THE QUEEN v JUSTIN PAUL HUEGE DE SERVILLE [2001] NZCA 188 (2 July 2001)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

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THE QUEEN

V

JUSTIN PAUL HUEGE DE SERVILLE

JOHN LESLIE HARPER

AIROE CLARKSON

LILY WAIPOURI

Hearing:	24 May 2001
Coram:	McGrath J Heron J Paterson J
Appearances:	C J Tennet for de Serville K R Smith for Harper W Lawson for Clarkson S N Hewson for Waipouri J C Pike for the Crown
Judgment:	2 July 2001

judgment of the court delivered by mcgrath j

Introduction

[1] These appeals against conviction and sentence arise from the association that each appellant had with Bryan Slight, a convicted offender who was at the centre of a drug distribution network.Each appellant was convicted by a jury of his or her particular actions in the distribution of class A, B and C drugs in different parts of the North Island.The appellants each appeal against conviction and in some cases sentence on different grounds.

Background facts

[2] In 1998 the Tauranga police became aware of the drug dealing activities of Bryan Slight and his associates.These involved supply of Class A, Class B and Class C drugs, respectively: LSD, morphine and methamphetamine, and cannabis.The police obtained an electronic interception warrant from the High Court at Rotorua on 21 July 1999.This authorised the police to intercept Mr Slight's telephone conversations from both his cell phone and the phone in his Tauranga office.Interception was carried out from 21 July to 18 August 1999 and during this period numerous drug related telephone conversations were intercepted and recorded.This, coupled with investigation of what was ascertained, led to the arrests and convictions of Messrs de Serville, Harper, Clarkson and Ms Waipouri amongst others, including Mr Slight, and provided much of the evidence on which they were convicted.This Court will now address each appellant's conviction appeal separately.

de Serville

[3] The police case on both the counts of conspiracy against Mr de Serville alleged he was an Auckland based supplier of drugs to Mr Slight.The case was largely built on their taped telephone conversations.The first series of conversations were alleged by the Crown to refer to arrangements for transactions in liquid morphine, which they referred to as "drink" in their conversations, and morphine sulphate tablets, of which 60mg strength were referred to as "oranges", 100mg strength as "greys" and 200mg strength as "greens".The conversations were alleged in count 14 to indicate agreement to supply to Mr Slight in order to enable him to deal in morphine and thus supply others.They included references to the liquid form being "easier" for Mr Slight rather than having to process morphine sulphate tablets into heroin. The conversations referred to separate dealings by and meetings of Mr de Serville which the Crown said were with his own sources of supply.The Crown said the two made arrangements in their conversations to meet in order to conduct transactions in morphine sulphate.One such arrangement was made shortly after Mr de Serville met with his supplier.Other conversations were alleged to indicate transactions in drugs between them had taken place in particular in a subsequent discussion over how much money had been handed over at a point when Mr de Serville thought he was missing $800 from a $3800 transaction with Mr Slight.Finally the conversations were alleged to indicate transactions between Mr de Serville and others had taken place which pointed to Mr de Serville dealing in drugs including morphine.

[4] The Crown's case under count 15 of conspiring to supply MDMA, known as ecstasy, was that Mr de Serville agreed to supply that drug to Mr Slight on 17 August 1999.This was the day before Mr Slight was apprehended by the police at the Henderson motel.There was evidence of two taped conversations on 17 August.In the first Mr de Serville made a telephone call to Mr Slight's phone number and left a message with an associate of Mr Slight.She was to say the letters "R.N." to Mr Slight who would know what Mr de Serville was on about.In a phone call later that day Mr Slight indicated he had got the message about RNs.In the conversation Mr de Serville referred to having "plenty right now" and that there was "either a feast or a famine".The figure "75" was mentioned.Mr Slight said he was on his way up and would call when he got there.

[5] There was further evidence obtained during the search of Mr Slight's motel and car the following day.In particular a note saying "Justin says RN" was found, corresponding with the telephone message which the tapes indicated had been taken by the associate the previous day.As well, ecstasy tablets were found in bags in Mr Slight's motel room - 10 of them were stamped "RN".

[6] The Crown case was that in the context of their drug dealing relationship these conversations established the agreement which founded the conspiracy count in respect of MDMA.The price was said to be $75 per tablet there being evidence that this was at the lower end of the market, consistent with the reference to plant being available.

