Deliu v Various Parties [2024] NZHC 1423 (31 May 2024)

Last Updated: 1 July 2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2024-404-0500 CIV-2024-404-0671 CIV-2024-404-0820 [2024] NZHC 1423

BETWEEN	FRANCISC CATALIN DELIU Applicant
AND	VARIOUS PARTIES Respondents

Judicial review list:	29 May 2024
Appearances:	Applicant in person C A Griffin as counsel assisting (CIV-2024-404-0500) P J Gunn and O Kiel for Attorney-General (CIV-2024-404-0671) M J Hodge for fourteenth to sixteenth respondents (CIV-2024- 404-0671) B M McKenna for first respondent (CIV-2024-404-0820)
Date of judgment:	31 May 2024

REASONS FOR DECISION OF JAGOSE J

[Recusal]

This reasons for judgment was delivered by me on 31 May 2024 at 3.30pm.

Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

.............................. Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Counsel/Solicitors:

C A Griffin, Barrister, Wellington B M McKenna, Barrister, Auckland M J Hodge, Barrister, Auckland

Crown Law, Wellington

Copy to:

Mr Deliu

DELIU v VARIOUS PARTIES [2024] NZHC 1423 [31 May 2024]

[1] These three proceedings were called sequentially before me in the judicial review list on 29 May 2024, all but Ms McKenna appearing remotely. In the course of the first (-0500), I indicated my intention to include in directions for each a timetable for filing any application for security for costs.

• [2] As may be seen from my associate’s annexed transcription of the list’s call, Mr Deliu immediately moved for my recusal “from all matters today” on grounds I was “involving” myself in the proceeding, “completely out of thin air” and without any basis for the suggestion, to “interfer[e] in the proceeding by suggesting a substantive step”. Mr Deliu submitted:

• [A] lay observer would reasonably consider that you’ve involved yourself, as I put it earlier, in the game. You’re no longer the referee who is just deciding what parties raise. You’re actually participating in the game and the bad part is you’re participating against me.

[3] Mr Deliu renewed his application for my recusal on call of each subsequent proceeding:

(a) in -0671, he elaborated his reasons in -0500 included no party sought security, counsel assisting lacked standing to seek security and the parties had agreed to progress to hearing which my direction risked derailing. In -0671, he submitted my recusal was “especially important” because the Crown sought to remove parties from the proceeding, which he was concerned my alleged bias against him might lead me to grant, leaving him without recourse as of right; and

(b) in -0820, he elaborated his reasons in -0671 included the Crown’s and Law Society’s senior counsel’s awareness of the option of seeking security, as to which me “effectively suggesting to the Government or those in authority, that they should seek to strike out or seek security of costs” was “outrageous”. In -0820, my “acting with open bias against [him] and ... not acting as a fair and impartial judicial officer” in the preceding two matters exacerbated my continued presence as his adversary.

• [4] I declined to recuse myself, with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
• [5] Resolution of legal disputes by impartial and independent judges is “an essential underpinning” of democratic society.¹ Those charged with criminal offences have “the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court”;² the right to apply for judicial review engages no lesser consideration.³ Not only must the Court actually be impartial and independent; it also must appear to be so.⁴ Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has stipulated “[j]udges should not recuse themselves without sufficient cause”.⁵ Apparent bias is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.⁶

• [6] Section 171 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 required development and publication of recusal guidelines for the High Court. The resultant guidelines include:⁷

A judge should recuse him or herself if, in the circumstances, a fair-minded, fully informed observer would have a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.

giving rise to a two-stage test,8 to identify first the relevant circumstances and then any “logical and sufficient connection” to such apprehension.

• [7] To paraphrase that test for application here, the issue is if my involvement in the case makes it a real possibility a fair-minded, fully informed intelligent lay observer reasonably would apprehend I might not impartially decide the issue before me on its merits, notwithstanding my oath to “do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of New Zealand without fear or favour, affection or ill will”.⁹

¹ Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2007] NZCA 334, [2007] 3 NZLR 495 at [32].

² New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(a).

³ Section 27(2), and see Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 1, at [32].

⁴ R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1923] EWHC KB 1; [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259.

