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This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society of its members from injury and molestation.[5]
He
maintained that as soon as any part of a person’s conduct prejudicially
affects the interests of others, society has jurisdiction
over it. He asserted
that the question of whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by
interfering with it thereby
becomes worthy of utilitarian analysis.
Integral to Mill’s approach to civil liberties was the recognition
of the existence of difficult conflicts amongst rights and
the need for
balancing individuals’ rights and obligations against the needs of society
generally. It was a discourse that
he sought to establish and a pragmatic
balancing that he wished to orchestrate. He maintained that interference with
individual rights
was justified but only to the extent made necessary by the
impact effected by upholding certain rights on the rights of others or
on the
‘general welfare’ of the broader community. He argued vehemently
against the overweening exercise of power by
government, insisting that
individuals are superior decision makers to government, that the exercise of
power by individuals promotes
‘mental education’ and that government
power is dangerously prone to be abused:
Every function superadded to those already exercised by the government causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and converts, more and more, the active and ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the government, or of some party which aims at becoming the government.[6]
Notions
of what constitute civil liberties are largely a product of cultural and
environmental context. Mill pointed out that they
are framed by the form of
government that exists at any particular juncture. Today we would generally
acknowledge that rights and
responsibilities are differently identified and
interpreted at different times. The era that generated the establishment of the
American
Civil Liberties Union (the ACLU) in 1918, the English National Council
for Civil Liberties (the NCCL) in 1934 and the Australian
Council for Civil
Liberties (the ACCL) in 1935, and a series of affiliated State and Territory
Councils for Civil Liberties around
Australia, was considerably different from
our own. However, many similarities and resonances can be found at the close of
the millennium
with the post-Depression years that spawned organised civil
libertarianism in Australia and England, and even with the post-Great
War years
that gave birth to organised civil libertarianism in the United States. A
surprising number of the issues that preoccupy
civil libertarians today are the
same, or substantially similar, to those that generated concern in the 1930s. In
such comparabilities
a way to the future for civil libertarianism and a
continuing identity may be able to be pinpointed.
The first ACCL
publication in 1935 proclaimed that the Council offered ‘a means of
expression to those people in all parties
who believe that social progress may
be achieved only in an atmosphere of
liberty’.[7] From the start, the
stance of the Council was non-party political, and socially progressive, not
surprisingly emphasising the importance
of rights and liberties, especially
those of ‘underdogs’, people unlikely to be able to assert their
entitlements because
of factors such as socio-economic disempowerment or
unpopularity. The Organising Committee listed a fascinating litany of grievances
that it said were deserving of civil libertarians’ attention. They
included the abuse of municipal by-laws in curtailing freedom
of speech and
assembly, the abuse of immigration and deportation laws, book censorship and
repressive amendments to criminal law.
In an era before the existence of legal
aid, the Council campaigned in favour of people being provided with a financial
means of
enforcing their rights; it sent observers to demonstrations, especially
when they included the Communist Party; it argued against
the application of the
‘dictation test’ to exclude the immigration of people suspected of
being subversive; it lobbied
against criminal law provisions that allowed the
prosecution of members of the Communist Party and Friends of the Soviet Union;
it
opposed steps taken by government to stop the visit to Australia of a Nazi
apologist in 1938; and shortly before the outbreak of
war in Europe it lambasted
requirements for wharf labourers to be licensed or face a 12-month cancellation
of their right to work.
The echoes with our own time are remarkable. They
highlight the extent to which issues concerning rights and liberties of minority
and socially disdained groups recur in common ways.