[7] In his written submissions to this Court Mr Tennet argued that, on both counts, the guilty verdicts of the jury were not supported by the evidence, and in particular there was no adequate evidence of identification of morphine as the subject of the alleged conspiracy.At the hearing Mr Tennet did not press that aspect of the appeal in respect of count 14.In any event it is clearly the case that there was adequate evidence in the conversations of transactions involving "oranges", "greys" and "greens".This was sufficient to allow the jury to find there were agreements in relation to transactions involving morphine in tablet form.In that context there was also evidence on which the jury could have found dealing in morphine in liquid form referred to as "drink".

[8] In relation to count 15, involving MDMA, Mr Tennet argued there was nothing in the evidence to suggest Mr Slight would be passing on the ecstasy for supply to someone else.However we are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to infer an agreement for supply to Mr Slight of that Class B drug in order that he might supply others.In particular we have in mind the reference in conversations to plentiful availability of "RNs" and the situation with them being one of feast or famine.Not only was this relevant on the question of supply to others but its significance was not removed by the fact that only ten RN tablets, that is a relatively small number of tablets, were found in Mr Slight's possession at the motel when he was arrested.At that time Mr Slight, in addition to ecstasy (and other drugs), was found in possession of a considerable sum of cash.Clearly it was open in the circumstances to the jury to infer that part of that sum was derived from the sale of ecstasy "RN" tablets obtained from Mr de Serville at $75 each.This context takes the case outside situations where a party was indifferent to whether or not what was to be supplied would be onsold to the extent he was not a party to a scheme for selling it.

[9] Mr Tennet also strongly took issue with the Judge's decision to admit evidence of the meaning of the term "double thirty plus" which was a phrase used in conversation between Mr de Serville and Mr Slight.The evidence was in essence that it was a reference to morphine, coated with heroin.The context here was that Mr Slight told Mr de Serville that "double thirty plus" was the drug he had consumed when recently he had been seen by Mr de Serville. Mr Tennet's complaint was that this was surprise evidence, that was highly prejudicial to Mr de Serville and that it should not have been admitted at least without a voire dire.In our view however the prejudice this caused to Mr de Serville has been overstated by counsel.The evidence was collateral, but not irrelevant, to the issues in the charges against Mr de Serville.The detective was in a position to give proper opinion evidence concerning the meaning of the term.In our view the extent of the prejudice, including the absence of prior knowledge that the evidence was to be called was not significant or unfair in the overall context of Mr de Serville's trial.We hold it was within the Judge's discretion to refuse to conduct a voire dire and to allow the evidence to be given.

[10] There were two further criticisms of the Judge's conduct of the trial. First there was a contention the Judge in various ways had suggested Mr de Serville and Mr Slight knew each other well when there was no evidence that was so.We regard this as a point of no significance.Secondly there was a complaint that counsel was not permitted to bring out in cross-examination that the Crown did not proceed against Mr Slight on any charge of supply of methamphetamine.We regard this as of no relevance and evidence of it was correctly excluded by the Judge.

[11] There was also a challenge by Mr Tennet to the Judge's direction on conspiracy.Mr Tennet analysed the passages of the Judge's direction making a number of criticisms.For example, he argued the direction suggested that talking in code somehow was in itself indicative of conspiracy.He also submitted the mens rea element was not properly put.As well the Judge had failed to emphasise that it was necessary for the jury to find the agreement concerned was of real consequence and assistance before any accused could be guilty of conspiracy.

[12] We have considered the terms of the Judge's direction in relation to these concerns.In our view it would have left the jury in no doubt that in order to find there was a conspiracy they had to find there was proof beyond reasonable doubt of an agreement of real substance to supply the specified drugs.In our view the direction accords with the elements held to be necessary in R v Gemmell [1985] 2 NZLR 74, the case on which Mr Tennet principally relied.

[13] We observe in relation to each of these matters that the direction was careful, fair, and of the nature and extent generally given in a case of the complexity of this;as the Judge said it involved addressing a number of individual conspiracies in which Mr de Serville and others were alleged respectively and separately to have conspired with Mr Slight.

