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Chen v R [2009] NZCA 445; [2010] 2 NZLR 158 (30 September 2009)

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Chen v R [2009] NZCA 445 (30 September 2009); [2010] 2 NZLR 158

Last Updated: 2 February 2018

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA770/2008
CA780/2008
CA795/2008
CA11/2009
CA35/2009
CA36/2009
CA37/2009
CA38/2009
CA310/2009
[2009] NZCA 445


THE QUEEN



v



CHEN MING CHIN
DENG GUO WEI
PAN WEI FENG
FAN LI
FUNG KAI LOK


Hearing: 23-24 July 2009

Court: William Young P, Robertson and Baragwanath JJ

Counsel: H D M Lawry for Chen Ming Chin
D G Young for Deng Guo Wei on 23 July 2009
M J Dyhrberg for Deng Guo Wei on 24 July 2009
M J Dyhrberg for Pan Wei Feng
Fan Li in person in CA11/2009 appeal against conviction
G J Newell for Fan Li in CA11/2009 and CA38/2009 appeals against sentence
D Reece for Fung Kai Lok
D G Johnstone and B Finn for Crown

Judgment: 30 September 2009 at 11am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

  1. Leave to appeal out of time is granted to Fung Kai Lok and to the Solicitor-General.
  2. The appeals against conviction and sentence by Chen Ming Chin, Pan Wei Feng, Deng Guo Wei and Fan Li are dismissed.
  1. The appeal against sentence by Fung Kai Lok is allowed. The sentence of 15 years imprisonment is set aside and replaced by a sentence of ten years imprisonment.
  1. The appeals against sentence by the Solicitor-General are allowed to the following extent:

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT


(Given by Baragwanath J)

Table of Contents
Para No

I INTRODUCTION [1]
Overview [3]
The Crown theory [5]
The verdicts [7]
The sentences [14]

II THE APPEALS AGAINST CONVICTION
Factual context [15]
The trial [23]
Mr Chen: appeal against conviction
Mr Chen’s submissions [24]
I Insufficiency of evidence [25]
II Inconsistency of verdicts [26]
III Errors in summing up [27]
IV Permitting trial to continue after “tainting”; the tenth juror
problem; the decision to continue with ten jurors [28]
Discussion
I Insufficient evidence
Mr Chen’s continuing involvement in the Isaac and Prosperity
shipments [29]
Conclusion as to presence of drugs in all shipments from Polymer 2 [34]
Conclusion as to sales of drugs [35]
Further evidence against Mr Chen [37]
II Inconsistency in verdicts
The law [40]
Its application [41]
III The summing up [44]
(a) Failure to direct the jury as to what evidence was admissible and
inadmissible [45]
(b) The absence of directions as to Mr Fung’s conversation with
“Raymond” and the co-conspirators rule [47]
(c) Party liability under s 66(2) of the Crimes Act [51]
(d) Error in suggesting onus on defence to establish innocence [59]
IV Permitting the trial to continue after “tainting”; the tenth
juror problem; the decision to continue with ten jurors [62]
The ”tainting” [63]
The tenth juror [73]
Were there exceptional circumstances? [77]
Conclusion [81]
Mr Pan: appeal against conviction [82]
Mr Pan’s submissions [83]
I Insufficiency of evidence
The Crown’s submissions [84]
Polymer and Jin Da [85]
Isaac and Prosperity: continuing liability under s 66(2) [90]
Mr Pan’s submissions [93]
Discussion [98]
II Admission of inadmissible and prejudicial evidence [100]
III Unfair revocation of bail during cross-examination and
comment by Judge [108]
IV Wrongly permitting trial to continue with ten jurors [110]
V Misdirection
The summing up – the effect of Mr Pan’s evidence [111]
Discussion [116]
The summing up – motive to lie [118]
Decision [131]
Mr Deng: appeal against conviction
Mr Deng’s submissions [132]

(1) The verdict was not supported by the evidence [133]
(2) Miscarriage of justice

(a) Failure to exclude the powder evidence [144]

(b) The criticism of Mr Deng’s decision to exercise his right

to silence [150]

(c) Failure sufficiently to explain elements of joint possession [155]
Mr Fan: appeal against conviction
Mr Fan’s submissions [163]
Decision [168]

III THE APPEALS AGAINST SENTENCE
Mr Chen [169]
Basis of appeal by Mr Chen [171]
Discussion
Mr Chen’s role [172]
The application by the Solicitor-General [180]
Decision [184]
Mr Pan [185]
Decision [189]
Mr Deng [191]
Decision [203]
Mr Fan [204]
Decision [209]
Mr Fung [210]
Decision [215]


I INTRODUCTION

[1] Chen Ming Chin, Pan Wei Feng, Deng Guo Wei and Fan Li appeal against their convictions on counts which related primarily to the Class A drug methamphetamine. They also appeal against their sentences, which included life imprisonment for Messrs Chen and Pan. The Solicitor-General applies for leave to appeal out of time against aspects of their sentences and submits that life terms should be imposed on Messrs Deng and Fan. Fung Kai Lok, who pleaded guilty to related counts, applies for leave to appeal out of time against sentence.
[2] This judgment is in three sections: Introduction; Conviction Appeals; and Sentence Appeals.

Overview

[3] The case concerns charges against the appellants arising from the importation from the Peoples Republic of China to New Zealand of seven consignments carried in shipping containers and alleged by the Crown to contain methamphetamine or pseudoephedrine.
[4] While there had been a search of the fifth shipment which did not reveal anything untoward, the real Police investigation began with the arrival in New Zealand in May 2006 of two containers shipped from China (shipments six and seven). One, consigned to Isaac International Trade Company Ltd, contained 96kg of methamphetamine and the other, consigned to Prosperity International Ltd, contained 154kg of pseudoephedrine. Caught red-handed with the Isaac shipment at an Auckland storage unit, Mr Fung agreed to co-operate with the Police and later pleaded guilty to a count of importing methamphetamine in the Isaac shipment. Mr Fung was instructed by telephone from China to deliver 40 1kg bags of the Isaac shipment to a carpark for collection by others within the enterprise. There followed Police surveillance of a car to which Mr Fung made delivery. Messrs Deng and Fan were seen to drive the car to an address in Kohimarama Road occupied by Mr Fan. Surveillance of another container at a storage unit containing the Prosperity container led to the arrest of Leung Kin Kwock who was acquitted at the subsequent trial. Further investigation led to the examination of the five earlier shipments in which Messrs Chen and Pan were involved. The respective consignees were Polymer 1, Polymer 2, Polymer 3, Jin Da, and Polymer 4. The Isaac and Polymer shipments were from Shekou, the port of Shenzhen, just south of Dong Guan where Mr Chen’s business was based. The Prosperity and Jin Da shipments were both from the inland city of Zhongshan.

The Crown theory

[5] The Crown claimed that the appellants and others were responsible for the seven consignments of which at least the last six were alleged to contain large quantities of methamphetamine or pseudoephedrine. The major player was “Raymond”, who was based in China and was never in New Zealand. Near the top of the hierarchy was Mr Chen whose business in Dong Guan sold epoxy or polyurethane flooring paint which was the concealment agent in the Isaac and Prosperity consignments and was the major cargo item listed in each Polymer bill of lading. The Crown contended that:
(c) Mr Deng, another New Zealand resident, who had been out of New Zealand and returned the day before the delivery of the Isaac shipment, was a major participant in that transaction.
(d) Mr Fan, who also lived in Auckland, was the occupant of Kohimarama Road and a distributor of the drugs.
(e) Mr Fung came to New Zealand to prepare for the Isaac transaction. He was a middle man crucial to the success of that plan.
[6] Co-accused also charged but acquitted were Mr Zhang, who had involvement not established as criminal in the Jin Da transaction, as well as Mr Leung who had similar involvement with the Prosperity consignment.

The verdicts

[7] A High Court jury convicted Messsrs Chen, Pan, Deng and Fan of counts alleging involvement at different times and in different respects in a scheme to import into New Zealand very large quantities of controlled drugs.
[8] The convictions related to six consignments from China, four of methamphetamine and two of its precursor substance pseudoephedrine, each concealed within a shipping container. The dates and details of those consignments and an earlier shipment not proved to contain drugs were as follows:

Shipment (Name of Consignee)
Drugs
Date of arrival NZ
Polymer 1
None proved
4 April 2005
Polymer 2
Methamphetamine
26 May 2005
Polymer 3
Methamphetamine
5 August 2005
Jin Da
Pseudoephedrine
8 August 2005
Polymer 4
Methamphetamine
30 December 2005
Isaac International
Methamphetamine
13 May 2006
Prosperity International
Pseudoephedrine
18 May 2006
[9] The first shipment, to Polymer Technology Ltd (“Polymer 1”), which was not proved to contain drugs, may have been a dummy run. Drugs seized from the sixth and seventh shipments during May 2006 had a potential street value of some $138,000,000. The Crown contended that the other shipments also involved drugs of high value.
[10] Mr Fung’s plea of guilty was to one count arising from the Isaac shipment of importing methamphetamine. He was sentenced by Stevens J to 15 years imprisonment.
[11] Messrs Chen and Pan were acquitted at trial before Courtney J on counts:

(2) selling methamphetamine between 4 April and 26 May 2005.


They were convicted on counts:

(3) importing methamphetamine on or about 26 May 2005 (consignee Polymer 2);

(4) selling methamphetamine between 26 May and 4 August 2005;
(5) importing methamphetamine on or about 5 August 2005 (consignee Polymer 3);

(6) selling methamphetamine between 5 August and 30 December 2005;
(7) importing pseudoephedrine on or about 8 August 2006 (consignee Jin Da);

(8) selling pseudoephedrine between 8 August and 18 May 2006;
(9) importing methamphetamine on or about 30 December 2005 (consignee Polymer 4);

(10) selling methamphetamine between 30 December 2005 and 15 May 2006;
(11) importing methamphetamine on or about 15 May 2006 (consignee Isaac International);

(12) importing pseudoephedrine on or about 18 May 2006 (consignee Prosperity International).
[12] Messrs Deng and Fan were found guilty on one joint count (14) of having methamphetamine in their possession for sale on 22 May 2006 (Isaac).
[13] Mr Fan was found guilty on three further counts:

The sentences

[14] Courtney J imposed the following concurrent sentences, of which those marked in bold are the subject of application by the Solicitor-General for leave to appeal:

Mr Chen: life imprisonment on the Isaac importing count (11);

12 years on each of the other counts of importing and selling methamphetamine (3-6 and 9-10);

eight years on the Prosperity count of importing pseudoephedrine (12);

four years on the other pseudoephedrine counts (7-8)

Mr Pan: the same sentences as Mr Chen, including the Solicitor-General applications.

Mr Deng: 17 years with a non-parole period of eight years six months in respect of the Isaac shipment (14)

Mr Fan: 19 years six months with a non-parole period of nine years six months in respect of the Isaac shipment (14)

Ten years imprisonment in respect of selling methamphetamine (Polymer 4 shipment 17);

Two years imprisonment in respect of each firearms charge (15-16).