5. A v R [2016] NZSC 31 at [16], citing Stephen Sedley “When should a judge not be a judge?” [2011] 33 LRB 1 at 9 (republished in Stephen Sedley Law and the whirligig of time (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2018) as “Recusal: when should a judge not be a judge?” at 116). See also Shimon Shetreet and Sophie Turenne Judges on Trial: The Independence and Accountability of the English Judiciary (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) at 214; and Chamika Gajanayaka “Judicial recusal in New Zealand: looking to procedure as the principled way forward” (2015) 46 VUWLR 415 at 422. And see also Lyttleton v R [2018] NZCA 243 at [5]; and Stokes v Insight Legal Trustee Company Ltd [2015] NZCA 519 at [27].
6. KI Commercial Ltd v Christchurch City Council [2019] NZCA 645 at [10], citing Russell v Taxation Review Authority [2011] NZCA 158, [2011] NZAR 310 at [23] (citing Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [1999] EWCA Civ 3004; [2000] QB 451 (CA)).

⁷ Courts of New Zealand, “High Court recusal guidelines” (12 June 2017)

<www.courtsofnz.govt.nz> at 1.2.

⁸ High Court recusal guidelines, above n 7, at 1.4; see also Sisson v Canterbury District Law Society

[2011] NZCA 55, [2011] NZAR 340 at [20]–[22].

⁹ Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, s 18.

[8] In considering Mr Deliu’s application, I applied those guidelines, including the standard of “real and not remote possibility”, rather than probability, of partiality;10 to be determined by the two-stage test;11 in the application of which I am to apply the relevant principles “firmly and fairly and not accede too readily to suggestions of bias”.12

• [9] In my assessment, a fair-minded, fully informed observer would understand:

(a) judicial review is the exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over susceptible decision-makers “to ensure that public powers are exercised lawfully”;¹³

(b) distinct from other contested disputes between parties, susceptible decision-makers have particular responsibilities attached to public decision-making to be candid with the Court,¹⁴ often reflected in decision-makers otherwise ‘abiding’ this Court’s decision;¹⁵

(c) as judicial review list judge, I have responsibility for ensuring judicial review proceedings are determined “in a convenient and expeditious manner”, “effectively and completely”, including by directing at my own initiative parties’ attendance at case management conferences and any consequential directions I consider necessary;¹⁶

(d) in the context of this Court’s refusal to allow a sum held by it on Mr Deliu’s account to be disbursed in partial satisfaction of his costs liability to third parties,¹⁷ the Court of Appeal recently observed:¹⁸

Mr Deliu has, for some time, failed to meet costs orders against him. It is reasonable to infer that he does not intend to do so. There are very limited means by which the appellants can enforce the orders.

...

¹⁰ High Court recusal guidelines, above n 7, at 1.3.

¹¹ At 1.4.

¹² At 1.5.1.

¹³ Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd [2016] NZSC 62, [2016] 1 NZLR 1056 at [1].

¹⁴ At [105].

¹⁵ High Court Rules 2016, r 5.50.

¹⁶ Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016, ss 13–14.

¹⁷ Deliu v Johnstone [2022] NZHC 467.

¹⁸ Harborow v Deliu [2024] NZCA 138 at [30]–]31].

[P]ublic confidence in the administration of justice would be served by demonstrating that the Court can and will take steps to ensure compliance with its orders.

(e) the question for my decision was the content of timetable directions leading to each proceeding’s determination;

(f) no party had sought security for costs;

(g) Mr Deliu is resident out of New Zealand; and

(h) r 5.45 of the High Court Rules 2016 entitles a Judge to order the giving of security for costs if just in all the circumstances, if satisfied on a defendant’s application a plaintiff is resident out of New Zealand.

• [10] Given represented or abiding parties not then seeking security for costs, the absence of any application for security for costs might possibly lead to an apprehension I might direct the filing of any such application other than on the merits for such filing. Such apprehension would not appear reasonable to a fair-minded, fully informed observer, who would comprehend — as judicial review list judge — I am expected actively to manage judicial review proceedings, and early identification of interlocutory applications — especially if for security for costs, which if unmet may result in the proceeding being stayed — is desirable. There is no logical or sufficient connection between my role in these proceedings as judicial review list judge and any apprehension I might make timetable directions other than on the merits for such timetables.

—Jagose J

Annexure: Transcript of 29 May 2024 case management conference

THE COURT:

My apologies counsel, and also for my lack of gown. I haven’t been able to get connected

from my chambers. Right, Mr Deliu, good morning.