The pattern of the
Council was set from its early days: it was a thorn in the side of government,
not so much by dint of its integrated
and fully fledged alternative policies, or
its involvement as an intervener in litigation, but on an ad hoc basis as a
critic, nuisance
and conscience. Its stances were not always popular,
particularly in the strident nationalism of the lead-up to the Second World
War
or during the Cold War, but it spoke consistently and stridently in favour of
people who were disadvantaged by the popular politics
of the day. In his
biography of the ACCL’s long-running secretary, Brian Fitzpatrick, Don
Watson comments:
From the beginning the Council was to be an instrument of resistance guided by circumstance more than ideology. The social theories of its various supporters, which ranged from the liberal left to the radical right, and sometimes the eccentric, were subjugated by consensus on immediate imperatives.[8]
In
the 1930s it was a mutual attitude of resistance to the forces of reaction,
nationalism and parochialism that bound together members
of the ACCL. The
Council provided a forum for a range of people disaffected by the actions of
government, with members of a social
credit movement opposed to armaments, as
well as dissident women’s groups giving it early support. It sought a
broad base of
interest, its members addressing groups as diverse as the Young
Nationalists, the YMCA, the Students Christian Movement and the Business
and
Professional Women’s Club.
The eastern suburbs respectability of
many of the ACCL’s Melbourne committee members and its mainstream focus
soon attracted
critical attention from more radical groups such as the
Trotskyists and left wing branches of the Australian Labor Party. It took
some
years until the initial mistrust of the ACTU was assuaged by the personal
lobbying of influential members of the ACCL, such
as Brian Fitzpatrick. The
attack on civil libertarians on the basis of their lack of ground-roots
involvement in the union movement
and other such institutions has emerged again
in latter days in the era of well-heeled lawyers providing the main public face
of
civil libertarianism. There has been occasional co-operation between Councils
and the ACTU but there has not been a close working
relationship. In this
though, Australian civil libertarians are not alone. The same tensions have
characterised the ACLU in the United
States. Its prime mover in early days,
Roger Baldwin, was a scion of an entrenched Massachusetts family that traced its
ancestors
back to The Mayflower.[9] He
was a social eccentric who cut his civil libertarian teeth on opposition to
conscription during the involvement of the United
States in the First World War.
While many of the ACLU’s early members were former or continuing
anarchists and pacifists, a
key component of the ACLU core came from the upper
middle classes. In more latter times, support for the ACLU has been broad-based,
stimulated by the respect of Americans for the amendments within their
Constitution that articulate and protect the rights of citizens. However, the
involvement of lawyers remains disproportionate to that of other
parts of the
community.
Councils for Civil Liberties around Australia have enjoyed varying levels of
interest and support. The core of civil libertarianism
in the early years was in
Melbourne and has remained in that city, in Sydney and in Brisbane with periods
of activism from branches
in other jurisdictions. Similarly, the profile of
leading members has fluctuated at different times.
While there have been
phases during which academics, historians and philosophers principally, have
been to the fore, the past 20 years
have seen the sustained involvement of
lawyers, many of them with a high profile and a series of them Queen’s
Counsel, later
to become members of the judiciary. As indicated previously, the
role of lawyers in the ACLU in the United States has also been prominent,
fanned
especially by the activist role of the Union as an intervener in the courts, not
subject to cost penalties as are more likely
to be imposed in Australian courts
against interveners which prolong the duration of proceedings.
The last
two decades have also seen the evolution of Australian Councils identified by
many as very much part of the establishment,
an irritant for government to be
sure, but hardly bodies likely to launch a fundamental critique of the state or
the powerful forces
within it. As noted above, though, this is not a significant
break from the past. In Victoria the Council even received legislative
recognition, being permitted under the Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) to
nominate representatives for the Psychosurgery Review Board, the practice of
lobotomies and leucotomies having particularly
aroused the concern of the
Council and the general community during the 1970s and 1980s.
