Quinn v. Harrison [2005] QDC 183 (18 April 2005)

Last Updated: 11 July 2005

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	Quinn v Harrison [2005] QDC 183
PARTIES:	CRAIG ANDREW QUINN Applicant v CRAIG JAMES HARRISON Respondent
FILE NO/S:	BD896/2005
DIVISION:	Civil
PROCEEDING:	Application by plaintiff for criminal compensation
ORIGINATING COURT:	District Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:	18 April 2005
DELIVERED AT:	Mt Isa
HEARING DATE:	7 April 2005
JUDGE:	Nase DCJ
ORDER:	That Craig James Harrison pay to Craig Andrew Quinn the sum of $8,250.00 by way of compensation pursuant to the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995.
COUNSEL:	Mr Dane W. Thornburgh for Applicant
SOLICITORS:	Blue Justice for Applicant

[1] This is an application for a Compensation Order pursuant to the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 ("the Act") brought by Craig Andrew Quinn ("the applicant"). The respondent to the application is Craig James Harrison. The respondent chose not to appear or to be represented at the hearing of the application.
[2] The respondent was convicted on indictment in the District Court at Beenleigh on 21 October 2003 of a serious assault committed upon the applicant.
[3] The applicant is a serving police officer. The assault was committed on 11 February 2003 during a police chase of a stolen motor vehicle driven by the respondent. At one point in the pursuit the respondent reversed the stolen car onto the front of the police vehicle a number of times. On the third occasion the impact was substantial, forcing the police vehicle back about 10 metres and causing major damage to the vehicle. The applicant was seated in the front passenger compartment and sustained a number of physical injuries.
[4] The applicant visited a government medical officer (Dr Culliford) on 12 February 2003. Dr Culliford has reported on the applicant’s condition at that time as follows:

"He complained of soreness over the left clavicle and shoulder; soreness in the left groin; and soreness of the left knee where it hit the door. Examination revealed the following:

i) Linear abrasions and bruising across the lower abdomen, right chest and left clavicle from the seat belt;

ii) Area of tenderness over the lateral patella and lateral knee joint but no clinical evidence of internal damage to the cruciate ligaments or menisci, and no instability, click or effusion;

iii) Tenderness over the left side of the pubis with some bruising;

iv) No evidence of recurrent hernia at site of previous hernia repair.

I made a diagnosis of minor blunt force trauma, mainly related to the seat belt and airbag deployment, consistent with the history given by Constable Quinn of being in a car subjected to sudden deceleration.

I did not perform any investigations and he did not require any specific treatment. I advised him that his injuries should fully resolve. I did not see him again in relation to this particular incident."

[5] In elaboration of the injuries noted by Dr Culliford the applicant said he suffered neck pain for about two weeks after the incident. He said the neck pain was associated with headaches. He said the neck injury interfered with a range of activities from driving a motor vehicle to resting his head on a pillow.

[6] I am satisfied the respondent was convicted on indictment of a personal offence within the meaning of s.21 of the Act, and that the applicant has suffered one or more injuries within the meaning of s.20 of the Act as a consequence of the offence.

[7] Under the legislative scheme a court may make a compensation order up to the scheme maximum in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The method of assessment under the legislative scheme involves associating an injury suffered by an applicant with a corresponding item in a compensation table attached to the Act. The maximum awards of compensation are to be reserved for the most serious cases and the awards in other cases are to be scaled according to the relative seriousness of the particular injury (s.22(4)). In assessing compensation it is important to be mindful of the principle that the compensation that may be awarded under the Act is intended to help an applicant and is not intended to reflect the compensation to which the applicant may be entitled at common law (s.22(3)).

[8] Bruising/lacerations are dealt with in items 1 (minor/moderate) and 2 (severe) of the compensation table. The ranges provided are, respectively, 1%-3% and 3%- 5% of the scheme maximum. The applicant has advanced a claim for 3% for the personal injuries. I think this is a reasonable claim.

