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Court of Appeal of New Zealand |
Last Updated: 13 November 2013
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
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BETWEEN
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Appellant |
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AND
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First Respondent
DOCTOR MARK GROEN AND DOCTOR MATTHEW GENTRY
Second Respondents |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(a) his rights under s 23(5) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; and
(b) section 33(3)(g) of the Penal Institutions Act 1954.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE
COURT
(Given by Cooper J)
Table of Contents
Para No
Introduction [1]
The relevant statutory
provisions [9]
The facts
found and conclusions reached by Lang J [16]
Mr Vogel’s health [44]
The appeal [46]
Discussion
Breaches
of the Penal Institutions Regulations [57]
Breach of s 33(3)(g) of the
Penal Institutions Act [63]
Remedy [76]
Result [85]
Introduction
[1] The appellant, Mr Vogel, appeals against the judgment of Lang J delivered on 24 February 2012,[1] in which the Judge rejected Mr Vogel’s claims for:
- (a) declarations that his rights under ss 9 and 23(5) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Act) had been breached; and
- (b) damages.
[2] Mr Vogel was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder on 26 February 1988. He was released on parole on 4 May 1998, but recalled to prison in January 2000 because of further offending and apprehended risk to the public.
[3] On 11 April 2000 he was sentenced to 21 days’ cell confinement for drugrelated disciplinary offences by a Visiting Justice at the prison. He was released again from prison in 2001 and recalled in 2002 because of further offending whilst on parole. He has remained in prison since that time.
[4] His claims of breach of the Act relate to the time he spent in cell confinement in April 2000. The basis of the claim was that the sentence of 21 days’ cell confinement was unlawful: the maximum penalty under the Penal Institutions Act 1954 was 15 days’ cell confinement.[2] Mr Vogel also argued that because during the period in which he was confined he was not visited daily by the superintendent or the medical officer, and because the medical officer had not been informed of the cell confinement, there had been breaches of the Penal Institutions Regulations 1999. As well as seeking declarations as to the breach of his rights, Mr Vogel advanced a damages claim for $50,000.
[5] There was no dispute in the High Court that the period of 21 days’ cell confinement exceeded the statutory maximum by six days. However, the Judge found that Mr Vogel had requested the Visiting Justice to impose that sentence for the purpose of assisting him to deal with his drug taking habit, a matter which would be of considerable significance for the purposes of parole. The Judge also rejected the claims based on breaches of the Penal Institutions Regulations.
[6] On appeal, Mr Vogel contends that Lang J was wrong to find that his rights under ss 9 and 23(5) of the Act were not breached. He argues that there was evidence of inadequate medical care during the period of confinement, and that the failure by the prison authorities to ensure daily visits was significant, as was the failure to take account of the psychological effects of cell confinement.
[7] The Crown submits that there has been no breach of s 9 of the Act and that Mr Vogel had been appropriately attended to by health and custodial staff while subject to the sentence of cell confinement. Further, the fact that the period of cell confinement was imposed at Mr Vogel’s request meant also that there had been no failure to treat him with humanity, or respect for his inherent dignity in terms of s 23(5) of the Act.
[8] Before dealing with the substance of the parties’ respective arguments, it will be appropriate to set out the relevant statutory provisions. These include ss 9 and 23(5) of the Act as well as provisions of the Penal Institutions Act and Penal Institutions Regulations that applied at the time that Mr Vogel was sentenced to cell confinement. We also deal with the facts found by Lang J relating to the imposition of the sentence and what happened during the period of cell confinement, as well as outlining the Judge’s conclusions.
The relevant statutory provisions
[9] Section 9 of the Act provides:
9 Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.
[10] Section 23(5) enacts that:
23 Rights of persons arrested or detained
...
(5) Everyone deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the person.
[11] Mr Ellis, counsel for Mr Vogel, also refers to s 22 of the Act, which affirms the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained.
[12] When Mr Vogel was sentenced to cell confinement, the provisions authorising and controlling such sentences were in the Penal Institutions Act and the Penal Institutions Regulations.
[13] Section 32A of the Penal Institutions Act dealt with offences relating to drugs and alcohol. There is no dispute that Mr Vogel had committed an offence against s 32A(1) of the Penal Institutions Act, which provided:
Every inmate commits an offence against discipline who,—
(a) Without the authority of a medical officer, uses any drug or consumes alcohol; or—
(b) Having been required under section 36BB to submit to a prescribed procedure,—
- (i) Refuses to comply with the requirement; or
- (ii) Without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with the requirement; ...
[14] When the sentence of 21 days’ cell confinement was imposed in April 2000, the powers of the Visiting Justice were those set out in s 33 of the Penal Institutions Act. At that time, s 33(3) provided:
(3) Where on any hearing under this section the Visiting Justice finds the offence proved, he may impose any one or more of the following penalties, namely:
(a) Postponement for a specified period of the inmate’s final release date determined in accordance with section 90 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 in respect of any sentence the inmate is then serving; but no period of postponement shall exceed the shorter of the following periods:
(i) Three months; or
(ii) A period which, by itself or when added to such other period or periods of postponement as there may be affecting the same sentence, is equal to onehalf of the term already served under the sentence:
(b) Forfeiture or postponement of any privilege, for any period not exceeding 3 months:
(c) [Repealed]
(d) Forfeiture of earnings, for any period not exceeding 3 months:
(e) [Repealed]
(f) [Repealed]
(g) Confinement in a cell for any period not exceeding 15 days:
Provided that where the Visiting Justice imposes more than one of the above-mentioned penalties he may not direct that any of them are to be cumulative.
