Ransfield v Police [2009] NZCA 460 (7 October 2009)

Court of Appeal of New Zealand

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Ransfield v Police [2009] NZCA 460 (7 October 2009)

Last Updated: 13 October 2009

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA383/2009

[2009] NZCA 460

ARETA RANSFIELD

v

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Hearing: 22 September 2009

Court: O'Regan, Venning and Winkelmann JJ

Counsel: Applicant in person
A M Powell for Crown

Judgment: 7 October 2009 at 2.30 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A We grant an extension of time to file the application for leave to appeal.

B We dismiss the application for leave to appeal.

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by O’Regan J)

Introduction

[1] Mr Ransfield seeks special leave to appeal against a decision of Dobson J (Ransfield v New Zealand Police HC WHA CRI 2008-488-14 21 November 2008) upholding a decision of Judge Callander convicting Mr Ransfield (and others) of trespass and fining him $500 with costs of $130 (Police v Senior DC KAI CRI 2006-029-001242-1245 14 May 2008).
[2] Mr Ransfield’s application to the High Court for leave to appeal was dismissed by Stevens J: HC WHA CRI 2008-488-041 27 March 2009.

Applicable law

[3] The application is made under s 144(3) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. The requirements of that provision were explained by this Court in R v Slater [1997] 1 NZLR 211 at 215 as follows:

It is sufficient to pose the statutory question: is there a question of law which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to this Court for decision?

[4] The limited nature of the appeal under s 144 was emphasised in a later observation of the Court in that case (also at 215):

Section 144 was not intended to provide a second tier of appeal from decisions of the District Court in proceedings under the Summary Proceedings Act. Parliament intended such proceedings to be brought to finality with the defendant having an appeal to the High Court other than when the conditions it has specified in subss (2) and (3) are met and leave to appeal is granted. Neither the determination of what comprises a question of law, nor the question whether that pointy of law raises a question of general or public importance, are to be diluted.

Facts

[5] The facts can be summarised briefly. The applicant and a number of others entered on land which is held by the Crown as part of a land bank for the purposes of future Treaty of Waitangi settlements. They had been warned to stay off the land but went onto it in what the District Court Judge described as a “planned, carefully considered, protest, a genuine cry from the heart about land they consider to be part of their ancestral right”.
[6] It was these circumstances which led to the applicant and others being charged with trespass and, ultimately, convicted after a defended hearing in the District Court.

Questions of law

[7] The questions of law for which leave to appeal is sought are not easily distilled from the voluminous material filed by the applicant. We think they can be fairly summarised as follows:

(a) The Crown cannot act against the applicant because he injuncted it from acting in 2005;

(b) The land is not lawfully owned by the Crown and therefore there was no factual basis for the finding of trespass;
(c) Persons holding office on behalf of the Crown such as the Commissioner of Crown Lands, police officers, prosecutors and the like could not act on behalf of the Queen: only the Queen could act personally against the applicant because she was the “vicarious liability”.

Our assessment

[8] These arguments and variations of them were carefully considered by Dobson J and Stevens J and we agree with their assessment that they have no validity. This Court has said on a number of occasions that challenges to the jurisdiction of the District Court of the kind raised in this case will not be indulged: leave will not be given so that an applicant can make what is essentially a political protest in a judicial forum. Mr Ransfield said this Court had injuncted the 2005 election and therefore the operation of the New Zealand government. In fact, it appears he filed a document purporting to seek such an injunction, but it does not appear to have been accepted for filing in this Court. The Court did not grant any such injunction. The “vicarious liability” point appears to be based on a misunderstanding of a High Court judgment.
[9] The points on appeal are matters on which there is no prospect of any genuine legal issue being raised, and in those circumstances we decline the application for special leave.
[10] A similar application arising from another incident involving the same land was dismissed by this Court last year: R v Roha [2008] NZCA 541. In that case, costs were awarded in favour of the Crown. The Crown did not seek costs in relation to the present application.

Miscellaneous matters

[11] Mr Ransfield asked that we amend the intituling to include a colleague, Patricia McLeod, as an applicant. Miss McLeod was not a party to the High Court appeal or to the application for leave to appeal in the High Court, and in those circumstances there is no basis on which she can be an applicant for leave to appeal in this Court. We therefore declined that application.
[12] The application for leave to appeal was filed out of time. The Crown takes issue with the late filing and opposes the granting of an extension of time. In the circumstances, having heard full argument on the application for leave, we think the appropriate step is to extend the time for the filing of the application.

Result

[13] We extend the time for the filing of the application for leave but refuse leave.

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington