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Supreme Court of Victoria |
Last Updated: 10 November 2021
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
IN THE MATTER of the Bail Act 1977
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Applicant
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JUDGE:
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WHERE HELD:
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DATE OF HEARING:
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CASE MAY BE CITED AS:
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MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
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CRIMINAL LAW – Application for bail – Charges of committing an
indictable offence on bail, contravening a conduct condition
of bail, assaulting
an emergency worker on duty and resisting an emergency worker on duty –
Applicant intellectually disabled
and reliant on support – Previously
found to be unfit to plead – Exceptional circumstances conceded –
Whether unacceptable
risk of reoffending if bailed – Bail granted –
Bail Act 1977 ss 1B, 4A, 4AA, 4D, 4E, 5AAAA, 30A, 30B, 31.
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APPEARANCES:
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Counsel
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Solicitors
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For the Applicant
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Mr J Lowy
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Criminal Lawyers Geelong
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For the Respondent
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Mr S McGinness
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Legal Services Department, Victoria Police
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Introduction
1 Harley
Brown (‘the applicant’) is a 27 year old man with an intellectual
disability. He has been in an intimate relationship
with his aunt, LC, who also
has an intellectual disability. The relationship is, in many ways fraught, and
police allege it has
been associated with violent behaviour by the applicant
towards LC. Some of that behaviour, if proven, is serious. An interim Family
Violence Intervention Order (‘FVIO’) is in place that prevents the
applicant going to LC’s home. In what follows
I will set out the
allegations but note that they have not been proven. As will emerge there is
also a real issue about the applicant’s
fitness to plead to the
allegations.
The alleged offending –
the second Horvath matter
2 In circumstances
to which I will later refer, on 11 September 2021, the applicant was charged and
bailed on a number of offences
relating to LC (‘the first Horvath
matter’). Those charges were recklessly causing injury (two counts),
assault with
a weapon, unlawful assault, criminal damage (two counts),
contravening a FVIO intending to cause harm or fear, and contravening a
final
FVIO.
3 After his release on bail, police were
informed that the applicant had attended LC’s home. At 12.40 pm on
12 September 2021,
police attended the address and the applicant answered the
door. He was told that he was not supposed to be at LC’s residence
and
that he was under arrest. The applicant responded that he was allowed to be
there. When police asked him to stand to be handcuffed,
he attempted to flee
inside of the house and hit a police officer with the screen door in the
process.
4 He was charged with the following offences
by Detective Senior Constable Jacob Horvath (‘the second Horvath
matter’):
(a) committing an indictable offence whilst on bail;[1]
(b) contravening a conduct condition of bail (two counts);[2]
(c) assaulting an emergency worker on duty (police officer);[3] and
(d) resisting an emergency worker on duty (police officer).[4]
5 The applicant has been on remand since
12 September 2021 when he was arrested and charged in this matter. He was
refused bail in
the Geelong Magistrates’ Court on 15 September 2021.
It appears that bail was refused in the context of the applicant not
having
sufficient funding through the National Disability Insurance Scheme
(‘NDIS’) for 24 hour support in the community.
The
applicant’s NDIS plan has since been reviewed and 24 hour support seven
days per week is now available, at least on a
short term basis.
6 The second Horvath matter is next listed for
mention in the Geelong Magistrates’ Court on 24 November
2021.
Other outstanding matters and procedural
history
7 The applicant is facing a number of
unresolved charges mainly concerning alleged offending against LC. These
matters are also listed
for mention on 24 November in the Geelong
Magistrates’ Court. The details are as
follows:
Informant Drever matter
(summons)
8 On 28 April 2020, LC became agitated
after the applicant refused to accompany her on a walk and she eventually
requested that he
leave her home. The applicant hit and kicked LC until his
carer intervened. He then punched a hole in LC’s bedroom door.
Police
attended and served him with a Family Violence Safety Notice.
9 The applicant was charged on summons on an unknown
date[5] with criminal damage, unlawful
assault, and assault by kicking.
Informant Dickson
matter (summons)
10 On 31 July 2020, the
applicant was with his carer, Gbeadeh Toubay Sangar. At the applicant’s
request, Mr Sangar drove the
applicant to LC‘s house, where the
applicant argued with her. The applicant then left and kicked and cracked the
windscreen inside of Mr Sangar’s car
on the way home.