II THE APPEALS AGAINST CONVICTION

Factual context

[15] On the Crown case each of the shipments involved a similar modus operandi. A foreign national (initially Mr Chen) would arrive in New Zealand and set up a company. He would also undertake other associated tasks such as opening bank accounts, post office boxes and arranging office space. He would then return to China, organise a shipment and arrange for a customs broker to clear it through the New Zealand Customs Service (Customs). The operative would arrive back in New Zealand shortly before the shipment and organise the storage and unpacking of the shipment. Concealed in the containers were controlled drugs under the guise of and hidden among plastics, paint, rubber or plaster products.
[16] The Crown alleged that, after Customs conducted an unsuccessful search of the Polymer 4 shipment in December 2005, those responsible for the importations tried to avoid detection of further importations by changing the personnel and the names of the companies directly involved, and the brokers and other innocent third parties used in the importations. But the modus operandi remained substantially the same for the two final shipments.
[17] The evidence covered the period from April 2005 to May 2006. Much of the investigation was performed retrospectively after Customs intercepted and undertook controlled deliveries of the last two shipments in May 2006. The first of these, consigned to Isaac International Trade Company Ltd (the Isaac shipment), arrived in New Zealand on 13 May 2006. When opened by Customs at Auckland the approximately 96kg of methamphetamine it was found to contain had a purity level of 79 per cent and was packed in 1kg bags concealed individually within resin blocks in the base of tins of paint. The final shipment (the Prosperity shipment) consigned to Prosperity International Ltd, arrived in New Zealand on 18 May 2006. When opened by Customs the 154kg of pseudoephedrine it contained was in the form of ContacNT granules within and amongst a container of around 600 bags of plaster.
[18] In the course of the controlled deliveries by Customs and Police of both shipments on 19 May 2006, the Isaac shipment was delivered to a storage unit. There, at about 5.00pm that day, Police intervened and arrested the man receiving it, Mr Fung.
[19] Mr Fung agreed to co-operate with the Police. He remained in telephone contact with the man “Raymond” in China, who instructed Mr Fung to deliver 40 of the 1kg bags of the drugs to a car park at the St Lukes shopping centre for collection by others within the enterprise.
[20] Customs and Police prepared substitute packages containing approximately 20kg of a placebo, together with approximately 50g of the imported methamphetamine, for delivery to the St Luke’s car park in a car that had been hired by Mr Fung. At about 3pm on 22 May 2006, once the car was in position, Mr Fung notified “Raymond” in China.
[21] At about 3.45pm that day Messrs Deng and Fan went from a house at 291A Kohimarama Road to St Lukes in a vehicle driven by Mr Fan. Mr Fan approached the rental vehicle, collected the keys from where they had been left within a wheel arch and collected Mr Deng who had remained near the vehicle in which he had arrived. They departed with a rubbish bag full of methamphetamine. Police and Customs then followed Mr Deng and Mr Fan to the Kohimarama Road house, where they were later found in possession of the delivered methamphetamine and arrested.
[22] Also on 19 May 2006 the Prosperity shipment had been delivered to a different storage unit, where Police observed a man identified as Leung Kin Kwok supervising the unloading of the shipment. On 22 May 2006, after Mr Deng and Mr Fan had been arrested, Mr Leung was arrested attempting to leave New Zealand on a flight to Singapore. He was later charged with importing the Prosperity shipment, but was acquitted when tried jointly with Messrs Chen, Pan, Deng, Fan and Zhang.

The trial

[23] Each accused gave evidence. Messrs Pan and Zhang ran cut-throat defences. Hostile cross-examination of Mr Pan by counsel for Mr Zhang led to withdrawal of Mr Pan’s bail, which gave rise to a ground of appeal. A letter from a juror expressing a social interest in one of counsel led to the juror’s dismissal and an argument that the trial had miscarried. The Judge’s decision to continue the trial with ten jurors led to a further challenge to the procedures.

Mr Chen: appeal against conviction

Mr Chen’s submissions

[24] Mr Chen’s grounds of appeal are:

I Insufficiency of evidence

[25] He submits that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions on counts 3-12. In particular there was no evidence:

and hence no basis for his conviction in respect of any of those importations.

II Inconsistency of verdicts

[26] The inferences available from the evidence on which the Crown relied to prove counts 3 to 10 (importation and sale of drugs in Polymer shipments 2, 3 and 4 and the Jin Da shipment) were identical to those relied upon to prove counts 1 and 2 (importation and sale of drugs in Polymer shipment 1). The jury acquitted Mr Chen of counts 1 and 2. The guilty verdicts for counts 3 – 10 are thus inconsistent with the acquittals for counts 1 and 2, and should be set aside.

III Errors in summing up

[27] The learned Judge erred in her summing up to the jury by:

IV Permitting trial to continue after “tainting”; the tenth juror problem; the decision to continue with ten jurors

[28] The Judge failed to make adequate inquiry of the jury before discharging the eleventh juror. In addition, there were insufficient grounds to justify the trial proceeding with only ten jurors.

Discussion

I Insufficient evidence

Mr Chen’s continuing involvement in the Isaac and Prosperity shipments

[29] The critical issue on Mr Chen’s appeal concerns the linkage of him to the Isaac and Prosperity shipments. That is for two reasons: to consider whether he was party to those transactions; and, in the event that he was party, to reason backwards that the earlier shipments, with which he was clearly involved, must also have contained drugs.
[30] So the first question is whether it was open to the jury to infer that the shipments Polymer 2, 3 and 4 and Jin Da contained drugs. There was no direct evidence that they did. But we are satisfied that the circumstantial evidence amounted to a powerful case of which it cannot be said, in terms of the test stated by this Court in R v Munro [2007] NZCA 510; [2008] 2 NZLR 87 at [87], that a jury acting reasonably ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt.
[31] Mr Chen had been one of the main actors in the operation Polymer and Jin Da operations. If the Polymer shipments did contain drugs, he had facilitated their importation under the guise of legitimate shipments of paint and rubber products exported from China by his Chinese company Da Yi. He set up Polymer as a company in New Zealand, remitted large sums of cash to accounts in China, travelled specifically to New Zealand to oversee the arrival and unpacking of the Polymer and Jin Da shipments (and the Jin Da export), was in regular contact with Mr Pan, and had the phone number of “Raymond”, saved in his phone as “China”.
[32] We summarise the evidence which was open to the jury to accept in respect of the methamphetamine:

(g) On 2 June 2005 (a week after Polymer 2 arrived), Mr Pan remitted more than $200,000 to China (suggesting that Polymer 2 contained drugs).

(h) There were other cash remittances involving Mr Chen which were proximate in time to the Polymer shipments.

(i) With the exception of some unaccounted for cartons (which on the Crown theory had contained drugs) the contents of the Polymer 2 shipment all remained in storage and with the exception of the Polymer 1 and 3 “sale”, there was no evidence of any attempt to market any of the Polymer or Isaac shipments. Yet the overall cost of importing this quantity of product from China into New Zealand plus the travel costs of Mr Chen (for each Polymer shipment) make the lack of sales and of any evidence of marketing inexplicable if the shipments had been legitimate.

(j) The tins in which methamphetamine were concealed in the Isaac consignment were in cartons which carried distinguishing marks. Likewise, 24 cartons from Polymer 4 were found to have been specially marked. Each of the tins inside contained an empty black plastic bag which was stuck to the bottom. At one of the storage facilities, the Police found a serrated knife and a screwdriver and at the other a large set of scales, plastic bags, face masks and a dessert spoon.

(k) 14 more cartons from Polymer 1 and 3 were imported into New Zealand than were exported. When the Polymer 2 shipment was inspected by the Police, 44 cartons of 1038 from Polymer 2 were missing. That is consistent with the Crown case that the other cartons had contained drugs and were disposed of.

[33] As to the importation of pseudoephedrine:

Conclusion as to presence of drugs in all shipments from Polymer 2

[34] The case for concluding, as the jury did, that the transactions from Polymer 2 onward entailed the same kind of exercise as the later Isaac and (in the case of the Jin Da pseudoephedrine shipment) Prosperity transactions, was overwhelming. It was amply sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the earlier shipments each contained drugs.

Conclusion as to sales of drugs

[35] From that conclusion, the inference that those drugs were sold is also overwhelming. As Courtney J observed, the only logical thing to do with such substantial quantities of drugs would be to sell them. That inference accords with the remittances of cash following Polymer shipments 2 and 3, and the Jin Da shipment. Their size and timing point to their being the proceeds of sale of bulk quantities of methamphetamine and pseudoephedrine from those shipments. Each of the remittances involved either Mr Chen or Mr Pan (with whom Mr Chen was in close and regular contact during his visits to New Zealand during this period) as either sender or recipient.
[36] It is plain from the evidence concerning the Polymer 4 shipment that the drugs in that shipment had been unpacked, weighed and removed. In the same month, January 2006, there had been cell phone contact between a gold Nokia phone attributable to Mr Pan and a phone found in the master bedroom at Kohimarama Road and attributable to Mr Fan, who was convicted of selling drugs out of Polymer shipment 4. The Police found $50,000 in cash at Kohimarama Road when Operation Major terminated. On the basis, as we later find, that Mr Fan was properly convicted, it may be inferred that the sale proceeds from the Polymer 4 shipment included those moneys.

Further evidence against Mr Chen

[37] In considering the competing submissions as to the involvement of Mr Chen certain considerations are of particular importance:

(a) The direct evidence of Mr Chen’s close involvement with the transactions finishes with the winding up of the Polymer company. But the pattern of his being in China prior to the despatch of the consignment and being here for its arrival continued at the time of the final Isaac and Prosperity shipments. In R v Fenton [2003] 3 NZLR 439 this Court stated at [32]:

A state of affairs, quality or tendency at a given time may be able to be proved by showing that such a state of affairs, quality or tendency existed not long before or not long after that time: see Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed), s 437(1). The probative value of the earlier or later happening will depend upon all the circumstances, including the nature of the proof and the probability of changes during the time interval. This is sometimes spoken of as a presumption of continuance but, as Halsbury (4th ed) vol 17(1), para 505 and Cross on Evidence (NZ ed), para 2.3 observe, the better opinion is that it is merely a probability, or presumption of fact, the effect of which will vary with particular circumstances. It is a process of deduction, reasoning and inference from probabilities and depends upon the accompanying facts: Axon v Axon [1937] HCA 80; (1937) 59 CLR 395 at p 405 per Dixon J.

(c) The change following the Customs search of Polymer 4 entailed substituting lower echelon personnel like Mr Fung to perform the task of setting up New Zealand operations previously performed by Mr Chen. But that gives no reason to assume that Mr Chen had distanced himself from the continued operation of the system which he had established. He was directly involved in all the Polymer shipments at both the Chinese and New Zealand ends as his Chinese company was the exporter and Polymer Technology, his New Zealand company, was the importer.
(d) Although not directly involved in the same way with the Jin Da shipment, he arrived in New Zealand in August 2005 shortly before the arrival of the shipment, was in New Zealand when the shipment was placed in storage and unloaded, and then departed.
(e) He was also in New Zealand in October 2005 when the Jin Da product was exported, on his own admission present (as was Mr Pan) when it was loaded and on the Crown evidence closely involved in the relevant physical processes, and departed a day after this occurred.
(f) While in New Zealand in August and October 2005 he was in close contact with Mr Pan who, on the Crown case, was heavily involved in the Jin Da shipment.
(g) He had a business interest in the plaster which was the ostensibly legitimate product imported in the Jin Da and Prosperity shipments.
(h) Mr Chen was involved in substantial cash transactions which were proximate in point of time to the Polymer 2 and 3 and Jin Da shipments. Five days after the arrival in New Zealand of Polymer 2, Mr Chen remitted $15,000 in cash to himself in China. On 9 August, four days after the arrival of Polymer 3 Mr Chen remitted $350,000 to third parties in China. In September 2005, around a month after the Polymer 3 and Jin Da shipments arrived in New Zealand, $117,000 was paid into Mr Chen’s HSBC bank account in Hong Kong.
(i) Mr Chen was aware that the Polymer 4 shipment had been searched by customs. When he learned this he lied to the customs broker as to his whereabouts and shortly afterwards left New Zealand (on 30 December 2005). A decision was then made ostensibly to change some of the personnel and companies used to undertake the shipments while retaining the same modus operandi (the role previously performed by Mr Chen was assumed by Mr Fung).
(j) But on 7 February 2007 Mr Chen returned to New Zealand where he was closely associated with Mr Pan and arranged the shutting down of Polymer Technology Ltd. He left on 13 February.
(k) Mr Chen arrived back in New Zealand on 24 May 2006, a week or so after the Isaac and Prosperity shipments. He gave no explanation for this visit when he gave evidence.

(j) We have noted that Mr Chen had “Raymond”’s telephone number saved in his phone.

[38] The combined effect of this evidence satisfies us that there was an adequate basis for the jury to conclude (as it plainly did) that:
[39] We conclude that there was ample evidence to justify all the jury’s verdicts against Mr Chen.

II Inconsistency in verdicts

The law

[40] A verdict of guilty on one count will be unsafe if it is inconsistent with a verdict of acquittal on another count. However, if there is a reasonable explanation to be found in the evidence that the jury could have differentiated rationally between the charges, there is no inconsistency: R v Irvine [1976] 1 NZLR 96 (CA); R v K CA49/96 13 August 1996.

Its application

[41] At [13] of her sentencing notes the Judge dealt convincingly with the point:

The Crown case was that the four earlier shipments known as the Polymer 1, 2, 3 and 4 shipments contained methamphetamine and the earlier shipment known as the Jin Da shipment contained pseudoephedrine. The jury accepted these propositions except for the Polymer 1 shipment, most likely because of the possibility that, as the first of the shipments, it may have been treated as a dummy run.

[42] As the Judge observed, the importations all involved extraordinary planning and sophistication. Although it was not the Crown’s case at trial, the jury could rationally have concluded that those responsible for the importations were sufficiently careful and meticulous to undertake a dry run to test the modus operandi that they subsequently used for all later importations.
[43] There was in any event an important difference in the evidence between Polymer shipment 1 and all of the subsequent shipments. There was no evidence of cash remissions to China of any significance until 2 June 2005 – about a week after Polymer shipment 2 arrived, when Mr Pan remitted over $200,000 to accounts in China. The remissions were powerful evidence, both of the importation of commercial quantities of drugs, and of their subsequent sale. Taken together with the possibility of Polymer shipment 1 being a “dummy run”, the absence of cash remissions shortly after the Polymer shipment rationally explains how the jury determined that the Crown had proved counts 3 – 10 beyond reasonable doubt, but not counts 1 – 2.

III The summing up

[44] We have noted at [27] the appellant’s submission that the Judge erred in summing up. The complaints concerned:

(a) Failure to direct the jury as to what evidence was admissible and inadmissible

[45] At a joint trial the Judge must not only direct the jury that the pre-trial statements of one accused are not evidence against another, but also that the question whether the Crown has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against a particular accused must be determined by reference only to the evidence admissible in respect of that accused: R v Morland CA148/99; CA218/99 6 September 1999.
[46] We have examined the directions given. We are satisfied that, save as to the next point, both the written directions provided by the Judge and her oral directions were exemplary.

(b) The absence of direction as to Mr Fung’s conversation with “Raymond” and the co-conspirators rule

[47] The jury was given no direction concerning the evidence of the telephone conversation between Mr Fung and “Raymond” on 22 May 2006. In this Court, although not in the High Court, Mr Chen’s counsel challenged the evidence as inadmissible; alternatively, if it fell within the co-conspirators rule of the common law it required the special directions discussed by the Supreme Court in Qiu. The Crown submitted that it was evidence of conduct which did not fall within any exclusionary rule.
[48] We accept Mr Chen’s first submission, that the evidence is prima facie inadmissible. That is because it was hearsay: using a statement by a non-witness as evidence of its truth. Moreover, the Crown’s reliance on the statement related in part to the Crown’s account of what appear to have been past events, rather than as made in furtherance of the appellants’ common design. It would therefore not fall within the co-conspirators exception.
[49] But had the hearsay point been taken at trial it would inevitably have been met by recourse to ss 18(1)(a) and (b) and 22(5) of the Evidence Act 2006: that the circumstances relating to the statement provide reasonable assurance that it is reliable; that “Raymond” was unavailable as a witness; and that no party was substantially prejudiced by failure to give notice of reliance on the statement.
[50] The conclusion that this evidence is admissible under the co-conspirators rule is equally obvious. Moreover, the cogency of what “Raymond” said as to the link between Isaac and the earlier shipments was so obvious as to remove the usual sort of concerns which arise when hearsay evidence is admitted (whether under the co-conspirators rule or otherwise). His remarks were very operational in nature (so much so that their hearsay quality does not appear to have occurred to anyone). In this context the error was too inconsequential to engage s 385(1)(c) of the Crimes Act.

(c) Party liability under s 66(2) of the Crimes Act

[51] Section 66(2) of the Crimes Act states:

Where 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose, and to assist each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence committed by any one of them in the prosecution of the common purpose if the commission of that offence was known to be a probable consequence of the prosecution of the common purpose.

[52] The words “to every offence committed by any one of them” do not exclude the very offence or offences that were the subject of the common intention: R v Currie [1968] NZPoliceLawRp 14; [1969] NZLR 193 at 203 (CA).
[53] The common intention will usually be inferred from the words or actions of the participants, including their concerted conduct in carrying out that common intention: R v Fa’apusa CA300/06 13 December 2006 at [18] - [19].
[54] Mr Lawry submitted that the Judge did not refer to “the need for the Crown to prove that [Mr Chen] had agreed to assist his alleged co-offenders”. But in her memorandum to the jury concerning party liability, the requirement that the Crown prove that “two or more people have reached a common plan to commit a criminal offence and to assist one another to do so” was clearly set out.
[55] Mr Lawry further submitted that the Judge should have directed the jury that the Crown needed to prove that Mr Chen “remained a party to the alleged agreement some five months after there is any evidence of his involvement in any shipments to New Zealand”. He argued that there was no evidence that a further shipment or shipments of drugs were a probable consequence of the common plan to import drugs.
[56] It is clear from the summing up at [26], and with specific reference to Mr Chen at [106], that the jury was directed that the Crown needed to prove that Mr Chen was still a party to the common plan “at the relevant time”. Direct evidence of Mr Chen’s involvement in the Isaac and Prosperity shipments was not necessary. Instead, the Crown simply needed to adduce evidence of Mr Chen’s continued involvement in the common plan at the time of those shipments.
[57] In summing up the Judge at [26] directed the jury in relation to the Crown’s case that Mr Chen, Mr Pan and others formed a common intention to import and sell drugs. She directed that under s 66(2) the Crown must prove:

[27] Now probable consequence just means that the accused knew it could well happen. A common intention does not have to be reached in any formal way. It does not have to be written down, sometimes it might not even be expressed in words although in this case you might think that it is not the kind of thing that conduct alone would convey. You can look at the behaviour of the parties throughout the whole period; before the importation, during the importation process, after the importation is completed. You can look at all of the evidence to decide, was this accused party to a common intention? And you have got to decide not only was he a party to a common intention, but when. When you are thinking about a particular shipment the question will be – was he still a party to the common intention at that point?

[58] We discern no error in that.

(d) Error in suggesting onus on defence to establish innocence

[59] It was submitted that by stating in closing that “there is no evidence of any meaningful sales of the contents of the cartons” the Crown suggested there was an onus of proof on Mr Chen and that, by referring to that submission at [96] of the summing up the Judge compounded the error.
[60] The submission is unfounded. The topic of what had happened to the missing cartons was a legitimate matter of submission, consistent with the Crown case that there was no legitimate commercial activity. It was a proper discharge of Crown counsel’s task to make submissions on what evidence was before the Court and what followed from it. The Judge gave a standard direction that Mr Chen did not have to prove anything, even if he elected (as he did) to give evidence.
[61] No error in the summing up has been identified.

IV Permitting the trial to continue after “tainting”; the tenth juror problem; the decision to continue with ten jurors

[62] It was submitted for Mr Pan that the Judge erred by not declaring a mistrial either after the jury became “tainted” or after a tenth juror temporarily went missing and, in any event, that the case could not continue with only ten jurors.

The “tainting”

[63] On 11 September 2008 counsel for Mr Pan provided to the Court an email from a juror which sought to arrange a social meeting with another counsel after trial. The email suggested a possible romantic interest and was sent on a confidential basis. The next day copies of the email were provided to all counsel. The Judge expressed her concern as to the possible bias of the juror either towards the counsel or against counsel for other parties. She sought submissions.
[64] Counsel agreed that the juror should be questioned and, whatever her response, that she should be discharged. Counsel were divided as to whether the Judge should then speak to the foreman. During the discussions the juror was kept separate from other jurors.
[65] At 10.30am on 12 September 2008 the Judge questioned the juror in the presence of counsel for the accused. The juror admitted sending the email. She stated that in her discussions with other jurors she had not expressed a view that might lead other jurors to believe she was favouring one accused over another. The Judge discharged her.
[66] The Judge then suggested to counsel that despite the juror’s assertion, that given the significance to the accused, it was necessary for her to speak to the foreman to inquire whether there had been discussion among jury members that might suggest any were favouring one accused or counsel over another. She further indicated that she intended to tell the jury that the juror had been discharged but not why. Counsel offered no objection.
[67] The Judge then questioned the foreman. In response to the Judge’s question as to possible favouritism the foreman stated:

I don’t think so. We – we haven’t – we have discussed certain issues that have come up, you know, at the time – that have come up, but there has been no great prejudice one way or the other I don’t think.

[68] The foreman then left. Counsel for Mr Chen expressed concern about the phrase “no great prejudice”. No other counsel raised concerns. The Judge stated:

I mean I can’t – I’ve got no grounds to question the foreman beyond the issue at hand and my impression of his response is that there’s been no expressed favouritism by a jury member in favour of one counsel for one accused.

[69] The Judge delivered her ruling that the trial should continue.
[70] In this Court counsel submitted that:
[71] The Judge had followed the five step process dealing with juror communication set out in R v N CA373/04 17 February 2005 which was endorsed and refined in R v C [2005] 3 NZLR 92 (CA). The foreman’s “no great prejudice” was a matter for the Judge to evaluate. Verbally it could have been understood as a statement that there was prejudice but that the prejudice was not great. It could also have been understood as a laconic vernacular statement that there was no basis for concern. There is no ground for challenging the Judge’s appraisal.
[72] It was submitted on behalf of Mr Pan that the juror who was discharged had a bias which could subtly have affected not only her own judgment but that of others. In view of the answers to the Judge there is no evidential basis for that proposition. Counsel for Mr Pan also submitted that the Judge’s questioning of the juror and foreman was too brief. Again the nature of the inquiry was presumptively a matter for the Judge. It was open to her to consider that no further questions were required.

The tenth juror

[73] Following the temporary absence and subsequent appearance of the tenth juror, there was no inquiry of the foreman or the juror, and no final ruling concerning whether the tenth juror was fully capable of discharging his duties.
[74] The sleeping juror cases show that, to establish the wrong or miscarriage of justice which is required by s 385 of the Crimes Act if a verdict is to be set aside on the ground of juror incompetence or misconduct, objection must be made which will allow the judge to undertake an investigation: R v Morris [2001] 1 NZLR 1 (CA), R v Briaturi [2008] NZCA 412, R v Lin Sen CA467/05 19 October 2006, R v Charles (1979) 68 Cr App R 334, R v Tomar 96/547/Y2 14 April 1997 (EWCA). That may entail the filing of affidavits in this Court, as occurred in Cesan v R [2008] HCA 52; (2008) 236 CLR 358.
[75] Here there is no evidential base for doubt that a temporary absence of the tenth juror was simply due to a misapprehension as to when the hearing would resume.
[76] The ground fails.

Were there “exceptional circumstances”?

[77] Section 374, now repealed, states:

(4A) The Court must not proceed with fewer than 11 jurors except in the

following cases:

(a) If the prosecutor and the accused consent:

(b) If the Court considers that, because of exceptional circumstances relating to the trial (including, without limitation, the length or expected length of the trial), and having regard to the interests of justice, the Court should proceed with fewer than 11 jurors; and in that case—

(i) The Court may proceed with 10 jurors whether or not the prosecutor and the accused consent:

The remaining question is whether there were “exceptional circumstances” in this case.

[78] In ruling that there were exceptional circumstances and that it would be in the interests of justice to proceed the Judge gave as reasons:
[79] Further considerations are:
[80] Here, as was the case in R v Harris [2008] NZCA 298 at [36]:

We are in no doubt that the legislature had in mind this type of case when identifying without limitation ‘the length or expected length of the trial’ as a specific factor to be taken into account when determining exceptional circumstances

In our opinion the Judge’s decision to continue the trial with ten jurors was inevitable and squarely within the policy of s 374(4).

Conclusion

[81] The appeal against conviction is dismissed.

Mr Pan: appeal against conviction

[82] We preface the following discussion by noting that Mr Pan’s arguments as to insufficiency of evidence were similar to those of Mr Chen. He was heavily involved in the Polymer and Jin Da shipments and to find him guilty the jury had to reason back from the Isaac and Prosperity shipments and, in relation to those shipments, conclude that he was a s 66(2) party. What we have already said about reasoning back from the Isaac and Prosperity shipments in relation to Mr Chen applies to Mr Pan.

Mr Pan’s submissions

[83] Mr Pan’s grounds of appeal against conviction are:

I Insufficiency of evidence

II Admission of inadmissible and prejudicial evidence

III Unfair revocation of bail during cross-examination and comment by Judge

IV Wrongly permitting trial to continue with ten jurors

V Misdirection

I Insufficiency of evidence

The Crown’s submissions

[84] Mr Pan is a New Zealand resident. The Crown submitted that by providing his phone number or email address and much general assistance, including finding suitable accountants, setting up bank accounts, arranging storage units and accommodation and helping with others’ travel, he was directly involved in all of the Polymer shipments and Jin Da. Like Mr Chen he was convicted of the Isaac and Prosperity shipments as a s 66(2) party.

