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Port Marlborough New Zealand Limited v EcoWorld Aquarium Limited [2022] NZHC 3016 (17 November 2022)
Last Updated: 15 December 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND BLENHEIM REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WAIHARAKEKE ROHE
|
CIV-2021-406-000023 [2022] NZHC 3016
|
BETWEEN
|
ECOWORLD AQUARIUM LIMITED
Plaintiff
|
AND
|
PORT MARLBOROUGH NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Defendant
|
|
CIV-2021-406-000029
|
BETWEEN
|
PORT MARLBOROUGH NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Plaintiff
|
AND
|
ECOWORLD AQUARIUM LIMITED
First Defendant
|
AND
|
JOHN PETER REUHMAN
Second Defendant
|
Hearing:
|
19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 28 September 2022
|
Appearances:
|
T D Gee and D P MacKenzie for EcoWorld Aquarium Limited and for J P
Reuhman
D J Friar and K J Dobbs for Port Marlborough New Zealand Limited
Second Defendant appears in Person
|
Judgment:
|
17 November 2022
|
JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J
ECOWORLD AQUARIUM LIMITED v PORT MARLBOROUGH NEW
ZEALAND LIMITED [2022] NZHC
3016 [17 November 2022]
Table of contents
Introduction [1]
The parties [4]
Port Marlborough New
Zealand Ltd [4]
EcoWorld Aquarium Ltd
[7]
The factual background
[10]
The Lease [14]
Dealings between the
parties [20]
The Port’s
considerations as to the end of the Lease [30]
EcoWorld’s attempts
to recommence negotiations for a new lease [41]
Continuing possession
[51]
The parties’
positions in general terms [54]
My conclusion in this case
[56]
The proceedings
[58]
The 23 proceeding
[59]
EcoWorld’s claims
[59]
The Port’s position
[62]
The 29 proceeding
[63]
The Port’s claims
[63]
EcoWorld’s position
[66]
Issues for determination
[68]
Analysis [69]
A contractual 10-year
right of renewal? [70]
Analysis [74]
Subsequent communications
[88]
Relief under the Property
Law Act [96]
Analysis [101]
Section 261 requirements
— in particular, did the parties “covenant in writing”?
[107]
Discretion for relief
under s 264 — should relief be granted under s 264? [116]
Conclusion on relief under
the PLA [119]
Specific performance
[122]
Equitable estoppel
[125]
Principles of equitable
estoppel [127]
Belief or expectation created or
encouraged in EcoWorld by the Port through a clear and
unequivocal representation [129]
Reasonable reliance on the
representation by EcoWorld to its detriment [138]
Unconscionability [151]
Conclusion on equitable estoppel
[157]
Conclusion on
EcoWorld’s claims [158]
The Port’s claims
[159]
Action for the recovery of
the Land [160]
Breaches of the Lease
[162]
Mr Reuhman’s
personal liability [165]
EcoWorld’s
affirmative defences [167]
Conclusion on the
Port’s claims [169]
Relief [170]
Possession [171]
Damages [178]
Costs [188]
Any other relief
[192]
Summary [193]
Result [194]
Orders [196]
Introduction
- [1] These
proceedings concern land on the Picton foreshore (the Land) owned by Port
Marlborough New Zealand Ltd (the Port). The Port
leased the land to EcoWorld
Aquarium Ltd (EcoWorld) under a lease which expired on 22 July 2021 (the Lease).
When the Lease expired
on 22 July 2021, EcoWorld refused to vacate the Land.
EcoWorld did not close the aquarium it owns and continues still to operate
on
the Land or to take any steps to rehome the animals in the aquarium.
- [2] EcoWorld
claims the Port promised EcoWorld a 10-year right of renewal on the existing
terms of the Lease. EcoWorld now seeks relief
under the Property Law Act 2007
(the PLA) and by way of specific performance for a new 10-year lease on the same
terms as the Lease.
Failing this, EcoWorld seeks under equitable estoppel to be
put in the position it would have been in had the Port acted conscionably,
namely, to allow sufficient time to wind down its business in an orderly
manner.
- [3] In response,
the Port claims that the parties never agreed EcoWorld would have a 10-year
right of renewal and EcoWorld is now
unlawfully in possession of the Land. It
seeks an order for immediate possession of the Land as well as damages for the
cost of removing
the improvements from the Land.
The parties
Port
Marlborough New Zealand Ltd
- [4] The Port is
a port company incorporated under the Port Companies Act 1988. It is responsible
for the operation of the Port of
Picton and the marinas at Picton, Waikawa and
Havelock. It also has a portfolio of commercial leases, which include land,
buildings
and berths.
- [5] The Port is
a wholly owned subsidiary of MDC Holdings Ltd, a council-controlled trading
organisation 100 per cent owned by the
Marlborough District Council (the MDC).
However, notwithstanding its ultimate ownership, the Port operates independently
from the
MDC and is not governed by the MDC but has its own independent board of
directors (the Board).
- [6] The
Port’s principal statutory objective is to be a successful
business.1
EcoWorld Aquarium Ltd
- [7] EcoWorld has
leased the Land from the Port. It owns and operates an aquarium on the Land,
which houses a number of marine animals
and some land-based animals.
- [8] Mr John
Reuhman is the sole director and sole shareholder of EcoWorld. He has personally
guaranteed EcoWorld’s obligations
under the Lease. From the evidence it
seems Mr Reuhman has been a director of 35 companies and has held shares in 28
companies.
- [9] A
café and cinema are also operated from the premises, although it appears
a separate entity, Picton Cinemas Ltd, owns
and operates the cinema. Mr Reuhman
is the sole director and majority shareholder of Picton Cinemas Ltd.
The factual background
- [10] It
is important in this case to set out in some detail the factual background to
these proceedings. That background is extensive,
but I will endeavour to broadly
summarise it.
- [11] Mr Reuhman
became involved with the aquarium on the land in 2003, when the aquarium was
owned by Sligo Enterprises Ltd (Sligo).
The shares in Sligo were owned by David
and Darrollyn Taylor, who had built the aquarium “from the ground
up”. In August
2001, Mr Taylor entered into a deed of lease for bare land
with the Port over the Land, which he assigned to Sligo in September
2003.
- [12] In 2003,
the Taylors looked to exit their aquarium business. NZIJ, a company in which Mr
Reuhman had an interest, bought shares,
as did several associates of Mr
Reuhman. Mr Reuhman became a director of Sligo in December 2003 and then
managing director on 1
February 2004. Then follows a narrative of what the Port
argues is questionable conduct on the part of Mr Reuhman, including a High
Court
1 Port Companies Act 1988, s 5.
judgment against Mr Reuhman and a personal settlement with the Taylors, which
the Port says Mr Reuhman arranged for Sligo to pay.
- [13] It seems
then that Mr Taylor successfully applied to appoint a liquidator for the
business. However, the independent liquidator
was then replaced by a
receiver, Mr Robert Walker, appointed by Mr Reuhman relying on NZIJ’s
secured loan. Two months after
Mr Walker’s appointment, he sold the
business to EcoWorld (then a newly incorporated company) in consideration for
EcoWorld
taking over NZIJ’s loan to Sligo. NZIJ was then liquidated and
all of its shares in EcoWorld sold to Mr Reuhman personally
for a
“notional sum”. In cross-examination, Mr Reuhman could not recall
whether this notional sum was more or less than
one dollar. The effect of all of
this, it appears, is that Mr Reuhman personally acquired the aquarium for what
was likely to be
a nominal amount, although Mr Reuhman for his part says he
remained a creditor for some $180,000. These matters, however, are of
limited
significance to the key issues in this proceeding.
The Lease
- [14] In the
meantime, the lease between Sligo and the Port remained on foot. The Port had
also granted EcoWorld a one-year lease nearby
on the Land to establish a little
blue penguin colony. On 26 November 2010, the Port set out in a letter to
EcoWorld a proposal for
the new lease (the Lease) combining the land that was
subject to the original lease as well as the land subject to the lease for
the
penguin colony.
- [15] The Lease
is dated 17 January 2011 but it commenced on 10 November 2010. It is between the
Port as lessor, EcoWorld as lessee,
and Mr Reuhman in his personal capacity as
guarantor. The Lease is for bare land and not improvements made to the Land (the
Improvements).
- [16] Key
conditions in the Lease included as “specific conditions”:
(a) the term commenced on 1 November 2010;
(b) the “Final Expiry Date” was 22 July 2021;
(c) the “Number of Renewed Terms Available” was
“Nil”;
(d) rental was $11,885 per annum (plus GST);
(e) rent was to be reviewed at two-yearly intervals from the commencement of the
term; and
(f) the permitted use was the operation of an aquarium and associated ecological
facilities.
- [17] “General
Conditions” in the Lease included:
(a) Clause 1.11 – EcoWorld would reimburse the Port for the reasonable
cost of any legal or other expenses incurred because
of any default on the part
of EcoWorld;
(b) Clause 2.1 – EcoWorld would not use the Land or any Improvements on
the Land for any use or activity other than that specified
in the Specific
Conditions without the written consent of the Port;
(c) Clause 5.1 – EcoWorld would comply with the provisions of all
“statutes, regulations, ordinances, bylaws and other
laws of any kind
(present or future)” affecting the Land or any activity carried on upon
the Land, in particular (under cl
5.2) all obligations which arose under the
Resource Management Act 1991;
(d) Clause 7.1 – EcoWorld would care for the Land and all Improvements on
the Land to a reasonable standard, and in particular
keep and maintain all
Improvements to a good standard of maintenance and repair and rectify any damage
or deterioration without delay;
(e) Clause 8 – EcoWorld would indemnify the Port against all claims or
damage or loss resulting from any act or omission in
breach of the Lease;
(f) Clause 9 – EcoWorld would institute and maintain public liability,
statutory liability and reinstatement insurance;
(g) Clause 10 – the Port was able to undertake such work or take such
action as was reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances
in consequence of
EcoWorld defaulting in any of its obligations under the Lease, and all moneys
expended in this was to be reimbursed
with interest;
(h) Clause 15 (the future development clause) – while
“acknowledg[ing] the need for [EcoWorld] to have security of tenure
and
also the need for [the Port] to have some degree of flexibility in what is a
dynamic port environment”, if the Port required
the Land to further
develop the port area the Port could terminate the Lease by giving at least
three months’ notice in writing;
(i) Clause 19 – “[n]o variation shall be efficacious unless it is in
writing and signed by all of the parties”;
(j) Clause 21 – in respect of Improvements made by EcoWorld:
(i) at least three months before the end of the term of the Lease, the Port and
EcoWorld would consult with each other to address
what should happen in relation
to EcoWorld’s Improvements at the end of that term;
(ii) any agreement reached in this respect would be recorded in writing; and
(iii) if no agreement was reached, EcoWorld must remove its Improvements off the
Land at the end of that lease term, and leave the
Land “clear, clean and
tidy”;
(k) Clause 23 – that Mr Reuhman as guarantor guaranteed payment of the
rent and the performance by EcoWorld of the covenants
in the Lease.
- [18] Mr Reuhman
confirmed in cross-examination he understood all of the terms
throughout.
- [19] Before me,
counsel for the Port emphasised what is not provided for in the Lease. In
particular, he said the Port makes clear there are no contractual provisions
providing for any right
of renewal.
Dealings between the parties
- [20] EcoWorld’s
claim that it was entitled to a 10-year right of renewal under the Lease is
based on dealings between the parties
said to commence from 2015.
- [21] On 21
August 2015, Mr Reuhman met with two representatives of the Port, Mr Toby May
and Mr Rhys Welbourn.2 It seems that at this meeting Mr Reuhman
emphasised the importance to EcoWorld of security of tenure beyond the
Lease’s expiry
in July 2021 and accordingly he requested a 20-year lease.
Mr Welbourn says at that meeting he indicated the Port was open to extending
the
Lease but only on commercial terms.
- [22] Mr Reuhman
then forwarded by email a letter to the Port, recording Mr
Reuhman’s confirmation that he was “keen
to have EcoWorld’s
lease renewed for as long a period as possible with rights of
renewal.”3
- [23] The Port
responded substantively on 16 September 2015 (the 16 September 2015 letter).
This is the letter on which EcoWorld largely
founds its case. It is in this
letter that EcoWorld claims the Port agreed to provide it with a right of
renewal for a term of 10
years. In this letter, the Port said that, following
internal consideration and discussion, it was:
... prepared to offer you [EcoWorld] a further right of renewal for a term of
ten years following your current term. This would make
the final lease expiry on
22 July 2031.
- Mr
Welbourn is now Chief Executive of the Port but was its Manager of Business
Delivery at this time.
3 The email was sent on 31 August
2015 but the letter was dated 22 August 2015.
- [24] Mr Reuhman
responded on 23 September 2015, saying he needed to discuss matters with his
lawyer before proceeding. On 7 December
2015, Mr Reuhman did respond by letter.
He confirmed his reply was prepared with the benefit of legal advice. Mr Reuhman
advised
that EcoWorld had reviewed the Port’s “offer” and had
its eye on “identifying changes which might usefully
be negotiated”.
Mr Reuhman then listed eight aspects of the Lease which he said required
attention. These were:
(a) In relation to the Lease term, Mr Reuhman stated:
... the lease term currently expires 22 July 2021. The letter from Port
Marlborough of 16 September 2015 offers a right to then renew
the Lease term for
a further 10 years ... adopting that offer, there are effectively, currently, 15
years 9 months available under
the Lease ...
He then went on to state, “I seek to renegotiate the lease term”,
apparently to seek up to a 20-year renewed term.
