Ransom v The Queen [2010] NZCA 390; (2010) 25 CRNZ 163 (23 August 2010)

Last Updated: 13 January 2012

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA369/2010 [2010] NZCA 390

BETWEEN ANNA MOANA RANSOM
Appellant

AND THE QUEEN
Respondent

Hearing: 10 August 2010

Court: Chambers, Rodney Hansen and Heath JJ

Counsel: A R Laurenson for Appellant
M D Downs for Respondent

Judgment: 23 August 2010 at 11 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A The appeal against sentence is allowed.

B The sentence of imprisonment imposed in the District Court is set aside.

C In substitution therefor, the appellant is sentenced to:

(a) Nine months’ home detention on count 11 (26 April 2007 offending);

(b) Three months’ home detention on each of the other counts;

(c) 75 hours’ community work on count 11 –

all sentences to be concurrent.

D The sentences of home detention are subject to the following conditions:

(a) The appellant must reside at 12 Scott Street, New Plymouth;

(b) The appellant must undertake counselling for her psychological and gambling issues, as directed by her probation officer;

(c) The appellant must undertake a budgeting programme or budgeting counselling, as directed by her probation officer.
____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Heath J)

The issue

[1] The issue, on this appeal, is whether a sentence of imprisonment was necessary[1] to mark benefit fraud offending, involving receipt of $127,985.59 of taxpayers’ money over a period of just under ten years.

The facts

[2] Ms Ransom was in receipt of a domestic purposes benefit from 13 June 1997 to 19 April 2008. At various times during that period, she also received an accommodation supplement and disability allowance.
[3] When signing an application form for these benefits, Ms Ransom agreed to advise the Ministry of Social Development immediately if there were any changes to her circumstances that may affect her entitlement. That included any change in her marital status.
[4] On 11 occasions, between 30 April 1998 and 26 April 2007, Ms Ransom was asked to declare her marital status. On each occasion, she signed forms but failed to disclose that she was married. It was only later, as a result of information received, that inquiries into that issue were undertaken on behalf of the Ministry of Social Development.
[5] The Ministry’s inquiries revealed that Ms Ransom had married Mr Hall on 20 December 1997. They had lived together during the whole period of the offending. When Ms Ransom was interviewed on 17 April 2008 and 17 November 2008, she claimed that she and Mr Hall had only lived together for a short period of time.
[6] During the period of offending, Ms Ransom illegitimately received the sum of $127,985.59, made up as follows:

1. Domestic purposes benefit: $109,487.57;
2. Accommodation supplement: $18,463.52; and

100. Disability allowance: $34.50.

Sentencing in the District Court

[7] Ms Ransom first came before the District Court at New Plymouth, in August 2009. She pleaded not guilty to the charges. On 22 December 2009, after completion of the committal process, an indictment was filed, alleging seven counts of using a document with intent to defraud and four of using a document with intent to obtain a pecuniary advantage.
[8] The first callover in the District Court was on 27 January 2010. On 11 February 2010, Ms Ransom sought and obtained from Judge Roberts a sentencing indication in respect of her alleged offending. The Judge considered, on the

information before him, that there was no basis to go lower than an end sentence in the vicinity of two years imprisonment, having regard to the amount of money involved. Nevertheless, he did say that, if guilty pleas were entered, he would call for a home detention appendix, adding:[2]

. . . but no guarantee that it would be followed and I would probably go so far as to say [counsel for Ms Ransom] would need to persuade me that it was appropriate.

[9] On 20 February 2010, Ms Ransom entered pleas of guilty to each of the eleven charges, spanning the period between 29 April 1998 and 26 April 2007. She was remanded on bail for sentence.
[10] After receipt of a pre-sentence report and a home detention appendix, Judge Roberts sentenced Ms Ransom, on 4 June 2010. The Judge was aware that she was considered a suitable candidate for home detention and that the proposed address was suitable for electronic monitoring.
[11] After recounting submissions on sentence, Judge Roberts took into account the following:[3]

1. “Personal difficulties” faced by Ms Ransom, arising out of a report from a clinical psychologist, dated 10 February 2010. That report identified “long-standing difficulties with depression and anxiety, for which she has taken medication for a significant period of time”.
2. Aggravating factors identified by the Crown; in particular the large sum of money illegally received and the period of time (almost ten years) during which her “deceit was practised”.

