DPP v Teiffel [2024] VCC 1266 (19 August 2024)

Last Updated: 18 September 2024

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE CRIMINAL DIVISION

Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication

Case No. CR-23-02128

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
RORY TEIFFEL

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JUDGE:	HER HONOUR JUDGE LEIGHFIELD
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	12 July 2024
DATE OF SENTENCE:	19 August 2024
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	DPP v Teiffel
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2024] VCC 1266

REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Subject: Criminal Law

Catchwords: Sentence – culpable driving causing death – early plea of guilty – remorse – youthful offender – extra-curial punishment – mental health issues – excellent prospects of rehabilitation – standard sentence – totality

Legislation Cited: Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s11A, s5A.

Cases Cited: Markovic v The Queen [2010] VSCA 105; Brown v R [2019] VSCA 286; DPP v Currie [2021] VSCA 272; Hennessy v The King [2024] VSCA 2

Sentence: Convicted and sentenced to a total effective sentence of 8 years and 9 months, with a non-parole period of 5 years and 4 months.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the DPP	Mr J. Dickie	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr P. Morrissey SC Ms A. Hughes	Murphy’s Lawyers

HER HONOUR:

Introduction

1. Rory Teiffel, you have pleaded guilty to two charges of culpable driving causing death which are Charges 1 and 2 on the indictment. Additionally, you consented to this court hearing, and pleaded guilty to a related summary charge of exceeding the prescribed concentration of alcohol in your blood within three hours of driving (related summary Charge 7). These charges arise from a short period of negligent driving by you at excessive speed on 9 April 2023 which resulted in the tragic death of your 16-year-old brother Denver and your 26-year-old cousin Ryan. You were 23 years of age at the time.
2. The maximum penalty for each charge of culpable driving causing death is 20 years’ imprisonment. Additionally, culpable driving causing death is a category 2 offence meaning that a term of imprisonment must be imposed unless relevant exceptions apply. It is not argued that any of those exceptions apply in this case. Further, the standard sentence for culpable driving is eight years’ imprisonment. I will return to the operation of the standard sentence provisions later in my reasons for sentence.
3. The maximum penalty for the related summary charge of exceeding the prescribed concentration of alcohol within three hours of driving is a fine of 20 penalty units.