(b) In relation to rent, Mr Reuhman said, though the rent had remained the same
since the Lease commenced in 2010, it was a “significant
burden” and
“disproportionate” and he would like to see the rent reduced.
However, he indicated he was prepared
to concede “in order to achieve
satisfactory outcomes on other points”.
(c) The permitted use he said was to be amended to capture the cinema and
café operations.
(d) Greater flexibility in relation to rent payment dates was requested.
(e) In relation to the future development clause, Mr Reuhman described this as
“a significant obstacle”. He suggested
it be removed entirely or
“softened in one or more ways”, including by an extension of the
three- month notice period,
requiring the Port to make available a suitable
alternative site for EcoWorld, or requiring EcoWorld to purchase the
Improvements.
(f) In relation to removal of Improvements, Mr Reuhman requested that the Port
be required to acquire the Improvements at the end
of the term, or otherwise
allow EcoWorld to “simply walk away” from them.
(g) The personal guarantee he requested should be softened.
(h) Finally, he asked that the Lease be converted from a Deed to a Memorandum
form to allow it to be registered (for use as a security
interest).
- [25] In
cross-examination, Mr Reuhman confirmed that he was not accepting the
Port’s offer, this apparently being on the basis
that “we were
hoping to get 20 years”. Mr Reuhman also described the situation as
“a work in progress” and
that the parties were “now in the
process of negotiations”.
- [26] The Port
responded on 3 February 2016. It recorded its concern that EcoWorld had
“requested substantial concessions”
to the Lease. The Port then
engaged with each of the eight points that EcoWorld was wanting to negotiate,
stating it was prepared
to accept some of these, but not others. In
summary:
(a) the Port reiterated that it had “offered a right of renewal of a
further 10 year term when the current term expires on
22 July 2021” and
stated it was prepared to break the lease term into shorter intervals but was
unwilling to extend the term
beyond this point (which it had proposed in the
September 2015 discussions);
(b) as to the rental, the Port was willing to consider a seasonable split to
ease lease payments during difficult times, but it was
not prepared to negotiate
any rent reductions;
(c) in relation to the future development clause, the Port did not agree with
removing the clause as suggested but said it would
be willing to extend the
notification period from three to 12 months;
(d) the Port was not willing to take on an obligation to purchase the
Improvements or to provide an alternative site, and also would
not simply allow
EcoWorld to walk away from the Improvements at the end of the term; and
(e) the Port was not prepared to soften Mr Reuhman’s personal guarantee
terms.
- [27] The Port
also recorded that any agreed changes to the Lease would need to be recorded by
way of variation, pursuant to cl 19.
- [28] There
followed over several years a series of meetings and discussions, which I
broadly summarise here:
(a) On 27 October 2016, Mr Reuhman met Mr Ryan Lock, then the Port’s
Property Manager, and Mr Welbourn. According to Mr Lock,
the parties were not
agreed on the terms of any new lease, and Mr Reuhman was still to respond to the
Port’s 3 February 2016
letter.4 The meeting ended on the basis
that Mr Reuhman would get back to the Port with his substantive response to that
February 2016 letter.
This was confirmed in evidence by Mr Welbourn, who said he
left with the “clear view that EcoWorld did not accept the terms
we had
proposed in our letter earlier in the year”. Mr Reuhman confirmed too that
matters were not advanced at that meeting
and it was “up to us” to
come back to the Port.
(b) In November 2016, Mr Reuhman says he met with MDC Councillors Oddie and
Taylor, who each told him words to the effect that the
Port would never
“kick out” EcoWorld. (He repeats his claim that these councillors
informed him of the same on three
other occasions, in December 2019, January
2020 and June 2020.) Councillor Oddie’s evidence before me refutes this,
however.
He says in this evidence that
- At
one stage Mr Reuhman appeared to blame the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake for his
failure to re- engage with the Port, but as he
accepted in cross-examination,
that occurred in November of that year, that is after the meeting.
he pointed out to Mr Reuhman that he could not assist in respect of the
Lease, as MDC could not interfere in the Port’s business. Councillor
Taylor’s evidence was largely
to similar effect. She said that she could
not recall making that statement and would be very surprised if she had given
that assurance,
for similar reasons as Councillor Oddie had outlined.
(c) On 25 August 2017, Mr Reuhman emailed Mr Welbourn (copying Mr Lock)
proposing “Picton Twilight Food Market” and “Edible
Marlborough” events. Mr Welbourn’s evidence is that the Port
considered raising the status of the EcoWorld lease negotiations
in their email
in reply to Mr Reuhman, but decided not to because, as Mr Reuhman had
not asked about a new lease, it was
firmly in his court if he wished to raise
again new lease issues.
(d) On 11 October 2017, Mr Lock provided EcoWorld’s lawyer, Mr Chris
Clark, with a copy of the Port’s 3 February 2016
letter and said “As
mentioned to [Mr Reuhman] recently, I am keen to progress a meeting with both
[Mr Reuhman] and you so we
can work through the details”.
(e) On 21 November 2017, Mr Reuhman and Mr Clark met with Mr Lock and Mr
Welbourn. Mr Reuhman’s evidence is that at this
meeting Mr Clark went
through all of the points that EcoWorld wanted changed in the Lease. These
included the removal from the lease
of the future development clause, which Mr
Reuhman agreed was a fundamental issue for EcoWorld. Both Mr Lock and Mr
Welbourn in their
evidence confirmed that they advised Mr Reuhman and Mr Clark
the future development clause would need to remain.
(f) On 22 January 2018, Mr Clark wrote to the Port, recording that
“fundamental to EcoWorld’s desire to move forward
is the need to
have changes made to the existing Lease which place matters on a sounder
footing”. The letter went on to list
the three “critical”,
“essential” and “fundamental” changes that EcoWorld
wanted as follows:
(i) that the future development clause be removed, as it “stifles”
EcoWorld’s opportunity for development;
(ii) in respect of the term of the Lease, that “the Lease term currently
expires in July 2021, and EcoWorld has been offered
a 10 year right of renewal
through until July 2031. This is an offer which EcoWorld would accept if nothing
more were available”;
and
(iii) an amendment to the permitted use.
Mr Clark noted these were only “the three most essential points” and
although there were “some other supplementary
matters” these three
points above were the ones EcoWorld regarded as “critical to its
future”.
(g) On 19 February 2018, the Port by email responded substantively on a
“without prejudice” basis. In respect of the
“three most
essential points”, Mr Lock noted:
(i) the future development clause could not be removed (though the position may
change in the next 18 to 24 months);
(ii) the Port “would agree” to reformat the term of the Lease to
four rights of renewal of five years each, “effectively
taking the final
expiry to 2041”; and
(iii) the Port was “open” to amending the permitted use, but sought
clarification as to what it would be amended to.
The email went on to request EcoWorld’s financial report and noted it
“would want the rental to be reviewed to a current
market rent”.
Those financial records however were not produced. Mr Lock also referred in the
email to the need to vary the
Lease formally.
(h) Mr Clark responded to the Port with a holding letter on
27 February 2018. This noted that Mr Reuhman was
gathering some information and
a response would be forthcoming in mid-March. Mr Clark wrote again on 30
April 2018, essentially
indicating there would be further delay with a
substantive response coming “as soon as practicable”. This letter
again
reiterated that the removal of the future development clause was
“the most fundamental issue of all, and one which will affect
any
development proposal”. It is accepted by all parties that neither Mr Clark
nor EcoWorld ever followed up these holding
letters to provide a substantive
response to the Port’s email of 19 February 2018.
(i) On 7 May 2018, Mr Reuhman met with Mr Welbourn. Their evidence of this
meeting differs. Mr Welbourn says he informed Mr Reuhman
that the future
development clause could not be negotiated while redevelopment plans were still
underway. Mr Reuhman’s written
evidence was that Mr Welbourn told him
there would be no negotiations with respect to the Lease until the Port had
firmed up its
plans for the particular Picton ferry redevelopment project, which
was underway at the time. However, Mr Reuhman accepted in cross-examination
that
the Port’s 19 February 2018 email did not say that no negotiations
could progress, and that this is what Mr Welbourn had actually repeated in the
meeting.
(j) In September 2018, Mr Reuhman and Mr Lock met one another by chance. I
apprehend there was no change to their respective positions
from their
encounter.
(k) On 3 September 2020, the Port consulted with EcoWorld about the Port’s
Picton Ferry redevelopment project.
(l) On 5 November 2020, Mr Lock and Mr Welbourn met with Mr Reuhman
at a local café. The purpose of the meeting
it appears, however, was for
the Port to catch up with its tenants following the
onset of COVID-19, and not to discuss the Lease. Mr Lock and Mr Welbourn,
it appears, confirmed this and told Mr Reuhman they
were not there to discuss
plans for EcoWorld and Mr Reuhman’s tenancy, which would have to be set up
for another time.
(m) On 4 December 2020, Mr Reuhman emailed Mr Lock in respect of the earlier
night market proposal. Mr Lock responded that it would
need to be held elsewhere
as it fell outside the permitted use under the Lease. Mr Reuhman by way of
postscript stated “PS.
Re Lease Renewal [Mr Clark] is preparing the
paperwork prior to arranging a meeting with you.”
- [29] There is a
significant difference in opinion between the parties as to what may have
happened during the three-year period following
the Port’s letter of 19
February 2018. EcoWorld describes it as a “three year wait” until
the Port had firmed up
its plans for redevelopment. The Port however describes
it as a “three year hiatus” with “the ball ... firmly back
in
EcoWorld’s court”. I accept the Port’s submission that,
although EcoWorld says it was waiting for progress on
the removal of the future
development clause, this is simply indicative of the fact that to EcoWorld the
removal of this clause was
critical to reaching an agreement on a new lease.
Given the Port’s letter of 19 February 2018, which was never substantively
responded to, I accept that throughout the period following that letter the onus
— and the opportunity — to advance negotiations
rested firmly on
EcoWorld’s side. Indeed, the subsequent “holding” letters from
February and April 2018 from EcoWorld’s
lawyer Mr Clark both acknowledged
this was the case.5
The Port’s considerations as to the end of
the Lease
- [30] In
early 2021, it appears the Port’s Senior Leadership Team considered the
future of the Land under the Lease. In February
2021, Mr Lock prepared an
internal
- Mr
Clark’s 27 February 2018 letter stated, “I anticipate that we will
be in a position to come back to you with a substantive
response to the queries
raised in your email toward mid-March”. And as Mr Clark’s 30 April
2018 letter said, “obviously
we have been delayed in providing that
response ... at this point a further delay, perhaps through until the end of
May, is expected.”
memo. In the context of the envisaged Picton Ferry development project, due to
commence potentially within the following six to 12
months, this memo stated:
Although not currently being considered, the EcoWorld lease area would likely
be a very useful site for the duration of this project
either as a site office,
temporary terminal, storage area etc.
- [31] The memo
presented three options:
(a) Option 1 — “look to renew/renegotiate the lease”;
(b) Option 2 — “issue EcoWorld with a notice that [the Port] require
the site for port redevelopment purposes”;
(c) Option 3 — “issue EcoWorld with a notice that we will not be
renewing the Lease and it will terminate as at expiry
of 22 July 2021 ... This
would allow utilisation of the site for ferry development activities in the
short/medium term.”
- [32] Option 3
was subsequently discarded, although ultimately it appears it was selected as a
preferred option. The Port’s executive
team recorded its decision on the
“agreed way forward” in the following way:
1. [The Port] look to exit lease with EcoWorld as it expires on 22 July
2021. This exit is not directly linked to a redevelopment
or ferry project,
simply the end of the lease term.
- [33] On 1 April
2021, the Port’s Senior Leadership Team submitted a paper to the Board in
relation to the Lease and the Land
(the Board paper). The Board paper proposed
that the Port “open up discussions with EcoWorld to negotiate a managed
exit of
the Lease.” The Board paper proposed the Port come to a
confidential agreement with EcoWorld to “soften” EcoWorld’s
exit from the Lease. Options for this could including purchasing some
Improvements, extending the exit period or via a cash payment.
- [34] In relation
to the use of the Land, the Board paper referred to a number of alternative
options, including:
(a) entering into a new lease with EcoWorld;
(b) establishing a Maritime Heritage and Environment Centre;
(c) using the site for the Waitohi Picton Ferry Redevelopment Project; and
(d) a hospitality option.
- [35] The Board
paper recommended the above options be rejected. One of the reasons for this was
because if the Port was to renew or
renegotiate the Lease, first, it would want
to seek a market rent that would be significantly more than EcoWorld would be
prepared
to pay, and secondly, EcoWorld would also be seeking concessions to the
Lease that the Port would not be prepared to agree to.
- [36] The Board
paper did not say that the Port had offered EcoWorld a 10-year right of renewal.
As EcoWorld raises, the Board paper
also removed the following summary which had
appeared in earlier drafts:
The Lease commenced in 2010 and was for an initial term of 11 years expiring
22 July 2021. Over the years, [the Port] and EcoWorld
have had various
discussions about varying the Lease to provide for further rights of renewal.
These discussions have not progressed
and the Lease is still due to expire as at
22 July 2021.
- [37] The
Board paper ultimately recommended that the Board provide for a managed exit
from the Lease of up to 12 months and a payment
of up to $100,000 to secure an
agreement to facilitate this. The Board made its decision at a meeting held on 9
April 2021. The Board
agreed with this recommendation. In doing so, the Board
considered animal welfare issues and acknowledged that there were “no
immediate plans for redevelopment but medium-term options are available (both
commercial and community focused)”.
- [38] Consequently,
on 14 April 2021, Mr Lock called Mr Clark to notify him that the notice of
expiry of the Lease would be forthcoming.
