R v Lo CA357/99 [2000] NZCA 410 (29 March 2000)

Last Updated: 25 September 2014

THE QUEEN

V

YIN TAT LO (AKA MICHAEL LO) Hearing: 29 March 2000

Coram: Elias CJ Gault J Fisher J

Appearances: L.B. Cordwell for Appellant

S.P. France for Respondent

Judgment: 29 March 2000

_{JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY FISHER J}

[1] On 9 July 1999 an Auckland District Court jury found the appellant guilty on four charges of demanding with menaces. Today he appeals against conviction on the ground that one member of the jury felt pressured by others to agree to the verdict.

[2] The accused and a co-accused had faced trial on five counts of demanding with menaces. The trial was outwardly unremarkable. The jury retired at 11 am on the last day of the trial. After three hours they sent a note to the Judge indicating that they had reached a verdict on one of the counts but were unable to agree on the others. The Judge responded with a note conveyed through the Registrar that they

Court, the last of these at 8.30 pm.

[3] At about 9 pm the jury returned. The foreperson gave the verdicts in open Court. The appellant was found guilty on the first four counts and not guilty on the fifth. His co-accused was found guilty on one count and acquitted on the others. The jury were then asked the standard question “And is that the verdict of you all?”. All responded affirmatively. The appellant was convicted and remanded on bail pending sentence.

[4] Later on the same night one of the jurors wrote a letter addressed to the appellant’s lawyer. In it she expressed dissatisfaction with the way in which other jurors had prevailed upon her and regret that she had not persisted with her own views. On the following morning the juror delivered the letter to the appellant personally at his home. He handed it on to his lawyer. The present appeal was the result.

[5] The juror’s complaint was examined by an independent barrister appointed by this Court for the purpose. His report is now to hand. With the benefit of hindsight we question whether obtaining such a report was appropriate. In any event it contains no grounds for concern. The juror acknowledges that she did ultimately agree to the proposed verdicts in the jury room, gave her assent when the verdicts were delivered in Court, and did nothing at the time to signal the concerns she later expressed.

[6] The principles governing the status of deliberations within a jury room are clear. This Court’s decisions on the point include R v Papadopoulos [1979] 1

NZLR 621, R v Norton-Bennet [1990] NZCA 36; [1990] 1 NZLR 559 and R v Beer (1999) 16 CRNZ

390. As a general principle the Court will not receive evidence from jurors about their deliberations in the jury room. The principle is designed to promote the finality of verdicts, candour and full participation in jury deliberations, and juror privacy.

[7] Mr Cordwell submitted that there should be an exception to the general principle of confidentiality where one juror later complains that he or she felt

the recognised exception relating to matters extrinsic to their deliberations. Plainly that could not be so. The way in which jurors interact lies at the very heart of their deliberations. Alternatively Mr Cordwell submitted that a new exception should be created where the degree of persuasion brought to bear upon one juror by others is so strong as to amount to a compelling reason for departure from the general principle. But that would open almost every case to the post-mortem examination of a jury’s discussions.

[8] This case falls squarely within the general principle of jury confidentiality. The juror concerned has since acted from the best of motives. The fact is, however, that having participated fully in the jury deliberations she ultimately agreed to the proposed verdicts both in the jury room and subsequently in the courtroom when the verdicts were delivered. In those circumstances there is no basis for now revisiting the verdicts or the convictions which followed.

[9] The appeal is dismissed.

Solicitors

Crown Law Office, Wellington.