Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
Court of Appeal of New Zealand |
Last Updated: 2 November 2004
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
Hearing: 21 September 2004
Coram: Anderson P
Baragwanath J
Randerson J
Appearances: S Tait for Appellant
B M Stanaway for Crown
Judgment: 22 September 2004
84 Guidance on use of cumulative and concurrent sentences of imprisonment
(1) Cumulative sentences of imprisonment are generally appropriate if the offences for which an offender is being sentenced are different in kind, whether or not they are a connected series of offences.
(2) Concurrent sentences of imprisonment are generally appropriate if the offences for which an offender is being sentenced are of a similar kind and are a connected series of offences.
(3) In determining for the purpose of this section whether 2 or more offences committed by 1 offender are a connected series of offences, the court may consider--
(a) the time at which they occurred; or
(b) the overall nature of the offending; or
(c) any other relationship between the offences that the court considers relevant.
85 Court to consider totality of offending
(1) Subject to this section, if a court is considering imposing sentences of imprisonment for 2 or more offences, the individual sentences must reflect the seriousness of each offence.
(2) If cumulative sentences of imprisonment are imposed, whether individually or in combination with concurrent sentences, they must not result in a total period of imprisonment wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the overall offending.
(3) If, because of the need to ensure that the total term of cumulative sentences is not disproportionately long, the imposition of cumulative sentences would result in a series of short sentences that individually fail to reflect the seriousness of each offence, then longer concurrent sentences, or a combination of concurrent and cumulative sentences, must be preferred.
(4) If only concurrent sentences are to be imposed,--
(a) the most serious offence must, subject to any maximum penalty provided for that offence, receive the penalty that is appropriate for the totality of the offending; and
(b) each of the lesser offences must receive the penalty appropriate to that offence.
[12] In considering the purposes and principles of sentencing stated in ss 7 and 8 of the Act the Court is required to balance the public needs for firm sentencing, which include denouncing the conduct, protecting the community from the offender, deterring him and others from such offending and holding him accountable for the harm he has done, against the interests of rehabilitation and maintaining consistency in sentencing patterns. The total sentence in this case must reflect adequately both sets of offending and the appellant’s history. [13] The presence of the pistol and the circumstance of robbery of Armourguard personnel brings the second episode close to the eight year starting point imposed in R v Mako [2000] 2 NZLR 170, 183 para 54. There are no mitigating circumstances. Mr Falakoa’s third aggravated robbery on 11 November required of the sentencer careful consideration of the second, nine days before, and of his past record, including the first which had been dealt with in the Youth Court. [14] But the cumulative effect of the District Court’s sentence of 11 years is excessive when set against the distinctly more serious cases of R v Delegat CA327/02, 24 February 2003 (four aggravated robberies of taverns and bars in a three week period with a plea of guilty); R v Stevens CA12/98, 23 February 1998 (four aggravated robberies with use of weapons, three offences whilst on bail, guilty plea, term of 12 years imprisonment). [15] The essential question is what total sentence would have been appropriate had the sentencings been performed together. If an excessive term would result from cumulative sentencing it may be necessary to exceed the Mako guidelines in relation to a single episode to do justice to the totality of the offending: see Delegat paras 19-20. [16] Mr Falakoa is a young man. Important as are the interests pointing towards a firm sentence, it is in the public interest as well as his that he should not be exposed to a sentence that would crush the prospect of rehabilitation on his release. Much of the burden of his youth has not been of his making; it is important that he have the opportunity for hope in the future. [17] The Crown submitted that we should adopt as starting and finishing point a period of nine years for the second episode which, taking into account the circumstances of the first, would reach a just result if ordered to run concurrently with the prior four year term. We agree that such a result, which would in effect add five years for the latest episode, would strike a proper balance [18] But a Court is prohibited by s 76 of the Parole Act 2002 from ordering that a sentence commence at a time earlier than the date on which it is passed. The point is discussed in Hall’s Sentencing
SA83.5(b) Concurrent
The fact that a Court is not able to order that a sentence commence at a time earlier than the date on which it is passed may lead a Court into error when imposing a sentence of imprisonment concurrent with a sentence or sentences currently being served. The concurrent sentence does not run from the time of the commencement of the sentence with which it has been ordered to be served concurrently. Thus the critical factor to be considered by the Court is the time still to be served by the offender under the original sentence.
To do otherwise may lead the Court into error, as was the case in R v McGlone (CA 28/88, 1 September 1988, McMullin, Casey and Bisson JJ) [1984-1988] BCLD 1857. The Judge imposed a sentence of three years’ imprisonment which was ordered to be served concurrently with a sentence of two years’ imprisonment (eight months of which had been served), the Judge stating that the effective sentence would be less than a year. The "arithmetical error" was remedied by the Court of Appeal by quashing the sentence and imposing a cumulative period of one year’s imprisonment.
Confusion as to the commencement date of a concurrent sentence of three years’ imprisonment led to the substitution of a cumulative term in R v Love (CA 353/02, 26 November 2002, Glazebrook, Baragwanath and Randerson JJ). L had appeared for sentence on a charge of arson relating to a building the burglary of which he had been sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. The sentencer had said of the sentence "it is concurrent, so it starts at the same time as the sentence of two years imposed last year". The warrant of commitment stated the commencement date to be the day of sentence. Pursuant to a referral back by the Department of Corrections under s 74 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 the sentencer indicated the warrant was correct. The Court of Appeal observed that the sentence imposed was that which was imposed in open Court by the Judge and to give effect to the Judge’s intention that three years be served, the concurrent sentence of three years was quashed and a cumulative term of one year substituted.
[19] It follows that the course proposed by the Crown is not open to us. Instead we order that the appeal is allowed and the cumulative sentence of seven years is replaced by one of five years cumulative upon the four years sentence imposed on 13 September 2003.
Solicitors:
Crown
Law Office, Wellington
NZLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZCA/2004/236.html