[14] A number of criticisms were also made of the way the defence case was put to the jury.These were summed up in the submission that the flavour of the summing up was denigratory, that it suggested the jury should convict Mr de Serville and that he had no defence to the charges.The only one of these complaints we consider it necessary to address specifically concerned the Judge's treatment of character evidence.The trial Judge did make some observations concerning counsel's submission that Mr de Serville had no previous convictions and that this was relevant to whether the evidence justified the charges against him.He told the jury that character evidence could be called to say an accused had a good reputation, so that it was unlikely he had committed the crimes he was charged with committing.Such evidence he added goes to credibility and it was for the jury to decide what weight it should carry.

[15] The Judge went on to say no character evidence of this kind was in fact called but the accused was putting forward, without dispute, that he had no convictions.He reiterated that the weight given to this evidence was for the jury but added that they may consider it was of little real value given that the accused appeared "to have been operating something of a home growing cannabis operation".He concluded saying "there is always a first time".

[16] Mr Tennet submitted that the direction in this respect was an attack on Mr de Serville's character incorporating a suggestion to the jury that evidence should have been called from defence witnesses as to how Mr de Serville was regarded in the community and that the failure to do so implied the accused had something to hide.This was wrong in law and a completely inappropriate response to Mr de Serville's counsel merely raising the absence of convictions before the jury.

[17] In R v Falealili (1996) 14 CRNZ 157 this Court held that when evidence of good character was adduced, as a matter of general practice, there should be a direction from the Judge as to its relevance to both the credibility of the accused and to whether it was unlikely the accused had committed the offences charged.In Falealili the Court also said there were logical difficulties in the proposition that an absence of previous convictions was in itself evidence establishing good character.On its own that factor was generally neutral.It was not necessary to give a direction therefore merely because, as effectively in this case, evidence of the absence of previous convictions had been elicited.To this extent we accept the validity of Mr Tennet's argument.

[18] However we do not accept that the direction was an attack on character or significantly damaging to Mr de Serville's case.In the end all of what the Judge said in particular in relation to "there's always a first time" was obvious, indeed so obvious as to not be prejudicial at all.Nor was it unfair in the context to refer to it appearing that the accused was a cannabis grower. Mr Tennet also sought to argue the Judge's observations in this respect were damaging to the credibility of Mr de Serville concerning his statement to the police that he had won $5000 at the casino.We see no link at all with observations about evidence of having had no convictions in relation to that matter.

[19] We reiterate that none of these matters would impact on the Judge's clear direction to the jury in relation to the defence case that they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the charges were made out and that there was an agreement between Mr de Serville and Mr Slight to supply the drugs the subject of the charges with the intention they be passed on to others.

[20] There were other miscellaneous points raised in his comprehensive submissions by Mr Tennet, some of which we have touched on and each of which we have considered, but do not regard as requiring particular comment.We are fully satisfied that none of the grounds advanced on behalf of Mr de Serville's conviction appeal have any merit.

Clarkson

[21] The Crown alleged that Mr Clarkson was an associate of Slight who operated in South Auckland.He was found guilty on four charges involving;

[a] Selling of Class C drugs, (cannabis)

[b] Conspiracy with Bryan Slight to sell Class C drugs (cannabis) to others

[c] Supply on 30 July 1999 of Class A drugs (LSD) to Bryan Slight, and

[d] Supply on 13 August 1999 of Class A drugs (LSD) to Bryan Slight.

[22] A substantial part of the Crown's evidence against Mr Clarkson was a record of entries in two electronic diaries that were found following a search, conducted under warrant of the house which was occupied by him and his family. One diary was located in the kitchen and had the name of a daughter of Mr Clarkson on it;the other was found in a chest of drawers in the main bedroom. This diary had another daughter's name on it.

[23] The Crown contended that evidence of the downloaded entries, which were largely in code, demonstrated drug dealing by Mr Clarkson with Mr Slight.It was alleged that the coded entries detailed orders placed by various buyers of drugs from Mr Clarkson.Mr Slight's cell phone numbers were entered.He was allegedly referred to in code as 002.There were 11 references to 002 said to record 11 transactions involving sale by Mr Clarkson to Mr Slight of LSD.

[24] It was alleged that the code for LSD was 00.This was not expressly recorded in the diaries.There were however entries alleged to be of values of unspecified drugs and of the money paid in each transaction.The Crown argued that the values could be matched with specific quantities of LSD by reference to the street value of LSD and that of other drugs such as cannabis.