MR DELIU:

Good morning to you sir, I can’t see you. It’s not a problem, I just note that.

THE COURT:

Not sure if that helps frankly but there you go.

MR DELIU:

Yes [inaudible 9:04:58]. Thank you sir.

THE COURT:

Right, Mr Deliu, just wait a minute. Shall we take the 500 matter first?

MR DELIU:

Yes, thank you sir. What I propose to do for each of the matters if it’s accepted onto the bench I can just tell you where there’s agreement or disagreement and I think that will narrow things down considerably. On the 500 matter there’s only one disagreement – the hearing time. I advocated three-quarters of a day, counsel advocates half-day. I’m not particularly pushing for three-quarters of a day so it’s up to the bench really. And otherwise I think we’re in agreement.

THE COURT:

So, we’re talking about the directions proposed at [15] of Ms Griffin’s memorandum. Is that

right Mr Deliu?

MR DELIU:

Sorry sir, just give me a second, I was reading off my notes. I wasn’t actually looking at the memorandum. Um yes, you’re correct sir and I have no problem with the record coming in later. I was just proposing 20 working days but if the court, if the District Court needs more time then it’s obviously fine by me. Sir, yes, you’re right.

THE COURT:

So, there’s agreement on those directions with a half to one-day hearing. The earliest available in either case is the 2nd of October. Is that suitable to you Mr Deliu?

MR DELIU:

Just one second please sir. Yes, that’s fine by me, thank you.

THE COURT:

Thank you, and Ms Griffin, I’m sorry I didn’t even get appearances.

MS GRIFFIN:

No problem, your Honour. Yes, the 2nd of October is fine for me. I also, if Mr Deliu prefers a longer hearing time than three-quarter days, I certainly wouldn’t object to that sir. I only, mainly suggested a half-day might be easier to get a quicker hearing and I think we could do it efficiently regardless if you set it down for three-quarter days and aim to finish within a half if we can.

THE COURT:

As it happens the 2nd of October is the earliest half or full day available so you can have the date. I’m going to suggest that any application for security for costs be made within two weeks of today.

MR DELIU:

Nobody asked for that sir. Is the bench involved in the game? I thought the bench is a neutral arbiter.

THE COURT:

I’m saying that if there is to be an application for security for costs, it is to be made within two

weeks.

MR DELIU:

Well then in that case I move to recuse you. I’d like to recuse you from all matters today because you’re involving yourself in proceedings [inaudible 9:08:05] from the bench sir, to the other party. It’s a random thing to come completely out of thin air and you have no basis to make that suggestion. So what you’re doing is you’re interfering in the proceeding by suggesting a substantive step that [inaudible 9:08:20] you just advocated. So there’s a question therefore...

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR DELIU:

There’s a question therefore [inaudible 9:08:26] whether you will progress this matter at procedural hearing in a manner other than the [inaudible 9:08:32] and whether a lay observer would reasonably consider that you’ve involved yourself, as I put it earlier, in the game. You’re no longer the referee who is just deciding what parties raise. You’re actually participating in the game and the bad part is you’re participating against me. So therefore I would move to recuse you under Saxmere as a biased judicial officer and I would appreciate a ruling on that. And this goes for all three matters.

THE COURT:

Thank you Mr Deliu. I decline to recuse myself. I will provide reasons in writing, in due course.

MR DELIU:

Thank you, I’m grateful.

THE COURT:

Anything else. Ms Griffin?

MR DELIU:

No, thank you sir.

MS GRIFFIN:

Sir, I hesitate to raise the issue of security for costs. The only thing I would say is of course, is I’m counsel assisting the court, essentially I’m not instructed by an active party or anything in that regard. I would not personally feel that was something that I could advance as counsel assisting the court. The District Court has entered [inaudible 9:09:30] to abide so it would need to be a matter for that party I suggest sir.

THE COURT:

If the position is that no one seeks security for costs, that’s fine.

MS GRIFFIN:

Yes sir.

MR DELIU:

Maybe, could I suggest that your Honour appoint a defendant that can seek security. That’s an option available to the bench. You can appoint the Attorney-General as the defendant and that the Attorney can seek security. So I respectfully suggest that your Honour do that.

THE COURT:

I think I can leave that in the hands of Ms Griffin. It seems to me that if Ms Griffin’s position is that costs will not be sought by her and there is no one wanting costs to be sought then I’m not really minded to go and appoint someone for the purposes of pursuing you for costs.

MR DELIU:

I’m grateful sir. I appreciate [inaudible 9:10:27] guidance from the impartial bench.

MS GRIFFIN:

Sir, the only thing I would add there is that the issue with costs of counsel assisting the court is something that’s determined there at the end of the hearing where counsel is asked to advise based on where costs should be paid. Whether it’s the public purse or otherwise and that is a matter that we would determine much later once we’ve gone through the proceeding and we’ve got to the end and there’s an outcome. And I would be able to present submissions then and so at this stage sir, I would feel that there wasn’t a necessity for me to advance any cost matter at this stage.

THE COURT:

It’s entirely a matter for you Ms Griffin. As I’ve raised, any application for security for costs

is to be made within two weeks of today.

MS GRIFFIN:

Thank you sir.

THE COURT:

Thank you Ms Griffin, feel free to discontinue.

MS GRIFFIN:

Thank you sir.

THE COURT:

What should we move to, is it 820? Is that the next obvious one?

MR DELIU:

I believe the 820 is the last.

THE COURT:

Okay. So, let’s move to 671.

MR DELIU:

Yes sir, so on 671, I again...

THE COURT:

Just hold up a minute.

MR DELIU:

Sir.

THE COURT:

Who is appearing otherwise?

MR GUNN:

Tēnā koe your Honour, its Gunn and Kiel, that’s K.I.E.L. for the Attorney-General in this matter sir.

THE COURT:

Thank you Mr Gunn, Mr Kiel.

MR HODGE:

And may it please the court, my name is Hodge. I appear for the 14th through to 16th defendants in this matter.

THE COURT:

Thank you very much Mr Hodge. Now, Mr Deliu.

MR DELIU:

Yes, I’ll be seeking your recusal again [inaudible 9:12:27] I just want to add one extra point. Your Honour in the 500 proceeding as we’ve just heard, you [inaudible 9:12:34] of your own motion without anybody even contemplating the issue. You raised that a security for costs application could be made within two weeks. You overlooked that there wasn’t even an active party that was seeking security and that there was counsel to assist which in my submission has no standing to seek security for costs. So, I advance the same application that you’ve interfered yourself in proceedings to suggest to non-parties, not even parties – non-parties, matters in which to derail my proceeding and to deny me access to a substantive hearing. In

that case, both Ms Griffin and I, we agreed to a hearing and so there was really no dispute between us. The court as I understand it, and I could be mistaken, would ...

THE COURT:

Mr Deliu, we’ve moved off your 500 matter. We are now addressing 671.

MR DELIU:

Right, and I’m moving to recuse you on 671 because I’m concerned that you will again interfere and become a participant in the proceedings as opposed to a neutral, impartial judicial officer who just decides the disputes that the parties raise and doesn’t decide alternative dispute resolution paths. So, I maintain the same recusal but it is especially important in the 671 proceeding because one thing that has been sought [inaudible 9:13:53] improperly by the Crown, is to remove parties from the proceeding without a proper application, without a proper hearing, without any of that which has [inaudible 9:14:01] I say, that if a party’s removed I can’t sue that party therefore I can’t maintain a cause of action. So it’s effectively by removing the party, the result would be its equivalent to a strike out or a summary judgment, except that I can’t appeal a removal of a party by right as I can for a strike out and a summary judgment. So what the Crown is inviting the bench to do is effectively dispose of part of my case in a manner in which I can’t challenge it, at least not as of right. And so my concern is you’ve already shown a clear [inaudible 9:14:33] to wanting to derail my ability to pursue lawful proceedings in the 500 proceeding, except now in the 671 you have an actual opportunity to do so. In the 500 it was ridiculous but in the 671 it is not ridiculous because the Crown has raised the [inaudible 9:14:50]. And so my concern is that you will take advantage of that invitation because it appears that you have some kind of bias against me that is inexplicable and so that’s my recusal application on 671. It [inaudible 9:15:04] to 500 I accept sir. Thank you.

THE COURT:

Thank you Mr Deliu. I decline to recuse myself. Reasons will follow in writing.

MR DELIU:

Thank you sir.