In general,
Councils for Civil Liberties in Australia have aggressively proclaimed
themselves to be non-party political, although
they are generally regarded as
part of the ‘progressive’ side of politics. Some of their members
have gone on to successful
and not so successful political careers. Councils
have provided a welcome source of critique for opposition parties, and an
unwelcome
source of independent assessment of respect for liberties on the part
of incumbent governments. Such a non-aligned stance has generally
been regarded
by Councils as important to their long-term survival and has been jealously
guarded. Any consistent alignment between
civil libertarians and a political
party, other than on particular issues or genres of issues, would erode one of
the greatest assets
of Councils, their independence, and reduce them to bit
players in the party political system.
From their earliest days, civil
liberties organisations this century have attracted curious bedfellows and
unusual colleagues in adversity.
Partly, this results from civil
libertarians’ recognition of the importance of the rights of the
individual and their mistrust
of centralised, inadequately accountable
institutions of government. The ACLU defended the rights of Nazi organizers
attempting to
march in the Jewish suburb of Skokie, Illinois, and supported
Colonel Oliver North in appealing from his conviction on perjury charges
stemming from the Iran-Contra hearings. In Australia, similar support was given
in early years to the right of members of the Communist
Party of Australia and
of the Nazi Party to espouse their views publicly. Civil libertarian views
continue to find supporters on
the conservative side of politics, Liberal and
National Party members frequently calling for government to reduce its level of
intrusion
into the affairs of members of the community and to become smaller and
less able to violate individual rights. This is in fact a
key part of small
‘l’ liberals’ contemporary philosophy.
What then constitutes, or is at the core of, modern civil libertarianism?
Boaz has usefully captured the essence of latter-day
‘libertarianism’
as residing in the belief that each person has the
right to live their life as they choose so long as they do not unacceptably
interfere
with the equal rights of others:
In the libertarian view, all human relationships should be voluntary; the only actions that should be forbidden by law are those that involve the initiation of force against those who have not themselves used force.[10]
John
Stuart Mill’s philosophy remains the touchstone for civil libertarian
analysis.
By their campaigns and public statements the Australian
Councils for Civil Liberties have achieved a high public profile. Through
what
they have said and done, they have defined a public perception of contemporary
libertarianism. By and large the positions of
civil liberties bodies have been
taken on an ad hoc basis as issues arise which have civil liberties
ramifications. Councils have
formulated little by way of manifestos, even in
respect of notorious issues, relying instead on the application of Mill’s
critique
to emerging factual situations. On occasions, though, they have made
data available on the basis of which members of the community
could gauge
governments’ performance in relation to matters involving rights and
liberties. For instance, in the 1995 Victorian
State election, the Victorian
Council became actively involved in the electoral campaign, airing its concerns
about the conservative
government’s reduction in the integrity of the
Victorian Constitution and providing a score-card in relation to
parliamentarians’ respect for rights and liberties.
An
organisation can be defined too by what it does not say and those issues on
which it does not adopt stances. With the diminishing
role of the ACCL, the
national civil libertarian body, and the more pronounced role of its State
affiliates Australian civil liberties
organisations have latterly been
relatively rarely heard in relation to federal issues. A notable example is
immigration issues,
by contrast with the early preoccupation of Fitzpatrick with
the welfare of refugees and his determination to oppose through the
ACCL
anti-semitism, provincialism and xenophobia. In addition, civil liberties bodies
have mounted disappointingly few campaigns
in relation to industrial issues,
although a range of legislative and other measures have eroded the union base,
union powers and
the right to withdraw
labour.[11] This contrasts with the
early activities of the ACLU in the United States.
Similarly, Australian
Councils have been largely silent on health issues, other than those involving
psychiatric disabilities, even
though changes to health structures have resulted
in impoverished health care in the public system, the encroachment by the United
States and English model of managed care, and the continuation of few rights to
treatment or to good quality treatment. There are
few more important putative
rights than those to sufficient and equal health care for those not sufficiently
financially privileged
to be able to take out private health
insurance.
Civil liberties organisations consistently confront difficult
conflicts of principle. An example would be the right not to belong
to labour
organisations and yet arguably the right to a fair wage for a fair day’s
work, a notional entitlement which can be
defeated by workplace arrangements
which deprive individual workers of an ability to negotiate workplace contracts
that protect their
rights to fair remuneration for provision of labour. While
understandably the focus of civil libertarians is on protecting the rights
of
the disempowered, there are other legitimate perspectives as well. The
acknowledgment of the legitimacy of such perspectives is
one of the features
that distinguishes libertarians from socialists, utopians and left wing
reformists. The general libertarian approach
to such matters is against
regulation unless it is necessary to protect the entitlements of people who
would be adversely affected
by the rights of others — often the powerful
and the moneyed.
Rights and liberties debates are rarely
straightforward. For instance, what of police wearing weapons? A civil liberties
approach
that focuses on ordinary members of the public might stress the
oppressive aspect of the consistent show of force by members of police
forces.
However, a focus on the needs of police, respecting their rights to a safe
working environment, might stress the need for
police to be safe from attack and
in face of unpredictable danger. It is a matter of perspectives and
balances. It can also be an
opportunity for a re-evaluation of the role of
organisations such as police and a chance to attempt a reformulation of
relationships,
such as those between police and citizens, which might reduce the
need for most police to require the levels of self-protection that
they commonly
assert to be necessary.
Frequently civil liberties bodies have been heard
lamenting the provision of additional police powers, without concomitant
obligations
of accountability being imposed on police forces, the encroachment
on rights of public access to information about government, the
State’s
assemblage of information about the private affairs of citizens; and the absence
of legal process and representation
for vulnerable members of the community. The
Councils’ most effective campaign of recent years was that mounted in the
early
1990s against the Australia Card, a document which was going to enable
linked access by government departments to a range of sources
of identifying
information. More than any other recent public stance by Councils, this tapped
into community mistrust of government
activity. The normally meagre coffers of
Councils were swelled with substantial public donations. Memberships came from
groups not
prominent amongst civil libertarians in recent years, including
doctors, teachers and unionists.
What can be discerned from such public
campaigns and expressions of criticism (sought and brought into the public
domain by journalists)
is that modern civil libertarianism has remained reactive
and relatively atheoretical, albeit still guided in general terms by
Mill’s
articulation of principles. Its membership still boasts a
comparatively small amalgam of people whose unifying characteristic tends
to be
their concern about the behaviour of government and the institutions of state.
The best known civil libertarians tend to be
lawyers and academics but the
membership of civil liberties’ organisations is much more diverse. Such a
polarisation creates
a risk identified usefully by Hayek:
The intellectual leaders in the movement for liberty have all too often confined their attention to those uses of liberty closest to their hearts, and have made little effort to comprehend the significance of those restrictions of liberty which did not directly affect them ... Liberty in practice depends on very prosaic matters, and those anxious to preserve it must prove their devotion by their attention to the mundane concerns of public life and by the efforts they are prepared to give to the understanding of issues that the idealist is often inclined to treat as common, if not sordid.[12]
A
continuing and, by and large, unresolved issue for civil liberties bodies is how
they can serve their constituencies democratically
and responsively without
succumbing to the temptation of paternalism and without sacrificing principle to
populism.
At the heart of civil libertarianism in practice remains a
preoccupation with the rights of people who may not be in a position to
be
effective advocates on their own behalf and a mistrust of the aggregation of
substantial amounts of power in the organs of state,
particularly when adequate
checks and balances are not set in place to guard against abuse. In Australia,
the focus for such positions
that exists in the United States with its Bill of
Rights is not available.
For the most part the work of Councils has been
a relatively marginalised exercise driven by the energies of a handful of
individuals,
some of them charismatic and attractive ‘talent’ for
the media. The function of Councils for members of the general community
has
most regularly been seen in quotations in the newspapers and ‘short grab
comments’ on the television and the radio.
