R v GUY [2004] NZCA 69 (19 May 2004)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA90/04CA91/04THE QUEEN

v

ROBYN LESLEY GUYSIMON DAVID GUY

Hearing: 17 May 2004

Coram: Anderson P Hammond J William Young J

Appearances: Mr and Mrs Guy in Person
A Markham for Crown

Judgment: 19 May 2004

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY ANDERSON P

[1] This is an application brought pursuant to the proviso to s144(1) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 for special leave to appeal to this Court from a decision of the High Court dismissing appeals against conviction entered in the District Court for failing to file tax returns by due dates being 30 June 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively. Following the dismissal of the appeals in the High Court the same Judge dismissed applications for special leave to this Court.
[2] There are three principal grounds upon which special leave is sought. First, the appellants submit there was apparent bias on the part of the High Court Judge, Panckhurst J, in dismissing the applications for special leave to appeal when he had been the Judge who had dismissed the appeals from the District Court. We mention this ground first in order to dispose of it summarily. Not only is it not uncommon for the High Court Judge who has dealt with a proceeding to deal with the question of special leave but also this application cannot be characterised as an application for leave to appeal against the declining of an application to grant special leave to appeal. That is, Panckhurst J’s judgment dismissing the application for special leave to appeal is not the subject matter of the present application and is irrelevant to it.
[3] Second, the appellants argue that there is presently no lawfully constituted Parliament of New Zealand, nor has there been since the Constitution Act 1986. Their arguments invoke and paraphrase what appears to be an article published in a popular magazine in February 2000. There is nothing which would lead us to think that the magazine article is a legal resource of value to this Court. More importantly, however, is the persistent line of authority, adverted to for example by this Court in Kaihau v South Waikato District Council CA73/01 22 August 2001, which precludes the Courts from passing on the constitutionality of Parliament or other constitutional constituents such as the Courts themselves.
[4] Third, the appellants submitted as a fall back position that they as natural persons are not comprehended by the definition of person contained in the Income Tax Act 1994, such being:

“Person” includes a company and local or public authorities; and also includes an incorporated body of persons.

The argument was that only legal persons specifically referred to in the definition are comprehended by it and that since only non-natural persons are mentioned natural persons must necessarily be excluded.

[5] The proposition that in enacting the Income Tax Act 1994 the legislature intended suddenly to exclude from its tax base the original and preponderant portion of it is manifestly untenable.
[6] This Court is not disposed to grant special leave to appeals which are patently hopeless and the applications are accordingly dismissed. In accordance with the indication given in discussion between the bench and counsel for the Crown, there will be no order as to costs.

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington