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THE QUEEN v BRENDON ARTHUR THOMAS [2003] NZCA 8 (27 February 2003)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA 311/02

THE QUEEN

v

BRENDON ARTHUR THOMAS

Hearing: 25 February 2003

Coram: Blanchard J

Baragwanath J

Goddard J

Appearances: D H Quilliam for Appellant

J C Pike for Crown

Judgment: 27 February 2003

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY BARAGWANATH J

[1]The appellant appeals against his convictions on six counts of offending against his partner at Hastings in the early hours of Sunday 21 October 2001.The indictment contained six counts: two of rape, two of sodomy, one of assault with a weapon and one of threatening to kill.The grounds of appeal comprise allegations of incompetence against the appellant’s former counsel.As formulated in the notice of appeal they comprised:
a)accepting instructions when he lacked sufficient time to prepare the defence;
b)failing to carry out alleged specific instructions; and
c)conducting the case so inadequately that the appellant was obliged to take over its conduct by delivering the closing address to the jury himself.
[2]The principal complaint concerned the alleged failure or refusal by trial counsel to raise by way of cross-examination or research issues relating to the complainant’s mental health.It was submitted for the appellant that at the time the complainant’s allegations were made she was under continuing treatment for problems arising from the trauma of a gang rape some 15 years previously and that approximately two weeks before the complaint she had been seeking counselling and medication; that trial counsel should have carefully explored whether there had been some connection between the gang rape, the complainant’s need for counselling and the complaint so soon after the apparent need for counselling and medication, but he neglected to do so; that the time needed for trial counsel to consider the mental health aspects and if necessary the brief of expert witnesses was inadequate and he ought not to have accepted the trial brief; that these problems were accentuated by trial counsel’s limited experience of such trials; and that overall there was a miscarriage of justice.
[3]Following receipt of trial counsel’s affidavit the complaints of inadequacy of time to prepare and inadequacy of experience were necessarily abandoned.In fairness to trial counsel we summarise the facts and the reasons for our conclusion that the complaints against him were wholly without foundation.
[4] The appellant deposed that he had supplied his original counsel with an account in writing of everything he felt relevant including concerns expressed about the complainant’s mental state and his view that there was need to explore that question for the purposes of trial.The trial date, originally set for Monday 20 May 2002, was allocated at short notice of just over a week.Original counsel was obliged to relinquish his brief because of a clash of fixtures and arranged for a transfer of the grant of legal aid to trial counsel.
[5]Trial counsel and original counsel met the appellant at the Hawkes Bay Regional Prison.The appellant deposed that during the meeting it was said that trial counsel did not have approval to conduct trials of such weight but that ad hoc approval had been or would be given to his defending this case because of the urgency with which it was being brought on.Trial counsel’s account by contrast was that his level of experience and the proposition that there was or was to be a one-off approval for his conduct of the case were never discussed at the meeting.Mr Quilliam elected not to cross-examine trial counsel whose affidavit we accept as unchallenged.
[6]In fact trial counsel did hold approval by the Hawkes Bay Legal Services Authority to conduct trials in category three, which embraces all cases up to but excluding those carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or preventive detention.The Authority’s usual policy is to classify sexual violation cases tried in the District Court as not carrying a possible penalty of preventive detention, which is a sentence that could be imposed only by the High Court.Counsel discussed that question with the Authority which, after discussion with former counsel, was satisfied that preventive detention was not in prospect.Accordingly trial counsel was approved to conduct the trial.
[7]He deposed that he has conducted numerous trials in the past.Only two have been for sexual violation, one resulting in a not guilty verdict on the sexual violation charge and the other in a hung jury and ultimately a not guilty verdict.He considered he had the appropriate experience and would not otherwise have accepted the assignment.
[8]Following the proposal by former counsel that he should agree to act for the appellant, trial counsel perused the materials disclosed by the Crown.He was particularly concerned about the appellant’s video interview by the police which contained a detailed repetition of the complainant’s evidence that trial counsel felt was prejudicial to the appellant.He therefore advised the Crown urgently that the defence would object to the admission of the video tape.The Crown’s application to admit the evidence was heard on 13 May 2002 and the defence objection was partially successful, significant portions of the interview being ruled inadmissible.
[9]On Friday 17 May 2002, with the trial due to commence on the following Monday, trial counsel received a brief of ESR evidence but was told by the police that they would not be calling that evidence.On the morning of the hearing however the Crown solicitor advised that the Crown had changed its position in relation to certain evidence and the hearing was adjourned to commence on Tuesday 28 May.
[10]The adjournment had nothing to do with lack of preparation by trial counsel.He deposed to having, and taking, the time required to prepare evidence, in particular that relating to injuries around the complainant’s genitalia.
[11]The transcript of evidence satisfies us that trial counsel had a thorough grasp of the case and handled a difficult brief with competence.We reject the complaints of lack of experience and lack of adequate preparation.
[12]On what emerged as the central point of the appeal - appellant’s instructions to trial counsel, the appellant had asserted that he instructed counsel to obtain psychological or psychiatric expert evidence and to explore the complainant’s mental health history through hospital records.The appellant’s affidavit and written submissions did not elucidate the grounds on which such instructions were given.
[13]Trial counsel deposed that he was supplied by the appellant with written notes about cross-examination relating inter alia to the psychological condition of the complainant.They did not extend to instructions to obtain medical evidence or to instruct a psychologist. Counsel’s account was that when discussing the notes with the appellant he indicated that cross-examination was a matter for which counsel must accept responsibility and that he did not consider cross-examination relating to the complainant’s previous history would be of help to his defence.Counsel’s expressed concern was two-fold.First, he considered that the state of mind of the accused during the incidents alleged by the complainant would be the central issue in the case.Of these some, including putting a knife to her throat, were challenged only as to details.So admission of the appellant’s knowledge of a previous rape of the complainant and the fact of her sensitivity to use of force, coupled with sexual intercourse, would be severely detrimental to the claim he was to advance in evidence, and did advance, that he reasonably believed that she was consenting to the acts of vaginal and anal intercourse.An overlapping concern was that to raise such issues would expose the accused to cross-examination about his knowledge of the prior rape and his knowledge of the unlikelihood that she would have consented to sex closely associated with violence.
[14]Trial counsel deposed that he discussed these concerns with the appellant who accepted his advice and agreed that the issues should not be raised at trial.We have noted that trial counsel’s account is unchallenged.
[15]Since there is no longer any question of counsel’s defiance of instructions, in order for the appellant to succeed it would have been necessary for him to establish that counsel’s advice entailed the kind of radical mistake discussed in R v Pointon [1985] 1 NZLR 109.But at the oral hearing the submission for such a case proved unarguable.For the argument to succeed would have required at a minimum expert evidence that the complainant’s damning evidence of the appellant’s brutality towards her was the result of some psychological reaction to her alleged prior ill treatment or to the medication she had been prescribed that would predispose her to give a false account against him.But none was put before us.
[16]In the absence of any such material there could be no possible basis for us to conclude, as required by s385(1)(c) of the Crimes Act 1961, that there has been a miscarriage of justice.The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Solicitors:

Crown Law Office, Wellington


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