquidator under the contract of reinsurance."
The term "relevant contract of insurance" is defined as "a contract of
insurance entered into by the company, as insurer, before the
relevant date" and
that term can include contracts of reinsurance: AssetInsure Pty Ltd v New Cap
Reinsurance Corporation Ltd (in liq) [2006] HCA 13; (2006) 225 CLR 331 at
[86]- [87]. The requirements of s 562A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act are
satisfied in this case since HIHUI was insured under contracts of reinsurance
entered into before the relevant date in respect
of its liability to pay amounts
in respect of contracts of insurance that it had entered in favour of the
Plaintiffs.
- The
operation of this section was considered in detail by Barrett J in his decision
in Re HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd [2005] NSWSC 240; (2005)
190 FLR 398 ("Re HIH - First Scheme Hearing") and that analysis has been
followed in subsequent cases including in my decisions in Amaca 2 and
Amaca 3. His Honour there noted that s 562A is an exception to the
general rule laid down in s 555 of the Corporations Act that all debts
and claims proved in a winding up rank equally and, if the company's property is
insufficient to meet them in full,
they must be paid proportionately. Section
556 in turn overrides s 555 of the Corporations Act in the specified
circumstances and s 562A overrides ss 555 - 556 by directing that the specified
assets be applied towards the claims with which it is concerned.
- Turning
now to the specific requirements of the section, s 562A(1)(b) of the
Corporations Act requires that, first, an amount in respect of the
relevant liability is received by the insurer. The claims made by the Plaintiffs
amount, in large part, to liabilities that had been incurred but not reported.
The liquidators contend that such contingent liabilities
fall within s
562A(1)(b). In Amaca 2 at [6]-[7], I held that the phrase "that
liability" in s 562A(1)(b) extends to a contingent liability of the insurer
which has the benefit of contracts of reinsurance to pay amounts in respect of a
relevant contract of insurance, and not only an established or admitted
liability. Ms Rees submit that that approach is consistent
with the approach
adopted by the Privy Council in Cleaver v Delta American Reinsurance Co (in
liq) [2001] UKPC 6; [2001] 2 AC 328 at [42], where their Lordships
recognised the importance of recognition of incurred but not reported claims in
an insurance company's accounts,
with the figure being actuarially calculated
and based upon past claims experience, reflecting "an estimate of a liability
that statistics
and experience show to exist in respect of claims not yet put
forward".
- Section
562A(1)(b) of the Corporations Act also requires that an amount is
received by the insurer under the contract of reinsurance. In Amaca 2, I
also held (at [10]) that a payment is made under a contract of reinsurance where
the amount represents a discharge of payment
obligations created by the
agreement, including by a commutation of rights under that agreement. I continue
to take this view. Ms
Rees points out that the commutations in this case relate
to insurance policies written on an occurrence basis as distinct from a
"claims
made" basis, whereas I had considered the position in respect of commutations of
policies had been written on a "claims made"
basis in Amaca 2. Neither
party identified any potential difference in the application of s 562A of the
Corporations Act arising from that matter and it is not apparent to me
that any such difference arises. The requirements of s 562A(1)(b) are satisfied
in respect of the two claim payments by reinsurers and eight commutations in
this case.
Whether amounts are payable under a relevant contract of insurance
- The
usual position is that a liquidator must distribute reinsurance proceeds among
the insured creditors in the manner specified in
s 562A(2)-(3) of the
Corporations Act. Section 562A(3), which would be applicable in the
present circumstances absent an order under s 562A(4), relevantly provides for
the liquidator to provide each insured a proportion of their claim calculated in
the specified manner. The
Court may make an order providing for a different
allocation of reinsurance proceeds under s 562A(4) which relevantly provides
that:
"(4) The Court may, on application by a person to whom an amount is payable
under a relevant contract of insurance, make an order
to the effect that
subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to the amount received under the contract
of reinsurance and that that amount
must, instead, be applied by the liquidator
in the manner specified in the order, being a manner that the Court considers
just and
equitable in the circumstances."
- Subsection
562A(4) applies on application by a person to whom an amount is "payable under"
a relevant contract of insurance. A question arose in the
course of submissions
before me on 18 March 2014 as to whether the fact that the Plaintiffs had made
their claim under a scheme of
arrangement in respect of HIHUI affected the
characterisation of that claim as being a claim under the relevant contract of
insurance,
so as to amount to a surrender of the rights of the Plaintiffs under
the relevant contracts of insurance in substitution for rights
under the scheme,
such that the amounts claimed by the Plaintiffs were now not payable to them
under the relevant contracts of insurance.