That call, as I understand it, lasted
13 minutes in duration. The contents of the call are not entirely known.
Mr Lock gave
evidence, however, (which Mr Reuhman accepted he had no reason to
doubt), that at no stage during that phone call, which directly
concerned the
expiry of
the Lease, did Mr Clark say to Mr Lock that EcoWorld had a right of renewal.
Indeed, Mr Reuhman appeared to accept in his evidence
that, if EcoWorld thought
it had a right to renew, its lawyer would have said so to the Port on that call.
EcoWorld elected not to
call Mr Clark. The Port invites me to infer from this
that Mr Clark’s evidence would only have been unhelpful to
EcoWorld’s
case. Without necessarily accepting this to be the case, I do
acknowledge that an effect of this is that there is no evidence before
me to
contradict Mr Lock’s account of the call between them (in which Mr
Clark did not say anything about a right to
renew the Lease).
- [39] On 16 April
2021, a letter was sent to the Port from Mr Clark’s firm, Hardy- Jones
Clark, EcoWorld’s lawyers. It
appears the substance of this letter was
prepared
before the call on 14 April 2021. Mr Reuhman agreed in cross-examination
that the letter sent by EcoWorld’s lawyers accurately represented
EcoWorld’s position at that time. The letter stated that EcoWorld had
concerns with the current lease, which was “due
to expire on 22 July
2021”. The letter then set out EcoWorld’s “proposal as to the
contents of a new lease”,
outlining eight points in this respect. These
included matters which the Port had previously declined to concede on as well as
some
entirely new matters. The letter again raised the future development clause
and requested that EcoWorld’s obligations in respect
of the Improvements
at the end of the Lease be softened. It is accepted by all that at no point did
the letter refer to a “right
of renewal”. Effectively, EcoWorld was
simply repeating its position that “it had taken since 2015 and was
continuing
to seek significantly different terms than were contained in its then
existing lease.”6
- [40] Also on 16
April 2021, Mr Lock provided to EcoWorld the notice of expiry of the Lease (the
Expiry Notice).7 The Expiry Notice confirmed the Lease would expire
on the final expiry date (22 July 2021) and that EcoWorld was required to comply
with all expiry obligations. The Expiry Notice also sought timely and
constructive discussions with EcoWorld with respect to the
Improvements,
although it also made
- These
were the words used by Associate Judge Paulsen at [11] in his 22 March 2022
judgment in the present proceeding related to discovery
issues, EcoWorld v
Port Marlborough [2022] NZHC 535.
- Mr
Reuhman’s evidence was that he was on holiday that day. I also
acknowledge, however, Mr Lock’s evidence that he
had sought
unsuccessfully to meet with Mr Reuhman personally to discuss the Expiry Notice
rather than simply to send it.
an offer (on a without prejudice basis) to pay EcoWorld $75,000 for the
building. The cover email accompanying the Expiry Notice
also stated that the
Port would be open to assisting with EcoWorld’s transition, including with
relocating its wildlife. And
indeed Associate Judge Paulsen in his discovery
judgment noted at the footnote below also said that in this 16 April 2021
letter:
[10]...Port Marlborough proposed a managed exit, whereby it would release
EcoWorld from its obligations to remove and reinstate improvements,
upon terms
which included the making of a payment to EcoWorld of $75,000.
EcoWorld’s attempts to recommence
negotiations for a new lease
- [41] Mr Reuhman
acknowledged receipt of the Expiry Notice on 20 April 2021 and stated that he
would be seeking advice on the matter.
EcoWorld then engaged new lawyers. On 30
April 2021, those new lawyers, Macalister Mazengarb, wrote to the Port on behalf
of EcoWorld.
This letter recorded that the Expiry Notice was a “surprise
to Mr Reuhman” as he had been “under the (reasonably-held)
belief
that negotiations for a new lease were progressing” and that “the
outcome of those negotiations was likely to
have been a new, long-term tenancy
for EcoWorld Aquarium (largely in line with the terms and conditions of the
earlier written offer
that EcoWorld aquarium had received)”. That letter,
however, made no reference to a “right of renewal”.
- [42] Mr Reuhman
in cross-examination confirmed his view that the new lease was going to
incorporate the terms and conditions of both
the September 2015 letter and the
February 2018 email. Mr Reuhman also accepted in cross-examination that from his
perspective, at
the time he received the Expiry Notice, a new lease was under
negotiation and that nothing had been agreed.
- [43] The Port
replied on 7 May 2021, agreeing to an extension to consider the without
prejudice offer in the Expiry Notice until 21
May 2021. The Port reiterated this
offer and said it was open to discussing and agreeing reasonable additional
arrangements to assist
EcoWorld, including actively assisting with sustainably
rehoming or releasing the aquarium marine life.
- [44] On 27 May
2021, the Port again wrote to EcoWorld to confirm that EcoWorld had not accepted
the offer by the extended deadline
the Port had given. It reiterated
its willingness to assist EcoWorld with a smooth exit from the premises, noting
that the provisions of the Lease would need to be
complied with. Again it
repeated its offer to assist with the sustainable homing or release of marine
life.
- [45] EcoWorld’s
lawyers responded directly to the Port on 6 June 2021. In that letter, EcoWorld
formally rejected the Port’s
offer. The letter went on to record its
“primary objective” here was to secure from the Port a new lease,
broadly on
the terms and conditions suggested in the letter from Hardy-Jones
Clark of 16 April 2021 (as opposed to any offers it had “received”,
which was the terminology used in the 30 April 2021 letter).
- [46] As
secondary objectives, relevantly EcoWorld informed the Port that:
(a) it would not be consulting in respect of the Improvements;
(b) it had concerns about the Port’s decision-making in respect of the end
of the Lease; and
(c) unless the Port confirmed that it would take the necessary steps to agree on
terms and conditions of a new lease for EcoWorld,
it would apply to the Court
for an order for possession, and use any public relations leverage it could to
achieve its objective.
- [47] EcoWorld’s
view, according to the letter, was that the negotiations had been ongoing and
had not concluded, Macalister
Mazengarb stating:
Mr Reuhman says that he was in discussion with Port Marlborough about the
terms and conditions of the new lease and until recently
had every hope, and
indeed confidence, that the negotiations would conclude successfully.
- [48] The letter
then outlined EcoWorld’s “specific proposal” that the Port
“urgently reconsiders its decision
not to grant EcoWorld the new lease and
immediately re- engages, in good faith, in the negotiation process with EcoWorld
to agree
and conclude a new lease of mutually-agreed durable terms and
conditions”. In cross-examination, Mr Reuhman accepted that with
this
letter, EcoWorld was asking for the negotiation process to recommence.
- [49] A series of
communications then passed between EcoWorld’s lawyers, Macalister
Mazengarb, and the Port. The Port responded
on 14 June 2021, stating among other
things that it wanted the Improvements to be removed. On 18 June 2021,
Macalister Mazengarb
replied that a “new lease for 10 years had been all
but agreed in 2015” and that “EcoWorld believed it was after
that
time in a protracted negotiation to finalise the detailed terms of such a new
lease”. On 25 June 2021, the Port replied
that it had been willing to
agree a renewal but that was always subject to the terms of a variation being
agreed. In particular,
it stated the correspondence had made it
“abundantly clear that the parties were never close to reaching agreement
on fundamental
terms and that qualifications existed”. The Port also
objected to several inferences Macalister Mazengarb had reached in its
letters
that the Port was slaughtering marine life and other species. Rather, the Port
noted that it trusted EcoWorld had been making
the necessary arrangements for
the rehoming of marine life and other species in the aquarium. And, it repeated
its offer to assist
with this.
- [50] The Port
also made without prejudice offers to assist. Those without prejudice offers
have now been accepted as admissible in
these proceedings it seems as a result
of being distributed by Mr Reuhman to the media. These offers included a
rent-free extension
of the Lease for a time, funds to facilitate the rehoming of
the animals, contracting a senior EcoWorld staff member at the Port’s
cost
while animals were rehomed, and the Port waiving EcoWorld’s end-of-lease
obligations in respect of removing the Improvements
and reinstating the Land. It
is clear that all of these offers went beyond the Port’s strict
obligations under the Lease. It
is also apparent that EcoWorld blankly rejected
all of these offers. And, on the question of rehoming the animals and winding
down
the aquarium, before me Mr Stephen Standley gave expert evidence relating
to this. This evidence included his opinion as to the time
required for the
difficulties with animal relocations. Even accepting this, what is clear to me
here is that already the Port has
undertaken significant preparatory work to
facilitate these arrangements if it necessarily falls to it to do
so.
Continuing possession
- [51] The Lease
ended on 22 July 2021. The day before, 21 July 2021, the Port wrote again to
EcoWorld outlining a “proposed way
forward” beyond the expiry of its
possession from 12.01am on 23 July 2021. The Port stated:
If EcoWorld does not accept this offer then the Lease expires on 22 July
2021
... Port Marlborough expects EcoWorld will vacate the premises including
taking the appropriate steps to ensure the welfare and correct
care of its
marine life and animals which are currently housed on the premises ... it offers
to assist EcoWorld with that process
and contribute towards the associated
reasonable costs.
- [52] EcoWorld
did not, however, vacate the Land. It did not remove the Improvements and did
not take steps towards the removal of
the animals housed in the aquarium.
Rather, EcoWorld has remained in possession and continued to operate its
business (and as I understand
the position it continues to do so) since that
time. The marine life and other animals remain in the aquarium.
- [53] The
Port’s evidence is that no work can be progressed on future uses of the
Land while EcoWorld remains in ongoing possession.
The parties’ positions in general terms
- [54] EcoWorld
says this is a unique case. It has run an aquarium, it says being one of only
three in New Zealand, which operates as
a community facility which is very
important to the Picton area. It presents itself as a “powerless”
lessee with limited
flexibility vis-à-vis the lessor, the Port. EcoWorld
essentially says that in this case there was a promise to renew the Lease,
which
in contract or by equity needs to be enforced.
- [55] The Port
for its part says this is a simple contract case of offer and acceptance. It
says there was never any unconditional
acceptance and never any agreement
reached before the parties. In any case, the Port says, there was no enforceable
promise made.
The Port claims now that, as the Lease has expired, EcoWorld is in
breach of the Lease by continuing to occupy the Land and refusing
to remove the
Improvements, and the Port is entitled to an order for possession of the
Land.
My conclusion in this case
- [56] At
this point, I need to say that I have little hesitation in reaching my
conclusions in this case. For the reasons I set out
below, I am of the clear
view that EcoWorld’s claims must fail. For those reasons I also consider
the Port is entitled in its
claims to an order for possession of the Land and
the consequential damages it seeks. Appropriate orders will follow.
- [57] I now
explain that reasoning.
The proceedings
- [58] There
are two separate proceedings in this case. Under the first (the 23 proceedings),
brought by EcoWorld against the Port,
EcoWorld seeks to have the Lease renewed
for a further 10 years under what it says was a right of renewal the Port
promised it in
September 2015. It brings its claim under the PLA, the equitable
doctrine of specific performance, and the equitable doctrine of
estoppel. Under
the second (the 29 proceedings), brought by the Port against EcoWorld, the Port
seeks first, vacant possession of
the land on the basis the Lease has come to an
end and EcoWorld has no right to now be on the land, as well as secondly, an
order
for consequential anticipated damages. The Port also seeks
judgment against Mr Reuhman personally with respect to these
matters as
guarantor under the Lease.
The 23 proceeding
EcoWorld’s
claims
- [59] EcoWorld
claims there was a promise by the Port here of a 10-year right of renewal, which
was intended to be relied on, and was
relied on. EcoWorld argues the fundamental
question at the heart of these proceedings is whether, in all the circumstances,
the Port
should be held to that promise. It submits that in all the
circumstances of this case, equitable principles displace the simple common
law
position advocated by the Port. EcoWorld says the Port should be held to that
promise.
- [60] EcoWorld
brings its claim under three causes of action:
(a) first, under the PLA, EcoWorld says that in the Port’s letter of 16
September 2015, the Port “covenanted in writing”
with EcoWorld to
renew the Lease on its expiry, and EcoWorld is therefore entitled to relief
under s 264 of the PLA;
(b) second, by way of specific performance, EcoWorld contends it is entitled to
an order for specific performance against the Port
for a new lease consistent
with the alleged right of renewal arising from the 16 September 2015 letter;
and
(c) third, under equitable estoppel, EcoWorld says that in the Port’s 16
September 2015 letter and subsequent letters, the
Port created in EcoWorld a
reasonable expectation that EcoWorld would be granted a renewed lease. EcoWorld
says it relied on those
representations to its detriment and it would be
unconscionable to allow the Port to now resile from that expectation it
created.
- [61] In terms of
relief, EcoWorld now seeks a new 10-year lease with the Port as Lessor on the
same terms as the expired Lease.
The Port’s position
- [62] The Port
says that EcoWorld’s claims are wholly misconceived, for the following
general reasons:
(a) there was never any right of renewal agreed or any unequivocal
representation by the Port that, even in the absence of an agreement,
EcoWorld
would still have a right of renewal;
(b) the requirements for relief under s 264 of the PLA are not met, and in any
case the Court should decline relief;
(c) specific performance is not a cause of action, and there is no contractual
right capable of being specifically performed here
in any case; and
(d) in terms of equitable estoppel, there was never any clear and unequivocal
representation by the Port that EcoWorld would have
a right of renewal.
The 29 proceeding
The
Port’s claims
- [63] The Port in
its proceeding (29) brings two causes of action:
(a) first, an action for the recovery of the Land; and
(b) second, claims for breaches of the Lease in two respects:
(i) breach of an implied term of the Lease which required EcoWorld to yield
possession on the expiry of the term; and
(ii) breach of an express term of the Lease, namely cl 21.1(c), which required
EcoWorld on expiry of the Lease to remove all Improvements
from the Land and
leave the Land clear, clean and tidy.
- [64] By way of
relief, the Port therefore seeks:
(a) an order requiring EcoWorld to give up possession of the Land and
immediately vacate it;
(b) damages in respect of the reasonable cost of removing the Improvements from
the Land (including any animals housed in those Improvements)
plus interest;
(c) costs on a solicitor–client basis; and
(d) such other relief as the Court deems fit.
- [65] To the
extent that EcoWorld fails to address the above issues, the Port also seeks
judgment against Mr Reuhman personally for
the same in his capacity as guarantor
of EcoWorld’s obligations under the Lease.
EcoWorld’s position
- [66] EcoWorld
denies the Port’s claims. And, it brings two affirmative defences against
the claims:
(a) first, by way of equitable set-off, EcoWorld says that to the extent that
either EcoWorld or Mr Reuhman is liable to the Port,
the extent of any damages
should be reduced to take into account the conduct of the Port in contributing
to that loss; and
(b) second, in estoppel, EcoWorld says it has relied upon assurances and
representations contained in the Port’s letter of
16 September 2015 and
subsequently to its detriment, that it is unconscionable for the Port to now
resile from these, and that consequently
it should, at a minimum, be put in the
position it would have been in had the representations not been made.
- [67] The Port
for its part denies EcoWorld’s affirmative defences to its
claims.
Issues for determination
- [68] The
two sets of claims, in my view, result in the following issues for
determination:
(a) First, was there a contractual 10-year right of renewal?
(b) If not, should the Court nevertheless grant relief to EcoWorld under s 264
of the PLA?
(c) Is EcoWorld entitled to an order for specific performance against the Port
for a new lease on the terms of the alleged right
of renewal?
(d) If not, should EcoWorld nevertheless be granted relief in equity under the
doctrine of estoppel on the basis of representations
or assurances made to it by
the Port?
(e) Is the Port entitled to an order for possession of the Land?
(f) Has EcoWorld breached the Lease by:
(i) failing to yield possession; and
(ii) failing to remove all Improvements from the Land and to leave the Land
clear, clean and tidy?
(g) Is Mr Reuhman personally liable for any failures on the part of EcoWorld?
(h) What relief, if any, ought to be awarded?
Analysis
- [69] I
now consider each of these issues in turn.
A contractual 10-year right of renewal?
- [70] EcoWorld
contends that it had a 10-year right of renewal under the Lease. It says tenure
was never in doubt and there was “always
a 10-year right of renewal on the
table”.
- [71] Counsel for
EcoWorld expresses his submissions on this point in the following way:
... A right of renewal is an uncomplicated matter. It arises in the context
of an existing landlord-tenant relationship whose terms
are already known to
both parties. They are already recorded already. The only matter that changes if
the tenant exercises a right
of renewal is the expiry date of the lease. The
renewal is essentially an open offer by the landlord to the tenant that can be
exercised
(accepted) by a tenant before a set time (usually the end of the lease
or shortly before). Seeking to negotiate new and different
terms outside of a
right to renew does not affect the right of renewal.
- [72] EcoWorld
contends this case “is a unique situation which seems is unlikely ever to
be repeated”. It points to three
aspects of the situation in
particular:
(a) first, that the lease is a bare land lease, meaning the lessee invests
significant sums of money into improvements which, if
not purchased by the
lessor, will be lost at the end of the lease;
(b) second, that the future development clause meant there was an ever- present
possibility of the Port repossessing the Land on
three months’ notice;
and
(c) third, that the Lease in this case was for a unique permitted use and that
was for an aquarium and associated activities.
- [73] EcoWorld
therefore maintains the Port’s contractual, common law approach to
analysing whether there was a right of renewal
here is misguided.
Analysis
- [74] What is
clear to me here is that EcoWorld’s case founders under this head under
several fundamental misconceptions.
- [75] Under basic
contract principles, the formation of legally binding obligations in a contract
amongst other things requires:8
(a) an offer and acceptance (that is, agreement); and
(b) that both parties intend to be immediately legally bound.
- [76] In the
present case, I am satisfied there has never been any agreement reached between
the parties amounting to a 10-year right
of renewal to which both parties
intended to be legally bound.
- See
for example Wire By Design Ltd (in receivership and in liquidation) v
Commercial Factors Ltd [2015] NZHC 985 at [52].
- [77] EcoWorld
claims first, the Port’s letter of 16 September 2015 gave EcoWorld a right
to renew the Lease for 10 years, secondly,
EcoWorld was entitled to exercise
that right to renew up until the expiry of the Lease, but thirdly, that it did
not do so because
of the Expiry Notice.
- [78] It is
undisputed that security of tenure here was highly important to EcoWorld.
Indeed, EcoWorld’s responsible actions
in seeking security of tenure in
2015, several years before the expiry of the Lease, are readily
acknowledged.
- [79] However,
there are a number of reasons why the 16 September 2015 letter does not amount
to an agreement to provide or “grant”
EcoWorld a 10-year right of
renewal to which the parties intended to be legally bound:
(a) In that letter, the Port said it was “prepared to offer”
EcoWorld a further right of renewal for 10 years following the current term. On
a restricted interpretation, this meant the
Port was prepared to enter into
negotiations in relation to a 10-year right of renewal. On an expansive
view, this meant the Port would allow EcoWorld to exercise a 10-year right
of
renewal. Whichever view is taken, however, this amounts at most to an offer
of a right to renew.
(b) The Port repeatedly used the word “would” rather than
“will”. For example, the letter stated “this
would make
the final lease expiry on 22 July 2031” and “we would record
the proposed right of renewal by way of a variation to your lease”. The
first example could be interpreted generously
as an expression of the situation
if EcoWorld chose to exercise a right of renewal under the terms proposed
by the Port. The second example, however, in particular, clearly indicates that
this statement
was an offer of an option or right to renew the Lease, and that
if EcoWorld chose to accept the offer of a 10-year right of renewal
option in the Lease, the Port would record this by way of variation, that
is in the manner prescribed for any agreed variations by cl 19 of the Lease.
(c) The offer was conditional on other terms being agreed, in particular,
amending the rent review mechanism to the greater of CPI
or market review. In
order to qualify as an offer, it must be capable of being accepted immediately.
The letter clearly contained
terms that as a factual matter were still very much
the subject of discussion and negotiations. Discussions clearly would be ongoing
beyond this letter. Thus it was not capable of being accepted immediately.
Indeed, M Reuhman said in cross-examination that
not only did he never accept
the offer, but that it would not have been prudent to accept the offer without
negotiating other terms
of the Lease.
(d) Any right of renewal would only be effective once the parties entered into a
written variation of the Lease. Clause 19 of the
Lease required all variations
to be in writing. No variation to the Lease would be effective unless it was
recorded in writing. Any
offer of a right of renewal was therefore clearly
conditional on the parties so recording their agreement to vary the Lease in
this
way in writing.
(e) The letter went on to state, that if EcoWorld was “happy with the
proposal”, it should say so and the Port would
write up a “draft
variation”. Mr Reuhman accepted in cross-examination that he never came
back to the Port confirming
that he was “happy with the proposal”.
Thus there were actions still to be taken with respect to any confirmed right
of
renewal, and in any case Mr Reuhman never communicated his acceptance of the
offer.
- [80] EcoWorld,
as I understand it, suggests here that says whether the Port promised EcoWorld a
right of renewal in the 16 September
2015 letter is “the most important
and fundamental question in this case.” However, as I see it, this is
incorrect. If
there is a single “most important and fundamental
question” in this case, it is whether the parties agreed to a right
of renewal.
- [81] I am
satisfied the above factors demonstrate there was no agreement between the
parties to which both intended to be legally
bound. In terms of an agreement, it
is
arguable whether the proposed right of renewal in the 16 September 2015 letter
in fact constituted an “offer”, as it
was not capable of being
accepted immediately (being conditional on further actions and negotiations),
except perhaps on a very generous
interpretation. Even if it was an offer,
however, in any case EcoWorld (via Mr Reuhman) never accepted the offer in the
letter.
- [82] Instead, Mr
Reuhman replied on 7 December 2015 with a counter-offer. It is another basic
principle of contract law that a counter-offer
is a rejection of the original
offer. The counter-offer replaces the original offer and is then itself open for
acceptance.9 In the recent case of
Inspire Holdings Ltd v JSM Properties Ltd, the document in question was
rendered a counter-offer by the deletion of the words “if any”,
which meant the previous
offer was no longer open for
acceptance.10
- [83] The 7
December 2015 reply letter, as I see it, was clearly a counter-offer. It
contained no fewer than eight aspects of the Lease
which EcoWorld wanted
changed. It never accepted the Port’s offer of a 10-year right of renewal.
By way of counterfactual illustration,
in that letter Mr Reuhman might have
expressed EcoWorld’s acceptance of the offer in the 16 September 2015
letter of the 10-year
right of renewal, and agreed to sign a variation to that
effect. The signing of such a variation would likely have constituted an
agreed
right of renewal. However, he did not do so.
- [84] Instead, Mr
Reuhman rejected any offer of a 10-year right of renewal in the Port’s 16
September 2015 letter and, as counsel
for EcoWorld accepted, “chanced his
hand for better terms”. This was confirmed in Mr Reuhman’s own
evidence before
me, that he viewed matters at this point as a “work in
progress” and was still involved in “discussions or
negotiations”
with a view to obtaining a 20-year term. All in all, I am
satisfied EcoWorld never accepted the offer of a 10-year right of renewal,
and
there was therefore no agreement.
- [85] I am also
satisfied there was no intention to be legally bound. In a case where the
parties agree on a term “subject to
a formal contract”, it is
generally only when the
- Jeremy
Finn, Stephen Todd and Matthew Barber (eds) Burrows, Finn and Todd on the Law
of Contract in New Zealand (7th ed, LexisNexis, 2022) at [3.4.7], citing
Hyde v Wrench [1840] EngR 1054; (1840) 3 Beav 334.
10 Inspire
Holdings Ltd v JSM Properties Ltd [2022] NZCA 136 at [32].
formal document is drawn up and executed by both parties that the parties will
be held contractually liable.11 I accept this would apply here. In
the present case, as noted, the offer was conditional on entering into a formal
variation of the
Lease, as required under cl 19.
- [86] For such a
variation to be recorded in writing is also consistent with the statutory and
common law position in relation to such
leases. Section 24 of the PLA requires
contracts for the disposition of land (including a lease for more than one year)
to be in
writing, and the courts have also found that where a contract is
required to be in writing, any variation to it must also be in
writing.12
- [87] Moreover,
the fact, as the Port argues, the offer was made on the basis of and subject to
a formal variation being drawn up to
record it meant, in contractual terms, that
the Port did not have the requisite intention to be legally bound at that point
until
the variation was executed, notwithstanding the requirements in cl 19 of
the Lease and under the PLA. Mr Reuhman also confirmed in
cross-examination
before me that he knew that any change to the Lease would need to be included in
a variation to the Lease to be
effective.
Subsequent communications
- [88] In
submitting that it had a 10-year right of renewal under the Lease and there was
“always a 10-year right of renewal on
the table”, EcoWorld relies
here exclusively on the Port’s letter of 16 September 2015. As I have
concluded, that document
did not found such a right of renewal. I am also
satisfied that no further correspondence between the parties gave EcoWorld a
right
to renew the lease in the way it now alleges.
- [89] In relation
to the Port’s February 2016 letter, though the Port reiterated its offer,
EcoWorld never responded to this
letter, and in any case, EcoWorld’s
counter-offer of January 2018 rejected and therefore extinguished this
offer.
- [90] As to that
EcoWorld January 2018 letter, in which Mr Clark on behalf of EcoWorld stated the
10-year right of renewal “is
an offer which EcoWorld would
11 Finn, Todd and Barber (eds), above n 9, at [8.2.2(a)].
12 Rattrays Wholesale Ltd v Meredyth-Young & A’Court
Ltd [1996] NZHC 1837; [1997] 2 NZLR 363 (HC) at 376–377.
accept if nothing more were available”, I am satisfied it could not be
seen as constituting an acceptance of the Port’s
September 2015 offer,
as:
(a) that offer had already been extinguished by EcoWorld’s 7 December 2015
reply letter, which I have found was a counter-offer;
(b) any acceptance was not unconditional, as it was accepting a position in
relation to one of several “critical” points
under negotiation and
subject to further points being negotiated; and
(c) the parties never entered into a written variation, as required by cl 19 of
the Lease and under the PLA.
- [91] With
respect to Mr Lock’s February 2018 email, I am satisfied this too did not
result in any agreed right of renewal, for
a number of reasons:
(a) the proposed term is distinct from what is now alleged, as the email offered
four rights of renewal of five years each, and not
one 10-year right of
renewal;
(b) the email was without prejudice and subject to approval by the Port’s
senior management;
(c) the offer in this email was never accepted;
(d) any offer was terminated by the Expiry Notice, and in any case the letter of
16 April 2022 from EcoWorld’s lawyers constituted
a counter-offer, thereby
extinguishing the offer;
(e) the offer was conditional on other matters, including receiving financial
statements from EcoWorld, which were not provided;
and
(f) any offer was subject to entering into a variation, which never occurred.
- [92] I do not
accept EcoWorld’s further submission that from February 2018 until the
Port had “firmed up” its plans
for redevelopment, there was
“little point” discussing terms for a new lease. EcoWorld was aware
that any changes to
the Lease would need to be recorded by way of variation to
the Lease. If EcoWorld was waiting to hear from the Port on other matters
before
it committed to a new lease, it nevertheless could have entered into a variation
as to a right of renewal of the Lease (as
it now alleges it had from 2015) and
pursued further negotiations in respect of other terms.
- [93] I am
satisfied in all the circumstances here that none of the communications between
the parties following the Port’s 16
September 2015 letter gave rise to a
10- year right of renewal under the Lease capable of being exercised by
EcoWorld.
- [94] Between
August 2015 and April 2018, the parties discussed a number of potential changes
to the Lease, which included the possibility
of a right of renewal. I find
however that the parties never reached any agreement to which they intended to
be bound by which EcoWorld
was granted a right of renewal under the Lease.
During this period, as Mr Reuhman himself accepted in cross-examination, the
parties
were in negotiations as to the terms of the Lease, but no variation to
the Lease, and in particular no right of renewal, was ever
agreed.
- [95] Neither do
I accept that any such common law contractual analysis is
“misplaced”, as EcoWorld has contended here.
As the Port submitted,
rightly in my view, there is “no rule of equity that allows the Court to
find that there is a binding
contract in circumstances where the law of contract
says there is none.”
Relief under the Property Law Act
- [96] A
primary claim from EcoWorld here is for relief under the PLA. I now turn to
consider this claim.
- [97] Sections
261 and 264 of the PLA together provide for relief against a lessor’s
refusal to enter into a renewal of the lease
with a lessee. In particular, s
264(1) provides that on an application under s 261, the court may grant relief
against the refusal
of the lessor to extend or renew the lease. In particular,
the court may order the lessor to
extend or renew the lease or enter into a new lease with the lessor and may
grant relief on any conditions as to expenses, damages,
compensation or any
other relevant matters as the court sees fit.13
- [98] Section
261(1) is the gateway provision a lessee is required to satisfy in order to make
such an application under s 261 for
relief under s 264. It applies to a lease
(insofar as relevant here) if the following requirements are met:
(a) the lessor has “covenanted in writing” with the lessee that, on
the expiry of the lease, the lessor will extend the
term of the lease or renew
the lease;
(b) that obligation of the lessor is conditional on the lessee giving notice,
within a specified time or in a specified manner, of
the intention to exercise
the right to require a renewal of the lease;
(c) the lessee has failed to give the notice within the specified time or in the
specified manner; and
(d) the lessor has refused to renew the lease.
- [99] EcoWorld
says the key question on this issue here is whether requirement (a) above is
met, that is whether in its letter of 16
September 2015 the Port
“covenanted in writing” with EcoWorld that, on the expiry of the
Lease, the Port would extend
the term of the Lease or renew the Lease. EcoWorld
contends it did, and it says that if (a) is met, it can navigate the remaining
requirements with little difficulty. It accepts that if the Port did covenant in
writing with EcoWorld that EcoWorld had a 10-year
right of renewal, EcoWorld
needed to exercise that promise and did not do so before it was repudiated by
the Expiry Notice and thereby
made incapable of being exercised. EcoWorld
therefore seeks an order under these sections that the Port extend or renew the
Lease
on the same terms until 22 July 2031.
13 Property Law Act 2007, s 264(2)(b).
- [100] In
response, the Port maintains that s 261 is not satisfied here, and that even if
it was the Court should decline relief under
s 264. Specifically, the Port
says:
(a) there was no written covenant in the Lease that it would be renewed;
(b) even if a written covenant outside the Lease did qualify for the purposes of
s 261, there was no such written covenant outside
the Lease in this case;
(c) no particular process was agreed for the renewal or extension of the Lease;
and
(d) the factors to be taken into account in considering relief under s 264 of
the PLA tell against the granting of relief.
Analysis
- [101] Since
these provisions codify equitable principles, the Court, in answering this
question, ought not to be unduly restrictive
in its interpretation. Rather, as
Turner P in the Court of Appeal held in Vince Bevan Ltd v Findgard Nominees
Ltd (albeit in reference to predecessor legislation) these sections,
intended as they are to be a remedial measure, should be “construed
as
conferring upon the Court a very wide jurisdiction to do equity in relieving
against refusals by lessors to renew
leases.”14 Later in that case,
McCarthy J stated:15
... I agree that we should not view
these sections narrowly, neither in the jurisdiction conferred nor in the relief
to be granted.
The obvious final intention of the Legislature was to place the
Court in a position to do what it thinks fit in accordance with the
justice of
the particular application.
- [102] To similar
effect, Richardson J in the Court of Appeal held in Weatherall Jewellers Ltd
v J Hendry and Son Ltd:16
Clearly the Court has to do justice as between lessor and lessee having
regard to all the circumstances of the case and so having
regard to the relative
prejudice occasioned to the lessor or lessee by the grant or refusal of
relief.
14 Vince Bevan Ltd v Findgard Nominees Ltd [1973] 2 NZLR
290 (CA) at 297.
15 At 299.
16 Weatherall Jewellers Ltd v J Hendry and Son Ltd CA
135/83, 11 September 1984 at 8.
- [103] It is
accepted these provisions are not to be read down, but rather to be given a
broad approach having regard to the overall
justice in all the circumstances of
the particular case.
- [104] I accept
also that these provisions can exist in the context of a power imbalance
inherent in a lessor–lessee relationship,
in which the lessor often has
substantial power and the lessee is in possession of the land only by the
lessor’s consent.
- [105] Indeed, I
consider this informs a possible legislative intent behind these provisions.
They modify the usual rule that specific
performance of an option provided for
in a lease will not be granted unless all of the specified conditions are
met,17 by allowing the Court to intervene where the lessee has failed
to meet one or more conditions.18 These sections therefore will aid a
lessee with a right of renewal who has failed to comply with a notice or other
requirement necessary
to execute that right.19
- [106] However,
what these sections do not do is to create a right of renewal where there
is none in the Lease.20 They also do not
allow a court a general ability to renew or extend a lease in circumstances
which go beyond or outside the legislative
gateway in s 261.
Section 261 requirements — in particular,
did the parties “covenant in writing”?
- [107] It is
clear here there was no covenant in writing in the Lease itself that the Lease
might be renewed or extended. In terms
of renewal rights, the Lease provided
these were “nil”. There was no subsequent formal variation changing
that position.
I am satisfied the parties had not “covenanted in
writing” in the Lease itself as to a right to renew the Lease.
17 John Burrows (ed) Land Law (online looseleaf ed, Thomson
Reuters, 2022) at [LS13.07(1)].
18 Vince Bevan Ltd v Findgard Nominees Ltd, above n 14, at 299.
19 At 299.
20 Bedford Investments Ltd v Alder & Co Ltd [2006] NZHC 521; (2006) 7
NZCPR 420.
- [108] EcoWorld,
however, asks me to accept, for the purposes of determining whether the parties
“covenanted in writing”
for a lease renewal, that the Port made a
binding promise for this outside the Lease itself.
- [109] The Port
for its part says only a covenant within the Lease itself qualifies under s 261.
The following points are made in support
of this argument. First, counsel say
they have been unable to identify any cases under these sections in which a
right of renewal
is located elsewhere than in a Lease itself. Further, in its
report which led to the PLA, the Law Commission had expressed the view
that it
was “not necessary” that the lessor’s covenant be in the lease
itself, but rather any binding arrangement
made between lessor and lessee should
fall within the section, no matter where it is found.21 However,
Parliament declined to adopt this recommendation. Instead, it included in the
PLA a definition of “covenant”
as “in relation to a lease ...
a promise expressed or implied in the lease”.22 And finally, a
requirement that the covenant be contained in the lease itself accords first,
with the requirement under s 24 of the
PLA that all leases (except leases of a
short duration) are to be in writing and secondly, it is consistent with the
intent of s
261 as providing relief where a lessee has failed to comply with a
condition in the lease.
- [110] EcoWorld
for its part however contends for a more generous interpretation. First, it
notes the definition of “covenant”
in s 207 of the PLA begins
“[u]nless the context otherwise requires”. It says that in a case as
here where a liberal
construction is warranted, the context allows for a
“covenant in writing” to be located somewhere outside the Lease
itself,
notwithstanding the rest of the definition. EcoWorld also notes that s
261 applies to all leases, including short-term leases, which
need not be in
writing. It would not make sense to require that a right of renewal be recorded
within the Lease itself when the Lease
itself is oral. Because a side letter
must therefore qualify for the purposes of s 261 of the PLA in respect of
short-term leases,
there is no suggestion this would not apply also for a longer
lease. And, as to general protection for the lessor, the balance is
achieved by
still requiring that the promise be in writing.
21 Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission A New Property Law
Act (NZLC R29, 1994) at 377.
22 Property Law Act, s 207 definition of
“covenant”.
- [111] Without
making any definitive finding on this point, and despite there seemingly being
no case law thus far to this effect,
I see some merit in EcoWorld’s
argument here. As will become apparent in the following paragraphs, it is not
necessary here
for me to definitively conclude that a side letter, or document
outside the lease itself, would qualify for the purposes of s 261.
I will now
proceed, however, to consider whether there was any such “covenant in
writing” in any documents outside the
Lease itself on the provisional
assumption that it could so qualify.
- [112] Unfortunately
for EcoWorld, in all the prevailing circumstances in this case, I do not
consider there was any such “covenant
in writing” to extend or renew
the Lease, even outside the Lease document itself.
- [113] It is
clear these provisions in the PLA do not create a right to renew in and of
themselves. Rather, the Court must be satisfied
that the lessor has
“actually contractually agreed that the renewal will be
granted.”23 As I have found above, the parties never made such
a contractual agreement for a right of renewal. The most that could be said is
that the Port made EcoWorld an offer — indeed, numerous offers — for
a 10-year right of renewal, which, however, EcoWorld
never accepted. Also, any
such offers were never contractually agreed and recorded by way of a variation
to the Lease as required
by it.
- [114] And, as to
relief here, in my view equity also cannot assist EcoWorld. Pointing to the
“fundamental principle in equity”
that “equity regards as done
that which ought to be done”,24 EcoWorld says equity will now
demand that the Port enters into a Deed of Variation of the Lease. However, this
is another principle
designed to achieve fairness in all the circumstances. This
principle would be helpful in my view in a case where the parties had
in fact
reached an agreement between them, intending for it to be legally binding, and
merely failed to comply with a technical requirement
in recording their
agreement. However, it will not serve to create an agreement where there is
none, as here.
23 Bedford Investments Ltd v Alder & Co Ltd,
above n 20. Although this case was
decided under s 120 of the Property Law Act 1952, s 264 of the Property Law
Act was not intended to substantively
alter the law in this regard: Stylo
Medical Services Ltd v Hum Hospitality Ltd [2018] NZHC 642.
24 Andrew Butler Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (2nd
ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2009) at [2.7.6].
- [115] Relief
under s 264 is contingent on a lessee meeting the gateway requirements of s 261.
In this case I am satisfied the Port
never “covenanted in writing”
with EcoWorld, either in the Lease itself or in any location outside the Lease,
to the
effect that, on the expiry of the Lease, it would extend the term of the
Lease or renew it. EcoWorld’s claim for relief under
the PLA must
therefore fail, as I am not satisfied it can meet the requirements in s 261 for
relief.
Discretion for relief under s 264 — should
relief be granted under s 264?
- [116] I have
found that EcoWorld cannot fit within the requirements in s 261 for relief under
s 264. However, even where the gateway
to relief under s 261 is satisfied,
relief itself under s 264 remains entirely at the Court’s
discretion.25
- [117] The courts
will consider a number of factors in determining whether to grant relief. The
Court summarised these factors in Ponsonby Mall Trust Ltd v New Zealand Food
Industries Ltd, which I now turn to consider:26
(a) The reasons for the failure to comply with the relevant condition or notice
requirement, including whether the failure was inadvertent?
The parties had been negotiating a new lease on-and-off since 2015. I am
satisfied EcoWorld was well-aware the Lease would expire
on 22 July 2021, yet
took no action in preparing for the end of the Lease despite this.
(b) Whether the failure was caused by any action of the lessor?
I am satisfied the Port met its obligations in respect of the Lease, including
providing EcoWorld with the required notice at all
times. The Port consistently
engaged with EcoWorld on the issues it had raised and responded in good time in
all respects. I am of
the view the Port went
25 Transform Minerals Ltd v Gordon Wright & Sons Ltd
(2010) 12 NZCPR 558 at [58].
26 Ponsonby Mall Trust Ltd v New Zealand Food Industries Ltd
[2005] NZHC 328; (2005) 7 NZCPR 48 (HC) at [29], applied in respect of the Property Law Act
in Saisatnam Ltd v Brandons Trustee Co Ltd [2017] NZHC 538, (2017) 18
NZCPR 215 at 224–225.
above and beyond in order to assist EcoWorld in endeavouring to achieve a new
lease.
(c) The lessee’s conduct, including whether it has complied with all of
the lease’s conditions and covenants and has
been a good lessee?
The Port claims in its proceedings against EcoWorld that EcoWorld has breached
its lease in several respects. I consider this in
more detail below at [162]–[164]. Beyond this, the Port complains
that EcoWorld and Mr Reuhman have deliberately made inflammatory and misleading
comments to the wider
Picton community and to the media about the current state
of affairs and the Port’s actions. These have included accusations
of the
Port attempting to “slaughter” native animals and “of bullying
Mr Reuhman.” These comments are unfortunate
to say the least. They do not
appear to be substantiated and in any event as I see it there does not appear to
be any evidence of
poor behaviour on the part of the Port here. Rather, the
evidence suggests it has been a careful, accommodating, and patient commercial
landlord throughout. And, with respect to the aquarium animals, the evidence is
clear that the Port on multiple occasions has offered
to assist with their
sustainable and effective rehoming in various ways. On this, to its credit, it
has engaged with Te Papa Atawhai
| the Department of Conservation, the Zoo and
Aquarium Association, and other expert bodies to do so.