Circumstances of the Offending

4. The full circumstances of your offending are set out in the Prosecution Opening for Plea Hearing which was tendered as Exhibit A on the plea and was read out on the plea hearing. In shorter compass, however, this offending occurred on Easter Sunday 2023. At the time you were living in Wangaratta with your family including your parents and your younger brother Denver. Your cousins, Ryan Suggate and Arron Suggate, along with their parents and their sister Cassie, were visiting you and your family in Wangaratta for the weekend. Throughout the weekend, the Suggates stayed at your home and spent time with you.
5. On Easter Sunday all of you attended church together and then gathered with other friends throughout the day. You then returned to church in the afternoon before returning to your home. You had drunk some alcohol over the course of the afternoon. Throughout the weekend you had spoken to others about your Jeep Grand Cherokee which you had bought in August 2022 and were very proud of. You spoke to your cousins about the Jeep’s performance, including how it was a high-performance car and had eight gears.
6. At 6.59 pm on Easter Sunday, you took your brother Denver, and your cousins Ryan and Arron for a drive in the Jeep. Ryan sat in the front passenger seat, Denver sat in the left side passenger seat, and Arron sat in the right-side rear passenger seat. Nine and a half minutes later the Jeep collided with two trees.
7. In that nine and a half minutes you drove out to the Wangaratta-Whitfield Road where you remained stationary at the intersection for approximately one minute. You then turned left onto the main road reaching a top speed of 93 kilometres per hour in the 80 kilometre per hour zone. A couple of minutes later you turned onto Laceby-Targoora Road and then on to Clarkes Lane. You drove along Clarkes Lane to Greta Road at variable speeds which were consistently over the 80 kilometres per hour speed limit, at one point reaching 152 kilometres per hour. Upon reaching Greta Road, you turned left and were driving away from Wangaratta. Over the first 40 seconds in a 100 kilometre per hour zone you sped up to 223 kilometres per hour. You then gradually slowed down over the following minute. A short time later you did a three point turn on Greta Road and turned your Jeep to face north towards Wangaratta. After turning, you drove a short distance, before your Jeep briefly idled. You then accelerated heavily.
8. Arron Suggate described the rapid speed of the Jeep taking off and said it was a speed that ‘kind of throws you back in your seat’. The speed limit at that point on Greta Road was 100 kilometres per hour. As you travelled along Greta Road you were driving at 155 kilometres per hour as you passed the entrance to Wangaratta Airport, 223 kilometres per hour at the start of the Hume Freeway overpass, 233 kilometres per hour at the apex of the Hume Freeway Overpass, and 245 kilometres per hour just before the intersection with Clarkes Lane. As the car crossed the Hume Freeway, Arron took his phone out to record the speed. The recording showed a display of 246 kilometres per hour on the speedometer. Arron recalls this as the top speed reached.
9. Less than 250 metres past Clarkes Lane, Greta Road curves to the right. There was an 80 kilometre per hour speed limit sign about 215 metres from the apex of the bend. There was also a 75 kilometres per hour advisory sign for the bend and multiple chevron signs aligning around the bend. As you passed the 80 kilometre per hour sign, your Jeep was still travelling about 222 kilometres per hour. You veered slightly to the left before entering the bend at about 205 kilometres per hour. You then lost control of the Jeep through the bend. At this stage you were still driving at a speed between 172 and 186 kilometres per hour. Your Jeep crossed the opposite lane, entered the roadside grass verge and side-swiped a tree with its passenger side. At the point of impact with the first tree, your Jeep was still travelling at between 95 and 102 kilometres per hour. The impact caused the car to rotate anti-clockwise before sliding sideways into a paddock and impacting another tree with the driver’s side. The Jeep then continued side-sliding for a short distance before rolling on to its roof.
10. As a result of the collision the Jeep sustained extensive impact damage – particularly to the passenger side. Your cousin Ryan is likely to have died immediately due to the injuries he sustained in the collision. At no point after the collision was he seen to show any signs of life.
11. You were assisted out of the car by passers-by and neighbours who rushed to the scene to assist. Arron, who had lost consciousness during the collision, regained consciousness and also managed to get out of the car. Denver was seriously injured and remained unconscious in the Jeep. Paramedics arrived a short time later, as did police officers and your cousin, Cassie Suggate.
12. You were cooperative with police at the scene, admitting that you had been speeding at the time of the collision and also advising police that you had had some alcohol earlier in the day. You also expressed considerable concern about your passengers, enquiring about their welfare. You were arrested and then taken to Wangaratta Hospital for a blood test and check-up. A sample of blood was taken from you which, when later analysed, showed a blood alcohol content of 0.079. That is above the prescribed blood alcohol content level of 0.05 and forms the subject matter of the related summary offence. I note that your alcohol consumption which resulted in you being over the prescribed concentration of alcohol, is not alleged to form part of your culpable driving. Your culpability arises from your excessive speeding prior to the collision.
13. Both Denver and Arron were flown to the Royal Melbourne Hospital. Arron remained in hospital for several days. His injuries included pelvic fractures, bruising and abrasions to his chest. After initial treatment and rehabilitation, he is not known to suffer any ongoing physical issues from the collision.
14. Denver was treated in the theatre for multiple injuries. By Friday 14 April 2023 he was extubated and initially considered for potential ward transfer. However, complications arose due to his injuries and as a result Denver passed away in the afternoon of 15 April 2023.
15. On Monday 10 April 2023 you had been formally interviewed and made a no comment record of interview – as is your right. You were then remanded overnight before being granted bail on 11 April 2023. You remained on bail until you sought to have your bail revoked on 8 July 2024 and you have remained in custody since that time. As a result, you have 44 days of pre-sentence detention.

Victim Impact

16. A number of victim impact statements were read out during the plea. Both Kerrie Suggate, Ryan’s mother, and Arron read out their own victim impact statements. Additionally, Mr Dickie read out victim impact statements from Cassie Suggate, Cassie’s now husband Grant Barry, and another of Ryan’s sisters – Melanie Edwards.
17. It is apparent from the victim impact statements that Ryan was a much-loved member of both his family and the wider community. Each of the statements spoke of the role Ryan played in the family after his father passed away from cancer. Despite being a young age at the time, Ryan put himself out to try and do everything that his father would have done in the household. As Arron described it, Ryan was not just a brother, but a best friend and a fatherly figure who provided a leading example in the absence of his father who had passed away in 2003.
18. Each of the statements also spoke eloquently of the hole which Ryan’s passing has left in the Suggate family’s life. Cassie and Grant were due to be married not long after Ryan’s death – and Ryan was to be Grant’s best man. The wedding had to be postponed and ultimately went ahead some months later. In her statement, Cassie reflected on the fact that the saddest thing about the family’s happiest times now is that their loved lost one is no longer there to witness and participate in those events. Cassie also spoke of the significant impact upon her of having been at the scene of the collision for a number of hours, watching her brother still trapped in the car whilst emergency workers were working on others, and the horror of the realisation when the coroner arrived that her brother was dead, and not just unconscious. Each of Cassie, Grant and Melanie also spoke of the significant mental toll which Ryan’s passing has had upon them. In closing his statement, Arron said that he forgives you, and prays that you may develop a spirit of the same that his family remembers Ryan for.
19. Whilst the members of your immediate family chose not to provide victim impact statements on the plea, instead preferring to provide character references on your behalf, the grief which your family has suffered through the loss of Denver is also apparent. Denver was described by members of your family as a young person with a joyful and loving spirit, who found contentment in the simple things, and was always very caring towards the welfare of others. As your mother described it, Denver’s loss in the household has had a huge impact. She said that the void which has been left is indescribable and devastating. Emma also reflected on the fact that not only has Denver’s loss been deeply felt but that she also misses Ryan terribly as they were very close as cousins. Your brother Jay, like Cassie Suggate, reflected on the fact that what he had witnessed at the collision scene would never leave him, and neither would he forget his role in officially identifying Ryan’s body for the police. Each of your family members identified that they feel no malice towards you for what you have done, but that they will forever miss Denver.
20. Whilst the primary impact of your offending is the loss by Ryan and Denver of their lives, each of the victim impact statements of the Suggate family, and the references from your family, identify the devastating ongoing effects that your offending has had on others. I do take this considerable impact into account in sentencing you.

Gravity of the Offending

21. As I commented during the plea, it is a difficult process to discuss the legal classification of the seriousness of your offending when two precious lives have been lost and cannot be regained. However, it is a necessary part of the sentencing process to assess the level of the seriousness of your offending in a legal sense. Nothing that was said during the plea or that I am about to say diminishes the loss which each of the Suggate family and your family have endured as a result of your offending.
22. Your culpability in this case arises from the fact that you were driving more than twice the designated speed limit as you entered the bend in Greta Road. Your actions in entering the bend at such a high speed can only be categorised as criminally negligent, irrespective of whether you were familiar with the road and/or thought you would be able to cope with the conditions in the car which you were driving. As identified by the prosecution you made a deliberate decision to speed over an extended period of time. You had been driving at high speeds intermittently over the nine and half minutes leading into the crash, and at exceptionally high speeds in the two minutes and 4.5 kilometres before you lost control of the car. You had three passengers in your care, two of whom died as a result of your actions, and the third suffering injuries which included broken bones.
23. I do accept that your motivation for driving at such a speed appears to have been to demonstrate the capacities of the car of which you were so proud, rather than you seeking the thrill of the chase, or pursuing some other unlawful conduct. I also accept that your driving lacked a number of other egregious features which are often seen in culpable driving cases. For example, there were not multiple breaches of road safety laws in terms of driving through red lights or on the wrong side of the road, and it is not alleged that either alcohol or drugs were a contributing factor to your driving, despite the level of alcohol in your system at the time of the collision. You also do not have an extensive criminal history of driving offences or infringements. You did receive a single traffic infringement notice when you were 18 years of age, for speeding by more than 30 kilometres but less than 35 kilometres per hour, which resulted in a short suspension of your licence, however there has been nothing since that time. Whilst that prior infringement is relevant, it only adds to your overall culpability for this offending to a minimal extent.
24. Ultimately however, despite the lack of additional aggravating features of your conduct, I still consider your driving to be a serious example of culpable driving. You had intentionally been driving at a high speed over an extended distance prior to the collision, and the speed with which you entered the bend was so high that there was no chance that you were ever going to be able to control that vehicle. In all of the circumstances, whilst your driving does not fall at the highest end of the range, I am of the view that it does fall above the middle of the range of seriousness for culpable driving.