- The
terms of the relevant scheme indicate that distributions to the Plaintiffs under
the scheme are in substitution for dividends
in a winding up. Clause 6.2 of the
scheme provides that scheme creditors accept their rights under the scheme in
lieu of their entitlements
to proving in and receiving a dividend from the
winding up. Clause 9 of the scheme in turn recognises the possibility that
applications
may be brought under s 562A(4) of the Corporations Act.
Under cl 12 of the scheme, once an amount is admitted as an "Acknowledged
Creditor Claim" (as provided by cl 11 of the scheme),
the scheme creditor is
paid the relevant payment percentage (or dividend) based on the value for which
its claim is accepted as an
"Established Scheme Claim" (as defined), and that
payment constitutes a discharge of the payment obligation owed by the scheme
company
to the scheme creditor.
- The
parties jointly submit, and I accept, that the fact that the amounts claimed by
the Plaintiffs are now payable as a claim under
the scheme of arrangement does
not deprive them of their original character as amounts payable under a relevant
contract of insurance.
As the parties point out, s 562A(4) operates in the
context of the winding up of an insurer, when creditors' right to sue for their
debts is in the ordinary course transformed
to a right to participate in a
distribution in the winding up: Re HIH - First Scheme Hearing at [119].
The parties submit, and I accept, that the fact that a person's claim is to a
distribution in the winding up cannot deprive
it of its character as a claim to
an amount payable under a relevant contract of insurance, because that would
deprive s 562A of sensible operation, and a similar analysis should be applied
where an insured has the right to prove in a scheme of arrangement.
It seems to
me that the amount is "payable under" a relevant contract of insurance, in the
sense that the relevant contract of insurance
gives rise to the right to
payment, notwithstanding that payment will be effected as a distribution in the
winding up or a payment
under the scheme of arrangement. To put it another way,
the insured continues to have a right to an amount "payable under" the relevant
contract of insurance, notwithstanding that it may not now sue the insurer for
indemnity under the policy of insurance, and instead
participates in the
relevant scheme. As the parties contend, and I accept, an amount is also
"payable" under the contract of insurance
because that payment will constitute a
satisfaction of the right of the insured to payment by the insurer under that
contract.
- The
case law also seems to me to support the view that claims made by the Plaintiffs
under the scheme of arrangement are nonetheless
properly characterised as claims
to amounts payable under a relevant contract of insurance for the purposes of s
562A of the Corporations Act. In Re HIH - First Scheme Hearing, in
considering the interaction between s 411 (which deals with schemes of
arrangement) and s 562A(7) (which provides that s 562A has effect despite any
agreement to the contrary), Barrett J proceeded on the basis that s 562A could
have application in respect of claims dealt with by a scheme of arrangement, and
did not order that meetings of creditors be
convened to consider the particular
scheme proposal which purported to require assets to be applied other than in
the manner provided
under the section. In Re HIH Casualty & General
Insurance [2005] NSWSC 1180; 56 ACSR 295 ("Re HIH - First Scheme Hearing No
2"), Barrett J subsequently made orders under s 411 of the Corporations Act
convening meetings of creditors to consider a revised scheme proposal, where
the proposed scheme had been modified so as to preserve
the rights of insured to
whom s 562A applied and, in particular, to accommodate the operation of s
562A(4). It seems to me that the necessary consequence of his Honour's
reasoning was that s 562A was capable of continuing to apply in respect of
rights dealt with under a scheme of arrangement, and that the revised scheme
would
not impede an insured's ability to apply for an order under s 562A(4).
This approach is consistent with the approach adopted by Barrett J in Amaca
1 at [60] - [62] and by me in Amaca 3 at [10].
When operation of s 562A(2)-(3) can be varied
- Where
s 562A(4) applies, it allows the Court to displace whichever of s 562A(2) or (3)
applies in the circumstances and, by its order, substitute a method of
application of the amount of reinsurance proceeds which
is different from that
which would otherwise have applied under the provision which is displaced:
Amaca 1 at [10]. The "just and equitable" criterion adopted in this
subsection confers a discretion on the Court that, while wide, can only
be
exercised judicially in the light of the whole of the circumstances surrounding
the relevant subject matter and requires the Court
to proceed in a way to which
Barrett J referred in Eddy Lau Constructions Pty Ltd v Transdevelopment
Enterprise Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 273 at [45]- [47], quoted by Barrett J in
Amaca 1 and followed in Amaca 2.