[25] Morris J allowed the record of the downloaded entries from the diaries to be given in evidence against Mr Clarkson.Other evidence against him was a visual identification of Mr Clarkson at the Mangere Town Centre, identification of his voice as that of a participant in intercepted conversations with Mr Slight, and items found during the search of his house.The defence of Mr Clarkson was that there was no evidence that he made the entries in the diaries and that it was not proved he was the person at the Mangere Town Centre or whose voice was on the audiotape.

[26] In this Court Mr Lawson argued in support of the appeal that the contents of the diary should not have been admitted into evidence, being in the nature of hearsay. Further, and in any event, the opinion evidence of police officers as to the meaning of the coded references should not have been admitted.Mr Lawson also submitted that the Judge did not give an appropriate warning to the jury in relation to the evidence of physical identification of the appellant and of identification through his voice.

[27] Whether the diary entries are hearsay in our view turns on the factual question of whether they were proved to have been made by the appellant Mr Clarkson.The link to Mr Slight of the transactions recorded in the diary was established by the entry of his cell phone number.That entry referred to "Bryan/Jumbo's mate" and the Crown's case was that this evidence linked Mr Slight to the customer code: 002.

[28] A police officer gave evidence that the code 00 equated to LSD by reference to an entry for the price of "Fred Bones" or "Freds" which he said was well established usage for LSD in the drug trade.There was a range of prices for various quantities of "00" which the officer said were common prices for LSD.By this evidence he linked sales by the person making entries in the diary of "Freds" to 002, and thus to Mr Slight.The diary, on the same page, included other 00 transactions.There was also other evidence that Slight dealt in LSD because LSD was found during the search at his property at the termination of the police operation.

[29] We are satisfied that the police officer called was qualified to give the evidence of his opinion that he did regarding the codes.The logic behind his evidence was not complex nor mysterious and it was fairly before the jury in a way which could have been challenged to the full extent the defence thought appropriate.

[30] The diaries themselves were found on Mr Clarkson's premises in circumstances in which, apart from his daughters, there was no evidence that others had access to the diaries.There was also no suggestion his daughters were in any way involved.Where they were located during the search did not suggest others were involved.The crucial information for the case was stored in a confidential section of the diary.This evidence was adequate to link the diaries and the transactions their entries evidenced to Mr Clarkson, with the consequence that there was no objectionable hearsay element in the evidence.Nor in our view was there any call for editing of these entries or need for more particular direction to the jury on reliance on the entries as evidence.

[31] We have considered criticisms of the Judge's caution to the jury in relation to evidence of visual identification of the appellant, including that the direction was given by reference to what had been said by the Judge concerning identification of another accused, Mr Harper.We are satisfied that the Judge fairly put the identification issue in relation to Mr Clarkson before the jury as required by s344D of the Crimes Act.The identification concerned was of course supported by evidence that Mr Clarkson had said in an intercepted call he would shortly be where the identification was made.In relation to evidence identifying the voice on the intercepted call the same duty to direct arises.R v Wickramasinghe (1992) 3 CRNZ 478.The Judge did read out in his direction on the point passages in relevant cross-examination by Mr Clarkson's counsel of the identifying police witness. Overall we take the view the evidence of this voice identification was sufficient and the direction adequate in terms of the statutory test.Each of these grounds of appeal accordingly fails.

[32] Overall we are satisfied that there was a sufficient link established between Mr Clarkson with the entries in the diary and with him as the maker of those entries and the sales of LSD to Mr Slight to which they refer.We are satisfied there was nothing prejudicial in the way the evidence of entries was admitted nor in the scope of it.The directions as to identification were adequate in the circumstances.Overall none of the grounds argued by Mr Lawson causes concern about the convictions of Mr Clarkson.

Waipouri

[33] Ms Waipouri was convicted on counts 17 and 18 of conspiring with Mr Slight to supply Class A and Class B controlled drugs, respectively LSD and methamphetamine, in each case to others.On count 19 she was convicted of having a Class C drug, cannabis in her possession for the purposes of sale.

[34] The Crown's case principally relied on the intercepted communications between Ms Waipouri and Mr Slight together with evidence of observations of Slight's movementson 30 July 1999.The communications did not refer to controlled drugs by either their names or common trade usages.The case was that nevertheless particular terms used could be matched to the drugs concerned.