Guilty Plea and Remorse

25. Of course, the seriousness of your offending is not the only matter which I must take into account in sentencing you. There are also a number of mitigating features which are also highly relevant to determining the length of imprisonment to be imposed upon you in this case.
26. The first of those mitigating features is your plea of guilty and the genuine remorse which you have clearly and repeatedly expressed since the collision.
27. This matter first came before the court on 11 April 2023 for a filing hearing, and then progressed through a number of committal mention hearings in the Magistrates’ Court. The day prior to the contested committal hearing you made an offer to plead guilty to a reduced number of charges, and on the basis that your culpability for the offending arose from the speeding. That offer was accepted by the prosecution and on 12 December 2023, you indicated your intention to plead guilty to the charges which have ultimately proceeded in this court. You were then committed by way of straight hand up brief to this court for the purposes of the guilty plea.
28. Your plea is a valuable plea of guilty in all of the circumstances. It was entered at an early opportunity. You did not cross-examine any witnesses and saved the victims of your offending – and in particular Arron Suggate – from having to give evidence. I accept that your plea has significant utilitarian value in avoiding the cost and delay of trial, and reflects a preparedness on your part to facilitate the course of justice and take responsibility for your offending.
29. I am also of the view that your plea of guilty is reflective of actual and genuine remorse. I am fortified in that conclusion by your actions following the collision, the content of the conversations which you have had with Professor Woods and your referees, and the content of the letter which you provided to the court. I am also told that you have provided a letter of apology to the Suggate family which they have graciously accepted. I am satisfied on all of the material before me that you have empathy for your victims and their surviving family members, that you face a daily struggle with the guilt and shame of what you have done to those around you, and that you have made efforts to do what you can to make restoration.
30. In all of the circumstances I have given you a substantial discount for your plea of guilty.

Personal Circumstances

Family, Schooling, Work and Community Involvement

31. Turning now to your personal circumstances, you are now 25 years of age. You are the fifth of six children born to your parents John and Jennifer – with Denver having been the youngest child. Your other siblings range in age from 26 to 36 years of age.
32. You were raised in the Brethren community with strict adherence to the values and teachings of the Church. You completed the final two years of primary school and all of your secondary education at OneSchool Global – which is a Brethren College. Your school principal, Melanie Roth, provided a character reference for you on the plea. In that reference she described you as having been a personable and friendly young man who upheld the school ethos and values. Further she noted that you were a keen and highly skilled sportsperson who was popular among your peers and teachers for your kind nature and cheerful disposition.
33. After completing Year 12, you started working for a company making stone benchtops. The work was demanding and required you to travel a lot. Then in late 2020, you approached your brother Jay and asked whether you could work for him in his building company. Aside from one six month period in 2021 when you worked for a cousin in Melbourne, you have worked with Jay since November 2020. Over the four years you have worked with Jay you have gained skills in driving specialised machinery and heavy vehicles, as well as in technical building and fabrication. In his reference, Jay described you as an excellent problem solver, a good people’s person, and an invaluable member of the company who is greatly respected by other members of the team. He also noted that you have a strong work ethic and have never been late or let him down.
34. As I have already noted, I received a number of references in support of you on the plea. Those references were written by your father John; your mother Jennifer; your sister Emma; your brother Jay; your brother Arne together with his wife and child; your sister Laura; your brother-in law Tom (Laura’s husband); your family friends Tom Rowe and Nicholas Stead; your friends Mitchell Hansen, Aaron Barker and Doug Grace; and the principal of the school you attended, Melanie Roth.
35. Each of the referees speak highly of you as a son, brother, friend and person, and you are described as someone who is particularly caring, kind, loving and steady in nature. Your brother-in-law Tom also described you as a hardworking, trustworthy young man with a good loving heart who voluntarily gives up a lot of your time to help those in the Wangaratta area with cutting firewood and helping on projects. These sentiments were echoed by Tom Rowe, Mitchell Hansen, Nicholas Stead and Aaron Barker who all commented on the hours you have devoted over the years to helping others, including by taking on volunteer roles and activities at school and in the community.
36. As a result of your offending and being charged with a criminal offence you have been subjected to disciplinary action by your Church – referred to as Withdrawal – which involves exclusion from church services and the Brethren Community in general. Members of the Community cannot consume food or liquids of any type with you and are not permitted to directly engage with you. This includes members of your family, and your co-workers. As expressed by your sister Laura – this has meant that your family, aside from your parents who you live with and your older brother who employs you, have not been able to have the contact with you that they would dearly love to have. It has also meant that even though you can communicate with your parents and your elder brother, you cannot share meals or attend any kind of social engagement with them. You have found your exclusion from church and the Community to be particularly difficult, especially in circumstances where your entire life has been lived within that Community.