[9] The applicant also claims for mental or nervous shock. Mental or nervous shock is a compensable injury under the Act (s.20). This aspect of the claim is based on a psychiatric report from a Dr Larder. Dr Larder saw the applicant on 17 January 2005. His report is dated 27 January 2005.

[10] Dr Larder’s opinions are sufficiently indicated in the following passages:

"Your client presents with symptoms affecting basic drives [sleep, appetite, libido], physical function and brain function.

Your client could have been killed or seriously injured in the index incident. [The A1 criterion in the DSMIV [4]] I believe there has been a sufficient degree of shock and horror as in the [the A2 DSMIV criteria for PTSD] to allow for the possible diagnosis of PTSD.

In the two-year timeframe since the incident there have also been difficulties with anxious mood, which have been in the severe range, plus a wide range of other somatic and anxiety symptoms.

Your client is assessed as suffering from a syndrome of anxiety and depression.

This presentation is best assessed as a syndrome of anxiety features in the realm of an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depression as specified using the DSMIV system of diagnosis [4]. It is possible that at times in the early months after the incident the symptom profile met the full criteria to allow for the diagnosis of a major depressive episode.

Having considered these matters it is my view that the history, examination and collateral information certainly support the view that, given the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (COVA) considered by Thomas J of the Queensland Supreme Court, there has been an injury.

There is an abnormal condition of the mind over and above the normal reaction or emotion following a stressful event."

[11] The applicant continues to work in the police service, although he has obtained a change in duties to ameliorate the emotional effects of the offence. Unfortunately the emotional effects of the offence were probably heightened when he was involved in a similar event in May 2003.

[12] Dr Larder reported impairment in the ability to function in the activities of daily living, and mild impairment for ambulation, travel, sleep, and social and recreational activities. He reported mild impairment of functioning in social relationships, concentration, persistence, and generally in the applicant’s functioning in the workplace.

[13] Dr Larder thought that medical intervention is indicated, and suggested a treatment regime of 5-10 fortnightly visits, then monthly visits for three years, then 6-monthly visits for five years.

[14] Dr Larder assessed the applicant’s impairment as being in the mid end of the mild range of impairment.

[15] I accept Dr Larder’s opinion evidence. I am also satisfied the effects on the applicant of the offence fall within the definition of mental or nervous shock as that term is to be understood in the legislation.^[1]

[16] Mental or nervous shock is dealt with in items 31 (minor), 32 (moderate) and 33 (severe), where the ranges provided are 2%-10%, 10%-20%, 20%-34% of the scheme maximum respectively. The task the Court is required to undertake involves ranking the seriousness of the applicant’s mental or nervous shock against the other cases of mental or nervous shock that come before the Court. In carrying out that exercise, and being guided by Dr Larder’s description of the mental or nervous shock in this case, I believe that item 31 is the appropriate category. In the circumstances 8% of the scheme maximum seems to me to be a reasonable allowance for the impairment suffered by the applicant.

[17] The final issue to be considered is that of causation. This issue arises because of Dr Larder’s estimation that the offence is only one of a number of factors which have contributed to the applicant’s present mental condition. In percentage terms Dr Larder suggested the offence represented about 20% of the significant causative factors. One approach in these circumstances might be to allow only 20% of the award for mental or nervous shock, however that is not the approach that has generally been adopted.

[18] In SAM v SAM (2001) QCA 12 the Court of Appeal approved "a material contribution" test as a practical answer to issues of causation under the Act. On this test causation is satisfied if the relevant offence (or offences) had made a material contribution to the particular claimant’s injury, even if it was not the sole or (even) the effective cause of the injury. Applying that test in this case the element of causation is satisfied.

[19] The Court is also required to consider whether any conduct on the part of the applicant may have contributed directly or indirectly to the injury suffered by him. In this case there is no conduct on the part of the applicant that should reduce the award to which he is otherwise entitled.

[20] ORDER: That Craig James Harrison pay to Craig Andrew Quinn the sum of $8,250.00 by way of compensation pursuant to the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995.

^[1] Ferguson v Kazakoff (2000) QSC 156