[15] The Penal Institutions Regulations imposed duties on medical officers, and required prison superintendents to notify medical officers of sentences of cell confinement and of the use of isolation cells. The relevant regulatory provisions were as follows:
49 Duties of medical officer
...
(2) ... a medical officer ... must:
...
(b) Advise the superintendent of an inmate who, in the opinion of the medical officer, requires—
(i) Special treatment or attention by staff members; ...
...
...
(2) A medical officer of an institution must ensure that special attention is paid to an inmate who is confined in an isolation cell.
...
The superintendent of an institution must ensure that a medical officer is notified promptly after the superintendent becomes aware that—
...
(b) An inmate has been confined in an isolation cell or is at any time undergoing confinement in a cell; ...
...
...
(4) Reasonably promptly after an inmate is confined in an isolation cell, the superintendent and a medical officer of the institution must be notified of the confinement.
(5) The superintendent, or an officer authorised by the superintendent for the purpose, must at least once a day visit an inmate confined in an isolation cell.
...
The facts found and conclusions reached by Lang J
[16] Most of the relevant facts are set out in the judgment of Lang J on which the following summary is closely based.[3] The appellant did not suggest that the Judge’s findings on matters of primary fact were incorrect. Rather, the challenge was to some of the inferences and conclusions drawn, particularly in relation to the effects of the period of cell confinement on Mr Vogel’s mental and physical health.
[17] Turning to the narrative, we note that Mr Vogel gave a urine sample on 3 March 2000. On analysis, the sample revealed the presence of cannabinoids. Mr Vogel was consequently charged with using a drug without the authority of a medical officer. Later that day, he was required to accompany a prison officer to a place where he could provide a further urine sample. He refused to do so and was charged with a further offence as a result.
[18] On 13 March he was again required to accompany a prison officer to provide a urine sample. Although he initially accompanied the officer, he then refused to provide a sample of his urine. A further charge was laid. Then, another request to accompany was made on 30 March 2000, which Mr Vogel refused. This led to the fourth and final charge against him.
[19] He entered guilty pleas to all of the charges except the charge of refusing to supply a sample of his urine on 13 March 2000. That charge was heard by a prison official on 17 March 2000 when the charge was found proved. Mr Vogel was sentenced to seven days’ cell confinement and his release date was postponed by seven days. Mr Vogel then appealed to the Visiting Justice against his conviction on that charge. Lang J noted that there was no evidence of the outcome of that appeal. However, he also recorded that Mr Vogel apparently accepted that he was not required to serve the sentence that had been imposed on him on 17 March.
[20] The remaining three charges came before the Visiting Justice, Judge Buckton, on 11 April 2000. Judge Buckton was very experienced in that role, and he was also a member of the Parole Board. Mr Vogel pleaded guilty to each of the charges and was sentenced to 21 days’ cell confinement.
[21] Lang J found that Mr Vogel had written to the Parole Board in November 2000, at a time when the Parole Board was scheduled to consider his case in December. Included in his letter was the following passage:
... feeling compelled to take a good look at my past behaviour, I changed somewhat. On the 11th April 2000, I asked Judge Buckton if I could be confined to a cell in solitary confinement for 21 days in order to kick the habit of drugs, my request was granted, I achieved my goal. Enclosed are 2 negative drug urinalyses [sic] results ...
Contrary to Mr Vogel’s evidence at trial, he had not made the request to the Visiting Justice in a sarcastic manner. The Judge thought that the tone of Mr Vogel’s letter made it clear that he wanted the Parole Board to know that he had taken significant steps to deal with his drug addiction. Lang J said:[4]
... the Visiting Justice imposed the sentence of 21 days imprisonment at the express request of Mr Vogel, who saw the sentence as being of assistance, and indeed necessary, in his quest to deal with drug-related issues. He was well aware that those issues were likely to be of considerable significance for the Parole Board when it came to consider whether he should be released again on parole. This finding explains, on a human level at any event, why the Judge imposed the sentence of 21 days cell confinement. It goes without saying, however, that the Judge ought not to have taken that step, because it meant that he was acting in excess of his lawful authority. Even the purest of motives does not justify acting in excess of statutory powers.
[22] The Judge noted that Auckland Prison, where Mr Vogel was confined, had appointed two medical practitioners, Drs Gentry and Groen, to undertake the statutory responsibilities imposed on medical officers under the Penal Institutions Act and Regulations. They were respectively responsible for conducting medical clinics in the West Division and East Division of the prison. Clinics were held in each division between the hours of 9.00 am and noon on Tuesdays and Fridays. The doctors offered basic general practitioner services, essentially the same as those offered by medical clinics in the community. They were on call in respect of emergencies.