Polymer and Jin Da

[85] Again like Mr Chen, he was present in China before and in New Zealand after the Polymer and Jin Da shipments occurred. His cellphone number appeared on the GST and tax registration documents for the company Polymer Technology (NZ) Co Ltd and on all of the Polymer bills of lading.
[86] For Polymers 2 and 3 his cellphone number was listed as well on the storage unit agreement.
[87] In relation to the Jin Da shipment, Mr Pan’s number was given to Customs by the man who came to set up the importation as that of his friend. A SIM card found at his house had the number on the Jin Da IRD application and in the application to set up an ASB account. Keys to the Jin Da post box were found at his house. An apartment in Eden Crescent used by Mr Chen was rented on Mr Pan’s instructions and the keys were found at his house.
[88] Mr Pan met Mr Chen at the airport and helped him with travel and accommodation and on 7 June 2005, soon after the arrival of the Polymer 2 shipment, he remitted $204,000 to Chinese accounts of persons whose names appeared in his address book.
[89] As noted at [37](e), he and Mr Chen were in regular contact during the latter’s visits in August and October. On the latter occasion he went with Mr Chen to the storage unit where the Jin Da export of containers that the jury found had contained drugs was being loaded. The export records were found at his house and in his computer. His fingerprints were found on Jin Da documents at Eden Crescent.

Isaac and Prosperity: continuing liability under s 66(2)

[90] In late January and early February 2006 Mr Pan’s gold Nokia cellphone was in contact with that of Mr Fan who occupied the premises at 291A Kohimarama Road, which it was open to the jury to find was a clearing house where drugs were packaged and sold and where part of the Isaac shipment ended up. It was open to the jury to prefer that construction to the defence version that the gold phone had been given to a co-accused, Mr Zhang, who was acquitted. Mr Zhang asserted and Mr Pan denied that it was at Mr Pan’s direction that he rented and maintained the Eden Crescent apartment; and that when they were both present with Mr Chen at the Jin Da storage unit loading a container Mr Pan had asked Mr Zhang to participate. The jury were entitled to accept that evidence.
[91] Further, in May 2006 when the Prosperity and Isaac shipments arrived, Mr Pan was seen collecting from the airport a Mr Chan (KM) whom he drove to Mt Albert to see the accused Zhang, who was acquitted at trial. Mr Zhang had rented the Eden Crescent apartment, opened a post box and had been telephoned by Mr Pan on 4 August 2005, the day after the third Polymer shipment arrived in New Zealand. Despite Mr Zhang’s acquittal, the Eden Crescent and post box facilities which he established, even if without mens rea, were part of the arrangements to which Mr Chen was party.
[92] Accordingly it was well open to the jury to find, as did the Judge for sentencing purposes, that although not the mastermind behind the operation, Mr Pan was a crucial player, providing continuity and practical assistance over its entire period.

Mr Pan’s submissions

[93] Ms Dyhrberg pointed to the Crown’s acceptance on a s 347 application that there was no direct evidence of Mr Pan’s involvement in the Isaac and Prosperity shipments and its reliance solely on s 66(2) in relation to those counts. Yet in relation to the earlier counts there was no clear evidence of drug dealing.
[94] She challenged the Judge’s acceptance of the Crown submission that Mr Pan was party to a plan in relation to the second and third Polymer importations and that his “ongoing involvement in May 2006, albeit minor and unrelated to any actual shipment showed that he was still part of the common plan and is therefore liable for the last two shipments”.
[95] She submitted that the Judge’s acceptance of a concept of an “ongoing” or “overall” plan or purpose of importing controlled drugs does not sit easily with the wording of s 66. It states:

Parties to offences

...

(2) Where 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and to assist each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence committed by any one of them in the prosecution of the common purpose if the commission of that offence was known to be a probable consequence of the prosecution of the common purpose.

[96] She argued that no authority supported adoption of the “ongoing” or “overall” plan or purpose approach and submitted that it risked unfairness by extending an accused’s liability indefinitely and unsafely. Specifically, she submitted that, for the Isaac and Prosperity importations to be a probable consequence of a proved common purpose to which Mr Pan was party, there had to be evidence of his involvement in those shipments. But there was none. Rather they were performed by a completely different group of people. The broadly similar modus operandi, of use of containers to carry concealed drugs, is not enough.
[97] Ms Dyhrberg submitted that there was likewise no evidence of selling by Mr Pan (counts 6, 8 and 10); his remittance of funds on 7 June 2005 preceded the arrival of the Polymer 3 and 4 and Jin Da shipments which arrived in August and December 2005.

Discussion

[98] We are satisfied that it was open to the jury to accept the Crown’s submission that Mr Pan was a major participant at the New Zealand end throughout what was a carefully planned importation and sales operation of unprecedented size. His local role complemented that of Mr Chen. His part was proved to begin with his phone number on the Polymer 1 bill of lading and continued until at least (according to Mr Zhang’s evidence) his January communication via the gold Nokia phone with Mr Fan who occupied Kohimarama Road. Once the pattern of sales had begun, the absence of evidence as to where the proceeds had gone is no basis for inferring that the sales had concluded. On the contrary, the continuation of the import process without any evidence of legitimate sales was accompanied by the proved subsequent drugs imports in the Isaac and Prosperity shipments and of course the Kohimarama Road sales outlet where Messrs Fan and Deng were caught red-handed at the end of the operation.
[99] The first ground fails.

II Admission of inadmissible and prejudicial evidence

[100] Counsel for Mr Pan submitted that certain Vodafone cell-site evidence relating to his movements should not have been admitted because there was no evidence as to the methodology underlying the call data information. It recorded the numbers of the cellphone SIM cards taking part in a call, the date, time and duration of the call together with details of the cell-sites utilised. Crown counsel cross-examined Mr Pan to the effect that on 7 February 2006 a SIM card found at his house received via the Avondale cell-site a call made via the Auckland airport cell-site from a SIM card attributable to Mr Chen. The former card had reached a position where it was in the area served by the Strand cell-site just before Mr Pan and Mr Chen were seen to enter the premises at the apartment in Eden Crescent. The Crown put to Mr Pan that Mr Chen had called Mr Pan from the airport and Mr Pan travelled from his home in Avondale to meet Mr Chen at the apartment.
[101] Mr Pan denied that he had been the user of the SIM card called by Mr Chen, claiming that he had received the cellphone with that card from Mr Chen only after meeting him at the apartment.
[102] We can see no basis for rejecting the evidence as inadmissible.
[103] The call data records had been prepared by the Vodafone expert, Mr Robert Kainuku. The call data comprised two CD Rom discs, which were disclosed to defence counsel well in advance of trial. It was made clear that the call data was to be relied upon by the Crown and produced by Mr Kainuku. No defence counsel objected to the admissibility of either of the discs, or to Mr Kainuku’s evidence. It was agreed by all counsel that Mr Kainuku’s brief of evidence could be read.
[104] Mr Kainuku’s brief was accordingly read. When referring to the call data, Mr Kainuku stated:

That call data and information consisted of details of outgoing and incoming calls from specified Vodafone mobile numbers.

That call data and information also included subscriber details relating to those Vodafone mobile numbers if known and relevant details relating to the connection/disconnection of those numbers to and from the Vodafone network.

(emphasis added)

[105] The “relevant details relating to the connection/disconnection” of the cell-phones incorporated the cell-site references, as they appeared in the call data. All of this was disclosed to defence counsel. No objections to the admissibility of any part of the call data were raised prior to trial. No request to hear evidence in person from Mr Kainuku was made. The evidence having been admitted it was open to any counsel to make use of it.
[106] In summing up the Judge gave the following warning concerning the cell site evidence:

[40] Finally, there was one aspect about the call data evidence that also requires special care and that is the evidence about cellphone sites. There was a very small amount of evidence about cell sites, about how the location of a handset might be identified by reference to the cell site record. However, you did not actually hear any evidence about how cell sites operate, how the data relating to them is collected and recorded, how reliable it is. So you just need to take care when you are thinking about the cell site evidence and where there is reference in any of the schedules to cell sites that do not relate to the actual evidence that was given - and you might remember there was some evidence specifically given by Detective Steedman - but other than that, if you come across evidence of cell sites in schedules, it would be risky to put weight on that evidence.

[107] The direction was over-generous to Mr Pan. The jury were perfectly entitled to use the cell-site evidence to refute his claim not to have received the cell-phone until after meeting Mr Chen at the apartment and as supporting the Crown’s contention of a close nexus between the pair. The point fails.

III Unfair revocation of bail during cross-examination and comment by Judge

[108] In Ruling 7 during hostile cross-examination of Mr Pan by counsel for Mr Zhang, on application by the Crown the Judge revoked Mr Pan’s bail. The Judge considered that the cross-examination as to Mr Pan’s use of a cellphone linked to the first four shipments, which he denied was his, had made an impression on the jury. The application was heard and the decision of the Judge was made in the absence of the jury. In her decision the Judge set out the background to the application, and the competing submissions of counsel for the Crown and counsel for Mr Pan. She determined to revoke Mr Pan’s bail at paragraph [5] on the basis that:

Whilst I have sympathy for Mr Pan my own observations of the cross examination today, Mr Pan’s responses and the jury’s apparent reactions mean that I am not prepared to take the risk that will inevitably attach to continuing Mr Pan’s bail. It is my belief that, although Mr Pan may well have known for some time the nature of the challenge to his evidence that is not the same as experiencing the reality of cross-examination. Given the nature of the charges and of the evidence adduced so far I am not prepared to take any risk in this trial.

[109] Mr Pan made an affirmation asserting, and Ms Dyhrberg submitted, that Mr Pan was disconcerted by the decision at a crucial time and that the decision was unfair to him. We do not accept the submission. The grant of bail during trial is a matter for the discretion of the trial judge. So is a decision to withdraw it. However disagreeable the consequences of withdrawal of bail, they are like the other consequences of arrest and trial an integral part of the process of administering justice. The point fails.

IV Wrongly permitting trial to continue with ten jurors

[110] We have dealt with this point at [80].

V Misdirection

The summing up – the effect of Mr Pan’s evidence

[111] At [131] of the summing up when describing the defence case for Mr Pan, and in particular after setting out the conflicts in evidence between Mr Pan and Mr Zhang, the Judge stated:

In the end Mr Pan’s position depends very much on what evidence you accept as being reliable enough to form part of the case against him. The Crown case is circumstantial and you can make up your minds about how far the circumstances go towards proving guilt. But you need to decide, do you accept what Mr Pan said in his defence? Do you accept that he was a legitimate businessman acting to assist business associates innocent of any wrongdoing that they might be up to? Do you accept what Mr Zhang says about things Mr Pan might have done or said? You need to carefully sift through all of that evidence and say to yourselves, what is it that I find reliable and that relates to Mr Pan?

[112] Counsel for Mr Pan submitted that this passage gave the incorrect impression that the circumstantial case advanced by the Crown to prove Mr Pan’s guilt could be significantly strengthened by a finding that the jury did not accept what Mr Pan had said in his evidence.
[113] Crown counsel submitted that in this passage the Judge was simply outlining to the jury that the facts as they related to Mr Pan will depend on what evidence they choose to accept, since there was a large quantity of evidence not just from the Crown but also from Mr Zhang, Mr Chen and Mr Pan himself.
[114] The Crown further submitted that the jury would necessarily have considered the passage in the light of the judge’s general directions at [44]. There, in the context of giving directions concerning evidence given by accused persons, the Judge clearly spelt out the three ways in which the evidence of an accused person may be treated by the jury and indicated that even if the jury rejected Mr Pan’s evidence, that did not make him guilty, and the burden remains on the Crown to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
[115] The Crown finally argued that at [133], shortly after the passage in question, the Judge gave the jury the standard direction concerning the need not to equate lies with guilt, with particular reference to Mr Pan’s lies, which would rectify any potential misunderstanding.

Discussion

[116] The direction as to onus of proof is fundamental to the fairness of a trial. Read in isolation the passage:

do you accept what Mr Pan said in his defence? Do you accept that he was a legitimate businessman acting to assist business associates innocent of any wrongdoing that they might be up to? Do you accept what Mr Zhang says about things Mr Pan might have done or said?

could, as Ms Dyhrberg argued, have tended to suggest an onus on Mr Pan to substantiate his version, when the onus lay on the Crown to disprove it. But the question for us is whether in terms of s 385 of the Crimes Act there is a wrong or miscarriage of justice. That depends on what impression the jury would have had of the passage heard in context.

[117] The Judge’s slip was to use the phrase “do you accept” without the additional words “as raising a reasonable doubt”. But we are satisfied, given the clear direction at [44], that the jury would have understood that to be implicit. In assessing what the jury would have made of the matter, a consideration of particular importance is that no point was taken at the time by the experienced counsel on both sides. If they did not perceive a misdirection it is not at all likely that the jury would have been misled. The point fails.

The summing up motive to lie

[118] The final submission is that the Judge erred in stating at [47] that:

...a person facing a criminal charge has an obvious motive to lie about his part in the alleged offending and to seek to implicate others. So you need to exercise some caution when you are assessing the truthfulness of an accused who implicates another person in their evidence.

[119] Ms Dyhrberg cited among other authorities R v Leef CA 14/06 24 August 2006 where an appeal was allowed because of the following passage in the summing up:

[77] The Defence argument is to the contrary, as we have discussed, but if you look at the question of motive, why would the complainant make the allegations she has in all of those circumstances? Then compare that with the accused’s situation. Of course, it is trite to say that an accused person has the best motive to be giving an untruthful account, because he is the person on trial. That ultimately is a matter, which you must determine in your assessment of the facts. Remember that Mr Leef does not have to prove his innocence. He does not have to prove anything at all. It is for the Crown to prove that he is guilty of each of the counts in the indictment.

(Emphasis added)

Similar directions led to the conviction being quashed in Robinson v R (No 2) [1991] HCA 38; (1991) 180 CLR 531, R v Bentley [2007] UKHL 37; [2001] 1 Cr App R 21 (CA), R v E [2008] 3 NZLR 145 (CA) and R v Stewart [2009] NZSC 53 where the Supreme Court stated:

[26] A witness should not be accused of having a motive to lie without there being an appropriate evidential foundation for the accusation. A generalised allegation that an accused person has a motive to lie simply to avoid conviction is particularly serious because it subverts the presumption of innocence. Only if the accused were presumed guilty could there be any basis for the suggested motive.

[120] Those were however cases of a single accused.
[121] It has been a longstanding requirement of fairness that where an accused person gives evidence which incriminates a co-accused, that co-accused is entitled to (at least) judicial consideration of whether it is necessary that the jury be warned as to the weight they might attach to the evidence of another with a motive to give false evidence: see ss 12B and 12C of the Evidence Act 1908 and now s 122(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 2006.
[122] Single accused cases do not raise that problem. The direction rejected in the cases at [119] could only be understood as denigrating the man on trial. Where there are, as here co-accused running cut-throat defences, the jury would understand the direction quite differently, as a warning protective of the accused against whom a co-accused gives evidence. It would, for example, have assisted Mr Pan in the jury’s consideration of the evidence against him from Mr Zhang.
[123] If the Court is to do justice to all parties in a multi-accused case, including as between accused persons, some reference will be required to the need for caution where their evidence incriminates each other: R v Szeto CA449/98 25 May 1999 and R v Smith (1993) 10 CRNZ 184 (CA).
[124] The direction came during a section of the Judge’s summing up headed “Statements and evidence by accused.” The Judge began that section of the summing up by giving standard directions concerning how to treat statements made by the accused out of Court, and the relevance of lies told by the accused when giving those statements. She referred in particular (at [43]) to the statement of Mr Pan and the lies he admitted telling the Police. When giving this direction she said:

But remember people do lie for lots of reasons. A lie does not, in itself, mean the person is guilty and you must not think that just because an accused person told a lie to the police that he must therefore be guilty.

[125] The Judge then directed the jury as to the evidence given in court by each accused. She again gave standard directions, including at [44]:

Or the third possibility, you might not believe what he told you. If that is your response be careful not to leap straight to the conclusion that because you did not believe him he must be guilty.

[126] At [45] – [47] the Judge spent considerable time directing the jury concerning the evidence given by various accused that concerned other accused. The Judge noted that in some cases, including as between Mr Pan and Mr Zhang, the accused “pointed the finger at one another”. The Judge then directed the jury that in assessing an accused person’s evidence about another accused, the jury would be assessing their credibility and reliability. At [47] she gave the direction that is challenged. To see the context we reproduce it in full:

There are, however, a few observations that might help you. First, a person facing a criminal charge has an obvious motive to lie about his part in the alleged offending and to seek to implicate others. So you need to exercise caution when you are assessing the truthfulness of an accused who implicates another person in their evidence. On the other hand, just because someone has a motive to lie does not necessarily mean that everything they said is untrue. So you cannot dismiss the evidence just because they might have a motive to lie. It might assist you to think about whether the evidence they gave is consistent with other evidence that you accept as reliable. So, for example, if you were to find that all or part of what a particular accused said about another is consistent with other reliable evidence, you may be able to add it to the body of evidence relating to that other accused. On the other hand you might conclude that you cannot place any weight or only minimal weight on what the witness said. In that case you would put it aside, not take it into account when you are considering the position of the accused whom you are considering about whom the evidence was given.

[127] The Crown submitted that, read in its context, the directions would not have been understood as generalised comments that the accused might be motivated to lie to avoid conviction. We agree.
[128] The Judge’s reference to the “obvious motive to lie” of an accused person was made in the particular context of assessing the evidence of one accused concerning another where some accused had in some way implicated one another. The Judge then directed the jury that if they did not believe what an accused said about another accused, they should “put it aside, not take it into account when you are considering the position of the accused whom you are considering about whom the evidence was given”. The focus of the direction was the position of the accused the subject of the evidence, not the accused giving that evidence – in other words, evidence that is inculpatory of another accused, not exculpatory of the accused giving the evidence. The Judge did not suggest to the jury that the totality of the evidence of each accused should necessarily be treated as more dubious than that of any other witness; but simply that caution should be exercised when considering what one accused has said concerning another. The Judge gave the jury a clear direction that when an accused lies when giving evidence, that does not equate to guilt. The Judge’s direction did not result in unfairness to the accused, indeed it enhanced the safety of the resulting convictions.
[129] Had the Judge not given the direction complained of Mr Pan would have had reason to complain at the absence of warning about Mr Zhang’s evidence.
[130] We are satisfied that the jury would have understood the warning as directed not to the exculpatory evidence of an accused but to the need to protect him from a co-accused bent on passing on blame. The point fails.

Decision

[131] It follows that Mr Pan’s appeal against conviction fails and is dismissed.

Mr Deng: appeal against conviction

Mr Deng’s submissions

[132] Mr Deng’s grounds of appeal are:

Further grounds, of continuing the trial with only ten jurors and that the Judge erred by not declaring a mistrial either after the jury became ‘tainted’ or after the tenth juror temporarily went missing, have been dealt with.

(1) The verdict was not supported by the evidence

[133] Mr Deng had been a New Zealand resident for 17 years. He left New Zealand in January 2006 and returned on 21 May 2006, the day before the controlled delivery of the Isaac shipment. On 18 May 2006 “Raymond” had a conversation with Mr Fung concerning the planned arrival and unpacking of the Isaac shipment. The following conversation was recorded:

Fung: I understand. Tell him that around Sunday the first lot may be given to people.

“Raymond”: Okay I will tell him/her.

Fung: Sunday. Correct.

The next Sunday was 21 May 2006, the date of Mr Deng’s arrival.

[134] We referred at [21] to Mr Deng’s movements on 22 May 2006 when he went with Mr Fan to the Kohimarama safe-house to pick up the car containing the drugs from the Isaac shipment from the St Lukes car park. Surveillance photographs show Mr Deng waiting there for Mr Fan as Mr Fan collected the key from inside the wheel arch of the car before driving back to Kohimarama Road with the rubbish bag of methamphetamine. Photographs taken during the Police search show the bag opened revealing packages of drugs. There were found in addition firearms, scales and scissors, $50,000 cash, multiple cell phones and a money counting machine.
[135] The Crown contended that Mr Deng arrived in New Zealand specifically to be involved in the collection of the drugs from the Isaac shipment and, having collected the drugs with Mr Fan, was at the safe-house, standing metres from the open bag of drugs when the Police arrived.
[136] The Crown relied as well on the evidence relating to three cell phones which Detective Sergeant Beale said he found in Mr Deng’s possession when he was the first officer to deal with Mr Deng after the Police entered Kohimarama Road. Defence counsel put to the detective sergeant that he was lying about finding the phones on Mr Deng and that they were in fact found in an armchair of the lounge. Detective Sergeant Timms and Detective Sergeant Osbourne reported arriving in the room to find Detective Sergeant Beale searching Mr Deng with the phones already on the armchair. The Crown submitted that Detective Sergeant Beale had searched Mr Deng and placed the phones on the armchair before the other officers arrived.
[137] It was open to the jury to accept the Crown submission.
[138] The significance of the evidence of Detective Sergeant Beale is that the SIM card on one of the phones started to be used only at around 4.54pm on 21 May 2006, the day Mr Deng arrived in New Zealand. The SIM card contacted the Chinese number used by “Raymond”, first on the afternoon of 21 May 2006 and constantly throughout the afternoon the following day when the drugs were dropped off at St Lukes, collected by Messrs Deng Fan and taken back to Kohimarama Road. At around 4.30, shortly after Messrs Deng and Fan returned to Kohimarama Road and shortly before the door was kicked in by the Police, the SIM card recorded three consecutive attempts to call “Raymond”’s number, perhaps because it appeared that only 20kg rather than 40kg had been found in the rubbish sack.
[139] It is also shown by the call data that throughout the afternoon on both 21 and 22 May, “Raymond” was making calls, not only to and from Mr Deng’s phone but also to and from Mr Fung relating to the collection of drugs from the car at St Lukes. Importantly, the second cell phone found on Mr Deng had “Raymond”’s number listed as the first contact. That number lacked the international prefix for China, suggesting that calls to that number were usually made in China. The phone was inactive between 15 January and 21 May 2006. At 4.07 it called a phone found in the master bedroom of Kohimarama Road and attributed by the Police to Mr Fan whose number appeared on its contact list.
[140] It was Mr Deng’s case that his visits to Kohimarama Road both before and after the trip to St Lukes were for the innocent purpose of recovering a debt. His counsel submitted to us that the chat log from Mr Fan’s computer of a conversation with a person in Hong Kong about cars (car being a code word for a kilogram of methamphetamine) suggested an absence of knowledge on Mr Deng’s part of what was happening. The log recorded: (decrease indentation)

(whatever) ...I heard there is a lot of cars over there now? Let me know when u back ok bro

(b) 13 May 2006 from 7.52pm

[Fan] ... don’t call ... I’ve got someone here.

[whatever] okok

[Fan] everything all good...I’ll go pick up the cars tomorrow...and take it to the dealer...

[whatever] ...please leave me some good cars to drive ok. I will try to come back asap.

[Fan] ok...mate... but be quick...

[whatever] have u test drive the cars yet?...yeah in a few days ok

[Fan] I will have 40 cars tomorrow...and pick up 50 cars from customs after...this weekend...so I leave a cup of car 4 u to sell ok?

[whatever] okok I understand cup is not enough mate...haha need more than that...

Counsel for Mr Deng submitted that for Mr Fan to ask the other party not to call suggested that Mr Fan was withholding information from Mr Deng, something inconceivable if Mr Deng had arrived to give him instructions about importing the Isaac methamphetamine.

[141] The Crown however submitted that the exchange was not only highly incriminatory of Mr Fan but not exculpatory of Mr Deng, 13 May being the date the Isaac shipment of some 95kg of methamphetamine arrived in New Zealand; 21 May being the date Mr Deng arrived. At 1.22pm on 21 May, the day before the controlled delivery of the Isaac shipment, Mr Fung and “Raymond” were recorded discussing the shipment with Mr Fung stating he would deliver “forty” [kilograms of methamphetamine] the next day. There followed the series of phone calls between Messrs Fan and Deng recounted in the discussion of their appeals.
[142] Mr Fan said in evidence that the log was of a conversation with a typist “whatever” with whom he did not want to discuss in Mr Deng’s hearing his own role in the transaction, about which Mr Fan was boasting to ”whatever”. We can understand Mr Fan not wishing Mr Deng to know that he was being indiscreet. No issue was made of the point by leading counsel for Mr Deng when cross-examining Mr Fan.
[143] These were matters for assessment by the jury. We share the Judge’s opinion that the evidence of Mr Deng’s involvement with the methamphetamine from the Isaac shipment was overwhelming.

