McLeod v Attorney-General CA107/05 [2005] NZCA 368; (2005) 18 PRNZ 154 (20 September 2005)

Last Updated: 20 January 2014

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

_CA107/05

BETWEEN PATRICIA TUI MCLEOD & ANOR Applicants

AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL & ORS First Respondents

AND TYCO NEW ZEALAND LIMITED & ORS

Second Respondents

Hearing: 20 September 2005

Court: Hammond, Chambers and Robertson JJ Counsel: No appearance for applicants

J D Rooney for Housing Corporation New Zealand

Judgment: 20 September 2005

_{JUDGMENT OF THE COURT}

_{The application for special leave to appeal to this Court out of time is dismissed.}

REASONS

(Given by Hammond J)

[1] The applicants seek special leave to appeal to this Court out of time against a judgment of Williams J delivered on 7 May 2003 (HC AK M256-SW02) in a

MCLEOD & ANOR V THE A-G & ORS AND ANOR CA CA107/05 20 September 2005

proceeding under the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 between Ms McLeod and the

Housing Corporation New Zealand.

[2] We do not find it necessary to recite the now extraordinarily convoluted history of the proceeding. It suffices to say that Ms McLeod was aggrieved (as was the other appellant, Areta Ransfield) at having been evicted from a state house by the Housing Corporation. This was for non-payment of rent.

[3] Ms McLeod then commenced the High Court proceeding to which we have referred, by way of appeal. There then ensued a lengthy series of skirmishes in the High Court at Auckland with judgments and minutes being delivered by no less than five Judges of that Court. Ultimately, Ms McLeod was unsuccessful. In the judgment which is formally under appeal, Williams J recorded at the conclusion of that judgment, “The Court records its suggestion to Ms McLeod and Mr Ransfield during the hearing that their undoubted industry and energy might be better applied in pursuing an object other than litigation relating to Ms McLeod’s former tenancy.”

[4] That judgment was delivered on 7 May 2003. But it was not until 10 June

2005 that an application for special leave to appeal to this Court out of time was lodged with this Court.

[5] The application is misconceived in practically every respect.

[6] First, it is hopelessly out of time, and no explanation is given for the delay.

[7] Secondly, the applicants include Mr Ransfield, who was not a party to the proceeding in the High Court.

[8] Thirdly, the respondents named in the application were not parties to the High Court proceeding and cover several pages of the application. They include the Attorney-General, several other Ministers of the Crown, the Accident Compensation Commission, the Governor-General, the President of the Labour Party of New Zealand, and a diverse range of commercial enterprises, including the Bell

Atlantic Corporation of America, in New York, which is not domiciled in

New Zealand.

[9] Fourthly, the subject matter of the proposed application, if granted, is not a question of law. Rather, what is sought is something described as a “robust judicial audit” of every aspect of the dispute that Ms McLeod and Mr Ransfield have been involved in, whether before the High Court or elsewhere. In short, the applicants (one of whom was not a party to the proceeding in the High Court) seek to throw a blanket over a great many parties (who were never involved in the relevant proceeding) by way of something called a “judicial audit”, in this Court.

[10] The President considered this extraordinary application when it was referred to him by the Registrar. On 5 July 2005, by minute, he indicated that the application for filing was “improvident”. The Registrar was directed to notify the appellants accordingly so that they could either withdraw the application, or apply in proper form, with supporting information, for leave to join new (and correct) parties. The President indicated that was not to say that such leave would or even could properly be given. But the opportunity was afforded, in lay terms, to give the applicants a chance to “put their house in order”, if they could. No steps to that end have been taken.

[11] This Court has jurisdiction to protect its own processes against abuses of process of this kind. That power is a necessary and appropriate one to avoid precisely the sort of events which have occurred in this case. The application is hopelessly out of time - it is more then two years late. It is entirely in the wrong form, and between the wrong parties, and it seeks to inflict a great deal of public inconvenience and expense on a wide range of public and private individuals and organisations who should not properly have been involved in this application. No proper question of law of public importance is stated for the determination of this Court. The applicants were given a chance to try and put things in proper order, if they could. They did not.

[12] The application is accordingly dismissed as an abuse of the process of this

Court.

Solicitors:

Simpson Grierson, Auckland for Respondent