[23] The Judge also found that the five prison health centres were staffed on a fulltime basis by qualified nurses who were responsible for treating minor ailments and injuries. If treatment was required for more significant conditions, the nursing staff would make arrangements for the prisoner to see one of the doctors. The nurses were responsible for administering medication that the doctors prescribed for prisoners. Mental health needs were met by qualified medical staff from the Mason Clinic, who visited the prison daily.
[24] The Judge found:
[43] The evidence established that the doctors did not regularly visit prisoners who were serving sentences of cell confinement. That task was left to the nursing staff, who were required as part of their daily duties to visit the punishment block and check on the welfare of prisoners who were serving sentences of cell confinement. The doctors would only see those prisoners if they required medical attention that the nurses could not provide.
[25] The Judge accepted evidence that had been given by Ms Maureen Brown, who had worked in the health centres at Auckland Prison since July 2008, and was at the time of the hearing in the High Court the prison’s Health Centre Manager. She referred to a daily schedule of duties for the nursing staff, which required them to check on prisoners serving sentences of cell confinement every morning between the hours of 8.00 am and 8.30 am. It was her evidence that each prisoner in cell confinement would be checked to see whether they had any health concerns, and the nurses would record the results in a daily record.
[26] The record kept in 2000 was unable to be found. However, the Judge accepted that a nurse would have checked daily on Mr Vogel whilst he was serving his sentence of cell confinement.[5] Notwithstanding this, he held that there had been a breach of reg 56(b), since there was no system by which the doctors were advised when a prisoner was placed on cell confinement.[6] They could not, therefore, ensure that special attention be paid to Mr Vogel as required by reg 52(2). But that did not mean that there had been a breach of s 9 or s 23(5) of the Act. In this respect, the Judge found that:
[48] There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Mr Vogel was denied, or hindered in receiving, medical treatment as a result of the fact that only the nursing staff knew that he was subject to a sentence of cell confinement. Rather, the evidence is to the contrary. It confirms that his sentence was interrupted for a period of approximately 24 hours on 19 and 20 April 2000 when he went to Auckland Hospital to undergo a liver biopsy. The fact that he was permitted to interrupt his sentence to undergo the biopsy confirms that Mr Vogel continued to receive the medical treatment to which he was entitled notwithstanding the fact that he was subject to the sentence of cell confinement. He does not appear to have had any other medical issues whilst serving that sentence.
[27] Lang J concluded in the circumstances that the established breach of reg 56(b) was of no practical consequence.
[28] He then turned to the issue of “managerial oversight”, addressing the requirement of reg 150(5) of the Penal Institutions Regulations that the superintendent, or a person authorised by him for the purpose, visit every prisoner confined in an isolation cell at least once a day. The Judge noted Mr Vogel’s evidence that he had never been visited by the superintendent, or by any other person authorised for that purpose, during the period of cell confinement. He also noted that there was no prison log showing what had happened in April 2000. Although there was evidence from a Mr Puohotaua, who had been a unit manager in the West Division of the prison in 2000, that he would regularly check on prisoners housed in the punishment cells, speaking to them and making sure they were all right, the Judge found it was not possible for any accurate assessment to be made regarding the extent to which there had been compliance with the obligation in reg 150(5).[7] Nevertheless, Mr Vogel would have had many opportunities to raise any issues that were concerning him with the prison officers, with whom he dealt on a daily basis, when receiving his meals and when he left his cell each day for exercise and to have a shower. Consequently, Lang J concluded that there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that any failure to observe reg 150(5) would have had an adverse affect on Mr Vogel.[8]
[29] The Judge found that in terms of physical dimensions and amenities, the cells in which Mr Vogel was kept during the period of cell confinement were the same as those housing “mainstream” prisoners.[9] Mr Vogel, therefore, had his own toilet and sanitary facilities and no issue had been raised with respect to heating, lighting and generally ventilation of the cell. He also received the same food as the other prisoners generally, although he was required to eat it in his cell. What the Judge described as the “principal restrictive features” of the sentence were the facts that Mr Vogel was confined to his cell for 23 hours a day, and was only given one hour for exercise during which period he was also expected to shower. He had no access to television or radio, but there was reading material to a limited extent. He had no right to make telephone calls or receive visitors and in practical terms his ability to meet and socialise with other people was also “severely restricted”.[10]
[30] The Judge recorded the submission that had been made for Mr Vogel that the Visiting Justice should never have permitted him to serve a lengthy sentence of cell confinement when he knew of his serious drug problem. The result of his sentence was said to have had “obvious dangers” for Mr Vogel, because it would have resulted in him going through a “cold turkey” process.[11] The Judge was prepared to accept that Mr Vogel had been involved in drug use while in prison, and that explained why he had been charged and sentenced. However, the Judge recorded that Mr Vogel had not given any detail as to the level or nature of his drug use. He considered, therefore, that it would be speculative to conclude that a sentence of 21 days’ cell confinement had placed Mr Vogel in the position of potential danger because of the level or nature of his addiction to drugs. In a passage of the judgment which Mr Ellis criticised in this Court, Lang J observed:
[68] Only Mr Vogel knew the extent to which he was using drugs in April 2000, and the likely effect that a lengthy period of cell confinement would have on him. Notwithstanding that knowledge, he expressly asked the Visiting Justice to impose that very sentence upon him. The only inference to be drawn from Mr Vogel’s request is that he believed that the sentence would be beneficial, and not harmful, for him.