(d) The prejudice to the lessee if the relief is not granted?
While I accept that for EcoWorld no renewal of the Lease would be
“existential” and it will be forced to close or relocate,
I note
also that EcoWorld has had ample opportunity to seek alternative accommodation
and/or to put plans in place for closure.27 I therefore consider the
prejudice to EcoWorld is consequently limited.
- Even
just since Note of Expiry of the Lease was given in April 2021, EcoWorld has had
19 months now to make other plans.
(e) The prejudice to the lessor if the relief is granted?
EcoWorld submits that the Port “does not need the land” and that
“waiting until July 2031 to get the land back
will make not an ounce of
difference to it”. It does not, however, lead any evidence to support this
claim. On the other hand,
the evidence before me in fact appears to suggest that
the Port does wish to use the land in the foreseeable future. There are,
as the Port has outlined, numerous options available to it with respect
to its
use of the Land, and the Port states it will be able to progress community
consultation regarding the use of the Land once
it has certainty as to its
possession.
(f) The lessor’s motivations for refusing to renew the lease and its
understanding of the lessee’s intentions to renew?
I have described above the Port’s motivations for allowing the Lease to
expire and for declining to renew the Lease for a new
term at [30]–[37]. These are set out in the Board paper
presented to the Port’s Board. While there does not appear to be any
decision currently
in hand on the immediate use for the Land, I accept the
Port’s submission that throughout it has acted in good faith and did
not
want to foreclose its options by entering into another long-term lease with
EcoWorld. Those decisions are matters for the Port.
(g) How the interests of third parties may be affected?
EcoWorld says the effect on third parties from its closure would be
“immense”. While the animals housed in the aquarium
will no doubt be
affected by its closure, the Port I note has offered several times to assist
EcoWorld in their sustainable rehoming.
I do accept however that EcoWorld is
one of only a few aquariums remaining in New Zealand and its closure,
unless it can
transfer elsewhere, will be a potential loss to the community as
an educational asset and tourist attraction. However, it is not
for the Court to
inquire too deeply into
such matters of a commercial nature, and this is only one factor to be
considered among many.
- [118] It will be
apparent from my consideration and comments on the above factors, that I am of
the view that even if relief were
available to EcoWorld here, I would exercise
my discretion in declining to grant relief under s 264.
Conclusion on relief under the PLA
- [119] Relief
under ss 261 and 264 of the PLA constituted EcoWorld’s primary cause of
action in its proceedings against the Port.
- [120] EcoWorld
pointed to the comments of Turner P in Vince Bevan that these provisions
under the PLA are designed “to do equity in relieving against refusals by
lessors to renew leases.”28 But EcoWorld’s interpretation
of this statement is, in my view, misconceived. The provisions under the PLA can
only go so far.
They cannot create between the parties a contractual right of
renewal where in fact none exists.
- [121] I have
concluded that EcoWorld cannot fit within the requirements of s 261 for relief
under these provisions. I have also found
that even if EcoWorld had been
entitled to apply for relief, I would, in my discretion, have declined to grant
any relief to EcoWorld
under s 264, for the reasons outlined above.
Specific performance
- [122] EcoWorld’s
second pleaded “cause of action” is specific performance. This issue
can be quickly disposed of.
- [123] Specific
performance is not a cause of action in itself, but rather an equitable remedy
allowing a party to a contract to seek
performance of a contractual right (as
opposed to damages for breach of that right). Thus, in order to utilise specific
performance,
there must be a contractual right capable of being ordered to be
performed. In this case, I have found there was no such contractual
right.
First, the parties never agreed to a contractual right of renewal now capable of
being ordered to
28 Vince Bevan Ltd v Findgard Nominees Ltd, above n 14, at 297.
be performed. Second, the Lease itself required that any such agreement be
recorded in writing as a variation to the Lease. No such
variation was ever
made. As I have found above, I do not consider that equity will regard the
making of such a variation as done
on the basis that it ought to have been
done.
- [124] Thus, I
have found no relief in the form of specific performance is available to
EcoWorld here. There is a clear lack of any
right of renewal capable of being
ordered to be performed.
Equitable estoppel
- [125] EcoWorld’s
final cause of action is brought in estoppel. It claims that the Port’s 16
September 2015 letter, combined
with subsequent statements made by the Port,
created in EcoWorld a expectation that the Lease would be renewed, on which
EcoWorld
then reasonably relied to its detriment. EcoWorld says it would be
unconscionable for the Port to now depart from the expectation
it created and
the Port should not be permitted to refuse to renew the Lease. EcoWorld submits
there are two primary “pinch
points” at which estoppel arose here,
either:
(a) in mid-2017, when the evidence suggests Mr Lock thought the Port should
write to EcoWorld withdrawing the offer of a right of
renewal; or otherwise
(b) in January 2018, when EcoWorld made it known to the Port that it would take
a 10-year right of renewal if that was all that was
available. EcoWorld says if
the right of renewal was not available at this point the Port could not
in good conscience continue to let EcoWorld think that it was, and it should
have said
so, rather than remaining silent.
- [126] Under this
cause of action EcoWorld consequently seeks to be put into the position it would
have been in had it been informed
that a right of renewal was no longer
available in mid-2017 or otherwise in January 2018. EcoWorld says this would,
provide it with
at least three-and-a-half years to conduct the orderly wind-down
and closure of its business, and the opportunity it would have had
to remove its
aquarium and the animals from the
Land.
Principles of equitable
estoppel
- [127] The
principles of equitable estoppel are clear. The basic principle underlying the
doctrine is that “a party will not
be permitted to deny an assumption,
belief or expectation that it has allowed another to rely on where such a denial
would be unconscionable.”29 There are four requirements here
EcoWorld must show:30
(a) a belief or expectation by EcoWorld was created or encouraged by words or
conduct of the Port;
(b) to the extent an express representation was relied upon, it was clearly and
unequivocally expressed;
(c) EcoWorld reasonably relied to its detriment on the representation; and
(d) it would be unconscionable for the Port to depart from the belief or
expectation.
- [128] I turn to
consider each of these elements below. In doing so I note it is important to
retain in mind the broad rationale for
the Court’s approach here, which is
(to adopt the words of Oliver J in Taylor’s Fashions Ltd v Liverpool
Victoria Trustees Co) to ascertain whether it would be unconscionable for
the Port to deny an expectation that it knowingly or unknowingly created or
encouraged EcoWorld to have and to rely on to its detriment.31 In
doing so, I will consider as they arise certain additional factual matters here
ancillary to the primary factual narrative but
relevant to this cause of action
in particular.
29 Sutherland v Lane [2020] NZHC 721 at [129]–[130];
and see National Westminster Finance NZ Ltd v National Bank of New Zealand
Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 548 (CA) at 549.
30 See for example Wilson Parking New Zealand Ltd v Fanshawe
136 Ltd [2014] NZCA 407, [2014] 3 NZLR 567 at [44], applied in Creative
Development Solutions Ltd v Chorus New Zealand Ltd [2021] NZCA 178.
31 Taylor’s Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co
[1982] QB 133 at 151–152.
Belief or expectation created or encouraged in
EcoWorld by the Port through a clear and unequivocal representation
- [129] The first
question is whether the Port created or encouraged by its words or conduct a
belief or expectation in EcoWorld that
it had continued tenure beyond July
2021.
- [130] Whether a
belief or expectation was created or encouraged in the
plaintiff:32
... must be judged objectively according to the impact that whatever is said
may be expected to have on a reasonable representee in
that position and with
the known characteristics of the actual representee ...
- [131] A
plaintiff must show that any representation it relied on was clearly and
unequivocally expressed, or in other words the language
must be precise and
unambiguous and be reasonably understood in the particular sense
required.33 The relevant promise, objectively understood, must be
apparent from the alleged representation.34 A Court would need to
consider whether a reasonable person would have inferred what is alleged to have
been represented.35
- [132] EcoWorld
claims here that in the Port’s letter of 16 September 2015, it gave
EcoWorld a voluntary, unequivocal promise
(that is, a representation) that a
10-year right of renewal was available to EcoWorld if it wanted it. EcoWorld
says that, ever since
that date, it has had a reasonably held belief that it
would have continued tenure beyond July 2021.
- [133] I
disagree. In my view, neither in its 16 September 2015 letter, nor in any
subsequent communications thereafter, was there
any clear and unequivocal
representation on the part of the Port that EcoWorld would have continued tenure
beyond July 2021. As at
16 September 2015, and at all times following, the
parties were (intermittently) engaged in negotiating terms.
32 Primus Telecommunications Plc v MCI WorldCom International
Inc [2004] EWCA Civ 957 at [30], cited with approval in Creative
Development Solutions Ltd v Chorus New Zealand Ltd, above n 30, at [86]; and see Wilson Parking New
Zealand Ltd v Fanshawe 136 Ltd, above n 30, at [125], referring to an expectation
the defendant “reasonably engendered” in the plaintiff.
33 Coffey v Coffey [2012] NZHC 1765 at [132].
34 John McGhee (ed) Snell’s Equity (34th ed, Thomson
Reuters) at [12-024].
35 Creative Development Solutions Ltd v Chorus New Zealand
Ltd, above n 30, at [86].
- [134] I note at
this point that a promise made during negotiations which are “subject to
contract” will not found an estoppel,
because a plaintiff must have been
led to believe that the promise would affect or lead to legal relations.36
As I have found above, such a situation existed here. At all material
times any offer of a right of renewal was subject to recording
the agreement in
a variation to the Lease. And, throughout, EcoWorld cannot reasonably have been
led to believe that it would have
continued tenure beyond the expiry of its
Lease, given that it and Mr Reuhman persisted in their attempts to renegotiate
more and
more additional aspects of what they wanted as lessees.
- [135] I am
satisfied too that, objectively considered, any renewed or ongoing possession of
the Land beyond the expiry of the Lease
would need to be formally set out in a
variation to the Lease before it was effectual, consistent with cl 19 of the
Lease. At no
point did the Port represent to EcoWorld that EcoWorld would have
the right to renew the Lease even in the absence of an agreement
to this effect
— such a right was at all times subject to the parties reaching an
agreement, and as I have noted, EcoWorld
throughout chanced its arm to achieve
better rental, rent review, future development, and early termination
conditions.
- [136] Neither
was such a representation noted above, objectively considered, engendered in any
of the Port’s subsequent communications
to EcoWorld:
(a) The Port’s letter of 3 February 2016 never stated that EcoWorld had
a right of renewal. Rather, it constituted negotiations between the parties,
reiterating (and thus clearly indicating) that any variation
to the Lease to
this effect would need to be formally documented.
(b) The Port’s February 2018 email stated it “would” agree to
provide EcoWorld with rights of renewal for four
terms of five years each. At
this point, there was clearly no intention to be bound by such an offer:
(i) first, it was made on a “without prejudice” basis,
understandably thereby requiring subsequent approval;
36 Krukziener v Hanover Finance Ltd [2008] NZCA 187, [2010]
NZAR 307 at [38].
(ii) again, it was clearly subject to acceptance of the offer from EcoWorld;
and
(iii) as ever, all parties were well aware that any agreement would need to be
recorded by way of variation to the Lease.
(c) I am also satisfied on the evidence before me that the oral discussions
between the parties over the years, objectively considered,
never represented to
EcoWorld that it would be entitled to remain on the Land beyond July 2021.
Rather, it seems these discussions
involved ongoing negotiations as to certain
terms of the Lease, such as the rent provisions and the future development
clause (the
removal of which was described at points, in particular the 22
January 2018 letter, as “critical” to EcoWorld).
(d) In terms of the representations EcoWorld claims were made to it by elected
councillors on behalf of the Port, Mr Reuhman testified
that the two MDC
councillors told him words to the effect that the Port would “never kick
EcoWorld out”. Mr Reuhman said
this happened on four occasions. However,
while the two councillors in their evidence could not say categorically that
they did not say those words, their evidence was that it was unlikely
they would have said that. This was particularly the case, they testified,
given
the MDC has no ability to control or direct what the Port does in its commercial
operations. I found the two councillors to
be honest and careful witnesses whose
testimony was credible. Moreover, even if they had made such comments, I am
satisfied a reasonable
person in Mr Reuhman’s position, armed with the
knowledge he had, would have recognised first, that the councillors did not
have
authority to make representations on the Port’s behalf and secondly, the
proper course here was to disregard such statements
as they would not represent
an actual position in relation to ongoing tenure for EcoWorld in any case.
(e) Although I accept the Port did consult with EcoWorld in August 2020 and
September 2020 to discuss its Picton port redevelopment
project, it is clear the
Port consulted with a number of its tenants at this time regardless of when
their leases were due to expire.
Such consultation was certainly not specific to
EcoWorld. Indeed, Mr Welbourn gave evidence that the Port consulted with all
owners
and occupiers of potentially affected land, including some tenants who
had only a 12-month lease. The fact that the Port consulted
with EcoWorld as a
current lessee does not constitute a clear and unequivocal representation that
EcoWorld would have ongoing tenure
beyond the expiry of its lease. This is
particularly the case in light of all the surrounding circumstances, which
included, as I
have noted, the ongoing negotiations between the parties.
- [137] For all
the reasons outlined above I am satisfied that, objectively assessed, there
could not have been any real or justifiable
belief or expectation created or
encouraged in EcoWorld by the Port through any clear and unequivocal
representation here. EcoWorld’s
claim for relief by reason of equitable
estoppel must fail at this point.
Reasonable reliance on the representation by
EcoWorld to its detriment
- [138] And, in
any case, I am also satisfied here that there was no reasonable reliance on any
alleged representations by EcoWorld
to its detriment.
- [139] I first
consider whether any reliance by EcoWorld on the alleged representations was
reasonable. The assessment of whether a
plaintiff reasonably relied on a
representation is necessarily objective, assessed from the perspective of the
representee against
the particular circumstances of the
case.37
- [140] As I have
already noted, the alleged representations occurred in the course of the
parties’ negotiations. Negotiations
are by their nature fluid and subject
to change.
- Wee
Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] SGCA 36 at [43], referred to in
Creative Development Solutions Ltd v Chorus New Zealand Ltd, above n 30, at [95].
Indeed, this is clearly visible in this case in the various concessions both
parties advised they would be prepared to either accept
or to move their
positions on. Most notably, these would include the comment in EcoWorld’s
January 2018 letter that the 10-year
right of renewal was an offer “which
EcoWorld would accept if nothing more were available”. The sole
director of EcoWorld, Mr Reuhman, on the evidence, has been a director of 35
companies, including a commercial leasing
company. Therefore it does not seem to
be contested that he has experience owning property and also dealing with
commercial leases.
To the extent EcoWorld relied on representations made during
the course of these negotiations, through its director Mr Reuhman, a
man
experienced in such matters, arguably such reliance cannot be seen as reasonable
in all the circumstances here.
- [141] I am also
satisfied that to the extent there was reliance by EcoWorld, such reliance was
not to EcoWorld’s detriment.
- [142] On this
aspect, EcoWorld pleads that it relied on the Port’s representations to
its detriment in three ways:
(a) EcoWorld carried out upgrades to its cinema complex;38
(b) EcoWorld engaged with architects and designers to develop plans for its
proposed business expansion; and
(c) EcoWorld “carried on its business” on the basis it had a right
to renew.
- [143] On the
evidence before me, however, there is simply no basis to any of these
claims.
- [144] With
respect to the cinema complex upgrades, Mr Reuhman pleaded that he spent
significant sums of money in reliance on the promise
in developing the cinema
complex. However, this is simply not borne out on the evidence. The expenditures
in question were made in
December 2014, March 2015 and June 2015. However,
the
- I
leave to one side here the fact the cinemas are owned and operated by a separate
company, Picton Cinemas Ltd.
first representation alleged to be relied upon was the Port’s letter of 16
September 2015. Mr Reuhman accepted in cross-examination
the upgrades to the
cinema were made before this date. EcoWorld could not have relied upon the
Port’s 16 September 2015 letter
with respect to its upgrades. By this
point, the upgrades were already complete.
- [145] As to the
design work, EcoWorld contended it “engaged with” architects and
designers to develop plans for its Picton
Wharf expansion. However, Mr Reuhman
accepted in cross-examination that in fact EcoWorld paid nothing for the concept
plans. I also
note EcoWorld engaged in what seems to be a preliminary way with
these designers and architects despite having never replied
to Mr
Lock’s email of 19 February 2018. I conclude there was no detriment to
EcoWorld with this design and plans work
to the extent it relied on the alleged
representations in so acting.
- [146] The final
respect in which EcoWorld claims to have incurred detriment is in continuing to
operate its business on the basis
it assumed it had a right to renew the Lease.
I am satisfied, however, that given all the circumstances here EcoWorld would
have
continued to operate its business in any case, as its lease was still
running right up to July 2021.
- [147] In this
regard I note first, Mr Reuhman’s own admission in his evidence that he
would have carried on business in the
same way, regardless of whether or not it
had a right to renew. Minor expenses Mr Reuhman identified were being incurred
“with
an eye to the future,” but he later accepted in
cross-examination these were simply the “sort of operating decision you
would make in the ordinary course of business”. And, on this aspect,
EcoWorld, in closing submissions from its counsel, has
endeavoured to say that
it had added many animals to its collection over the years and it had not taken
any steps to investigate
whether an alternative site might be available, nor to
make arrangements to rehome any of the animals, or indeed to wind down its
business.
- [148] However,
overall I am satisfied there is no evidence before me to suggest that EcoWorld
would have acted in any way differently
had the alleged representations not been
made. In particular, this is clear from how EcoWorld has in fact acted, given it
continued
and continues to remain in possession of the Land operating the
business.
IT does this despite being faced with the Expiry Notice, and what I see as the
proceedings by the Port against it for immediate possession.
- [149] Therefore,
I conclude on all the evidence before me that there was no reliance on the
alleged representations here to EcoWorld’s
detriment.
- [150] I find
that EcoWorld also fails to satisfy this element.
Unconscionability
- [151] The final
consideration in assessing equitable estoppel is whether it would be
unconscionable for the Port to now resile from
the expectation it is said to
have created and which arguably EcoWorld reasonably relied on to its detriment.
The element of unconscionability
is “the ultimate
touchstone”.39 This is largely moot, however, given I have
found none of the requirements for an estoppel have so far been made
out.
- [152] But, in
any case, however, I am also satisfied here that there was no unconscionable
behaviour on the part of the Port. On all
the evidence before me, I conclude
that the Port acted appropriately throughout the negotiations between the
parties. The arguments
EcoWorld raises to suggest unconscionability on the part
of the Port largely rehash its arguments in respect of the above elements,
and
therefore founder against my conclusions that these have not been made
out.
- [153] As
additional evidence of unconscionable behaviour on the part of the Port,
however, EcoWorld endeavours to point to what it
describes as material
non-disclosures in the Board paper. It was largely on the basis of this that the
Board then made its decision
as to the future use of the Land, that is allowing
EcoWorld’s Lease to expire on its terms. However, irrespective of whether
there were any such omissions (which I accept on the credible evidence of Mr
Lock and Mr Welbourn in any case would have been unintentional),
that is a
matter of internal governance for the Port, and not a foundation for any
unconscionability here vis-à-vis its negotiations
with
EcoWorld.
- Nectar
Ltd v SPHC Operations (NZ) Ltd HC Tāmaki Makaurau | Auckland CL20/02, 7
May 2003 at [141].
- [154] Indeed, I
am of the view the Port has gone not only beyond its minimum obligations under
the Lease, but also well beyond the
expectations usually to be expected from a
commercial landlord such as itself. It has made numerous offers to assist
EcoWorld in
its exit from the Lease, which offers it has then repeated on a
number of occasions. On every occasion EcoWorld has rejected these
offers to
assist.
- [155] The only
respect in which the Port might possibly be said to have bordered on being
somewhat unfair is perhaps in its 16 April
2021 offer of $75,000 for the
aquarium, a building which may be worth significantly more than that,40
and then by only providing EcoWorld with two weeks to consider the offer.
However, I remind myself that this must be seen against
the wider backdrop. The
building itself may have been of no use to the Port. And also, by this point,
EcoWorld and the Port had been
engaged in intermittent negotiations for almost
six years. EcoWorld had taken on the Lease in January 2011 knowing it would
expire
in July 2021, and had no right to renew, and had throughout this entire
period (or, at least, as I have found, should have had) the
understanding that
this had not changed. Moreover, the Lease was for bare land and specifically
required EcoWorld to remove any Improvements
made to the Land and leave it
“clean, clear and tidy” at the end of the Lease. While this might
have been somewhat costly
and perhaps difficult to comply with, nevertheless
this was the basis on which EcoWorld assumed the Lease. Finally, as I have
noted,
the Port offered to assist EcoWorld with its end-of-lease obligations and
extended the deadline for acceptance of its offer to purchase
the Improvements
which, of course, it was not required to do.
- [156] Therefore,
I find that the Port has not acted unconscionably here. It was entitled to allow
the Lease to run out on its terms.
I add too that, in not ultimately providing
EcoWorld with the 10 or more year right of renewal it sought, the Port was not
in any
real way resiling from a clear belief or expectation it is said it had
created. It was EcoWorld which, as all parties acknowledge,
was acting in such a
way to “chance its arm” to negotiate a better deal
throughout.
40 I note at this point, however, that Mr Reuhman in trying to
argue the Port was simply after a “windfall gain” here did
accept,
however, in response to questions put to him in cross-examination, that the
figure he produced for the value of the building
($2.5 million) was in fact not
a valuation of the existing building but rather his “unqualified
estimate” based on “what
it would cost to demolish the existing
building and replace it with a new, modern, equivalent asset”.
Conclusion on equitable estoppel
- [157] As will be
apparent, I have found that none of the elements required to establish an
equitable estoppel have been made out.
Consequently I decline to award the
relief EcoWorld seeks under this cause of action, even if it was only to add
several more additional
years of possession, ostensibly to wind up its affairs.
In my view, EcoWorld has had considerable opportunity to do so to this
point.
Conclusion on EcoWorld’s claims
- [158] None
of EcoWorld’s claims in this proceeding have been made out to the required
standard. All its claims here fail.
The Port’s claims
- [159] I
turn now to the Port’s claims against EcoWorld, namely an action for
recovery of the Land and for breaches of the Lease.
I will also consider
whether, to the extent EcoWorld is in breach of its obligations, Mr Reuhman is
personally liable under his guarantee
under the Lease. In doing this I will also
address whether EcoWorld’s affirmative defences are any answer to the
Port’s
claims here.
Action for the recovery of the Land
- [160] An action
for the recovery of land is an action in tort available to a lessor where a
lessee is holding over and the lessor
has been unable to effect a peaceable
re-entry. To succeed in this action, the Port needs to demonstrate that it has
an entitlement
to possession and it is being denied that possession by
EcoWorld.41
- [161] I have
found the Lease here expired on its terms on 22 July 2021. EcoWorld ceased to
have a right to possess the Land as lessee
from that date. However, EcoWorld has
remained in possession of the Land and has refused to leave. I am therefore
satisfied the Port
is entitled to possession of the Land. I will make an order
to that effect below.
41 Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand
(online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [59.9.3].
Breaches of the Lease
- [162] The
Port alleges that EcoWorld has breached the Lease including in its failure to
comply with the following obligations under
the Lease:
(a) first, that there was an implied term of the Lease42 that on its
expiry,
EcoWorld would yield vacant possession; and
(b) second, that EcoWorld was required under cl 21 to remove all Improvements
from the Land and leave the Land “clean, clear
and tidy”.
- [163] While the
Lease did not specifically state that on its expiry EcoWorld would yield
possession, I have no doubt this was what
was clearly intended by all involved.
The law in New Zealand on the implication of a term in a contract is now
well-settled, following
the Supreme Court’s unanimous agreement in
Bathurst Resources Ltd v L & M Coal Holdings Ltd as to the approach
to be taken.43 Under the Lease, at the end of which I note EcoWorld
was specifically required to leave the Land “clean, clear and tidy”,
EcoWorld was expected to yield vacant possession and to return the bare land to
its owner, the Port. I am satisfied such a term is
reasonable, and is so obvious
as to go without saying. It is capable of clear expression and does not
contradict any express term
of the Lease and also is strictly necessary to give
business efficacy to the Lease.44 EcoWorld is clearly in breach of
the Lease in failing to yield up vacant possession.
- [164] With
respect to the Improvements on the Land, cl 21 of the Lease provides that
EcoWorld, as lessee, is required to remove all
Improvements from the Land at the
end of the Lease and leave the Land “clear, clean and tidy”.
EcoWorld has not done
so. It is consequently in breach of this provision in the
Lease.
42 I put on one side allegations raised here by the Port (but
perhaps somewhat tentatively) that EcoWorld had also breached other aspects
of
its lease, such as its resource consent terms to operate the business and its
permitted uses of the premises.
43 Bathurst Resources Ltd v L & M Coal Holdings Ltd
[2021] NZSC 85, [2021] 1 NZLR 696.
44 At [116]; and see BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire
of Hastings [1910] ArgusLawRp 71; (1977) 16 ALR 363 at 376; and Attorney General of Belize v
Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10 [2009], 1 WLR 1988 at [25].
Mr Reuhman’s personal liability
- [165] This issue
can be disposed of in short order. Clause 23 of the Lease sets out Mr
Reuhman’s personal guarantee. In
particular, I note that under cl
23.1, Mr Reuhman guaranteed payment of the rent and EcoWorld’s
performance of all the
covenants in the Lease. Clause 23.2(b) provided that Mr
Reuhman may be treated as EcoWorld for all purposes and the Port was under
no
obligation to take action against EcoWorld before bringing proceedings against
Mr Reuhman personally.
- [166] I find
that Mr Reuhman is personally liable to the Port as guarantor in the Lease for
any failures arising under the lease on
the part of EcoWorld.
EcoWorld’s affirmative defences
- [167] EcoWorld
brings two affirmative defences against the Port’s claims (which the Port
denies):
(a) First, equitable set-off. EcoWorld says that to the extent that either
EcoWorld or Mr Reuhman is liable to the Port, the extent
of any damages should
be reduced to take into account alleged conduct on the part of the Port in
contributing to that loss. This
was to include conduct through its
representations made in the Port’s letter of 16 September 2015 and its
subsequent communications.
EcoWorld says that, had it not been for the
representations in those communications, EcoWorld would have been able to manage
its
affairs appropriately, including the taking of steps either to relocate or
to wind up its business by at or about the final expiry
date in the Lease.
(b) Second, estoppel. EcoWorld says the Port’s letter of 16 September 2015
and its subsequent communications amount to clear
and unequivocal assurances by
the Port as to EcoWorld’s continued tenure of the Land after the final
expiry date in the Lease.