THE COURT:

Where are we at in terms of the timetable?

MR DELIU:

Right, so that’s what I was going to say sir. As I proposed at the outset, I can explain where we disagree and I can explain where we agree and then I guess we can argue the disagreements. The disagreement is exactly what was just discussed, the removal of parties [inaudible 9:15:30]. I say that has to be done with a proper application, with a proper hearing to get into the issues. The [inaudible 9:15:37] appears to want to just file memorandum and just leave it at that, which I say would be inappropriate. I’ve addressed this in my reply memorandum yesterday in as much detail as I can in the very brief time that I was given. Assuming...

THE COURT:

Mr Deliu...

MR DELIU:

Sorry.

THE COURT:

I’ve read all of this. I don’t need to have it repeated at me. The short point seems to me to be that there is a timetable proposed by the Attorney, which I understand you generally to agree with.

MR DELIU:

Yes, the only [inaudible 9:16:09] I should add is it gets put off to July and ask for the 10th because your Honour put off another one of my matters for the 10th, yesterday. I have matters in the Court of Appeal on the 3rd...

THE COURT:

Yes, I understand that.

MR DELIU:

So yes, otherwise [inaudible 9:16:24] sir.

THE COURT:

What I’m proposing to do is to make the timetable directions sought by the Attorney at 5.2 and 5.3, and in terms of Mr Hodge’s memorandum at paragraph 1(a), and we will have a further call of this generally, on the 10th of July.

MR DELIU:

Thank you sir, one thing I think you might not be aware...

THE COURT:

Just, just a moment. I’m going to make a further timetable direction that any interlocutory applications including for strike out or security for costs, be made within two weeks of today. Now, Mr Deliu I stopped you.

MR DELIU:

The only point I was going to make sir, you said you would make the direction for interim disclosure [inaudible 9:17:45], so I’m not sure if that’s [inaudible 9:17:48] direction. It’s not one that I would comply further with because I’ve already done it and so I don’t know how I would be able to comply with it unless I send the same disclosure a second time.

THE COURT:

Mr Gunn.

MR GUNN:

Thank you your Honour. Just on the last point that Mr Deliu has made, he has in fact made disclosure so I think in terms of 5.2 that’s already been met your Honour. In terms of the points he’s making about the parties and removal of the various parties that the Attorney- General had sought, the Crown would be happy to address that in any response to the proceedings your Honour, on the basis that that might be sufficient and effective way of moving to the next stage of this. So, if your Honour was agreeable then we could, if indeed

we proceeded by way of strike out, include in that strike out the more formal application for strike out of the names of various respondents. That would allow Mr Deliu an opportunity to come back and for the matter to be argued before the court in the way that he seems to wish, your Honour. Other than that your Honour, we would meet the timeframes and have no comment on the timetabling orders obviously.

THE COURT:

Thank you Mr Gunn, Mr Hodge.

MR HODGE:

Thank you sir. Happy with all of that. My only plaintive request is if we could perhaps have three weeks rather than two weeks to file those interlocutories. I confess sir, I’m asking for that for no other reason than I am particularly busy the next couple of weeks. So that would be my only submission sir.

THE COURT:

Mr Gunn, any...

MR GUNN:

Crown would be happy to join that submission, your Honour.

THE COURT:

Mr Deliu.

MR DELIU:

No opposition, sir. I don’t care what the other side does, whenever they [inaudible 9:20:05] need to do it.

THE COURT:

And if I was to give you a further week for any opposition, would that be sufficient for you?

MR DELIU:

Sure.

THE COURT:

Thank you Mr Deliu. All right, a minute will issue in due course, covering off those matters. Mr Gunn, Mr Hodge feel free to depart.

MR GUNN:

Thank you, your Honour.

MR HODGE:

Thank you sir, as the court pleases.

THE COURT:

The last matter is the 820 matter. Do we have anyone for the Crown? Ms McKenna, I’m so sorry, that’s extremely rude.

MS MCKENNA:

[inaudible 9:20:55] Ms McKenna for Judge Taumaunu.

THE COURT:

Thank you. Now, as I understand it Mr Deliu, well what is your position Mr Deliu?