Mental Health

37. A psychological report authored by Professor Stephen Woods, dated 2 July 2024, was tendered on the plea. You initially consulted with Professor Woods on
    22 December 2023 and have continued engaging with him on a roughly four weekly basis since that time. I note that prior to commencing treatment with Professor Woods, you had engaged with two other psychologists over five sessions between April and October 2023.
38. The report prepared by Professor Woods is detailed and extensive. I accept the opinions expressed by Professor Woods in his report, and I note that neither party sought to challenge any of his conclusions. Given that Professor Woods’ findings and opinions are not challenged, I do not intend to descend into a detailed analysis of the content of his report. Rather I am simply going to summarise the main findings and conclusions.
39. Professor Woods noted that you suffer from a number of symptoms which include recurrent distressing memories and flashbacks of the collision and its aftermath; recurrent nightmares that relate to the collision; a deep and pervasive sense of shame, remorse and guilt in respect of the collision, the loss of your brother and cousin, the injuries caused to your other cousin and the distress suffered by each of your family and your cousin’s family; a sense of emotional isolation and low self-worth with loss of identity in response to being Withdrawn from the Brethren community; recurrent major depressive episodes on a background of chronically low mood; and pervasive anxious worry in respect of the emotional wellbeing of your parents. Professor Woods noted that you attempt to hide or disguise your symptoms of traumatic grief and depression in order not to cause your parents additional upset.
40. Consistent with those symptoms, testing showed that you present with clinically severe depressive symptoms, clinically severe symptoms of anxious worry, and have a generally harsh and negative self-evaluation with a high level of self-doubt and shame. Further, your clinical profile is consistent with that of an individual who is highly traumatised.
41. Professor Woods is of the opinion that you suffer from a number of comorbid mental disorders being – Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder with Survivor Guilt and Shame Syndromes and recurrent Major Depressive Episodes (‘Complex PTSD’); Prolonged Grief Disorder with Melancholic Features, and Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood. Additionally, Professor Woods is of the opinion that your level of social and emotional maturity is at a lower level of development than your IQ, likely as a result of your age and the insulated community in which you were raised.
42. Professor Woods additionally identified you as being an emotionally vulnerable and socially isolated young man who will likely experience a far greater level of hardship as a correctional inmate than would otherwise be the case. Further he acknowledged that he has quite significant concerns about your long-term mental health prognosis.
43. It is clear that your mental health issues have developed in the aftermath of the collision, and in response to the collision and associated events including your Withdrawal from the Brethren Community. As such your mental health symptoms do not reduce your culpability for the offending, nor do they constitute a form of additional punishment.^[1] However, I accept that your mental health conditions will make your time in custody more burdensome than it would be for someone without those same conditions. Further, I do accept that there is a real risk of significant deterioration in your mental health whilst in the prison environment, having regard to the concerns raised by Professor Woods and the contributing factors to your mental health issues, including your anxiety related to the welfare of your parents. I do take these matters into account in mitigation of sentence.