[31] The Judge then referred to Mr Vogel’s evidence about the effect that the sentence had upon him. The evidence was:[12]
32. Solitary does your head in. Because I was doing so long in solitary I got transferred from high-medium to max for most of the time. I think maybe the first day and last two days I was in the cells in the high-medium area, but for the rest of it they put me up in max – I think to make the other cell available for others.
33. Sometimes in solitary, there might be someone else in one of the other cells, so you can kinda yell out to them and have someone to talk to for a bit, but because I was in max, there wasn’t anyone else while I was there.
...
36. It’s pretty stressful in solitary. I actually started talking to myself. Even in a language I didn’t understand. The sensory deprivation does that to you. You got a bit mad.
...
41. When I came out of solitary the hair in my nostrils and my whiskers had turned white and grey. When some of my friends who hadn’t seen me in the three weeks or so I was in solitary saw me they asked me “what happened to you” because you could just tell that I looked different.
42. Solitary wasn’t healthy for me mentally. The only way I can describe it is maddening. I think when I came out I was one or two degrees more mad.
[32] The Judge stated that it was difficult now to assess how a sentence served nearly 12 years ago might have affected Mr Vogel in psychological terms. However, the notes made by the prison’s nursing staff did not show that Mr Vogel expressed concerns at the time regarding any psychological effect that the sentence was having on him. Nor was there other evidence to suggest that he had suffered any long-term psychological or psychiatric effects as a result of “serving the extra period of cell confinement”.[13]
[33] The context of this observation suggests that the “extra period of cell confinement” to which the Judge was referring was the six days by which the sentence of cell confinement exceeded the statutory maximum of 15 days.
[34] In the balance of his judgment Lang J assessed Mr Vogel’s causes of action based on ss 9 and 23(5) of the Act. In the course of doing so he referred to the decisions of both the Supreme Court and the High Court in Taunoa v AttorneyGeneral.[14] He also referred to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture),[15] ratified by New Zealand on 10 December 1989, and the interim report presented by the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 5 August 2011,[16] to which he had been referred by Mr Ellis. He concluded that the sentence itself, and the circumstances in which Mr Vogel served it, could not be said to amount to torture.[17] He also found that Mr Vogel had not been subjected to conduct deliberately intended to cause him to suffer severely. He considered that the evidence did not establish that Mr Vogel had “suffered intense physical or mental suffering”.[18] In addition there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that the treatment was degrading in the sense that it had “gravely humiliated or debased” him, whether or not that was its purpose.[19]
[35] Addressing the question of whether the punishment had been “disproportionately severe”, the Judge expressed conclusions that it was excessive, because it was significantly longer than the maximum sentence that was legally available and that it could probably be said to be significantly greater than the offending deserved.[20] However, he did not think that that was sufficient to reach the threshold of being disproportionately severe. The Judge thought that was “particularly the case when the circumstances in which the sentence was imposed are taken into account”.[21]
[36] The Judge also held that the circumstances of the offending would probably have justified a sentence somewhere close to the maximum available to the Visiting Justice because of the fact that on 17 March 2000 Mr Vogel had received a sentence of seven days’ cell confinement on a single charge of refusing to supply a urine sample: it was, therefore, likely that the Visiting Justice would have imposed a significantly greater sentence in respect of the three further similar charges. In the end, however, the sentence of 21 days had been imposed at Mr Vogel’s request. That aspect of the evidence persuaded the Judge that the sentence could not realistically be described either as “inhuman” or “disproportionately severe”.[22]
[37] That meant that none of Mr Vogel’s claims under s 9 of the Act could be sustained.
[38] Lang J also rejected Mr Vogel’s claim based on a breach of s 23(5) of the Act. He held that the circumstances in which Mr Vogel had received the sentence of cell confinement were determinative of this issue.[23] Since the Visiting Justice had imposed the sentence in the genuine belief that it might assist Mr Vogel in his forthcoming bid to be released on parole, it could not be said that he had been motivated by a lack of humanity. Although the sentence exceeded his statutory authority, he had imposed it in accordance with Mr Vogel’s express request.
[39] Nor was there anything about the circumstances in which Mr Vogel had served his sentence to suggest a lack of humanity on the part of the prison authorities. In that respect, the Judge thought it significant that with the exception of his complaint about the lack of medical and managerial oversight, Mr Vogel had raised no issue about the circumstances in which the sentence had been served.[24]
[40] These conclusions meant that Mr Vogel had not established any breach of his rights under s 23(5) of the Act.