11 The applicant apologised. Mr Sangar reported the
incident to police, who interviewed the applicant at the scene. He admitted
to
causing the damage and said he wanted to pay to fix it.
12 The applicant was charged on summons with wilful
damage to property on 1 September
2020.
Informant Smith matter
(summons)
13 On 10 June 2021, the applicant was
at LC’s home when they got into an argument. The applicant kicked
LC’s leg multiple
times. Police attended and took the applicant to Corio
Police Station where a Family Violence Safety Notice was issued.
14 The applicant admitted to kicking LC during his
interview. He was charged on summons on 29 July 2021 with assault by kicking
and
unlawful assault.
15 On 22 June 2021, a final
FVIO was made against the applicant at the Geelong Magistrates' Court to protect
LC. The order included
safe contact conditions, including not to commit family
violence against LC or destroy her property. It was served on the applicant
on
1 July 2021.
The first Horvath
matter
16 At 4.00 am on 11 September 2021, the
applicant was at LC’s home when they argued over cigarettes. This
escalated to the
applicant punching LC’s arm, kicking her leg, and
threatening her with a 15 centimetre knife. LC received a small laceration
on
her hand from trying to protect herself. The applicant then swung the knife
towards her chest but LC avoided being struck. The
applicant also broke
crockery, cups, and a bedroom window during the
incident.
17 Police attended and arrested the
applicant. He was charged on 11 September with recklessly causing injury (two
counts), assault
with a weapon, unlawful assault, criminal damage (two counts),
contravening a FVIO intending to cause harm or fear, and contravening
a final
FVIO.
18 He was then granted bail on the same date
by a bail justice on conditions including as to residence, not to go or remain
within
200 metres of LC’s home, not to contact witnesses for the
prosecution other than the informant, and to comply with any active
FVIO. His
bail in the first Horvath matter was extended on 20 September to the next
listing date on 24 November 2021.
The
applicable legislation
19 When interpreting
and applying the Bail Act 1977 (‘the Act’), the Court is
required to take into account the guiding principles set out in s 1B(1) of the
Act.[6]
20 Because
the applicant seeks bail for offences against the Act which are Schedule 2
offences in their own right,[7] bail
must be refused unless the applicant satisfies the Court that exceptional
circumstances exist that justify the grant of
bail.[8]
21 Under s 4AA(2)(c)(i) of the Act, the exceptional
circumstances test applies, as those Schedule 2 offences were allegedly
committed while the applicant
was on bail for Schedule 2 offences. The
respondent submitted that the contravention of the FVIO charges in the first
Horvath matter
(on which the applicant was bailed shortly before the alleged
offending in the second Horvath matter) fall within item 18 of Schedule
2.
Contravening a FVIO[9] is a Schedule 2
offence under item 18 if, in the course of committing that offence, the accused
is alleged to have used or threatened
to use violence and:
(a) the accused has within the preceding 10 years been convicted or found guilty of an offence in the course of committing which the accused used or threatened to use violence against any person; or
(b) the bail decision maker is satisfied that the accused on a separate occasion used or threatened to use violence against the person who is the subject of the order or notice, whether or not the accused has been convicted or found guilty of, or charged with, an offence in connection with that use or threatened use of violence.
22 Charge 3 of contravening a FVIO
intending to cause harm or fear in the first Horvath matter is particularised in
the charge sheet
as arising from physical violence. Further, the applicant was
found guilty of unlawful assault and making a threat to kill in 2016,
and
unlawful assault in 2017 (item 18(a)). Given that the applicant must meet the
exceptional circumstances test on this basis,
it is not necessary for me to be
satisfied that the applicant has used or threatened to use violence against LC.
23 If the Court is satisfied that there are
exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of bail, the Court must apply the
‘unacceptable
risk
test’.[10] Bail must be
refused if the respondent satisfies the Court that there is a risk of a kind set
out in s 4E(1)(a) of the Act, and that such risk is an unacceptable
risk.[11]
24 In considering both steps above, the Court must
take into account the ‘surrounding circumstances’ contained in
s 3AAA of the Act,[12] and in
relation to risk, consider whether there are any conditions of bail that may be
imposed to mitigate the risk so that it is
not
unacceptable.[13]
Intervention
orders and family violence risk
25 As already
noted, there have been a number of interim FVIOs in place in relation to the
applicant and LC. On 15 September 2021,
the FVIO made against the applicant to
protect LC on 22 June 2021 was varied by the Geelong Magistrates’ Court to
an interim
FVIO with full non-contact conditions. The FVIO matter is next
listed on 24 November 2021.