[12] The Judge was mindful that Ms Ransom had a dependent child, aged six years. He acknowledged that he needed to address the impact of her incarceration on that child and her continuing relationship with Mr Hall.[4]
[13] In a letter written to the District Court for the purpose of sentencing, Ms Ransom indicated that she did not regard her actions as “criminal”. It is clear that the Judge was unimpressed with what he perceived as her failure to take full responsibility for her offending, notwithstanding entry of the guilty pleas.[5]
[14] During the course of his sentencing remarks, Judge Roberts said:

[23] Higher Courts have consistently reinforced Lower Court decisions whereby significant defalcations by way of benefit fraud are usually met by a term of imprisonment. Those Courts have reiterated time after time after time that the obligation is on those receiving benefits to ensure full, frank, and open disclosure is made. Where the State provides assistance it is entitled to insist on integrity of beneficiaries in return. The High Court decision of Davey v Ministry of Social Development,[6] the decision appended to the Crown written submissions, essentially provides a start point for a lesser amount, two and a half years’ imprisonment. I consider that to be the appropriate start point in your case.

Although the word “usually” was used by the Judge,[7] taken together with other comments made during the course of sentencing, in particular the way in which he expressed himself on the issue of home detention,[8] we interpret these comments as reflecting the Judge’s understanding that a period of imprisonment was almost inevitable in a benefit fraud case with features of the type before him.

[15] The Judge took a starting point of two and a half years imprisonment, including aggravating factors relevant to the offending. From that, he deducted a credit of six months to recognise Ms Ransom’s need to care for a young child, her state of health and the unlikelihood that she would reoffend. A further credit of six months (25%) was given for entry of guilty pleas. The Judge took the view that the pleas were not entered “at the earliest” opportunity.[9] This resulted in an end sentence of 18 months imprisonment.
[16] The sentencing Judge dealt briefly with Ms Ransom’s submission that home detention was the most appropriate sentence. The Judge said:

[26] I turn to address the issue of home detention. I intend to decline that application for these reasons:

(a) Your offending is far, far too serious. $127,000 was received by you with no prospect of repayment.

(b) Sentencing consistency is important and a consistent message must go to you and to other beneficiaries who seek to abuse this system that significant defalcation will be met by sentences of imprisonment. In the end that is my decision, home detention is not appropriate and you will be sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.

Competing contentions

[17] Mr Laurenson, for Ms Ransom, submits that the Judge erred in imposing imprisonment in preference to home detention. In short, he contended that the Judge gave too much prominence to the amount of the overpayment. He submitted that there was no warrant for the Judge’s view that “significant defalcation will be met by sentences of imprisonment”;[10] particularly, for someone who had not previously offended in any way. In making those submissions, Mr Laurenson relied on two High Court decisions, Beedell v Ministry of Social Development[11] and Werahiko v Ministry of Social Development.[12]
[18] Mr Downs, for the Crown, submitted that the appellate authorities to which he referred[13] have created a presumption of imprisonment for serious benefit fraud of this type, involving large sums of money being obtained dishonestly over a long period of time. In this case, he submitted there was nothing to displace that presumptive position and that home detention would not mark the offending adequately.

Analysis

(a) The purpose of a home detention sentence

[19] We examine first the purpose of the sentence of home detention, introduced as a discrete sentencing option by the Sentencing Amendment Act 2007 (the 2007 Amendment),[14] along with other new community-based sentences.[15]
[20] The policy underlying the introduction of additional community-based sentences and the elevation of home detention to a stand-alone sentence was explained in the Explanatory Note to the Criminal Justice Reform Bill:[16]

The purpose of the Bill is to introduce a range of measures to arrest the sharp increase in the prison population in recent years. This increase is no longer sustainable, neither financially nor socially. New Zealand’s imprisonment rate is considerably higher than countries that we habitually compare ourselves with, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. The Bill, which includes some measures that will have an immediate effect and others that will take longer for their impact to be felt, is intended to contribute to a reduction in the imprisonment rate over time.

[21] Delivering the judgment of this Court in R v Hill, Arnold J emphasised that creation of a sentence of home detention “reflects a perception that society’s interests are better served in some cases by the imposition of restrictions on liberty through home detention rather than through imprisonment”.[17] His Honour referred to the “acknowledged advantages” of home detention that had been set out in the Explanatory Note to the Bill, including, “low rates of re-conviction and re-imprisonment, high compliance rates, and positive support for offenders’ reintegration and rehabilitation”.[18] In the context of offending involving a Class A controlled drug, the Court held that home detention should be treated as a real alternative to imprisonment.[19]
[22] In R v D(CA253/2008),[20] this Court considered the approach that should be taken in determining whether imprisonment should be imposed in preference to home detention. In doing so, the hierarchy of sentences set out in s 10A of the Sentencing Act 2002, the sentencing principle of imposing the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances, in accordance with the hierarchy of sentences,[21] and the terms of s 16 of the Sentencing Act, in relation to the circumstances in which imprisonment might be imposed, were considered.[22]

(b) The Court of Appeal authorities

[23] Mr Downs referred us to four Court of Appeal authorities, which he said demonstrated “that offending on this scale ordinarily attracts a significant and irreversible term of imprisonment”.[23] We now turn to those cases to analyse whether they do truly support that submission.
[24] The first case is R v Harlen,[24] a decision of a Full Court of this Court. The case was decided before the Sentencing Act 2002 came into force. It involved 20 counts of using a document to gain a pecuniary advantage and six counts of wilful omission to advise the authorities that she was in a relationship in the nature of marriage, for the purpose of misleading officials and receiving a benefit. The duration of the offending was from January 1994 to June 1999, during which time Ms Harlen received $120,355.26 illegitimately.[25]
[25] The Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of 15 months imprisonment. The sentencing Judge in that case had given leave to Ms Harlen to apply to the District Prisons Board for release on home detention. That was the procedure at that time by which a sentence of home detention was obtained. This Court said nothing to suggest that leave to apply ought not to have been granted. So this case is not support for Mr Downs’ submission.
[26] In R v Beech,[26] this Court upheld a sentence of 15 months imprisonment. The appellant had received overpayments of more than $87,000, over a period of about five years and four months.[27] The sentencing Judge had concluded that it was inappropriate to impose anything other than a full-time custodial sentence.[28] Nevertheless, leave to apply for home detention was granted by the sentencing Court.[29] No adverse comment on that was made in the Court of Appeal judgment. So, again, we do not see this case as support Mr Downs’ submission.
[27] In R v Creeks,[30] the appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 18 months on six charges of knowingly making false statements and nine of using a document with intent to defraud to obtain a pecuniary advantage. The duration of the offending was about six and a half years.[31] The Judge declined to grant leave to apply for home detention.[32] Because the offender was due to be released from prison in about one month from the date of judgment, the Court saw “no practical significance in determining whether the Judge should have granted leave to apply for home detention”.[33] Therefore, this case is of little assistance in determining whether imprisonment or home detention was the more appropriate sentence.
[28] The final case is R v Hapuku.[34] Ms Hapuku was sentenced to two years and three months imprisonment, having pleaded guilty on arraignment before trial to 15 counts of using a document with intent to defraud in order to obtain a pecuniary advantage. The amount stolen was $126,877, over a period of about three years and five months. Home detention was not available as a sentencing option because the term of imprisonment imposed foreclosed that possibility.[35] The Court of Appeal held that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive and dismissed the appeal.[36]
[29] In our view, these cases do not support Mr Downs’ submission. They all predate the current sentencing regime, where home detention is now available as a discrete sentence. If the current legislative framework had applied when these cases were decided, it is entirely possible that in two of them, perhaps even three, a sentence of home detention might have been imposed.

(c) The High Court authorities

[30] The relevant High Court authorities, in the order in which they were decided, are Hogan v Ministry of Social Development[37] (2005), Werahiko v Ministry of Social Development[38] (2008), Davey v Ministry of Social Development[39] (2009) and Beedell v Ministry of Social Development[40] (2010). Hogan was a judgment of a Full Court of the High Court.
[31] In Hogan, the High Court eschewed the setting of tariffs for benefit fraud offending. Gendall and MacKenzie JJ held that, for sentencing purposes, fraud on the Ministry of Social Development should be treated no differently from any other fraudulent use of documents to obtain money illegally from agencies, individuals or companies. They considered that relevant circumstances would determine the seriousness and culpability of the offending in each case.[41]
[32] Having discussed the authorities to that time, the Full Court observed that, since the passing of the Sentencing Act 2002, “there has been a more systematic approach to sentencing generally”.[42] The Court declined to interfere with the District Court’s sentence of between four months and nine months imprisonment (for the five offenders before the Court), with leave to apply for home detention. The amounts dishonestly obtained ranged from $22,766 to $48,586.[43]
[33] Importantly in the present context, the Court added:[44]