[41] The Judge held that Mr Vogel’s failure to establish a breach of either s 9 or s 23(5) of the Act meant that he was not entitled to the declaratory relief sought. Further, given the circumstances in which the sentence of 21 days’ cell confinement had been imposed, the claim for monetary compensation could not be sustained.[25]
[42] The Judge also considered whether there should be a declaration that the sentence was unlawful because the statutory maximum had been exceeded. He concluded that the sentence was an isolated occurrence and there was no need for concern that similar instances might be occurring.[26] Further, the sentence had been imposed and served nearly 12 years ago, and at Mr Vogel’s express request, while the Visiting Justice who imposed the sentence is now deceased. In those circumstances the conclusions set out in the judgment were sufficient to mark the unlawful act that would have been the subject of any declaration, and no declaration was required.[27]
[43] As a consequence, Mr Vogel’s claim was dismissed.
Mr Vogel’s health
[44] Lang J did not refer to some evidence that was before him that related to Mr Vogel’s state of health prior to the imposition of the sentence of cell confinement. That evidence was given by Dr Gentry, and included the facts that:
- (a) Mr Vogel had been referred to a psychiatric services clinic from Mount Eden prison in July 1999, having reported poor sleep patterns and anxiety about his upcoming criminal trial and possible recall to prison.
- (b) Although the doctor could not remember it, Mr Vogel’s medical records showed that he had been involved with Mr Vogel’s health care in early 2000.
- (c) Mr Vogel was referred to Dr Gentry around 29 February 2000 by a Dr Seth, a consultant psychiatrist. In Dr Gentry’s words, the referral:
... would have been made on the basis that Mr Vogel no longer required specialist psychiatric care and his health needs could be addressed by a general practitioner.
(d) A file note made by Dr Seth on 25 February recorded under the heading “Diagnosis”:
Dysthymia. Previous diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and chronic issues relating to past abuse.
[45] Although Dr Seth thought that Mr Vogel was well and it was possible to hand his care back to a general practitioner, he did recommend that he should continue on his present medication of Paroxetine for a further period of nine months. If there was then any evidence of any relapse in his mental state the Paroxetine medication should be continued for a further two years. This suggests that Mr Vogel was suffering from chronic depression, for which he was being treated with an antidepressant.
The appeal
[46] Mr Ellis argued that Lang J erred when he found that there had been no breach of s 9 of the Act. In summary, he submitted that cell confinement for a period well in excess of the statutory maximum was arbitrary and that regardless of any consent of Mr Vogel, or the motive of the Judge in imposing the sentence, there could be no justification for exceeding the maximum period prescribed by law. Seen in conjunction with the failure to comply with the requirements of the Penal Institutions Regulations (failure to ensure that a medical officer was notified promptly after Mr Vogel had been confined to his cell and alleged breach of the requirement that there be daily visits) the sentence was disproportionately severe. Mr Vogel’s drug habit was such as to make him particularly vulnerable.
[47] Mr Ellis relied on art 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which refers to some of the terms employed by s 9 of the Act and art 16 of the Convention Against Torture.[28] He also referred to art 10(1) of the ICCPR, which is to the same effect as s 23(5) of the Act. He drew attention to criticisms of solitary confinement in the Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights under art 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.[29] Article 3 provides that:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
[48] Mr Ellis also drew to our attention Canadian authorities acknowledging the harmful effects of cell confinement.[30]
[49] Mr Ellis was critical of Lang J’s finding that only Mr Vogel knew the extent to which he was using drugs in April 2000, and the likely effect that a lengthy period of cell confinement would have on him.[31] Mr Ellis submitted that this inappropriately left to the prisoner’s opinion a decision about the effect on him of a period of 21 days’ cell confinement when the effects of that should properly have been the concern of the prison authorities and the Visiting Justice.
[50] Mr Ellis submitted that the unlawful period of solitary confinement was of itself sufficient to amount to a breach of s 23(5) of the Act. In this respect he again emphasised the arbitrary nature of the sentence, and relied on the observation of Blanchard J in the Supreme Court decision in Taunoa v Attorney-General that the subsection has:[32]
... the task, couched as a positive instruction to the New Zealand government, of protecting a person deprived of liberty and therefore particularly vulnerable (including a sentenced prisoner) from conduct which lacks humanity, but falls short of being cruel; which demeans the person, but not to an extent which is degrading; or which is clearly excessive in the circumstances, but not grossly so.
[51] For the Crown, Mr Powell submitted that the facts of this case fell well short of the conduct required to establish a breach of s 9 of the Act.
[52] Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Taunoa v Attorney-General he argued that cell confinement is not of itself a breach of s 9 of the Act, and has been referred to as a standard feature of prison systems.[33] He noted that in Taunoa, Tipping, McGrath and Henry JJ all found that the almost 1,000 day period for which Mr Taunoa was confined and subject to the additional strictures of the Behaviour Management Regime (BMR) did not constitute a breach of s 9.[34] While Blanchard J found that the extended amount of time that Mr Taunoa was subject to the BMR amounted to disproportionately severe treatment, he held that there was no breach of s 9 in respect of two other plaintiffs, who had been confined for up to three and 12 months respectively.[35]
[53] Mr Powell submitted that apart from the unlawful length of the period of cell confinement imposed here, there was no evidence that the sentence was served in poor conditions, let alone conditions of such severity as to breach s 9. In this respect, he emphasised that the confinement cell would have been essentially the same as cells in other units in terms of windows, light and fittings, although there was no television or radio. Mr Vogel would have been allowed one hour outside the cell every day to shower and exercise. While personal visits and telephone calls were not allowed, reading material was provided.