26 Section 5AAAA(1) of
the Act requires the Court to make certain inquiries of the prosecutor including
whether there is in force a FVIO against the
applicant.
27 I note that s 5AAAA(2) of the Act
requires the Court, considering the release of a person charged with a family
violence offence, to consider whether, if
the accused were released on bail,
there would be a risk that they would commit family violence; and whether that
risk could be mitigated
by the imposition of a bail condition or the making of a
FVIO. Section 3 of the Bail Act defines ‘family violence offence’
as: (a) an offence against section 37(2), 37A(2), 123(2), 123A(2) or 125A(1) of
the Family Violence Protection Act 2008; or (b) an offence where the
conduct of the accused is family violence. Although the context of the
offending in the second Horvath
matter is that the applicant attended LC’s
house when he was not permitted (and he is charged in other matters with family
violence against her), the actual offences for which he seeks bail are
bail-related and resisting arrest. It is not necessary to
decide whether
s 5AAAA(2) of the Act applies because the risk of family violence directed
towards LC is a central matter on the application
and requires very close
attention.
The applicant’s personal
circumstances
28 The applicant is 27 years
old and has an intellectual disability and a global cognitive impairment with a
full scale IQ of 48.
His mother also had an intellectual disability and he was
removed from her care as a toddler due to neglect and abuse. He remained
in
state care until the age of 18, he experienced frequent changes to his
residential arrangements, and attended specialist schools
due to learning
difficulties. The level of intellectual deficit is quite profound.
29 The applicant also has diagnoses of attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder, epilepsy, Tourette’s disorder, and
depression.
He is in receipt of a disability support pension and a NDIS
package. He requires a high level of assistance with almost all aspects
of his
daily living.
NDIS support and funding
30 The applicant is currently receiving
funding under the NDIS.
31 It appears that at an
earlier time, the applicant had funding for 24 hour support seven days per week,
however, this ceased at
some point as the applicant was not staying at his home
overnight.
32 Mark James, who is a social worker and
director of All in One Support Services, is the applicant’s NDIS
co-ordinator. In
a letter tendered on the bail application in the
Magistrates’ Court, Mr James said that at the time of the second Horvath
matter
the applicant only had sufficient NDIS funding for supports between 9.00
am and 5.00 pm seven days per week. Mr James indicated
that a plan review
would need to occur to determine whether additional support could be funded.
33 Mr James gave evidence before me. He explained
that he had been working with the applicant for about five years and was aware
of his needs. He said that the applicant has funding that is currently being
used to pay for care from 9.00 am to 5.00 pm seven
days per week. He
said a carer assists the applicant with daily living needs. He said that a
request has been made to vary the
plan to fund 24 hour care but at the time of
giving evidence the plan had not been approved. He said that in the meantime
the existing
funding could be used for that purpose and if spent in that way
would last about two months.
34 When asked in cross
examination how a carer would respond in the event the applicant tried to make
contact with LC, he explained
that a carer could not physically restrain the
applicant from doing so, but could try and divert his attention or persuade him
not
to do so. He said that in the event that the applicant persisted or was
otherwise in breach of his bail conditions they would call
the
police.
35 As the funding status of the applicant
was uncertain, and given the importance of having support for the applicant in
the event
he was released on bail, the application was adjourned to provide
details of funding and the level of care that would be available
to the
applicant immediately on release. The proposed level of care would involve a
team of about 10 support workers and it was
important that the proposed measures
be clearly identified before the applicant was released on bail.
36 The matter has again adjourned on 4 November
when the medium term status of funding remained unresolved and his existing
carers
were not in a positon to resume immediate care. The application was
adjourned to 10 November 2021.
Criminal history
37 The applicant has some criminal
history between 2016 and 2017, although he has no prior convictions. It
primarily comprises bail
and property damage related offences, as well as
unlawful assault and making a threat to
kill.