The latter years of the
Bjelke-Petersen regime in Queensland, the continuing corruption scandals in the
New South Wales Police Force,
the repeated efforts of the Kennett government to
by-pass planning and other laws and the Victorian Constitution, and the
establishment Australia-wide of private prisons have set in place as a reflex
response for many journalists the making of
contact with the local Council for
Civil Liberties to obtain an ‘alternative’ or
‘provocative’ point of view.
In some cases, this resulted in
Councils functioning as self-appointed oppositionalists, critical of government
measures but not
always possessed of sophisticated alternative positions on the
difficult issues on which they were asked to comment.
This status of civil libertarians’ perceived oppositionalism generated
a term of contemptuous opprobrium in the 1980s from police:
‘armchair
civil libertarians’, perhaps inspired by the predecessor, ‘armchair
academics’ and later in the
descriptor, ‘chardonnay
socialists’. The tactic was intended to dismiss civil libertarians and
their supporters as theorists,
out-of-touch with the ‘real world’,
always negative and with little by way of constructive suggestions to offer.
They
were lumped into the same reviled sociological categories as
criminologists, academics, utopians and other social do-gooders, characterised
as out-of-step with the new management efficiencies and the drive toward
privatisation and outsourcing of the 1990s.
The tone and the vehemence
of the abuse laid at the feet of civil libertarians and their organisations is
open to various interpretations.
One is that it is testament to their success in
prompting anxiety in police managers, prison authorities, large corporations and
representatives of government departments by reason of the adverse publicity
that the Councils have generated. Another, and less
palatable for civil
libertarians, is that such criticisms on occasions have contained at least a
kernel of truth and deserved to
be articulated.
There can be little doubt that the core concerns for civil libertarians
remain remarkably similar for the turn of the millennium to
what they were half
a century before the Alternative Law Journal came into existence. There
remains a need for civil liberties bodies to forge for themselves a
comprehensive ideology. It cannot
be one that embraces individualism as its
defining principle, nor one that identifies an undiscerning alliance with
anti-conservative
political parties. It needs to be one that has at its centre a
respect for people’s rights, poorly articulated as they are
in
Australia.
Undoubtedly, it will embrace a role as a watchdog over
government, over privatised utilities and over super-corporations such as
Microsoft
which have more power than many governments. The activities of those
entrusted with especial powers of coercion, such as police,
immigration
officials, protective workers, and prison officers, will continue to merit close
scrutiny.
It will encompass the need to protect workers from the erosion
of their rights to negotiate in strength with employers. It will recognise
the
need for citizens’ privacy to be safeguarded in ways never even
contemplated as necessary in the era before the capacity
for integrated
collection of personal information by both government and corporations. It
should encompass a monitoring of government’s
erosion of citizens’
entitlement to an equitable provision of health services in the shadow of the
onset of managed care.
It will include active lobbying on behalf of
minority groups such as those with mental illnesses and intellectual and
physical disabilities
in face of a system less and less attuned to those with
little by way of political muscle. It will involve support for rights to
resources for new immigrants, for fair systems of appraisal of claims of refugee
status, and for proper recognition to the past role
and present plight of
Australia’s indigenous people. It will incorporate opposition to racist
disempowerment of members of
the community and appreciation of the right to work
in safety and for proper remuneration.
In such tasks and with such
perspectives, Councils for Civil Liberties have many fellow travellers. A
concern with the above missions
is not unique to civil liberties bodies.
However, it may be that civil libertarians will approach their role in respect
of such matters
differently from the way in which other organisations do. The
conundrum for Councils is that the issues with which they grapple are
almost
never straightforward. They involve the complex balancing of different rights
and responsibilities, focusing on whether the
arrogation of rights to some
constitutes unacceptable derogation from the rights of others. The dilemma that
faced Councils during
the debate about whether Australia should pass racial and
religious vilification legislation is a good example. The growth of
anti-semitism
in many places at different times has been characterised by
unregulated expression of incitements to violence, discrimination and
hatred.