[54] The only other tangible complaints made by Mr Vogel were that medical officers and the superintendent did not fulfil specific duties that they had under the Penal Institutions Regulations. Mr Powell submitted that the breaches were not significant and did not approach the seriousness required for a finding of a breach of s 9.
[55] Mr Powell also argued that there was no breach of Mr Vogel’s rights under s 23(5) of the Act. He relied on a passage by Manfred Nowak summarising the relevant United Nations Human Rights Committee jurisprudence on art 10 of the ICCPR as follows:[36]
Although the case law depends on the particular circumstances of every individual case and is not always fully consistent, some general conclusions can be drawn. Short term solitary confinement, in particular if applied to highly dangerous persons in pre-trial detention, might be justified and does not amount to a violation of Art. 10. After a few months, there is a strong indication that total isolation from the outside world violates Art. 10, and prolonged solitary confinement, i.e. more than one year, amounts to inhuman treatment violating Art. 7.
[56] Mr Powell submitted that it was clear from Taunoa and the international jurisprudence that cell confinement in reasonable conditions for a period of 21 days was not of itself a breach of Mr Vogel’s rights. Lang J was correct to conclude that the other matters raised by Mr Vogel did not alter that conclusion. The breach of the Penal Institutions Act limiting the period of cell confinement could not be equated with a breach of s 23(5) and the fact that the limit had been exceeded at the request of Mr Vogel prevented any finding that the Visiting Justice had failed to treat Mr Vogel with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the person.
Discussion
Breaches of the Penal Institutions Regulations
[57] As noted above, Lang J found that there had been a breach of reg 56(b) of the Penal Institutions Regulations, because there was no system by which the doctors were advised when a prisoner was placed on cell confinement. He also found that the prison doctors did not regularly visit prisoners who were serving sentences of cell confinement.
[58] However, the Judge also held that there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that Mr Vogel was denied medical treatment he required. In the circumstances, while a breach of reg 56(b) had been made out, it did not appear to have had any effect.
[59] The Judge felt unable on the evidence to make any determination about compliance with reg 150(5). However, if the Regulations were breached, he considered that there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that any failure to observe its terms would have adversely affected the appellant.
[60] There is no basis upon which we can depart from these conclusions. We note that in this Court Mr Ellis referred us to evidence given by Dr Gentry, one of the prison doctors, to the effect that he had not read the Penal Institutions Act or Regulations and that no one had pointed out his particular legal obligations under the Regulations in respect of prisoners in cell confinement. This meant that he did not know that he was required to pay special attention to any inmate in Mr Vogel’s position by virtue of reg 52(2).
[61] However, the Judge found that the daily visits by nurses were likely to have included a daily check on Mr Vogel. Mr Ellis at one stage suggested that the nurses were insufficiently qualified to provide the necessary check on Mr Vogel having regard to his long history of drug use and the possible psychological impact that a lengthy period of cell confinement would have on him. We do not consider the evidence would justify a finding that their qualifications were inadequate. But the absence of records of any observations they may have made makes it difficult to make a finding that the breach of reg 52(2) would have been inconsequential.
[62] Equally, however, we are not persuaded that the evidence establishes that any identified failure to comply with any of the Penal Institutions Regulations would have had an adverse effect on Mr Vogel such as would support his claims advanced under ss 9 and 23(5) of the Act.
Breach of s 33(3)(g) of the Penal Institutions Act
[63] Mr Powell did not seek to argue that Lang J erred by holding that the sentence of 21 days’ cell confinement was unlawful. We agree with that conclusion. The Visiting Justice had to sentence Mr Vogel for three offences. The maximum term of 15 days applied to each of them. The reference in the proviso to s 33(3) of the Penal Institutions Act to “the imposition of more than one of the abovementioned penalties” is able to be construed naturally to embrace more than one imposition of the same kind of penalty as well as the imposition of different kinds of penalty. Although s 33(3) commences with a reference to the Visiting Justice finding “the offence” proved, the singular must include the plural in accordance with s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1999. We think this conclusion is consistent with what this Court said in Drew v Attorney-General:[37]
The maximum period of cell confinement which a Visiting Justice can order is 15 days which, in itself, is a considerable penalty.
[64] The alternative approach would limit the proviso to preventing more than one of the kinds of penalty listed in s 33(3) being imposed on a cumulative basis. In the result it would be possible to sentence offenders who had committed a number of offences to long periods of cell confinement. On the face of it that would be contrary to the intent of the proviso. We consider the better view, and one that is more consistent with the Act, is that where the offender is to be subject to a number of penalties of cell confinement the prohibition on them being imposed cumulatively applies.