[35] On appeal Mr Hewson did not dispute it was open to the jury to make findings of fact that Ms Waipouri was the person whose conversation with Mr Slight was intercepted, that she was prepared to deal in controlled drugs and that she was in possession of cannabis for that purpose.She had also reached agreement in relation to supply of methamphetamine.But in relation to her conversations said to concern supply of LSD the nature of the drug had not adequately been proved.

[36] The transcripts of telephone conversations of 27 July clearly indicated that Ms Waipouri was in possession of "bales" for the purpose of supply and was planning to supply Slight.There was evidence that bales is code for cannabis.There was also evidence that "running shoes" is code for methamphetamine which formed the basis of conviction on Count 18. Mr Hewson did not abandon his client's challenge to all three convictions but his submissions principally concerned the conviction on count 17, in respect of the Class A controlled drug, that there was no adequate evidence to the effect that "surfboard shirts" referred to LSD.

[37] The transcripts of Ms Waipouri's conversations with Slight on 27 July 1999 at the outset indicated her interest in swapping the high grade cannabis in her possession for two other substances;"running shoes" and "surfboard shirts". It is plain from the transcripts that two separate substances were to be involved in the exchange.In a second conversation Slight indicated there was a problem with availability of "running shoes" concerning quality; they were "falling to bits".In relation to "shirts" he says he can't do anything about the shirts until he gets to Auckland "cos they're all up there".Later in the conversation he speaks of having to buy them and "take them down to them".He asks Ms Waipouri to bring the cannabis to Auckland to do a swapover.In their next conversation later in the afternoon Mr Slight reports that he has the "running shoes".

[38] On 30 July Mr Slight travelled to Auckland from Tauranga.At this time he was under police surveillance.He met Mr de Serville and evidence of intercepted conversations indicates that on this occasion he purchased "oranges" a term referring to morphine.Shortly before 8.00pm Mr Slight met Mr Clarkson at Mangere. There is evidence that a substance was handed over and that Mr Clarkson appeared thereafter to be counting money.Mr Clarkson in fact supplied LSD to Mr Slight on this occasion.There was evidence from entries in a diary that were consistent with the sale of LSD on 30 July.

[39] The transcripts thereafter indicate Mr Slight went to the property in Mt Albert and eventually met Ms Waipouri.The visit to Mt Albert was confirmed by the evidence of the surveying officer.

[40] When on 18 August Mr Slight was arrested at the Lincoln Court Motel in Auckland LSD was amongst the drugs found in his possession.

[41] It is true, as Mr Hewson emphasised, that there is no reference to "shirts" as having a common slang meaning equating to LSD.Nor is there evidence that the term is used other than in the conversations between Ms Waipouri and Mr Slight that were intercepted.However the jury had before it evidence that Mr Slight would have to travel to Auckland to gain access supplies of "surfboard shirts" to do a swap trade with Waipouri.They were not available in Tauranga.The "shirts" were a different substance to the "running shoes".Shortly before going to the property where Ms Waipouri was at in Mt Albert he purchased LSD.All these facts and that the visit to her took place so soon after the purchase of LSD is open to the inference that the LSD was supplied to Ms Waipouri.As she failed to give evidence and continued even at sentencing denying any involvement in dealing in controlled drugs, there was nothing to contradict the evidence linking her to an LSD transaction, that was sufficient to satisfy us that the jury was entitled to find an agreement was reached sufficiently linked to LSD in relation to the conspiracy charge.

[42] Mr Hewson invited us to accept new evidence on the appeal being further transcripts of conversations on 30 July.It indicated "oranges" were also purchased at the relevant time by Mr Slight. We took the view the additional evidence was not fresh evidence and is not admissible.In any event it would have made no difference to our finding.The special efforts needed to access the "shirts" coupled with the recent acquisition of LSD before meeting with Waipouri all indicate that is the substance being referred to sufficiently in the absence of any evidence to the contrary to found a conviction which is safe on count 17.

[43] Mr Hewson also made a number of criticisms of the summing up of the Judge. It is suggested His Honour equated a lie about contact with Mr Slight to the possibility of a lie about "shirts".It is also submitted he did not isolate the evidence related to the charges.There were a number of other complaints. However we are of the view that the Judge's treatment of all these matters was balanced, and that the summing up did not suggest that the earlier lie was supportive of the conclusion that shirts were LSD.None of the other grounds or indeed any of those advanced gives rise to any concern about the reliability of the jury's verdicts.