The failure to check the expression of such sentiments has led to the infliction
of physical and emotional harm. And yet
Councils are especially sensitive to the
need to eschew censorship and restriction on free speech. Civil libertarians can
take, and
legitimately have taken, different approaches to whether racial and
religious vilification legislation should be passed by
Parliament.
Ultimately, civil libertarianism is a philosophy that values
and recognises rights and responsibilities. Often it will not have a
clear
answer to complex conflicts between different rights and duties. Libertarians
may have different emphases in the difficult
balancing exercises amongst
entitlements and responsibilities. However, what civil libertarianism can
attempt is to ensure that government
and other powerful sectors of the community
which make decisions that affect rights and liberties are taken in an informed,
rational
environment, sensitised by community involvement to the impact that
enactments and decision-making will have on the lives of individual
people. On
some occasions, such as where the balance between a proposed measure and the
abuse of rights is clear, civil libertarians
will speak with one voice. On other
occasions, libertarianism must be sufficiently tolerant and broad-minded to
acknowledge that
more than one approach, consistent with a sensitivity to rights
and duties, is legitimate. What then distinguishes civil libertarianism
from
many other philosophies and movements is its inclusiveness, its humanity and its
recognition that legislation, regulation and
decision-making by the empowered in
respect of the disempowered, when it is heedless of the consequences for the
individual, is prone
to be abusive and unacceptable. Where the line is to be
drawn will often not be susceptible of precise delineation for the civil
libertarian, while it might be, for pragmatic reasons for the
politician.
The greatest obstacle in the way of clarity and consistency amongst civil
libertarian responses to given scenarios of conflicting
rights in Australia is
the difficulty of articulating values and rights in the absence of a Bill of
Rights. If there is to be one
task that has the potential to give to civil
libertarians a self-defining and influential role in the Australia of the early
third
millennium, it will be to persuade the general community of the utility
and viability of a Bill of Rights and then of the fundamental
principles,
inspired by the analyses of John Stuart Mill, that should underpin such an
instrument. With the move toward a symbolic
and real emergence of Australia as
its own nation, a century on from its federation, comes the chance, 25 years on
from the urgnings
of Gareth
Evans,[13] to revisit debates about
rights and liberties that 100 years ago proved too difficult for the
self-interested agendas of Australia’s
founding States. The opportunity is
present for civil libertarians to nail their distinctive perspective to the
masthead of a sophisticated
and socially acceptable document that articulates
the rights and responsibilities of citizens, corporations and government in the
multicultural and diverse environment of the Australia of the third millennium.
References
[1] Evans, G., ‘Civil
Liberties’, (1974) 1 (4) Legal Service Bulletin
99.
[2] In Victoria the Council for
Civil Liberties has latterly reinvented itself as ‘Liberty
Victoria’.
[3] Pagone, T. and
Wallace, J. (eds), Rights and Freedoms in Australia, Federation Press,
1989.
[4] Mill, J.S., ‘On
Liberty’ in M. Warnock (ed) Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on
Bentham, Fontana Library, London, 1962, ch iv,
p.205.
[5] Mill, J.S.,
above.
[6] Mill, J.S., above, ch v,
p.244.
[7] Untitled booklet, c1935,
quoted by D. Watson, Brian Fitzpatrick: A Radical Life, Hale &
Iremonger, Sydney, 1979, p.78.
[8]
Untitled booklet, c1935, quoted by D. Watson,
p.79.
[9] See Garey, D., Defending
Everybody: A History of the American Civil Liberties Union, TV Books, New York,
1998.
[10] Boaz, D.,
Libertarianism: A Primer, The Free Press, New York, 1997,
p.2.
[11] However, see the
coverage of issues discussed within D. Kinley (ed), Human Rights in
Australian Law, Federation Press,
1998.
[12] Hayek, F.A., The
Constitution of Liberty, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960,
p.7.
[13] Evans, above.
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