Fitness to stand trial
38 Significantly, the Office of Public
Prosecutions discontinued prosecutions against the applicant in the County Court
in 2020 in
relation to six matters. These appear to have involved similar
offending to the current matters faced by the applicant, being family
violence
allegations in contravention of a FVIO and bail related offences.
39 This followed reports by Dr Matt Treeby
(clinical neuropsychologist and psychologist) on 5 June 2019, and Dr Joseph
Sakdalan (clinical
psychologist) on 14 April 2020, who both formed the view that
the applicant was unfit to stand trial. Dr Treeby also considered
the applicant
had a defence of mental impairment.
40 Dr Treeby
opined:
My impression is that [the applicant] has limited understanding that some of his conduct was wrong. For instance, he seemingly has no understanding as to what bail is, what bail conditions mean, what his bail conditions were, and why they must be adhered to. Due to his global cognitive impairment... he certainly could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether the conduct, as perceived by reasonable people, was wrong. I am of the opinion that [the applicant] does have a defence of mental impairment.
For his own safety and that of others, my impression is that [the applicant] requires 24/7 supervision and substantial one-to-one support. His support needs will be lifelong. Ensuring that [the applicant] is adequately supervised by carers and that he has appropriate accommodation would seem to be the most important and relevant issues to address to help minimise his behaviours of concern going forward.
Given the extent of his cognitive impairment and severely impaired learning and memory function, my impression is that [the applicant] will require a substantial degree of assistance and monitoring to ensure that he adheres to any intervention orders, bail conditions, or community-based dispositions should he receive these going forward. [The applicant] regrettably does not have the cognitive capacity to read, comprehend, or commit to memory any form of complex legal information.
On the basis of his marked global cognitive impairment and his responses to questions addressing Presser criteria, my impression is that [the applicant] is not fit to plea. He appears to have no understanding of the nature of the charges he is facing and he seemingly has no understanding as to what it means to enter a plea. He could not tell me the purpose of a trial or understand the substantial effect of evidence. My impression is that his global cognitive impairment will compromise his ability to follow the course of the trial and will also compromise his ability to give instructions to his legal practitioner. I also have substantial concerns regarding [the applicant’s] fitness to be tried on the basis of his global mental/cognitive impairment.
In relation to [the applicant’s] fitness to stand trial, as defined by Section 6(1) of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997, I am of the opinion that [the applicant] meets all the criteria for the consideration of unfitness to stand trial under the CMIA. [The applicant’s] Full Scale IQ falls in the moderate intellectual disability range. In my experience, individuals with Full Scale IQs in the 40s and early 50s are largely incompatible with being fit to stand trial. The severity of [the applicant’s] cognitive impairment renders him unable to participate meaningfully in the court process. [The applicant’s] condition of having a severe cognitive impairment due to his intellectual disability can be considered permanent. I am of the opinion that [the applicant] would not likely to become fit to stand trial in the next 12 months and in the foreseeable future.[14]
The applicant’s contentions
42 The applicant conceded that family
violence is inherently serious, however, it was not conceded that this was a
serious example
of this type of offending. Whilst the applicant did not submit
the prosecution case is weak, he submitted his fitness to be tried
is a live
issue. A fitness assessment in relation to the current offending was to be
undertaken, however, the assessment appointment
has been cancelled twice due to
prison lockdowns. Due to the applicant’s IQ and based on the previous
assessments, it was
submitted to be almost certain he will be found unfit.
43 The applicant relied on his limited
criminal history and absence of criminal convictions in support.
44 The applicant’s intellectual
disability and cognitive impairment are submitted to render him vulnerable in
custody. Further,
this is the applicant’s longest period on remand and he
is reportedly frightened.
45 The applicant further
submitted that, as a matter of public policy, he should not remain in custody
awaiting disposition given
the severity of his cognitive impairment and with
NDIS supports available that could not be provided to a similar level in prison.
46 The applicant also referred to the delays in the
County Court (should this matter proceed in the committal stream due to the
fitness
issues raised), and submitted if the charges are proven the time spent
on remand would exceed any term of imprisonment imposed.
47 The applicant proposed to reside at his
home in Bell Post Hill (or as directed by his NDIS provider).