(2) Miscarriage of justice

(a) Failure to exclude the powder evidence
[144] Environmental Science and Research Ltd (ESR) produced a marking powder comprising spores that adhere to items with which they come into contact and which show fluorescence under ultraviolet light. The presence of fluorescence on a person’s hands is not conclusive evidence of the presence of spores, which may be due to other factors such as washing powder, toothpaste and oranges. So to make its marker powder distinctive, ESR mixes with the spore not only the fluorescent powder but a heavy metal compound. In this case a customs officer placed ESR powder into the rubbish sack from the Isaac shipment before closing the sack. The car delivered it to the St Lukes car park. After the rubbish sack had been found open on the kitchen floor at Kohimarama Road the customs officer examined the hands of Messrs Deng and Fan under ultraviolet light and noted fluorescence. The added chemical compounds were found in the spores taken from Mr Deng’s hands.
[145] It emerged at trial that the officer had not been provided with ESR guidelines describing how the marking powder should be used so as to minimise the risk of cross-contamination. She failed to comply with the guidelines:
[146] The ESR expert accepted that the errors would result in a real chance of cross-contamination.
[147] Crown counsel in closing accepted that the value of the powder evidence was undercut by the way it had emerged and did not seek to place particular reliance upon it. Although describing it as “not inconsistent... with the Crown case” they submitted that in view of the custom officer’s evidence that she did not touch either Mr Deng or Mr Fan when shining the light on them, the ultraviolet light testing was not jeopardised to the same extent.
[148] The Judge however directed the jury:

Ms Caulson’s evidence just makes it clear that it is not safe to rely on the evidence of the fluorescence on the clothing and hands and I am going to direct you to disregard that evidence when you are thinking about Mr Deng’s position.

[149] We comment that the jury saw the process of challenge to the Crown evidence. The Judge’s direction was perfectly clear. There is no reason to apprehend that the jury failed to understand and act upon the direction.
(b) The criticism of Mr Deng’s decision to exercise his right to silence
[150] The Judge properly directed the jury:

Mr Deng did not make a statement to the police and he did not give evidence and I must remind you that you must not take from those facts anything adverse. Those were decisions that Mr Deng was perfectly within his rights to make.

[151] Mr Young criticised the words we have emphasised in a subsequent passage:

The next circumstances relied upon by the Crown is Mr Deng going with Mr Fan to St Lukes. Potentially the Crown says once again that there is no innocent explanation that would justify his accompanying Mr Fan to pick up drugs or returning to the house with what appeared to be 20 kgs of methamphetamine. The Crown says that Mr Deng’s presence at Kohimarama and at on the trip to St Lukes and back speak for themselves and that it is implausible to suggest any innocent reason for him being there or indeed any reason for Mr Fan to allow him to be there if he was in fact not involved in the drug dealing.

[152] Mr Young relied on s 23(4)(b) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990:

Everyone arrested or detained ... shall have the right to refrain from making a statement ...

and on s 32 of the Evidence Act:

Fact-finder not to be invited to infer guilt from defendant's silence before trial

(1) This section applies to a criminal proceeding in which it appears that the defendant failed—

...

(b) to disclose a defence before trial.

(2) If subsection (1) applies,—

(a) no person may invite the fact-finder to draw an inference that the defendant is guilty from a failure of the kind described in subsection (1); and

(b) if the proceeding is with a jury, the Judge must direct the jury that it may not draw that inference from a failure of that kind.

...

[153] We think it unlikely that the jury would have read the second passage as detracting from the direction of the first. Its natural meaning is that defence counsel could point to no such explanation. But if the jury thought otherwise s 33 would apply:

33 Restrictions on comment on defendant's right of silence at trial

In a criminal proceeding, no person other than the defendant or the defendant's counsel or the Judge may comment on the fact that the defendant did not give evidence at his or her trial.

[154] As this Court stated in R v Drain CA249/94 11 October 1994:

Inferences against an accused may be drawn as a matter of logic and commonsense from his or her failure to give an explanation in the face of evidence of guilt calling for one.

The point fails.

(c) Failure sufficiently to explain elements of joint possession

[155] Immediately before summing up the Judge distributed issue sheets to the jury. That relating to Mr Deng was in the following form:

Count 14 - Deng Guo Wei

Possession of a Class A controlled drug for sale (methamphetamine) on 22 May 2006

NB: Crown to prove all elements beyond reasonable doubt.

1 Was the substance found at Kohimarama Road on 22 May 2006 methamphetamine? If No, find Not Guilty. If Yes, proceed to Step 2.

2 Did Deng Guo Wei know that the substance was present and that it was a controlled drug? If No, find Not Guilty. If Yes proceed to Step 3.

3 .Did Deng Guo Wei have either physical custody of or the power to exercise control over the methamphetamine? If No, find Not Guilty. If Yes proceed to Step 4.

Did Deng Guo Wei intend to exercise control over the methamphetamine? If No, find Not Guilty. If Yes, proceed to Step 5.

5 Was Deng Guo Wei in possession of more than 5 grams of methamphetamine? If No, find Not Guilty. If Yes, find Guilty.

[156] After the oral summing up was delivered it was transcribed and provided to the jury. At [11] of the summing up, under the heading “The charges”, the Judge directed the jury to consider each accused and each charge separately. At [29] she repeated the need to consider each accused separately. To emphasise this the issue sheets were set out with each charge on a separate page.
[157] At [16] – [19] the Judge directed the jury as to the different elements of possession, directing that possession “can/could be shared”. At [49] the Judge began directing in relation to Mr Fan and at [53] she stated:

When you are considering the charge against Mr Fan and later against Mr Deng remember that possession can be either alone or shared. The Crown case is that both of these accused had possession and both are guilty. Mr Fan’s position is that he did not have possession and Mr Deng did. Mr Deng’s position, put by Mr Haig in cross-examination, is that Mr Fan had possession and Mr Deng did not.

[158] At [65] the Judge turned to the case against Mr Deng. She stated that the questions in the issue sheet for Mr Deng were “effectively the same as you’ll already have looked at in relation to Mr Fan”. Referring to the issue sheet she indicated that the contentious matters were questions [2], [3] and [4] relating to possession.
[159] At the end of the paragraph she gave the direction:

The significant issue in relation to Mr Deng is whether he had possession of methamphetamine in the sense of knowingly having custody or control over it and intending to exercise that control whether it was alone or whether it was with Mr Fan.

[160] Mr Young submitted that the direction was inadequate and may have confused the jury especially when read in conjunction with the information that she handed out for Mr Fan. The direction relating to Mr Fan was in similar terms to that in respect of Mr Deng with substitution of Mr Fan’s name and (instead of the statement at the foot “Possession may be either alone or shared”) the addition in paragraphs [3] and [4] after the phrase “control over the methamphetamine” of the words “either alone or together with Mr Deng”. Mr Young argued that the oral direction was inadequate and that the information sheet for Mr Fan was confusing and the more so given the absence from the sheet of the words “either alone or together with [the co accused]”, the point being dealt with only at the bottom of the page in respect of Mr Deng. He submitted that, given that the count was of joint possession, the oral direction “having control ... and intending to exercise that control whether it was alone or whether it was with Mr Fan” may have confused the jury into believing that once Mr Fan’s intent to exercise control was proved the element was proved also against Mr Deng. Mr Young cited R v Searle [1971] Crim LR 592 (CA) where drugs were found in a car with more than one occupant. It could not be proved which of the defendants had possession. Each was charged with possession. None gave evidence. It was held that mere knowledge of the presence of drugs by any particular accused was not enough to convict him.
[161] We accept the Crown’s submission that the Judge made clear the elements to be proved against Mr Deng. The issue sheet relating to him was unambiguous, as were the oral directions as to the need to consider each accused and each charge separately. We do not consider that the reference to Mr Deng in the sheet relating to Mr Fan could have given rise to confusion. The point fails.
[162] The appeal against conviction fails.

Mr Fan: appeal against conviction

Mr Fan’s submissions

[163] Mr Fan’s grounds of appeal are:

We have rejected that ground at [80].

(b) Mr Fan was not the lessee of the property at Kohimarama Road and the owner leased the property to someone else.

He sought to argue as further grounds lack of preparedness to deal with the chat log evidence and a mistranslation of Mr Chen’s evidence.

[164] Mr Fan, who represented himself on his conviction appeal, relied on an affidavit by Ronald Tse of Kowloon, Hong Kong sworn on 13 July 2009 which exhibited a photograph of the appellant and stated that the man to whom he rented the property, who called himself Mr Tan, was an older man. Mr Fan made oral submissions which were reduced to writing. He submitted that:
[165] Mr Fan submitted that the evidence of the chat logs should never have been admitted. He further contended that there was a major translation error in respect of Mr Chen’s evidence about the kind of illness suffered by his son which made him leave New Zealand urgently when the fourth shipment was going to be searched by customs: Mr Chen had referred to a hygiene problem as a baby passes on a virus from hands and feet to its mouth causing sickness. This was wrongly translated as foot and mouth disease, which is a cattle disease only.
[166] The contention about Mr Tan was run unsuccessfully at trial and is not the type of significant new evidence which could lead to a conclusion of miscarriage.
[167] The challenge to the chat log evidence is without substance. Nor is the contention about mistranslation of Mr Chen’s evidence germane to a point helpful to Mr Fan.

Decision

[168] The appeal against conviction is dismissed.

III THE APPEALS AGAINST SENTENCE

Mr Chen

[169] Counsel for Mr Chen submitted that the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon Mr Chen was manifestly excessive.
[170] The Solicitor-General submitted that the sentences of 12 years on counts 1-6 and 9-10 should have been of life imprisonment.

Basis of appeal by Mr Chen

[171] Counsel for Mr Chen submitted that the sentence of life imprisonment was manifestly excessive because:

Discussion

Mr Chen’s role

[172] The jury found Mr Chen liable for the Isaac shipment by way of common intention, pursuant to s 66(2). The scale of that shipment made it the most serious and the lead offence for sentencing purposes. In sentencing Mr Chen for the lead offence, the Judge considered she was required by s 85(4) of the Sentencing Act 2002 to increase that sentence to take into account his additional offending. The Judge noted at [52] that Mr Chen was “directly involved in most of the shipments and liable by reason of common intention in those in which [he] did not have a direct hand.” She described him as one of the “main actors in this operation” (at [48]), a “crucial player” and probably more culpable than even Mr Pan (at [52]). She considered that given the number and seriousness of the earlier shipments and sales, and Mr Chen’s significant, continuing role in the operation, the lead sentence needed to be increased to the point where life imprisonment was entirely appropriate.
[173] We see no reason to disagree with that assessment in relation to the Isaac importation.
[174] The factors advanced at (b) and (c) are personal circumstances. While the Court will not fetter the discretion to take such circumstances into account, they generally carry little weight in sentencing for serious, drug related offending given the vital need for denunciation and deterrence. The Judge nevertheless referred to them at [47], [53] and [54] of her sentencing notes. She explicitly considered whether the fact that Mr Chen would be serving a sentence far from home and family, in a country where he does not speak the language, would amount to circumstances rendering an otherwise appropriate sentence disproportionately severe. At paragraph [54] she concluded that:

A primary objective of a sentencing Judge in a case such as this is to deter those who might become involved in this trade. Those who come to this country for the purposes of criminal offending on this scale take the risk that they will be caught and imprisoned far from their families. Deterrence will not be achieved if those who choose to target this country in that way are shown leniency when the risk they willingly undertake becomes reality. Your offending is of such gravity that I am not persuaded that the penalty I intend to impose is disproportionately severe.

[175] We endorse that reasoning as consistent with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act.
[176] After considering overseas experience, this Court in R v Fatu [2005] NZCA 278; [2006] 2 NZLR 72 recited the Crown’s account of the effect of the drug:

Methamphetamine abuse can fairly be characterised as the most serious drug problem the country faces at present. The various ways in which the drug threatens the community are well-known. Methamphetamine is a particularly destructive drug for users; it is highly addictive with profound mental and physical side-effects. It induces aggressive and irrational behaviour, and is regularly responsible for other offending involving extreme violence, a phenomenon not commonly associated with other drugs. It has created a thriving industry, in which organised crime is heavily involved at all levels. ... It is submitted, with respect, that if it is appropriate to draw any distinction between Class A drugs, methamphetamine can fairly lay claim to a place in the most serious category.

The Court took a similar view, adopting at [36] the following sentencing bands in cases involving the importation of methamphetamine:

(a) Band one – low-level importing (less than 5 g) – two years six months’ to four years six months’ imprisonment.

(b) Band two – importing commercial quantities (5 g to 250 g) – three years six months’ to ten years’ imprisonment.

(c) Band three – importing large commercial quantities (250 g to 500 g) – nine years’ to 13 years’ imprisonment.

(d) Band four – importing very large commercial quantities (500 g or more) – 12 years’ to life imprisonment.