[30] Of course to impose a deterrent penalty does not necessarily require imprisonment, see Katoa v DSW.[45] But if the culpability of an offender and the seriousness of the particular crime reaches a certain level that only imprisonment can provide a sufficient deterrence then there is no error in principle in imposing such imprisonment. Although there has been some debate as to whether imprisonment or stern penalties in fact deter others to committing crimes, this will always remain an area where the production of evidence is notoriously difficult, if not impossible. The fact remains that deterrence is regarded as a necessary feature or purpose of sentencing, and is so recognised for in s 7(1)(f). As a matter of common sense, if repetitive serious offending over a significant period might be seen to be “worth it”, in that only a minor or light penalty might be expected upon apprehension, then those who might be tempted to commit such crimes might be more inclined to do so. There is a view that stern sentences may be of particular deterrent value if offending is premeditated rather than impulsive so that an offender may evaluate the risk of offending and likely severity of punishment — R v Latta.[46]

[34] In Werahiko, the offending involved receipt of over $85,000 during a period in excess of 10 years. In the District Court, the offending had been characterised as “prolonged and deliberate”.[47] Following pleas of guilty, Ms Werahiko was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year.[48] Ms Werahiko appealed against the sentence imposed on the grounds that the Judge erred in not imposing a term of home detention.[49]
[35] On appeal, the High Court set aside the sentence of imprisonment and imposed a sentence of four months home detention, which took into account the fact that Ms Werahiko had already spent about two months in custody. That sentence was imposed on the basis of Ms Werahiko’s remorse and unlikelihood of reoffending. Heath J considered that a term of home detention would respond adequately to the sentencing goals of denunciation and deterrence.[50]
[36] In Davey,[51] Mr Davey entered pleas of guilty to obtaining $110,280 over a period of some seven years. MacKenzie J was asked to impose a term of home detention, in reliance on Werahiko.[52] The issue on appeal was whether, by reason of the absence of a report addressing home detention issues,[53] the sentencing Judge had failed to consider whether home detention was adequate.[54]
[37] While the Judge agreed that a home detention report had not been obtained, he held that it was unnecessary in every case for that to be done.[55] Because the sentencing Judge had “clearly had in mind the potential availability of home detention but [had] concluded, having considered all relevant factors, that that was not an appropriate sentence”, MacKenzie J upheld the District Court sentence of one year and five months imprisonment. In doing so, MacKenzie J observed that it was “clear that a sentence of imprisonment is a usual and appropriate outcome for cases of substantial benefit fraud”, citing Hogan v Ministry of Social Development in support of that proposition.[56] Davey was the authority on which Judge Roberts placed emphasis in sentencing Ms Ransom to imprisonment.[57]
[38] In Beedell, the High Court set aside a term of eight months imprisonment on benefit fraud totalling $45,522.57 over a period between 1 February 2007 and early 2009.[58] In doing so, the Judge held that a term of imprisonment was not required for deterrent purposes, relying on genuine remorse, absence of prior convictions, early guilty pleas, attempts to repay over-claimed benefits and positive consequences of her availability to continue to care for two relatively young children.[59] Giving some allowance for time spent in custody, a sentence of five months home detention was imposed.[60] Commenting on the deterrent aspect of sentencing, Dobson J said:

[25] In terms of the deterrent, it is an alternative to imprisonment because of the extent of credit able to be given for the relatively strong mitigating factors in Ms Beedell’s favour. Further, it is only adequate when it is supplemented with a period of community work which, as is submitted, puts something back into the community from which Ms Beedell has taken. Accordingly, the substituted sentence will include a sentence of 50 hours’ community service.

[39] In our view, the High Court cases demonstrate that, in some benefit fraud cases, home detention will be an appropriate sentence. Since Hill, it has been necessary for sentencing Judges to determine, on a case by case basis, whether a sentence of home detention will respond to the particular offending or whether, in terms of s 16(2) of the Sentencing Act, a sentence of imprisonment is required. There is no prescriptive or usual sentence in cases of this type.

(d) Should home detention have been imposed?