48 As to risk, the applicant relied on the support
he will receive through the NDIS, accompanied by bail conditions requiring him
to live at his Bell Post Hill address or as otherwise directed by his NDIS
provider. The affidavit in support also proposed a condition
that the applicant
follow all lawful directions of his NDIS provider or support workers but this
was not proposed in the submissions.
The
respondent’s contentions
49 The
respondent conceded that it may be open to the court to find that exceptional
circumstances exist that justify the grant of
bail.
50 However, the respondent opposed the
application on the basis that there was an unacceptable risk that the applicant
would endanger
the safety or welfare of any person and commit an offence while
on bail.
51 The respondent submitted that the case
is strong, however, it was conceded by the respondent, that if future
assessments mirror
those provided with the affidavit in support, then fitness to
plead may be a live issue. It was noted that there is no recent evidence
as to
the applicant’s fitness in the context of the current
offending.
52 The respondent indicated remittance of
the Horvath charges to the committal stream due to the fitness issues raised
cannot be considered
by the Office of Public Prosecutions until the outcome of
the plan review is known.
53 The respondent
submitted the current offending, when viewed in aggregate, involved a serious
example of family violence. The informant’s
report noted the applicant is
recorded in the LEAP database as the perpetrator in multiple family violence
incidents and he has criminal
history involving physical violence and property
damage.
54 The respondent asserted that the previous
prosecutions were discontinued due to fitness, not due to factual issues with
the prosecution
case.
55 The respondent noted that
the applicant will have spent 48 days in custody up to and including the date of
the hearing. It was
submitted that a term of imprisonment for the FVIO
contraventions and assault charges would be within range, however, a
rehabilitative
disposition would be likely due to the applicant’s
circumstances.
56 LC told police on 20
October 2021 that she wishes for the applicant to return to live with her and
she believes he will do so even
if he is provided with other
accommodation.
57 The
respondent submitted that the applicant’s history including as alleged in
the discontinued prosecutions demonstrates
a ‘pattern of behaviour’.
The risk of future family violence is ‘extremely high’, considering
the current
allegations, previous history, and 15 records in the LEAP database
between June 2018 and September 2021, where LC has been the victim
and the
applicant was responsible. The respondent also submitted that the applicant has
an inability to control his anger and has
contacted LC whilst remanded,
expressing an intention to see her if released.
58 The respondent submitted that the current
supports in place, which are limited to 9.00 am to 5.00 pm, do not
ameliorate the risk
of the applicant reoffending and the applicant’s
disability is a risk factor for non-compliance with the FVIO or bail
conditions.
59 The respondent relied on the
applicant being charged 19 times with bail-related offences, and that the
current offending occurred
the day following his grant of bail in the first
Horvath matter.
Conclusion
Exceptional circumstances
60 I am satisfied that there are
exceptional circumstances. Having regard to the medical evidence and the nature
of the charges there
is a very real issue concerning the applicant’s
fitness to plead. He suffers from a profound intellectual impairment that
affects his daily life and plainly affects his reasoning process to a
significant extent. He has a very low IQ and is dependent
on a high level of
care for his daily functioning.
61 It appears that
the respondent has accepted that the applicant has been unfit to plead in
respect of earlier offending and the
condition of the applicant is obviously
unremitting, and there is no reason to consider it has improved over
time.
62 In addition to his fitness to plead, the
incarceration in prison on remand of a person with the level of intellectual
impairment
suffered by the applicant raises important issues. I accept that
there is some material that shows that he is coping on remand after
a difficult
start and that he is now more settled, nevertheless I am not persuaded that he
has a proper understanding of his situation
and this makes the incarceration
more burdensome and inappropriate.
63 It is plain,
and understandable, that the ongoing risks of offending towards LC are at the
centre of the current application.
The respondent makes the valid point that
having regard to past events, LC is at risk of being subjected to further
violence by the
applicant in the event he is released on bail. However, as the
Court of Appeal said in HA (a pseudonym) v The
Queen,[15] in the absence of any
specific statutory provision, preventative detention is alien to fundamental
principles that underpin our system
of
justice.[16] It undermines the
system of justice to use remand as a form of preventative detention to protect
against the risk of criminal behaviour
caused by mental impairment.
64 Given the applicant’s very poor level of
comprehension, the imposition of conditions directed to him are unlikely to be
of
much utility in protecting against further offending unless the applicant has
assistance with compliance.