[65] We turn then to consider the implications under the Act of the breach of s 33(3)(g). The assessment must be made in a way that is consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Taunoa v Attorney-General. As has been seen, Lang J considered that no breach of s 9 had been established. Although unlawful, the 21 day period of cell confinement imposed did not amount to torture, or to cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.
[66] As this Court noted in Vaihu v Attorney-General there were a variety of views expressed in the five separate judgments delivered in the Supreme Court in Taunoa.[38] It is clear, however, that cell confinement for much longer than that imposed on Mr Vogel here was held not to constitute a breach of s 9. Only Elias CJ held that the treatment to which all those on the BMR were subjected was in breach of s 9, on the basis that the “cumulative conditions of the BMR in themselves” amounted to cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment.[39] None of the other judges took that approach. Blanchard J held that the treatment of Mr Taunoa was a breach of s 9, but that was clearly because of the almost 1,000 day period for which Mr Taunoa was subject to cell confinement.[40] Tipping, McGrath and Henry JJ all found that Mr Taunoa’s rights under s 9 had not been breached, and nor had those of the other prisoners, all of whom had been subject to cell confinement for much longer periods and to greater restrictions than Mr Vogel.[41]
[67] In the circumstances, we agree with Mr Powell that the present facts could not justify a finding that there had been a breach of s 9 of the Act.
[68] However, we have reached a different conclusion insofar as s 23(5) of the Act is concerned. Once again, the analysis must reflect the discussion in Taunoa. All of the judges in the Supreme Court noted that s 23(5) imposed a positive obligation on the state in relation to persons deprived of liberty. Relevant observations of Blanchard J have already been set out above at [50].
[69] Elias CJ held that s 23(5) was concerned to ensure that prisoners are treated “humanely”.[42] Tipping J noted that a failure to observe the positive duty contained in s 23(5) is different from a breach of s 9: in the case of s 23(5) a claim can be made that a statutory standard has not been met and, in terms of potential liability, why the standard has not been met does not matter.[43] Consequently, issues such as the intentional infliction of harm, or consciously reckless indifference to causing harm, need not be features of a claim of breach of s 23(5). On this approach, a failure to observe the law relating to prison management may “more readily cause a breach of the State’s positive duty under s 23(5)”.[44]
[70] The statutory maximum for which prisoners can be confined to cells is clearly an important protection for their mental health and well-being. In the present case, we agree with Lang J that it was difficult to make an assessment of the effects of the sentence served by Mr Vogel nearly 12 years previously. Although there was some evidence from Mr Vogel that he had suffered adverse effects, that evidence was imprecise and not supported by any other evidence. As noted earlier, there are no records of any observations that may have been made by the nurses checking on him during the period for which he was confined to his cell.
[71] However, Mr Vogel was known to have a problem with drug addiction at the time the sentence was imposed. He had also been diagnosed as suffering from dysthymia for which he was being treated with an antidepressant. Consequently, there was a need in his case for special care in imposing any sentence of solitary confinement.
[72] Because s 23(5) casts a positive duty on the state, Mr Vogel’s claim that it has been breached cannot properly be met by the assertion that the sentence was imposed for the purpose of assisting him to break his drug habit. Rather, what was known about his addiction and mental condition should have underlined the potentially harmful effects of an excessive period of cell confinement on his mental well-being. We are unable to agree with Lang J’s observation that “[o]nly Mr Vogel knew ... the likely effect that a lengthy period of cell confinement would have on him”.[45] In terms of s 23(5), it was for the Visiting Justice to ensure not only that the sentence imposed did not exceed the statutory maximum but also that the sentence was one which could safely be imposed. We do not think it was permissible or satisfactory to rely on Mr Vogel’s own judgment in that respect. We emphasise also that it is the effect of the sentence of 21 days’ cell confinement that must be considered, not simply the period of six days by which the statutory maximum was exceeded.
[73] Further, we do not accept as Lang J held that the circumstances in which the sentence was imposed were conclusive against a finding that s 23(5) had been breached. In this respect, the fact that Mr Vogel requested the sentence is not a relevant consideration. The sentence was imposed on a vulnerable person. In the circumstances of this case the s 23(5) duty could not be avoided on the basis that the prisoner sought the sentence imposed.
[74] We do not accept, as Mr Powell submitted, that the cases decided under art 10 of the ICCPR should lead us to conclude that cell confinement for a period of 21 days did not amount to a breach of s 23(5) of the Act. While there is a close affinity between art 10 of the ICCPR and s 23(5) of the Act, the authorities on which Mr Powell relied did not reflect the present context where there is a statutory maximum on the period for which cell confinement can be ordered. As was noted by both Blanchard and Tipping JJ in Taunoa, the Act has to be construed and applied in light of values and standards prevalent in New Zealand.[46]
[75] For the reasons discussed we are of the view that there was a breach of s 23(5) of the Act. The unlawful sentence had the consequence that Mr Vogel was not treated with humanity and respect for his inherent dignity.