Extra-curial Punishment and Effect on Family

44. Mr Morrissey submitted on your behalf that I should also take into account, in mitigation, the hardship which will be occasioned to your parents through your imprisonment, and the impact of the extra-curial punishment which you have already have suffered and will continue to suffer.
45. Mr Morrissey submitted that a high level of extra-judicial punishment exists in this case – with you already having been heavily punished and heavily specifically deterred. Mr Morrissey submitted that you have lost your brother and your cousin; lost a great measure of your community identity; and caused enduring pain to your family, extended family and Community. Further, prison will, in your case, be damaging and unusually hard to bear. Mr Morrissey submitted that the outcome of the collision, which resulted in the loss of your brother Denver, the loss of your cousin Ryan, and injuries to your cousin Arron, weighs heavily upon you and will continue to do so for the rest of your life. Further, there is evidence, derived from Professor Woods’ report, that your incarceration will cause further deterioration in the mental health of both of your parents, and that you are acutely aware of the distress suffered by them, which is in turn exacerbating your own symptoms.
46. Mr Morrissey submitted that it would be open for me to find that the hardship which will be visited upon your parents by your incarceration, in the particular circumstances of this case, does amount to exceptional circumstances such that hardship to your family could be considered to be a mitigating factor in sentence. Mr Morrissey further submitted, relying on Markovic v The Queen [2010] VSCA 105, that in the event that I was not persuaded as to exceptional circumstances, it would still be open to mitigate your sentence on the basis of the hardship to your parents placing an additional burden upon you whilst in custody.
47. Mr Dickie, on behalf of the prosecution acknowledged that you have suffered from extra-curial punishment in the sense of the impact of the offending upon you, including your grief over losing your younger brother and cousin and being excluded from your religious community. Further Mr Dickie conceded that the impact of your offending on others – including your family members who you strongly care for – who face the prospect of their son and brother being incarcerated in addition to another son or brother having lost his life, is also relevant. However, he noted that whilst your punishment might exacerbate the burden on your already grieving parents and compound their anxiety, this does not meet the high threshold for ‘family hardship’ as known to the law. Additionally, he submitted that any weight given to extra-curial punishment in mitigation should not overwhelm the sentencing process.
48. As identified by the Court in Markovic at [37]:

[w]hether or not, in any particular case, family hardship gives rise to ‘exceptional circumstances’ must be a question of fact and degree. In answering that question, it is necessary to have regard to the admonition, often stated in the authorities, that such cases will be ‘rare’. A sentencing judge should also have regard to the many examples in the decided cases of undoubted hardship which have, nonetheless, been held by appellate courts to fall short of exceptional circumstances.

49. Having considered the material before the court and the submissions of each counsel, I am satisfied that your parents will suffer additional hardship and psychological distress by reason of your incarceration so shortly after losing Denver. However, I am not of the view that that hardship is at such a level that it amounts to exceptional circumstances, even when considered in the context of the restrictions which arise as a result of your offending and the Community within which you and your parents live.
50. I do however accept that you have considerable anxiety about your parents mental health deteriorating whilst you are incarcerated and that this will impose an additional hardship upon you whilst in custody. Additionally, I do accept that you have suffered, and will continue to suffer, significant extra-curial punishment by reason of your grief over losing your younger brother and cousin and being excluded from the religious community in which you have spent the entirety of your life to date. I have taken each of these matters into account in mitigation of sentence.