[177] The Judge’s approach to such large scale international offending is consistent with the approach taken in England. In R v K [2002] EWCA Crim 927; [2003] 1 Cr App R (S) 6 (CA) the appellant was involved in conspiracy to supply 44kg of heroin, though participants testified that the amount imported was larger. He pleaded guilty late in the trial and was sentenced to 26 years as the ringleader in the United Kingdom, a sentence which would have been 30 years but for his guilty plea. The sentence was upheld on appeal.
[178] It is also consistent with the approach in Australia. In R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1 (NSWCCA) the accused were convicted of importing into Australia 383kg of cocaine. Two of the offenders were sentenced to life imprisonment. Others were sentenced to 24 years imprisonment. Appeals by prisoners and by the Crown were dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeal. We append an appendix a summary of Australian sentencing decisions. They bear out the appropriateness of the life sentence.
[179] The life sentence imposed for the lead charge was justified given the culpability of Mr Chen and the seriousness of the importations, having regard to the guidance of this Court in R v Fatu and the principles and purposes of sentencing set out in the Sentencing Act, in particular section 8(c). The appeal against the life sentence is dismissed.

The application by the Solicitor-General

[180] The Solicitor-General’s application for leave to appeal in relation to the sentences of Messrs Chen and Pan on counts 3-6 and 9-10 and against Messrs Deng and Fan on count 14 was 13 days out of time as a result of erroneous advice given by a Court officer as to the effect of the long vacation. There is no prejudice resulting from the delay and leave to appeal is granted.
[181] The Judge considered that, in relation to the shipments prior to Isaac and Prosperity, she could make no finding as to the probable amounts of drugs, save that they were clearly part of a sophisticated commercial operation. She considered she could safely conclude from the evidence, including the remains of the packaging found after, that they contained “what would be regarded in New Zealand as very large commercial quantities of at least 500 grams”. The Crown contended that the Judge erred in:

We accept that submission. The size and nature of the total operation, the travel to and from New Zealand, the careful establishment of accommodation and the separate consignee companies each with its own ostensible credentials (registered name, office) yet wholly lacking substance, the renting of a succession of storage lockers, the storage of materials for which there was no commercial purpose and which can only have been a disguise for the containers that were removed, and the evidence both of sales (from Kohimarama Road) and of remittance of funds together point to successive transactions on a grand scale.

[182] The Sentencing Act states:

8 Principles of sentencing or otherwise dealing with offenders

In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court—


(a) must take into account the gravity of the offending in the particular case, including the degree of culpability of the offender; and

(b) must take into account the seriousness of the type of offence in comparison with other types of offences, as indicated by the maximum penalties prescribed for the offences; and

(c) must impose the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence if the offending is within the most serious of cases for which that penalty is prescribed, unless circumstances relating to the offender make that inappropriate; and

(d) must impose a penalty near to the maximum prescribed for the offence if the offending is near to the most serious of cases for which that penalty is prescribed, unless circumstances relating to the offender make that inappropriate;

...

[183] These principles require this Court to convey the message that large-scale importation and sale of methamphetamine into and in New Zealand will attract the stern maximum penalty which Parliament has set for such offending. Mr Chen embarked on the large scale operation employing successive consignments, seen by him and his co-offenders to warrant use of elaborate preparations and shipping containers. There can be no excuse for the earlier transactions any more than for their successors.

Decision

[184] The Solicitor-General’s appeal against Mr Chen’s sentences on counts 3-6 and 9-10 is allowed. The 12 year sentence in each of those counts is set aside and substituted by a sentence of life imprisonment on each.

Mr Pan

[185] The Judge found that Mr Pan had a very high-level role in the overall operation in which he was involved throughout. He performed the crucial task of providing continuity and practical assistance most needed for the operation to succeed. While not the instigator or mastermind he was a crucial player. The offending being of the most serious kind, and because Mr Pan played an essential role over its entire period, she imposed a life sentence upon him.
[186] The ground of Mr Pan’s appeal was that the sentence was excessive in terms of the circumstances and the authorities.
[187] Counsel for Mr Pan submitted that it was not correct to regard the scale of the offending as the overriding factor in holding that life imprisonment was the only appropriate penalty. Logic and history tell us that there will always be a bigger importation in the future. For the Court to rely primarily on this factor draws an arbitrary line based only on quantity, rather than properly also taking into account and giving due weight to both the offender’s role in the operation and the offender’s previous history and likelihood of re-offending. It can only be cases where the offending is on a large commercial scale and where the offender is the mastermind, and where the offender has shown by his previous conduct to have a propensity for such offending, that the most severe penalty available should be imposed. Such cases are properly categorised as the worst of their kind, and the protection of society necessarily calls for a sentence of life imprisonment.
[188] We disagree. We have recounted the observations in Fatu about the nature of the drug. While not irrelevant to sentencing, in the case of such a carefully planned large-scale operation personal considerations can have little weight. A deterrent sentence is required and for Mr Pan, like Mr Chen, a life sentence was inevitable.

Decision

[189] Mr Pan’s appeal against his sentence is dismissed.
[190] For similar reasons to those in Mr Chen’s case we draw the inference that the only reason for the kind of importations and the circumstances surrounding them is because they were of a large scale. The appeal by the Solicitor-General against the sentence of Mr Pan to 12 years imprisonment on counts 3-6 and 9-10 is allowed. There are substituted sentences of life imprisonment on each of those counts.

Mr Deng

[191] Mr Deng submitted that the 17 year term of imprisonment for possession of methamphetamine from the Isaac shipment for the purpose of supply, with a minimum term of eight and a half years, was excessive. The Solicitor-General applies for leave to appeal against Mr Deng’s sentence and submits that a life term should be imposed.
[192] Counsel for Mr Deng challenged the Judge’s rejection of his submission that Mr Deng played a lesser role than Mr Fan whom the evidence identified as the man who set up and equipped the drug distribution warehouse at Kohimarama Road and one of the persons trusted with collecting and distributing the drugs from the Isaac shipment.
[193] The Crown pointed to the evidence that:
[194] The Judge considered that Mr Deng’s role was no less than that of Mr Fan, while accepting that, whether or not he was the link to “Raymond”, the structure required for the distribution of the drugs was already set up. She considered that the evidence fell short of showing he had any greater role than that of the distributor on that day. She regarded the roles of Messrs Deng and Fan while different as complementary.
[195] Stevens J had taken a 25 year starting point in relation to Mr Fung’s conviction for the importation of the whole Isaac shipment. Courtney J, when sentencing Mr Fan, made the determination:

... whilst the evidence was clear that you expected to take delivery of 40 kilograms of methamphetamine, in fact you only ever had possession of 20 kgs of what you believed to be the drugs. I intended to sentence on that basis.

She described Mr Fan’s culpability as less than that of Mr Fung.

[196] The Solicitor-General submitted that the Judge erred in:
[197] We accept the Crown’s submission that the touchstone for determining culpability in cases of possession of drugs for supply where there has been a controlled delivery of some or all of the drugs is the intention of the offender: R v Gray CA209/91 14 April 1992 and R v Huang [2008] NZCA 46.
[198] This Court stated in R v Gray:

In assessing the seriousness of the offence of possession for the purpose of supply, it would be unreal not to take into account the way in which the drug came into the applicant’s possession and the closeness of his involvement with the importation, even if he was not himself the person who arranged it.

[199] We accept the Crown’s submission that Messrs Deng and Fan knew what the quantity of methamphetamine was in the Isaac shipment and intended to supply not only the 40kg packaged by Mr Fung but at least 50kg further from the Isaac shipment to be provided at a later date.
[200] The evidence of the chat logs between Mr Fan and “whatever” on 13 May and 21 May 2006 referred obliquely to “a lot of cars” (meaning kilograms of methamphetamine) and stated “I will have 40 cars by tomorrow ... and pick up 50 cars from customs after this weekend ...” We accept the Crown’s submission recounted by the Judge in summing up:

Although the conversation was ostensibly about cars, the Crown says the dates and the amounts that had been talked about of 40 or 50 so closely mirroring the amount of the methamphetamine in the Isaac shipment, meant that Mr Fan was actively involved in this importation.

[201] In sentencing Messrs Deng and Fan the Judge should therefore have taken into account both the immediately expected 40kg (rather than 20kg) and the fact that it was part of an anticipated 95kg which had arrived in the Isaac shipment and also should have recognised that Mr Deng was very close to “Raymond” and the supply from China.
[202] The very great quantity of the expected drug and the high-level participation by Mr Deng in the operation make it inappropriate to treat him as a subordinate of Mr Fan.

Decision

[203] We dismiss Mr Deng’s appeal against sentence. A sentence of life imprisonment would have been within range. This being a Solicitor-General appeal, on that appeal we set aside the sentence of 17 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight and a half years on count 14 and substitute a sentence of 25 years imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of ten years.

Mr Fan

[204] In support of Mr Fan’s appeal against sentence, Mr Newell submitted that the 19 years six months term of imprisonment with a minimum of nine years and six months was excessive. The Judge’s approach was to treat Mr Fan’s culpability as lower than that of Mr Fung. She began with Mr Fung’s starting point of 25 years. She considered his culpability to be less than his because he had been convicted in relation to the entire Isaac shipment and, whereas Mr Fan had expected to take delivery of 40kg of methamphetamine, Mr Fan only ever had possession of 20kg of what he believed to be the drug. She selected a starting point of 17 years and added an uplift of two and a half years to reflect the charge of selling methamphetamine and two charges of possession of firearms.
[205] Mr Newell referred to R v Huang where a sentence of 12 years imprisonment was upheld in relation to possession of 8kg of methamphetamine and conspiracy to supply that drug. He submitted that a starting point of 15 years imprisonment would have been appropriate with a minimum term of 50 per cent. He submitted that Mr Fan had been directed by others and that there was no evidence of his involvement in the importation of the drug or any role in the distribution of methamphetamine until January 2006 when the Polymer 4 shipment arrived.
[206] The Crown submitted that, unlike Mr Fung but like Mr Deng, Mr Fan:
[207] Mr Fan is 31 years of age and had emigrated with his family from China at the age of 13. We endorse the Judge’s finding that his role was that of a distributor and he occupied the premises at Kohimarama Road alone and for that purpose. It was a position of responsibility and the nature of the business could be gauged from the presence on the premises of firearms which included a machine gun. As the author of the chat log passage about the quantity of methamphetamine being imported, Mr Fan, like Mr Deng, is to be sentenced on the basis of an expectation of 95kg of methamphetamine in the Isaac shipment additional to his involvement in Polymer 4 and the selling count.
[208] We agree with the Judge that despite their different roles the complementary functions of Messrs Deng and Fan are of comparable gravity. The volume of the Isaac shipment was such that, in view of Mr Fan’s overall role in the operation, a life sentence would have been within range.

Decision

[209] In Mr Fan’s case also we dismiss his appeal and allow the Solicitor-General’s appeal. We set aside the sentence of 19 years 6 months with a non- parole period of nine and a half years on count 14. Because of the conservatism that attends such appeals we substitute a sentence not of life but of 25 years imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of ten years. In practical terms the two are not far removed.

Mr Fung

[210] Mr Fung was sentenced to 15 years following his plea of guilty. Stevens J adopted a starting point of 25 years and allowed a discount of 40 per cent for the mitigating “features of the offender” comprising an early guilty plea, his being a first offender who co-operated fully with the Police, and his providing assistance (including giving evidence) which led directly to the arrest of Messrs Deng and Fan and contributed to their subsequent conviction.
[211] Mr Fung came to New Zealand to prepare the way for the Isaac importation. He incorporated Isaac International Trade Company Ltd, rented office space, opened a bank account and made an application on behalf of the company for a client code to import goods. On 23 March 2006 he left New Zealand for Hong Kong, following which on 22 April 2006 the Isaac container was shipped. He returned to New Zealand on 10 May 2006. Following the arrival of the vessel containing the container he arranged to hire three storage units in Penrose. The container was delivered to that address where Mr Fung was observed overseeing the unloading of the container.
[212] On 25 May 2006 he pleaded guilty to the importation of methamphetamine and having the methamphetamine in his possession for sale. The Judge described the shipment of 95kgas the largest the country had seen. She considered that Mr Fung’s involvement was that of a “middle man crucial to the success of the plan” who was to receive the equivalent of $NZ10,000 for his participation.
[213] We see no basis for distinguishing Mr Fung’s position from that of Messrs Deng and Fan, and accept the Judge’s starting point of 25 years, while observing that a life term would have been within range. But as Mr Johnstone properly conceded, on the original sentencings there was disparity between his 15 years and the sentences imposed on Messrs Deng and Fan. Counsel cited R v Hadfield CA337/06 14 December 2006, where a drug courier who had imported 800g of pure methamphetamine assisted in the detection and apprehension of four other people involved in the importation. Without his assistance the Police would not have discovered their identity. He pleaded guilty at the earliest possible time to one count of importing the Class A drug methamphetamine. This Court endorsed the Judge’s 11 year starting point. The argument concerned whether the discount of five years (approximately 45 per cent) on the basis of Mr Hadfield’s guilty plea and assistance to the authorities was appropriate. The appellant’s counsel submitted the discount should be in the order of 60 per cent. The submission was accepted and a discount of six and a half years was allowed, resulting in a substituted sentence of four and a half years imprisonment.
[214] We are satisfied that the combination of the prompt plea of guilty and the assistance to the authorities warrants the same 60 per cent deduction.

