Warner v United Kingdom [2000] NZCA 238; [2001] 1 NZLR 331 (12 October 2000)

Last Updated: 8 December 2011

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA 334/00

	BETWEEN	GARY DAVID WARNER
		Appellant

	AND	UNITED KINGDOM
		Respondent

Hearing:	12 October 2000
Coram:	Thomas J Blanchard J Tipping J
Appearances:	R Vigor-Brown for Appellant J C Gordon and A F Pilditch for Respondent
Judgment:	12 October 2000

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THOMAS J

The issue

[1] The question put in issue in this appeal is whether a Bench warrant issued in the Crown Court at Leeds in the United Kingdom on 25 August 1998 for the arrest of the appellant, Mr Warner, constituted a warrant for his arrest for the offences of conspiracy and burglary pursuant to s 18(4)(a)(i) of the Extradition Act 1999.

The background facts

[2] Mr Warner was charged in the United Kingdom with the following offences:

• (1) Between 27 November 1997 and 16 January 1998 conspiring with others to commit burglary, contrary to Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1997 (UK);
• (2) On or about the 15th of January 1998, committing burglary contrary to Section 9(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968 (UK);
• (3) Between the 23rd day of December 1993 and the 6th day of January 1994 conspiring with others to rob, contrary to Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 (UK); and
• (4) On or about the 6th of January 1998, together with others, committing burglary contrary to Section 9(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968 (UK).

[3] Mr Warner was granted bail but absconded prior to trial. On 29 October 1998, the warrant for his arrest was issued.
[4] Mr Warner eventually came to New Zealand. The respondent, the United Kingdom, made a request under s 18 of the Extradition Act for him to surrender. On 3 December 1999, Keane DCJ issued a provisional warrant pursuant to that request, and on 8 January 2000 Mr Warner was arrested at Rotorua. He has been detained in custody since that date.
[5] The United Kingdom then made an application under the Act for the surrender of Mr Warner to that country so that he could be returned to face the above charges.
[6] At the hearing before Wolff DCJ, Mr Warner conceded that the application for extradition had been established in respect of the last two offences referred to above. He contended, however, that no valid warrant for the purposes of the Extradition Act had been issued by the United Kingdom for his arrest in respect of the first two charges.
[7] In support of the request for the surrender of Mr Warner, the United Kingdom submitted three documents to the Court as duly authenticated “supporting documents”. The first is the warrant issued by the Circuit Judge in the Crown Court on 25 August 1998. The second is a notation made by the Judge on the Court file on 30 June 1999. It reads:

...when this warrant of arrest was issued Gary David Warner faced the charges set out in the indictments attached part numbered T981414 and signed by an Officer of the Court on 10 August 1998.

The third document is the indictment itself. It relates to the two offences in issue and bears the number T981414 mentioned in the Judge’s notation and is dated 10 August 1998 as referred to by the Judge in that minute.

[8] Wolff DCJ held that these documents complied with the requirements of the Act. The learned Judge therefore issued a warrant for surrender and later issued a warrant for detention in connection with all four offences.
[9] Mr Warner appealed against this decision by way of Case Stated. The appeal was heard in the High Court by Nicholson J on 9 June 2000. The learned Judge upheld the decision of the District Court Judge.
[10] Mr Warner sought and was granted leave to appeal against that decision to this Court on 23 August 2000.

The relevant statutory provisions

[11] The statutory provisions which are particularly pertinent to the question in issue are the definition of “warrant” in s 2 and the terms of s 18(3) and (4)(a) of the Act. The definition of “warrant” reads as follows:

“Warrant” includes any judicial document authorising the arrest of a person.

It is to be noted the definition is not exclusive. It is not limited to a particular species of warrant.

[12] Subsections (3) and (4)(a) of s 18 read:

• (3) The request [a request by an extradition country for the surrender of a person] must be accompanied by duly authenticated supporting documents.
• (4) In this section, “supporting documents”, in relation to an extradition offence, means, –
• (a) If the offence is an offence of which the person is accused, –
  • (i) A warrant issued in the extradition country by a court or a Judge or a judicial officer of a court for the arrest of the person for the offence; or
    • (ii) A copy of such a warrant:

...

Our decision

[13] We have no hesitation in holding that the documents in issue constitute valid “supporting documents” for the purposes of s 18. On its face, the warrant for arrest is signed by a Circuit Judge of the Crown Court. It authorises all constables to arrest Mr Warner who had failed to surrender as required and to bring him before the Crown Court or a Magistrates Court. As pointed out by Ms Gordon in her comprehensive written submission, the critical question is whether this warrant was issued for Mr Warner’s arrest “for the offence” as required by s 18(4)(a)(i). It clearly was. The Bench warrant for his arrest was founded on those offences. The offences are explicitly identified in the notation signed by the Circuit Judge to the effect that when the warrant of arrest was issued Mr Warner faced the charges set out in the indictment attached numbered T981414 and signed by an Officer of the Court on 10 August 1998. The attached indictment bears that number and that date. It relates to the offences in issue.
[14] Counsel entered upon extensive arguments relating to the application of the Interpretation Act 1999, the scheme and objective of the Extradition Act, the applicability of a purposive approach, and the current existence and relevance of the principle that penal statutes are to be construed strictly. We do not consider it necessary to address these issues. In our view the position is crystal clear. A warrant was issued for the arrest of Mr Warner in respect of the offences in the indictment. Because the notation of the Judge refers to and identifies the indictment which relates to the offences in issue, there is no ambiguity or gap in the supporting documents submitted to the Court.
[15] We consider that our approach is in line with the approach adopted by the Privy Council in the recent decision; Charron v United States 26 June 2000, No 53.
[16] We therefore dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the District Court Judge.

Solicitors
R Vigor-Brown, Rotorua for Appellant
Meredith Connell, Auckland for Respondent