Youth, Prospects of Rehabilitation and Specific Deterrence

51. Additionally, I accept that you are a youthful offender, whose previous character was excellent and who has excellent prospects for rehabilitation.
52. As submitted by both counsel, youth of an offender, particularly a first offender, is often a primary consideration in sentencing, so that rehabilitation in the case of a youthful offender will often be more important than general deterrence. However, because of the need to emphasise general deterrence in these types of cases of culpable driving by young men, there is correspondingly less scope for leniency on account of an offender’s youth than there may be in the case of some other crimes. That does not mean that youth becomes irrelevant. Rather, it simply carries less weight than it might otherwise carry.
53. Having said that, in the particular circumstances of your case, youthfulness and your prospects of rehabilitation are highly relevant sentencing considerations. As I have already stated I am of the view that your prospects of rehabilitation are excellent. You do not suffer from a mental illness or personality disorder, you have no history of illicit drug use, and whilst you were over the legal limit for alcohol whilst driving on this occasion, you do not have any ongoing problematic drinking behaviours. Additionally, aside from that one traffic infringement notice for speeding, you have no criminal history whatsoever; you have a history of uninterrupted and stable employment; strong family support; and a sense of shame and guilt in respect of your offending behaviour and the impact of your behaviour on others which will strongly protect against re-offending in the future. Further, you have embraced responsibility for your offending, and on release from custody will have employment, family support and a strong commitment to leading a good life.
54. Taking into consideration all of these matters, I am of the view that the weight which needs to be given to the sentencing purposes of specific deterrence - that is deterring you personally - and community protection in your case is minimal.

Standard Sentence Provisions and Sentencing Submissions

Standard Sentence Provisions

55. As noted at the outset, I am required, in sentencing you, to take into account the standard sentence of eight years’ imprisonment for the charge of culpable driving. Further, in fixing a non-parole period for a standard sentence offence, s11A of the Sentencing Act requires me to fix a non-parole period of at least 60 per cent of the relevant term if the term of imprisonment is less than 20 years, unless I consider it to be in the interests of justice not to do so.
56. Pursuant to s5A(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act, ‘the period specified as the standard sentence for the offence is the sentence for an offence that, taking into account only the objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of that offence, is in the middle of the range of seriousness’.
57. Section 5A(3) states that objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of an offence are to be determined without reference to matters personal to a particular offender or class of offenders; and wholly by reference to the nature of the offending. The nomination by the legislature of a standard sentence does not make that sentence a starting point from which to add or subtract time. As was explained by the Court of Appeal in Brown v R [2019] VSCA 286, this requirement is to be treated as a ‘legislative guidepost’. It has the same function as the maximum penalty; it does not affect the established ‘instinctive synthesis’ approach to sentencing; it does not require or permit ‘two-stage sentencing’; and it does not otherwise affect the matters which the court may, or must, take into account in sentencing.^[2]
58. The requirement to take into account current sentencing practice as one of the factors in the instinctive synthesis, still remains even when sentencing under the standard sentence regime. However when considering current sentencing practice for a standard sentence offence, the Court must only have regard to sentences previously imposed for the offence as a standard sentence offence. It follows that non-standard sentence cases are only relevant insofar as they relate to sentencing principles, they cannot be relied upon in respect of the actual sentences imposed.

Sentencing Submissions

59. Mr Morrissey, on your behalf, conceded that the only appropriate disposition in this case would be a term of imprisonment with a head sentence and a non-parole period. However, he submitted that the seriousness of your offending falls between the middle to lower end of the range of seriousness for this kind of offending.
    Mr Morrissey urged me, in light of the mitigating circumstances of this case, to impose a sentence involving a mitigated level of incarceration and a generous period of eligibility for parole, noting that the standard sentence is a guidepost and not a starting point for the sentence to be imposed.
60. Mr Dickie, on behalf of the prosecution, similarly submitted that the only appropriate sentence in this case is a term of imprisonment with a head sentence and a non-parole period. However, he submitted that, viewed objectively, your offences are serious examples of the offence of culpable driving which fall between the middle and higher end of the range for this kind of offending. In his submissions Mr Dickie referred me to a number of somewhat comparable cases (as well as to the analysis of current sentencing practice contained within those cases) where the offender had committed the offence of culpable driving by speeding. Those cases included DPP v Currie [2021] VSCA 272, and Hennessy v The King [2024] VSCA 2.
61. I note that I have read and had regard to those cases, and the cases referred to therein. Clearly each case turns on its own facts and circumstances and there are differences in both the circumstances of the offending and the offender in each of those cases as compared to your case. They are however important as examples of the application of sentencing principles in similar cases, and provide a guide as to the range of possible sentences available for offending of this kind. Ultimately though, I have sentenced you on the basis of the sentencing principles as they apply to you and the facts of your case.