Harper

[44] Mr Harper was convicted on one charge of conspiring to supply the Class B drug methamphetamine.There was evidence that he knew Mr Slight whose telephone number was found at Mr Harper's house, as was a business card of Ms Waipouri.Mr Harper was also identified as present at the meeting at the motel in Henderson on 27 July 1999 with Mr Slight and Ms Waipouri.

[45] On appeal it was not in issue that it was Mr Harper whose conversation with Mr Slight was intercepted.Mr Smith did however contend that the Judge had not given a direction to the jury that they needed to be satisfied as to which type of drug was being discussed by Mr Harper and Mr SlightHe submitted that the direction was inadequate because it fell short of saying that the drug had to be "speed".

[46] We are, however, satisfied that the Judge's direction clearly stated the requirements.In Mr Harper's case, as in that of Ms Waipouri in relation to LSD, the agreement which the jury clearly found to have been established on the evidence related to the supply of methamphetamine between Mr Slight and Mr Harper to be thereafter supplied to others.We are satisfied there was adequate evidence that references to running shoes at particular price levels could have that meaning.There was again no evidence to contradict it.In this context the Judge's direction in our view made clear the need for the jury to be satisfied of an agreement between Mr Harper and Mr Slight to supply methamphetamine to each other and to others.The direction was adequate on the only point raised in this appeal.

Sentence Appeals

[47] Mr de Serville appealed against his sentence of four years imprisonment in particular on grounds of disparity with other offenders and what he argued was the small level of dealing, a factual contention we have rejected.We are satisfied the Judge was right to sentence Mr de Serville on the basis he was a wholesale supplier to Mr Slight who himself was a major drug dealer as Mr de Serville clearly knew.They were in close and regular contact in relation to their trade as the taped telephone communications demonstrate.The sentence, viewed objectively, is not out of line with those of other offenders including Mr Slight.Four years imprisonment even for a first offender was by no means an excessive sentence for Mr de Serville's offending.

[48] Mr Clarkson did not appeal against his sentence.

[49] In support of Mr Harper's appeal against sentence Mr Smith submitted that he was sentenced to 3½ years imprisonment for a single supply.He submitted there was disparity with those others who were sentenced by a different judge.However Mr Harper had previous cannabis convictions including one for possession of cannabis for supply for which he had been imprisoned albeit 9 years agoMr Harper was of course convicted of conspiracy and, importantly, sentenced on the basis that tape recordings made plain he was prepared to continues his association with Mr Slight.In these circumstances a sentence of 3½ years imprisonment was not excessive.

[50] Ms Waipouri was sentenced to four years imprisonment.She was of course convicted on 3 counts: conspiracy to supply LSD, conspiracy to supply methamphetamine and possession of cannabis for sale.The Judge sentenced her on the basis that she was an active participant more deeply involved than a number of other associates of Mr Slight.He did so after acknowledging her impressive employment and academic history.

[51] Ms Waipouri did not help herself at sentencing by reiterating her hopeless assertions that conversations related to clothing merchandise and not drugs. On the other hand the quantity of the drugs involved in the charges on which she was convicted was not clear and her wider involvement consisted only of introducing Mr Slight to Mr Harper.Mr Hewson's submission that she was not shown to have been implicated in drug dealing to the extent of Mr de Serville, whose sentence was identical, in our view has merit.Unlike Mr Harper she has no relevant previous offending history and in other respects has a good record of personal achievement.We consider that the appropriate sentence in her case was one of three years imprisonment and her appeal against sentence is allowed with that sentence being substituted.

Conclusion

[52] For these reasons the appeals against conviction by Mr de Serville, Mr Clarkson, Mr Harper and Ms Waipouri are dismissed as are the appeals against sentence by Mr de Serville and Mr Harper.The appeal of Ms Waipouri against sentence is allowed.The sentence of 4 years imprisonment is quashed and a sentence of 3 years substituted.

Solicitors

Kevin Smith, Wellington, for Harper

Lance Lawson, Rotorua, for Clarkson

Hewson & Co, Wellington, for Waipouri

Crown Law Office, Wellington, for Crown