It says it has relied upon these to its detriment and
as a result has not taken the necessary steps to wind down its business or
to
relocate the improvements. EcoWorld says it is unconscionable for the Port to
now resile from the
expectation it created in its representations and should therefore, at a
minimum, be put in the position it would have been in had
those representations
not been made.
- [168] I have
dealt with EcoWorld’s arguments on both points earlier. For all the
reasons I have described there, I am satisfied
the affirmative defences EcoWorld
brings are without substance and are no answer to the Port’s
claims.
Conclusion on the Port’s claims
- [169] I am
satisfied the Port has made out both its claims noted above at [159]. I find
that to the extent EcoWorld is liable to the
Port for any failures on its part,
Mr Reuhman is personally liable for the same. I do not consider EcoWorld is able
to make out the
affirmative defences it raises in response to the Port’s
claims.
Relief
- [170] Having
found that the Port has made out its claims, and is therefore entitled to
relief, the question then becomes what relief
is appropriate in all the
circumstances. The Port specifically seeks the following relief:
(a) an order requiring EcoWorld to give up possession of the Land and
immediately vacate it;
(b) damages in respect of the reasonable cost of removing the Improvements from
the Land (including any animals housed in those Improvements)
plus interest;
(c) costs on a solicitor–client basis; and
(d) such other relief as the Court deems fit.
Possession
- [171] An order
for possession is appropriate. The question is when that order should take
effect.
- [172] The Port
seeks that possession be effected immediately. Its counsel submits that it would
be open to the Court to grant possession
with relative immediacy, that is within
a number of days or weeks. It considers that four weeks would be reasonable but
in any case
it should be no more than three months.
- [173] EcoWorld
for its part maintains that immediate possession would not benefit the Port, as
the Port would not continue to receive
rent, it would have legal requirements to
look after the welfare of the animals in the aquarium, and it would have to take
on the
wind-down process itself, including the costs of doing so. EcoWorld
submits that it should be given time to close down the aquarium
and asks for a
number of years (two or more) to allow it to do so.
- [174] As I see
it, immediacy is required in all the circumstances here. I am of the view that
the order for possession should take
effect in about one month, for the
following reasons:
(a) EcoWorld at all times has known (or at least ought to have apprehended) that
the Lease would expire in July 2021. It has therefore
had ample opportunity to
make arrangements for the eventual return of the Land to the Port. I accept
EcoWorld should not now be allowed
to rely on what seems to be its deliberate
failure to plan for what was a clear eventuality to prolong the period of its
(unlawful)
possession.
(b) At all times the Port has had the right under the Lease (by way of the
future development clause) to terminate the Lease and
require EcoWorld, for Port
development purposes, to return the Land with three months’ notice. There
is no reason why EcoWorld,
well over a year after the expiry of the Lease on its
terms, should now somehow be entitled to a further lengthy period of time to
wind down its operations and return the Land as required under the Lease.
(c) EcoWorld received the Expiry Notice in April 2021. It has therefore had 19
months to turn its mind to the winding down of its
business and rehoming of its
animals.
(d) From undisputed evidence before me, it is clear the Port has made numerous
offers to assist EcoWorld in its end-of-lease obligations,
including rehoming
the aquarium’s animals. The Port advises again that it remains willing to
provide that assistance.
(e) The Port is prepared and ready to take on responsibility for the animals and
marine life. I acknowledge that EcoWorld has expertise
in looking after the
animals and marine life housed at the aquarium. However, notwithstanding the
looming expiry of its Lease, on
the evidence before me it seems it has made no
firm arrangements in preparation for their future rehoming. By way of
contrast,
the Port has engaged with Te Papa Atawhai | the Department of
Conservation and the Zoo and Aquarium Association in order to
do so. It advises
it has the funding required in order to safely rehome the animals. It has also
arranged for a previous manager
of EcoWorld to assist in this process. Although
I accept EcoWorld could safely rehome the animals, I have no doubt the Port
would
actively and properly carry out the safe and effective rehoming as it has
assured the Court it would be able to do if this may be
required.
- [175] In making
any determination in this case, a real concern must be the welfare of the
animals housed in the aquarium. Conscious
of this, I am confident however that,
with the orders I am proposing to make, the animals will be removed safely. If
EcoWorld is
unable to rehome the animals within the timeframe I have allowed for
it to relinquish possession of the premises the Port has maintained
throughout
that it will be able to handle this responsibility effectively. I am affirmed in
this view from detailed assurances to
this effect from the Port itself. It
appears too that the Port has indeed made preliminary preparations with relevant
persons for
their assistance in this task in anticipation of such an
eventuality. If this eventuality does occur, it is expected the Port will
properly and safely carry out this rehoming task. I am satisfied there is no
real danger to the welfare of the animals with the orders
I am
proposing.
- [176] I note
EcoWorld’s objection to relinquish possession on the basis it says it
would cost more for the Port to undertake
the necessary processes than it would
to do
so itself. Again as I have noted, however, EcoWorld has had a number of years to
prepare for this eventuality and it appears it has
made very little, if any,
preparation for what was an entirely foreseeable eventuality. If it may cost
more as a result, this in
my view is a consequence of EcoWorld’s
actions.
- [177] Therefore,
an order that EcoWorld relinquish possession of the Land within 20 working days
of the date of this decision is to
follow.
Damages
- [178] As I have
found above, the Port is entitled under the Lease to recovery from EcoWorld of
the bare land without the Improvements.
EcoWorld has failed to date to remove
those Improvements.
- [179] The Port
seeks damages for the cost of removing such Improvements as remain, as well as
the costs of removing the marine life
and other animals that may remain in the
Improvements.
- [180] In my
view, this is wholly appropriate.
- [181] A long
established principle, (known as the rule in Joyner v Weeks) provides
that where a lease contains a covenant to leave the premises in good repair at
the end of the term, and the lessee breaks
that covenant, the lessee must pay
the lessor “a reasonable and proper amount for putting the premises into
the state of repair
in which they ought to have been
left”.45 The Court of Appeal has
found that this rule applies in New Zealand, noting that when a lessee has
failed to perform a covenant in
a lease, the prima facie measure of damages is
ordinarily the cost of having the covenant
performed.46 Thus, if a lessee fails to
remove or make good improvements at the end of the lease, the lessor is entitled
to damages in the amount
of the reasonable cost of removing or making good those
improvements.47
45 Joyner v Weeks [1891] UKLawRpKQB 90; [1891] 2 QB 31 (CA) at 43–44.
- Maori
Trustee v Rogross Farms Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 410 (CA), citing Joyner v
Weeks, above n 45, at
43–44.
47 Maori Trustee v Rogross Farms Ltd,
above n 46, citing Joyner v
Weeks, above n 45, at
43–44.
- [182] As
EcoWorld has rightly pointed out, however, the Court of Appeal noted the rule in
Joyner v Weeks is not an absolute rule. It also noted though that it will
only be displaced where the lessee is able to show that in both the short
and
long term the lessor will “definitely suffer no loss” or will suffer
a loss which “can definitely be assessed
as less than the prima facie
measure”.48 I do not consider here there is sufficiently cogent
evidence before the Court to demonstrate that the losses the Port will suffer
in
this case are “definitely” less than the cost of removing the
Improvements. I therefore do not consider the usual
rule that the Port should be
entitled to damages in the amount of the cost of removing or making good the
Improvements is displaced.
- [183] EcoWorld
was obliged to remove all Improvements and leave the Land clear and tidy. It has
not done so to date. Any damages should
therefore be the reasonable costs of
removing the Improvements and making good the site.
- [184] With
respect to the costs of removing the Improvements, EcoWorld attempts to draw a
distinction between the aquarium and its
animals and stock. However, such a
distinction in my view does not hold up. Anything added to the Land is an
“improvement”.
The aquarium and buildings have clearly been added to
the Land. The animals have also been brought onto the land the subject of the
Lease. The wording in cl 3.0, which refers to “further constructions or
additional improvements”, suggests that improvements
need not necessarily
be only physical structures. A possible argument exists that, in this context,
where the Improvements in question
include an aquarium, for present purposes the
animals in that aquarium might also in one sense be considered
“Improvements”
to the Land as well. I leave that argument on one
side here, however.
- [185] When
considering the PLA itself, it is notable this automatically implies into a
lease a covenant on termination that the lessee
yield up the leased premises in
the condition they were in when the term of the lease began.49 It
simply would not be possible to remove the aquarium building without also
removing the animals and stock. I accept the Port’s
submission that for
the Land to revert to the condition which
48 At 420.
49 Property Law Act, sch 3 pt 3 cl 13(1)(b).
it was in previously, both the aquarium and its animals and stock must be
removed. Any damages for the reasonable cost of removing
the Improvements (which
includes the aquarium) must therefore include the costs of removing the
animals.
- [186] And, as I
have found above, I do not consider the amount should be reduced by way of
equitable set-off.
- [187] I
therefore find that the Port is entitled to damages in the reasonable amount of
the costs of removing any Improvements from
the Land, including the aquarium and
its stock which remain after the 20 working day period from the date of this
judgment has expired.
An order to this effect will follow.
Costs
- [188] The Port
also seeks costs on this proceeding on a solicitor–client basis given the
terms of the Lease.
- [189] For a
party to be entitled to indemnity costs, the right must be plainly and
unambiguously stated.50 In Drive Holdings Ltd v Mission Bay
Pharmacy Ltd, the Court held that the lessor was entitled to costs assessed
on a solicitor–client basis, subject only to reasonableness
of the costs
charged by the lessor’s solicitors.51 In that case, the lease
had provided that “all costs charges and expenses for which the Lessor
shall become liable” as
a result of the lessee’s breach or default
were to be paid by the lessee.
- [190] The clause
in the present Lease is clear. It is suggested it outlines the costs position in
the present case even more directly
than that which prevailed in Drive
Holdings Ltd v Mission Bay Pharmacy Ltd. In the present case, cl 1.11 of the
Lease provides that:
If at any time Port Marlborough shall be obliged to incur legal or other
expenses because of any default on the part of the Lessee,
then the Lessee
50 Synlait Milk Ltd v New Zealand Industrial Park Ltd
[2020] NZSC 157, [2020] 1 NZLR 657 at [189]–[196].
51 Drive Holdings Ltd v Mission Bay Pharmacy Ltd HC
Tāmaki Makaurau | Auckland CIV 2005- 404-00829, 27 May 2005, upheld on
appeal in Mission Bay Pharmacy Ltd v Drive Holdings Ltd CA 98/05, 29 June
2006 at [61].
shall upon demand reimburse Port Marlborough for the reasonable costs which
it has incurred.
- [191] I have
found that EcoWorld is in breach of its Lease and that it has unlawfully
remained in possession of the Land. It is clear
the Port has been obliged to
incur legal and other expenses as a result. I am therefore satisfied that the
Port is entitled under
the Lease to be reimbursed by EcoWorld for its reasonable
legal costs consequently incurred. This includes those costs on a
solicitor–client
basis. An order to this effect will follow.
Any other relief
- [192] I consider
the relief as already described is appropriate here. Any other relief by way of
further damages, interest or otherwise,
was not the subject of detailed
submissions before me. Leave to approach this Court for further clarification on
these issues will
be reserved.
Summary
- [193] In
summary, I now set out my answers to each of the questions posed above at [68]:
(a) First, was there a contractual 10-year right of renewal?
No.
(b) If no, should the Court nevertheless grant relief to EcoWorld under s 264 of
the PLA?
No.
(c) Is EcoWorld entitled to an order for specific performance against the Port
for a new lease on the terms of the alleged right
of renewal?
No.
(d) If no, should EcoWorld nevertheless be granted relief in equity under the
doctrine of estoppel on the basis of representations
made to it by the Port?
No.
(e) Is the Port entitled to an order for possession of the Land?
Yes.
(f) Has EcoWorld breached the Lease by:
(i) failing to yield possession; and
(ii) failing to remove all Improvements from the Land and to leave the Land
clear, clean and tidy?
Yes.
(g) Is Mr Reuhman personally liable for any failures under the lease on the part
of EcoWorld?
Yes.
(h) What relief, if any, ought to be awarded?
The Port is entitled to relief in terms of the orders made below at [196].
Result
- [194] EcoWorld’s
claims under its causes of action in the 23 proceedings are unsuccessful. They
are dismissed in their entirety.
- [195] The Port
has succeeded in its claims under its causes of action in the 29 proceedings.
The Port is entitled to possession of
the Land as well as certain damages as
claimed and reimbursement for its costs incurred, in terms of the following
orders.
Orders
- [196] I
make the following orders:
(a) EcoWorld is to relinquish and provide to the Port vacant possession of the
Land within 20 working days of the date of this decision.
(b) The Port is entitled to damages against EcoWorld and Mr Reuhman (jointly and
severally) in the reasonable amount of the costs
of removing any Improvements
from the Land that remain after the period noted at [196](a) above, including
the aquarium (and making
good the site) and including also removal of any
animals housed in those improvements that remain at that time.
(c) The Port is entitled under the Lease to be reimbursed by EcoWorld and Mr
Reuhman jointly and severally, for the reasonable legal
costs and disbursements
it has incurred on this proceeding, on a solicitor–client basis, such
costs and disbursements to be
approved by the registrar.
- [197] Leave is
reserved to either party to approach the Court on 5 working days’ notice
for any further clarification that may
be reasonably required on the question of
damages and interest thereon, or relating to implementation of any of the orders
made in
this judgment.
Gendall J
Solicitors:
Toby Gee Barrister and Duncan MacKenzie Barrister for EcoWorld Aquarium
Limited Bell Gully for Port Marlborough New Zealand Limited
Copy to Second Defendant
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