MR DELIU:

Sure sir, if I could go on a recusal application first. I advance the same allegations in the 500 and then the 671 proceeding. The thing that I would add additionally is in the 671 proceeding, you again suggest that a strike out or security for costs when nobody had asked for that. The representation of both the Crown and the Law Society are very senior experienced lawyers. They must be aware of that option under the rules and indeed they indicated to the court that they would give a response. Both parties used the word ‘response’ to the pleadings within five weeks or whatever it is, and so again what the [inaudible 9:21:51] defence or a strike out or a security or whatever other response, God knows. They would be fully competent and capable to file for their clients what is deemed fit. So, again it appears that the bench is now in every case that I’m appearing before in a procedure of timetabling, effectively suggesting to the Government or those in authority, that they should seek to strike out or seek security of costs against my claims. This is outrageous, sir. It is with respect, outrageous that the bench would basically tell the parties – hey don’t ya think this is a good idea? Why don’t we do this in the Deliu case.

And so, you appear to be acting with open bias against me and are not acting as a fair and impartial judicial officer and it is now two cases in which you’ve done that, when nobody has raised the possibility that you raise. And so, I yet again in this proceeding, for the same reasons I gave in the 500 and in the 671 proceeding, move to disqualify you as an adversary and not my – as my adversary – not a judicial officer. Thank you sir.

THE COURT:

Thank you Mr Deliu. I decline to recuse myself. Reasons will follow in writing.

MR DELIU:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Mr Deliu, where are we at with the orders that have been proposed.

MR DELIU:

Well, I guess I can put it this way, there’s disagreement on whether or not the Attorney should be joined as a party or whether the Solicitor should be asked to appoint counsel to assist, so that’s one point of disagreement. The other point that I’ve raised is the possibility of severing the first cause of action against the second cause of action. In other words what I say is that the first cause of action is not [inaudible 9:23:37] against the District Court Judge. I totally accept that he has not done anything wrong under the first cause of action. Rather, my cause of action is that the [inaudible 9:23:47] has failed to provide a mechanism for judicial [inaudible 9:23:49].

THE COURT:

Right, but they are all coming from the same factual context aren’t they?

MR DELIU:

Of course, of course I totally accept that. What I’m trying to do sir, is in fact be practical and not have the second cause of action adjudicated if it’s unnecessary. That is, if I win on the first cause of action and if the court agrees with me there is no mechanism, well then obviously there’s nothing the District Court Judge can do. In other words, I can’t get a reconsideration, because a reconsideration would be futile. So I suggested severing the causative action as a way to promote judicial economy in that the second cause of action might fall by the wayside. Again, it is just a suggestion. I’m not pushing for it. So, I think the proper way for your Honour to look at it today is, do you accept my suggestion or not because if you do then the first cause of action gets adjudicated and then you resolve the second dispute which is whether the Attorney should be joined as a party, which of course I would object to for the reasons I have given. Plus, the Attorney would be able to seek security from me and I’m sure you’d suggest that based on your conduct today. Whereas appointing counsel to assist, counsel to assist could not seek security from me as per the 500 proceeding. So, if the bench is against my position, appointing the Attorney is the way to achieve that goal. Anyway, that’s what has to be decided and then from there I do agree to a further case management conference in July, again the 10th would seem to be, well convenient for me at least. And I would seek that.

THE COURT:

I’m not sure I see the utility in severing the proceeding. It seems to me that having the respondent named as the Chief District Court Judge and appointment of the Attorney will simply allow all the matters that you want to bring, to be examined.

MR DELIU:

Thank you sir.

THE COURT:

I’m not sure what utility severance achieves so I propose to make the orders that are sought at paragraph [10] of Ms McKenna’s memorandum, with a further case management conference on 10 July. I’m going to include in that any applications for security for costs to be made within two weeks of today.

MR DELIU:

Thank you sir, I respectfully request reasons as to why the Attorney is better named as a defendant as opposed to counsel assisting being appointed by your sister [inaudible 9:26:39].

THE COURT:

I’m happy to do that with my minute.

MR DELIU:

Thank you sir.

THE COURT:

Ms McKenna, is there anything that you wanted to raise with me?

MS MCKENNA:

Your Honour, there’s nothing additional to the orders that you have made.

THE COURT:

All right. Anything else Mr Deliu?

MR DELIU:

No, as the court pleases.

THE COURT:

Good, thank you all. You’ll get minutes from me in due course.