65 As foreshadowed
above, when this matter was first before me on 29 October 2021, 24 hour
care was still in the process of being
approved by the NDIS. I adjourned the
matter to 4 November 2021, on the basis that approval would be obtained by this
date. On
3 November 2021, I was advised in a letter sent by the
applicant’s social worker that 24 hour care was still in the process
of
being approved and that, in any event, it would not be possible to commence 24
hour care until 8 November. On 4 November 2021,
the applicant requested an
adjournment until after 8 November so that his care arrangements could be
approved. I adjourned the matter
to 10 November.
66 On 10 November 2021, I was advised that the
applicant has 24 hour care available under his current funding, at least for a
limited
period of time, and that this will be available for approximately seven
weeks. I was also advised that a formal response from the
NDIS regarding the
applicant’s funding going forward is expected imminently.
67 The fact that the applicant has in place NDIS
funding for 24 hour care, which was not in place when bail was refused in the
Magistrates’
Court, will mean that the risk will be significantly
ameliorated. In reaching that conclusion I am conscious of the potential
limitations
on what the NDIS workers can do. Their role is not to physically
restrain the applicant but I am persuaded that the continuous oversight
of an
NDIS worker will assist in keeping the applicant away from LC and that they will
be able to call the police for assistance.
I appreciate that this may place
strain on those involved, however, I am not persuaded that the burden would be
onerous or justify
keeping the applicant on remand.
68 I am satisfied that there are presently in place
suitable arrangements for the care of the applicant at least in the short term.
I will not require 24 hour care as a condition of bail. Whether or not the
applicant has sufficient NDIS funding to allow that
level of care beyond the
current funding envelope is outside of his control. Obviously a central purpose
of his care arrangements
is to keep both the applicant and others, most
importantly LC, safe. Having a carer with him will no doubt reduce the risk
that
the applicant will seek to contact LC, and under the current care
arrangements it is contemplated that he will have that level of
support.
However, a shortfall in funding should not mean that the only option is for the
applicant to be remanded in custody in
a prison. That is particularly so where
the question of the applicant’s fitness to plead, which will inevitably
arise, will
be dealt with in the County Court which is subject to significant
delay.
69 The applicant will be bailed to appear
before the Magistrates’ Court on 24 November 2021. Given the uncertainty
as to the
future progress of the charges including the attitude of the
prosecution to the question of the applicant’s fitness to plead,
which may
significantly affect the delay in finalising the charges, and the uncertainty as
to the applicant’s ongoing level
of support once his current funding comes
to an end, it would be appropriate for the Magistrates’ Court to be
informed about
the ongoing level of care at the next hearing.
70 I was advised by Mr James, who gave evidence
before me again on 10 November 2021, that in the event that funding is not
available
for adequate care the informant will be notified. I do not think it
is necessary for this Court to impose judicial monitoring.
The
applicant’s bail will be returnable to the Magistrates’ Court and in
the event an issue as to fitness to plead arises
the matter will be transferred
to the County Court. I consider that the applicant’s bail will be subject
to adequate supervision
in those courts
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[3] Crimes Act 1958 s 31(1)(b).
[4] Crimes Act 1958 s 31(1)(b).
[5] I note that the charge sheets are undated, however, he was summonsed to appear at Geelong Magistrates’ Court on 13 October 2020 so he was presumably charged prior to that date.
[7] Bail Act 1977 schedule 2, item 30.
[8] Bail Act 1977 ss 4AA(2)(c)(i), 4A(1A) and 4A(2). Additionally, the indictable offences for which he seeks bail (assaulting an emergency worker on duty and resisting an emergency worker on duty) also fall within Schedule 2 as they were committed while the applicant was on bail or summons for other indictable offences: e.g. recklessly causing injury in the first Horvath matter and criminal damage in the Drever matter (sch2, items 1(a) and (b)).
[9] An offence against section 123 or 123A of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008.
[10] Bail Act 1977 s 4D(1)(a).
[11] Bail Act 1977 s 4E(1)-(2).
[12] Bail Act 1977 ss 4A(3) and 4E(3)(a).
[13] Bail Act 1977 s 4E(3)(b).
[14] Report of Dr Sakdalan (exhibit NH-2) [37].
[16] Ibid [64] (Maxwell P and Kaye JA).
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