Decision

[215] Accordingly Mr Fung’s sentence of 15 years imprisonment is set aside and is replaced by a sentence of ten years imprisonment.

APPENDIX
Chen & Ors – Schedule of Australian life sentence cases

Case/ Jurisdiction
Drug (quantity)
Comments
Cocaine (380kg, pure)
Importation by boat after buying and equipping boat in New Zealand and collection of drugs at rendezvous near New Zealand with Central American suppliers. It was the largest cocaine seizure in Australia (at the time). The two principal organisers, both of whom had been convicted for similar offences, received life sentences (25 years MPI). One principal bought and refurbished the boat and bought equipment; the other organised the purchase of drugs in Central America. The five others 24 years (16 years MPI) variously assisted with refurbishment, operated bank accounts, bought supplies and sailed the drugs to Australia. A further mastermind and financier was sentenced to 16 years following substantial assistance to authorities and guilty plea. Sentencing judge indicated that he would have given the financier life also.
R v Campillo Vaquere [2004] NSWCCA 271
Cocaine (224kg – 170kg pure)
Importation by boat of at that time the record cocaine seizure, 85 times the minimum weight for the offending to qualify as commercial. Appellant’s role was to rent house in Sydney from which distribution of drugs could be undertaken, arrange transport and pay expenses, and select others to pick up drugs. Appellant was not the “Mr Big” of the operation, but was his representative in Australia. Sentenced to life (24 years MPI) after trial, upheld on appeal.
R v Gonzales-Betes [2001] NSWCCA 226
Cocaine (224kg – 170kg pure)
Co-offender of Campillo Vaquere – was described as “mid-level executive”. Sentenced to life (22 years MPI) after trial. The Judge stated:
The amount of drug involved in this case was enormous. This was a carefully planned sophisticated importation in which the appellant was not the ring leader, chief operative or chairman of the board. She was, however, a person who involved herself early and whose activities seem to be such as to be essential to the operation of this small group of criminals bringing into Australia a very large quantity of the pernicious drug for a challenge to distribution. The precise terminology describing by analogy that role, misses the point.
There was evidence that appellant had been involved in previous importations as intercepted communications showed she held herself out to the others as knowing the best way to land boats. Appeal dismissed.
Cocaine (224kg – 170kg pure)
Co-offender of Campillo Vaquere and Gonzales-Betes, also described as “mid-level executive”. Appellent supervised importation by taking delivery of the drugs, sailing them part of the way with another man, then meeting the delivery vessel with the other man at various islands along the journey. He also gave instructions as to the landing of the drug. Received life sentence after trial with 25 years MPI. Appeal against sentence dismissed.
Cocaine (1000kg – 700kg pure)
Appellant and 2 others picked up cocaine worth $A100-400m off the coast of Cape Verde and sailed it to Broome in Western Australia. Appellant was to receive $US200,000 and his role was to supervise the cocaine on board and deliver it to other Colombian nationals in Broome. There was some evidence of hardship in Colombia motivating him to offend. Appellant pleaded guilty and conceded at sentencing that only a life sentence would be appropriate, issue was MPI. MPI was 20 years. Crown appeal against sentence dismissed.
R v De La Espreilla-Velasco [2006] WASCA 31; (2006) 31 WAR 291 (WASCA)
Cocaine (1000kg – 700kg pure)
Co-offender of Suarez-Mejia, received life sentence after trial (26 years MPI), raised duress and parity with other offenders, sentence upheld on appeal. The appellant was not a principal, but played a very significant role as the leader in Australia, and was a “recidivist offender”. The Court of Appeal stated that duress/personal circumstances would be significantly less relevant in drug cases because of large-scale harm caused.
Cocaine (1000kg – 700kg pure)
Co-offender of Suarez-Mejia and De La Espreilla-Velasco who piloted the boat from Louisiana to Cape Verde and then to Australia. He alleged that he was owed $US300,000 in Colombia and was told that he would only receive it if he piloted the boat to Australia. He was described as having a “key” role in that he set up bank accounts, recruited a subordinate and purchased and repaired the boat, but the Crown did not submit that he would have had any ongoing role after importation. He had prior drug convictions and received an initial sentence of 25 years (14 MPI), Crown appealed on ground that sentence manifestly inadequate and disparate to Suarez-Mejia’s sentence. Suarez-Mejia had ultimate responsibility for the drugs, but Reaves was paid more and became involved earlier. Like Suarez-Mejia, and unlike De La Espreilla-Velasco, Reaves pleaded guilty at earliest opportunity and helped the authorities. CA doubted correctness of trial court’s assessment that Reaves was less involved than the other two. Crown appeal allowed – sentence of life imprisonment imposed with 18 years MPI, which took into account his guilty plea, assistance, and to a lesser extent his personal circumstances (ie age, having to spend his prison sentence in Australia and not the US, and that he would be deported afterward to the US and would likely face more prison time).
R v Sevilla [2007] WASCA
Cocaine (100kg - 70kg pure)
Appellant planned receipt of cocaine and received drugs by rowing out in dinghy. Judge stated that his role was “crucial to success of the operation” as he had collected the drugs and been in contact all others necessary to complete the importation – it was a sophisticated and well organised importation. Appellant pleaded guilty; got life with 21 years MPI, upheld on appeal. On appeal argued that he had offended under duress; this was rejected by the judge.
R v Attalah [2005] NSWCCA 277
Heroin (3kg) and cocaine (8kg)
Appellant supplied large commercial quantities of heroin (3kg) and cocaine (8kg) to drug-addicted prostitutes in an unlicenced brothel he ran, and deducted the cost of the drugs from the prostitutes’ earnings over 2 years. Sentenced to life imprisonment (MPI unclear), reduced on appeal to 24 years (18 MPI).
R v Chung Hing Law [2006] NSWCCA 100
Heroin (large but unspecified commercial quantity)
Appellant convicted following trial of conspiracy to import heroin. There were 5 separate importations from Bangkok, each strikingly similar (a conspirator would fly in to Sydney, rent premises for the purposes of receiving and distributing the drugs and sometimes remitting the proceeds overseas. The drugs were concealed in shipping crates along with other legitimate goods). No drugs were detected until the 5th shipment, but the circumstances were remarkably similar in the previous shipments. For all but two of the importations, the appellant came to Sydney, rented premises and received the drugs. Sentenced to life imprisonment with 30 years MPI. Upheld on appeal, judge stating:
In my opinion the applicant was in the relevant sense an offender in the “worst case” category. Although he may not have been at the pinnacle of the operation he was a key organiser of the enterprise both here and overseas. His role was greater than the provision of important assistance. A sentence of life imprisonment was appropriate.
Ecstasy (52kg in shipment of tiles); heroin (0.5kg in liquor bottle carried in hand luggage); methamphetamine (10g) and further heroin (14g) through post
First offender was knowingly concerned in importation of heroin bottle, knowingly concerned in importation of commercial quantity of ecstasy, and had high level involvement in planning and distribution of both. She and the second offender arranged for her uncle to carry the heroin bottle on a flight, and gave it to him in Hong Kong. She had no prior convictions but was an experienced drug trafficker. She pleaded guilty and received sentence of 25 years imprisonment (non-parole 18 years) allowed - Sentence of 22 years imprisonment (non-parole 16 years 6 months) substituted on appeal.

Second offender was knowingly concerned in importation of trafficable quantity of heroin and importation of commercial quantity of ecstasy; he was a principal who planned and received delivery and organised distribution with first offender. He had no prior convictions and pleaded guilty. Appeal against sentence of life imprisonment (non-parole 25 years) following guilty plea allowed - Sentence of 28 years imprisonment (non-parole 18 years)

Fourth offender pleaded guilty to possession of commercial quantity of ecstasy. He arrived and assisted extraction of ecstasy from tiles, and had a prior conviction for a drug offence. His appeal against sentence of life imprisonment (non-parole 20 years) allowed - Sentence of 22 years imprisonment (non-parole 16 years 6 months) substituted.

A third offender received a lesser sentence for the letter importations.
Heroin (389kg – 252kg pure)
Four appellants imported heroin from specially converted fishing trawler, which had a secret compartment from which speedboats carrying the drug to shore were launched. The trawler strayed into Australian waters and was captured by the Australian Navy. Several Indonesian crew members received life sentences also.

The Court stated:
The importation represented a crime of massive proportion perpetrated in a disciplined manner by criminals able to marshal money, ships, speedboats, crew, other personnel and a refuelling at sea. It was a highly sophisticated criminal enterprise conducted by professional criminals whose connections stretched over several countries. The amount of heroin intercepted, its quantity and consequent value, alone placed this crime within that band of such crime that may properly be labelled most serious.

First appellant arrived in Australia to supervise importation and appellant also have distributed the drug. Pleaded guilty; sentence of 24 years (18 MPI) upheld on appeal.

Second appellant arrived with first and monitored journey. Not clear that role would have extended to distribution, pleaded guilty much earlier than the others. Received life sentence with 28 years MPI, upheld on appeal.

Third appellant arrived with first two; took instructions from second appellant and got first and fourth to carry them out. Had smuggling in the past and was involved in selecting beaches. Received life sentence, MPI reduced from 30 to 28 years on appeal.

Fourth appellant prepared for delivery and distribution. Had more complicated but less vital role than first offender. Pleaded guilty, previous good record but no remorse, received life sentence with 28 years MPI upheld on appeal.
Heroin (389kg – 252kg pure)
Appellants were chief mate and chief engineer on ship in R v Li and falsified logs and must have known ship contained heroin. Chief mate had some mitigating personal circumstances; was supporting his family whose home had been destroyed in riots. Both received life sentences with 20 years MPI. Appealed arguing their sentences were disparate to that of captain. Appeals dismissed.
R v Mandagi [2002] NSWCCA 57 – note – disapproved in Li
Heroin (389kg – 252kg pure)
Captain of ship in Li which attempted to escape Australian Navy. He directed the collection of the drug, falsification of the log and communicated with others in Asia and Australia.
Appeal against sentence of life imprisonment after trial (non-parole period of 25 years) allowed - Sentence of 27 years (non-parole period of 19 years) substituted
Heroin (93.5kg – 69kg pure)
Applicant arrived in Australia almost a year before importation, recruited two others, and arranged to receive importation in shipment of commercial ovens from China. He was described as a “high-level operative who oversaw reception and would have overseen distribution. Pleaded guilty; life sentence (18.5 years MPI) upheld on appeal.
Heroin (50kg – 38kg pure)
Appellant was a Hong Kong customs Senior Inspector who was involved at high level to import heroin from China. He recruited another to supervise the journey and suggested ways to conceal the drug and finance the operation. Was extradited from Hong Kong, found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment (MPI 11 months), upheld on appeal.
Heroin (79kg – pure)
Senior figure who received, stored and distributed heroin from Sydney. Recruited an accomplice to help. Appellant associated with Hong Kong triad and at times threatened the accomplice’s family with violence to ensure accomplice’s cooperation. Life sentence after trial upheld on appeal.
R v Wangsaimas (1996) 6 NTLR 14; (1996) 133 FLR 272
Heroin (89.1kg – at time largest heroin seizure)
Appellants sailed boat containing drugs to Australia. One appellant piloted the boat and knew of the drug; the other two were responsible for safeguarding and delivering the drug. All three pleaded guilty and received life sentences without parole, upheld on appeal.
R v Che Yook (1995) 122 FLR 106; (1995) 84 A Crim R 432 (NSWCCA)
Heroin (70.5kg – 51.4kg pure – at time largest seizure)
First appellant was company director in Malaysia and Australia, arranged exportation from Malaysia, flew to Australia to supervise importation, probably principal but at least intimately involved at top level. Second appellant acted as first appellant’s subordinate in Australia but also recruited another. Both pleaded guilty. First appellant received life sentence with 20 years MPI, reduced on appeal to 24 years (18 MPI); second appellant’s life sentence with 16 years MPI upheld on appeal. Note that first appellant’s sentence reduction was required by s 16G of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), which has since been repealed.


Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Auckland


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