[40] In reliance on Davey,[61] Judge Roberts considered it was necessary to impose a period of imprisonment. However, Davey does not go that far, suggesting only that a sentence of imprisonment “is a usual and appropriate outcome for cases of substantial benefit fraud”.[62] Agreeing with the view expressed by Rodney Hansen J in Savage v New Zealand Police,[63] MacKenzie J considered the introduction of the sentence of home detention introduced a new aspect into the sentencing exercise whereby “the legislation intended to confer a broad [discretion] and the weight to be given to relevant factors is a matter for the sentencing Judge”.[64] That approach is consistent with the Judge distinguishing Werahiko rather than declining to follow it.[65]
[41] In our view, Judge Roberts appears to have ruled out a sentence of home detention solely on the grounds that the fraud was too serious. With respect, whether home detention or imprisonment is the appropriate sentencing option in cases of this kind requires a more detailed and nuanced analysis than that. The cases we have cited above show that offending of equivalent seriousness has been held amenable to home detention in the past. In light of Judge Roberts’ error in approach, we must reconsider what sentence should be imposed.
[42] We have concluded that a sentence of home detention will, in conjunction with one of community work, adequately respond to the sentencing goals of accountability, denunciation and deterrence.[66] While the remorse expressed by Ms Ransom is not as fulsome as one may have liked and there is no real ability to repay the dishonestly obtained money, the need for her to care for her child, the benefits of ensuring that her husband returns to paid employment (something we were assured by Mr Laurenson he would do if the appeal were successful) and her acceptance of responsibility by entering pleas of guilty persuade us that home detention is an appropriate sentence and responds adequately to the sentencing goals to which we have referred.[67]
[43] Put in terms of s 16 of the Sentencing Act, which determines the circumstances in which imprisonment should be imposed, it is desirable to keep Ms Ransom in the community and that approach is consonant with the safety of the community.[68]
[44] We consider that it is necessary to take account of the time that Ms Ransom has spent in custody in fixing a sentence of home detention. Ordinarily, we would have imposed the maximum period of 12 months to respond to the offending. However, we impose a sentence of nine months home detention to take account of the time she has spent in prison. In addition, we impose a sentence of community work of 75 hours.
[45] All the 11 counts are of roughly equal seriousness. In accordance with s 85(4) of the Sentencing Act, we have chosen the last count – count 11, relating to offending on 26 April 2007 – as “the most serious offence”, which receives the penalty “appropriate for the totality of the offending”. Three months’ home detention is imposed in respect of the other counts.[69] In addition to the standard conditions imposed by virtue of s 80C(2), we have imposed two special conditions under s 80D: see order D(b) and (c). Both these conditions were recommended by the writer of the pre-sentence report. We agree they are sensible conditions, which should reduce the likelihood of further offending by Ms Ransom.
[46] For convenience, we have attached the community work sentence solely to count 11.

Postscript

[47] As indicated above,[70] a significant factor in our decision to allow the appeal and substitute a sentence of home detention has been our concern that, since Ms Ransom went to prison, her husband, Mr Hall, has had to give up work in order to care for their six year old child, who has considerable behavioural difficulties, which have been exacerbated by his mother’s absence from the family home. Mr Hall is now himself, as a consequence of her imprisonment, on a social welfare benefit. We were assured by Mr Laurenson, when Mr Hall was in court at the hearing of the appeal, that Mr Hall was very confident that he would be able to go off the benefit and return to work if his wife could come home and serve a sentence of home detention. We expect Mr Hall to do everything possible to return to work promptly.
[48] We direct the Registrar to send a copy of this judgment to the Chief Solicitor of the Ministry of Social Development, with a view to it being brought to the attention of WINZ officers in New Plymouth, so that those officers can do what they can to ensure that Mr Hall honours his pledge to do his best to return to work promptly.

Solicitors:
Govett Quilliam, New Plymouth
Crown Law Office, Wellington

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[1] Sentencing Act 2002, s 16(2).
[2] R v Ransom DC New Plymouth CRI 2009-043-2664, 11 February 2010.
[3] R v Ransom DC New Plymouth CRI 2009-043-2664, 4 June 2010 at [17].
[4] At [20].
[5] At [21].

[6] Davey v Ministry of Social Development HC Palmerston North CRI 2009-454-47, 15 December 2009.

[7] Reflecting Davey v Ministry of Social Development HC Palmerston North CRI 2009-454-47, 15 December 2009 at [15].
[8] See [16] below; in particular, [26] of the Judge’s sentencing notes, set out in that paragraph.
[9] At [24]. See Hessell v R [2009] NZCA 450, [2010] 2 NZLR 298 at [15].
[10] R v Ransom DC New Plymouth CRI 2009-043-2664, 4 June 2010 at [26](b).
[11] Beedell v Ministry of Social Development HC Wanganui CRI 2010-483-9, 11 February 2010.
[12] Werahiko v Ministry of Social Development HC Rotorua CRI 2008-463-55, 5 September 2008.

[13] R v Beech CA314/01, 6 December 2001, R v Harlen [2001] NZCA 130; (2001) 18 CRNZ 582 (CA) and R v Creeks CA26/04, 23 June 2004.
[14] This statute came into force on 1 October 2007.
[15] Intensive supervision and community detention.

[16] Criminal Justice Reform Bill 2007 (93-1) (Explanatory Note) at 1. This Bill, when enacted, became the 2007 Amendment.
[17] R v Hill [2008] NZCA 41, [2008] 2 NZLR 381 at [33].
[18] At [33].
[19] At [33].
[20] R v D(CA253/2008) [2008] NZCA 267.
[21] Sentencing Act 2002, s 8(g).
[22] At [61]-[66].
[23] The emphasis was Mr Downs’.
[24] R v Harlen [2001] NZCA 130; (2001) 18 CRNZ 582 (CA).
[25] At [1].
[26] R v Beech CA314/01, 6 December 2001.
[27] At [10].

[28] At [7]. At that time there needed to be “special circumstances” making it “inappropriate” to impose any other sentence: s 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985.
[29] At [8].
[30] R v Creeks CA26/04, 23 June 2004.
[31] At [6]

[32] At [37]. At this time leave to apply for home detention was governed by (the now repealed) s 97 of the Sentencing Act 2002. The power to grant home detention was reposed in the Parole Board: ss33-35 of the Parole Act 2002 (also repealed).
[33] At [40].
[34] R v Hapuku [2007] NZCA 368.

[35] Sentencing took place in March 2007, before the 2007 Amendment came into force, on 1 October 2007.
[36] At [19].
[37] Hogan v Ministry of Social Development (2005) 23 CRNZ 500 (HC).
[38] Werahiko v Ministry of Social Development HC Rotorua CRI 2008-463-55, 5 September 2008.

[39] Davey v Ministry of Social Development HC Palmerston North CRI 2009-454-47, 15 December 2009.
[40] Beedell v Ministry of Social Development HC Wanganui CRI 2010-483-9, 11 February 2010.
[41] Hogan v Ministry of Social Development (2005) 23 CRNZ 500 at [11].
[42] At [24].
[43] At [1].
[44] At [30].
[45] Katoa v DSW (1991) 7 CRNZ 44.
[46] R v Latta [1985] 2 NZLR 504 at 506.

[47] Werahiko v Ministry of Social Development HC Rotorua CRI 2008-463-55, 5 September 2008 at [12].
[48] At [2].
[49] At [3].
[50] At [22].

[51] Davey v Ministry of Social Development HC Palmerston North CRI 2009-454-47, 15 December 2009.
[52] At [7].
[53] Sentencing Act 2002, s 26A.

[54] Davey v Ministry of Social Development HC Palmerston North CRI 2009-454-47, 15 December 2009 at [9].
[55] At [11].
[56] At [15].
[57] R v Ransom DC New Plymouth CRI 2009-043-2664, 4 June 2010 at [23], set out at [13] above.

[58] Beedell v Ministry of Social Development HC Wanganui CRI 2010-483-9, 11 February 2010 at [1] and [4].
[59] At [18].
[60] At [24].

[61] Davey v Ministry of Social Development HC Palmerston North CRI 2009-454-47, 15 December 2009.
[62] At [15].
[63] Savage v New Zealand Police HC Whangarei CRI 2008-488-1, 14 February 2008.
[64] At [15].
[65] At [10].
[66] See R v D(CA253/2008) [2008] NZCA 267 at [70] and Kincaid v R [2010] NZCA 384 at [21].
[67] Sentencing Act 2002, s 16(2).
[68] Sentencing Act 2002, s 16(1).

[69] Sections 84 and 85 of the Sentencing Act apply to sentences of home detention by virtue of s 80B(3).
[70] At [42].