- Certain
matters which the Court may take into account in considering whether to make
such an order are specified, in an inclusive
manner, in s 562A(5) as
follows:
"(5) The matters that the Court may take into account in considering whether
to make an order under subsection (4) include, but are
not limited to:
(a) whether it is possible to identify particular relevant contracts of
insurance as being the contracts in respect of which the contract
of reinsurance
was entered into; and
(b) whether it is possible to identify persons who can be said to have paid
extra in order to have particular relevant contracts of
insurance protected by
reinsurance; and
(c) whether particular relevant contracts of insurance include statements to
the effect that the contracts are to be protected by
reinsurance; and
(d) whether a person to whom an amount is payable under a relevant contract
of insurance would be severely prejudiced if subsections
(2) and (3) applied to
the amount received under the contract of reinsurance."
In my view, the factor specified in s 562A(5)(a) of the Corporations Act
is established in this case in that it is possible, in each of the relevant
policy years to which I have referred above, to identify
particular relevant
contracts of insurance as being the contracts in respect of which the contract
of reinsurance was entered into.
- The
question whether the Plaintiffs would be "severely prejudiced" if ss 562A(2)-(3)
applied in this case, for the purposes of s 562A(5)(d) of the Corporations
Act, raises issues which correspond to those considered by Barrett J in
Amaca 1 and by me in Amaca 2 and Amaca 3. These decisions
indicate that the prejudice to which s 562A(5)(d) is directed is the prejudice
flowing from the operation of s 562A(2)-(3), if left unaltered by the Court,
rather than any prejudice flowing from the alteration of that section pursuant
to s 562A(4). That paragraph directs attention to the prejudice to the person
seeking the alteration of the order of distribution under s 562A(2)-(3) if that
order is declined, rather than the prejudice to other parties if that order is
made: Amaca 1 at [73]. The concept of "severely prejudiced" contemplates
prejudice or disadvantage that is severe, in the sense of being harsh
or
unpleasantly extreme: Amaca 1 at [74]. A finding of "severe prejudice" is
relevant, but not necessary, to an exercise of the discretion under s 562A(4) of
the Corporations Act.
- In
this case, as in the earlier cases dealing with other policy years raising
similar issues, the Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if
they did not receive the
direct benefit of the reinsurance monies for which they had bargained, where
they plainly would not have
contracted for cover from HIHUI, and indeed HIHUI
would not have offered the relevant cover, without the reinsurance that was in
place. As Barrett J noted in Amaca 1, the real and significant prejudice
that the Plaintiffs would suffer by being deprived of the reinsurance proceeds
is a matter that
supports the making of an order under s 562A(4) in their
favour, even if it were properly characterised as substantial rather than
"severe" prejudice.
- In
this case, as in the earlier cases, further factors that make it just and
equitable to make the order sought by the Plaintiffs
seem to me to include the
limited role played by HIHUI in insuring the risk; the unusually direct
relationship between the Plaintiffs
and the reinsurers; and the fact that the
Plaintiffs, in a substantive sense, paid their premiums to HIHUI for cover to be
afforded
by the reinsurers rather than HIHUI.
- Ms
Rees, who appears with Mr Hollo for the Plaintiffs, properly draws attention to
the decision of Nicholas J in Re HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (in
liq and subject to schemes of arrangement) [2013] NSWSC 741; (2013) 95 ACSR
1 ("Sydney Water Corporation"), where his Honour declined to make an
order under s 562A(4) of the Corporations Act in respect of reinsurance
proceeds received by HIH on the application of Sydney Water Corporation.
Judgment in an appeal from the
decision of Nicholas J in Sydney Water
Corporation is presently reserved by the Court of Appeal.
- I
do not understand the analysis adopted by Nicholas J in Sydney Water
Corporation to be in any way inconsistent with the analysis previously
adopted by the Court in Amaca 1, Amaca 2 and Amaca 3,
although his Honour exercised his discretion differently in different factual
circumstances. His Honour there (at [73]) adopted
the description of the
operation of ss 562A(2)-(3) of the Corporations Act given in Amaca
3 at [9]-[12] and [19], where I had in turn adopted the same analysis as
Barrett J had adopted in Amaca 1 and I had adopted in Amaca 2. His
Honour also referred to Amaca 1 in recognising that the discretion
conferred under s 562A(4), while wide, can only be exercised judicially in light
of the whole of the circumstances surrounding the relevant subject matter:
Sydney Water Corporation at [78]. His Honour emphasised that the question
for the Court, in exercising the discretion conferred by s 562A(4), was whether
an applicant had demonstrated on the evidence a reason or an appropriate case to
warrant the exercise of discretion
in its favour, so that it should be treated
differently to other insured creditors, and cited Amaca 1 at [85] in
observing that (at [106]):
"In the end, the Court must be satisfied that the circumstances are such as
to make it just and equitable that the ordinary course
envisaged by sub s (2)
and (3) be departed from in respect of the manner of application of the amounts
received under a contract
of reinsurance ... and in this exercise it may take
into account the matters included in sub s (5)."
- As
I read his Honour's decision, it involves the application of the same principles
which have been applied in the earlier decisions
of the Court, but reflects his
factual findings (at [124]) that the correspondence on which Sydney Water
Corporation relied did not
disclose direct participation by it with the relevant
insurance syndicate in negotiations for reinsurance and did not support a
finding
in that case that HIH was merely a front or conduit to facilitate direct
negotiations between Sydney Water Corporation and the syndicate,
by contrast
with the position found in the Amaca cases. It will be noted that HIH had
in that case in fact retained a significant portion of several layers of the
insurance that
it provided to Sydney Water Corporation, by contrast with the
position in this case and the earlier Amaca cases where it appears to
have been understood throughout the process that HIHUI did not have the capacity
to and would not accept
any economic exposure to the relevant
risk.
Prejudice to other creditors
- This
case is, however, more difficult than earlier Amaca cases in one respect.
In Amaca 2, I observed that (at [25]):
"The conclusion that it is just and equitable to make the orders sought is
also supported by the fact that, while the prejudice to
the Plaintiffs of being
deprived of the proceeds of the reinsurance for which they bargained is
significant, the adverse impact of
the orders sought on other insurance
creditors of HIH C&G will be widely diversified and the detriment suffered
by any particular
creditors will be limited."
I there observed that the fact that the reduction in the return to other
relevant creditors from making the relevant orders was insubstantial
was a
factor that assisted in, but was not necessary to, a finding that it was just
and equitable to make the relevant order.
- By
contrast, the Plaintiffs' application in this case will have a more substantial
financial impact on the return to other insurance
creditors of HIHUI than
earlier applications, in the sense that those other insurance creditors would
receive a significantly higher
return if the monies claimed by the Plaintiffs
were made available to all insurance creditors of HIHUI rather than only to the
Plaintiffs
as a result of an order made under s 562A(4). The liquidators advised
the solicitors for the Plaintiffs, on 13 March 2014, that the impact on other
insurance creditors of HIH
was expected to be approximately 14¢ in the
dollar if the Plaintiffs were successful in obtaining the orders sought in this
application. That position was confirmed by further submissions filed by the
liquidator on 16 April 2014, which indicated that, if
the Plaintiffs'
application was successful, other insurance creditors of HIHUI will receive a
distribution estimated at 20¢
to 30¢ in the dollar. On the other hand,
if the Court did not make the orders sought by the Plaintiffs and all insurance
creditors
participated rateably in the reinsurance proceeds claimed by the
Plaintiffs, the distribution received by insurance creditors of
HIHUI would be
34¢ to 44¢ in the dollar.
- The
liquidators acknowledge that the impact on other insurance creditors of an order
made under s 562A(4) in this case is arguably of a different magnitude to the
impact of such an order on other insurance creditors in Amaca 1 (where
the difference resulting from an order under s 562A(4) was then estimated to be
in the order of 5¢), Amaca 2 (where the return to other insurance
creditors was reduced by less than 0.3¢) and Amaca 3 (where the
return to other insurance creditors was reduced by less than 1¢ in the
dollar). The liquidators submit, as I had
noted in Amaca 2, that this was
a matter that the Court may take into account in the exercise of its discretion
under s 562A(4) but is not determinative. It does not seem to me that this
matter ultimately provides a reason not to make the relevant order. The
reduction in the return to other creditors seems to me to be in the nature of
the loss of an advantage, if their return was subsidised
by receipts from
reinsurance arrangements in which HIHUI had no substantial economic interest,
rather than a deprivation of a benefit
that ought to flow to them in the factual
circumstances which I have set out above.
Orders
- Accordingly,
I am satisfied that it is just and equitable to make an order under s 562A(4) of
the Corporations Act in the relevant circumstances, in the form set out
in the Amended Originating Process. The parties should bring in short minutes
of
order to give effect to this judgment within 7 days.
**********
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