Totality

62. It was additionally acknowledged by both counsel that I must have regard to the principle of totality when imposing sentence in this case. In circumstances of culpable driving where there have been multiple deaths, the principle of totality requires that a sensible portion of one offence must be cumulated upon the other. I have taken this principle into account in sentencing you.

Other Sentencing Principles – General Deterrence and Denunciation

63. Finally, I note that whilst I have found that the weight to be given to specific deterrence and community protection in the sentencing synthesis is minimal, general deterrence – that is deterring others in the community from doing this - and denunciation are still important sentencing purposes which carry substantial weight. Any sentence which I impose must not only demonstrate that the community does not condone this kind of driving, it must also send a clear signal to other people, and in particular the young people in our community, that if they do drive at excessive speeds and in the process kill another person or persons, they will face significant gaol time.

Relationship of Sentence to Standard Sentence

64. As I identified earlier in these reasons for sentence, I have come to the view that objectively the gravity of your offending does fall above the middle of the range for this kind of offending. However, there are significant mitigating features which you can call in aid in sentencing including, but not limited to, your early plea of guilty, the genuine remorse which you have demonstrated for your offending, the
    extra-curial punishment which you have suffered as a result of your offending, your youth, your prior good character, the additional burden of imprisonment upon you by reason of your mental health issues and your concerns about your parent’s ongoing welfare, your excellent prospects of rehabilitation, and the minimal weight to be given to specific deterrence and community protection in sentencing you.
65. Having regard to all of the circumstances, I note pursuant to s5B(5) of the Sentencing Act, that the sentence I am about to impose on Charges 1 and 2, is lower than the standard sentence for those charges. I have considered the standard sentence as one of the factors in my instinctive synthesis of the relevant facts and principles, however having regard to all of the relevant factors including the seriousness of the offending and the extensive mitigatory material in this case, I am of the view that a sentence lower than the standard sentence on each charge is appropriate.
66. However, whilst I am of the view that a sentence lower than the standard sentence is appropriate, and I do intend to give you the opportunity for an extended period of time on parole, I am not satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to fix a
    non-parole period which is less than 60 per cent of the total term of imprisonment. I am of the view that there is sufficient scope for the sentencing purposes of rehabilitation to be met, and for adequate weight to be given to the mitigating factors, without imposing a non-parole period of less than 60 per cent of the head sentence.

Sentence

67. Mr Teiffel, if you can now please stand.
68. On Charge 1, culpable driving causing death, you are convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 years and 9 months.
69. On Charge 2, culpable driving causing death, you are convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 years and 9 months.
70. On related summary Charge 7, exceeding the prescribed concentration of alcohol in your blood within three hours of driving, you are convicted and sentenced to a fine of $750.
71. I direct that 2 years of the sentence imposed on Charge 2 be served cumulatively upon the sentence imposed on Charge 1.
72. The total effective sentence of imprisonment is therefore a term of imprisonment of 8 years and 9 months.
73. I further direct that you serve a minimum period of 5 years and 4 months imprisonment before becoming eligible for parole. You can take a seat.

Pre-Sentence Detention

74. Pursuant to s18 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), I declare that a period of 44 days is to be reckoned as a period of imprisonment already served under this sentence, and I direct that the fact of this declaration and its details be noted in the records of the court.

Section 6AAA Declaration

75. Pursuant to section 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), I indicate that had you pleaded not guilty to the charges for which you received a term of imprisonment today and been convicted of them, you would have been sentenced to a total effective sentence of 12 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 8 years and 9 months. So, you have been given a substantial discount for that plea of guilty.

Licence Disqualification/Suspension

76. On Charges 1 and 2 your licence is cancelled and you are disqualified from driving for a period of 36 months from today.
77. In relation to related summary Charge 7, your licence is cancelled and you are disqualified for a period of six months from today.
78. Each of those terms of disqualification will run concurrently, so the total period of the disqualification will be 36 months.

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^[1] See, eg, Singh v The Queen [2021] VSCA 161, at [48]-[55].

^[2] At [4].