Remedy
[76] Having concluded that there has been a breach of s 23(5), we address the issue of the appropriate remedy. Lang J’s conclusions that neither a breach of s 9 nor s 23(5) had been established meant that no remedy was available for any breach of the Act. He also declined to make a declaration that the sentence was unlawful for the reasons we have earlier set out.
[77] Our conclusions that there was a breach of s 23(5) means that different considerations must be taken into account. In Taunoa the Supreme Court confirmed that damages for breaches of the Act should be redressed by the provision of remedies that are effective,[47] appropriate[48] and proportionate.[49] It was said that the remedy should have the purpose of vindicating the right breached,[50] deterring the relevant authorities from future rights breaches[51] and denouncing the conduct so as to mark society’s disapproval of the breach.[52]
[78] But for the provisions of the Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act 2005 (PVC Act) we would have been of the view that this was an appropriate case for a small award of damages. As was said by Richardson J in Martin v Tauranga District Court the remedies for breach of the Act should be directed to the values underlying the particular right that has been breached, the remedy granted should be proportional to the breach and other aspects of the public interest should be taken into account.[53]
[79] In this case, the breach was of an important right. Moreover, the breach has occurred and, unlike breaches of some other rights (such as the right to a fair trial or to natural justice), Mr Vogel could not be put into the position he was in before the breach.[54]
[80] Calculation of the amount of the award would, however, be problematic given that the breach occurred so long ago. As Mr Powell noted, no complaint was made by Mr Vogel for several years after the sentence was imposed. In these circumstances, the need to recognise and address the “affront” to Mr Vogel is less compelling. Moreover, there does not appear in the circumstances of this case to be any realistic prospect of similar breaches occurring in other cases if a damages award is not made.
[81] In this context, however, it is necessary also to consider the provisions of the PVC Act. That Act applies to the present claim because it is a “specified claim” as defined in s 6: it is based on an act by or on behalf of the Crown made before the commencement of the Act, affecting a “person under control or supervision”, and involves the breach of a right contained in and affirmed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.[55]
[82] Section 13(1) of the PVC Act proscribes an award of compensation unless the Court is satisfied amongst other things that the plaintiff has made reasonable use of all the “specified internal and external complaints mechanisms”. For a prisoner in the legal custody of the superintendent of a penal institution (called a “1954 Act prisoner” under s 7(2)) this means the mechanisms set out in s 7(1)(c) of the PVC Act. Mr Powell pointed out that although Mr Vogel requested an interview with the Ombudsman on 9 July 2000 he later withdrew that request and there is no explanation in the record for why he did so. There is no other evidence that he took any steps in relation to the matters raised in the statement of claim. In the circumstances, s 13 of the Act prevents the Court from making any damages award.
[83] We are satisfied, however, that there should be a declaration. Mr Powell submitted that the Court should not make a declaration on the basis that the decision in question was made 12 years ago under legislation no longer in force, no attempt had been made to raise any issue with a prison inspector or Ombudsman and no application for judicial review had been made. He noted also that the Visiting Justice who made the decision is now deceased, and the appellant has since been paroled and recalled after reoffending. He argued in the circumstances that recording the breach in a judgment ought to be sufficient, and suggested that to grant a declaration would be to risk trivialising the remedy.
[84] We disagree. Having regard to the importance of the right breached we are satisfied that it is appropriate to make a declaration. To do so will achieve the purposes of vindicating the right and marking society’s disapproval of its breach.
Result
[85] The appeal is allowed and the judgment in the High Court is set aside.
[86] We make declarations that the appellant’s cell confinement for 21 days was in breach of:
- (a) his rights under s 23(5) of the Act; and
- (b) section 33(3)(g) of the Penal Institutions Act.
[87] The appellant is entitled to his costs in this Court and in the High Court. The first respondent must pay the appellant costs for a standard appeal on a band A basis and usual disbursements.
[88] The matter is remitted to the High Court for costs to be fixed in that Court in accordance with this judgment.
Solicitors:
Marshall, Bird & Curtis, Auckland for Appellant
Crown Law Office,
Wellington for Respondents
[1] Vogel v Attorney-General [2012] NZHC 269, [2012] NZAR 154.
[2] Penal Institutions Act 1954, s 33(3)(g).
[3] We refer below at [44]–[45] to some additional matters concerning Mr Vogel’s health prior to his cell confinement.
[4] At [34].
[5] At [45].
[6] At [46].
[7] At [53].
[8] At [55].
[9] At [63].
[10] At [64]–[65].
[11] At [66].
[12] At [69].
[13] At [70].
[14] Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429; Taunoa v Attorney-General (2004) 7 HRNZ 379 (HC).
[15] Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987).
[16] Juan E Méndez Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment A/66/268 (2011) at [26].
[17] At [81]–[83].
[18] At [86].
[19] At [88].
[20] At [94].
[21] At [94].
[22] At [96].
[23] At [103].
[24] At [104].
[25] At [106].
[26] At [107].
[27] At [108].
[28] Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) provides: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
[29] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 222 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), art 3.
[30] For example Winters v Legal Services Society (British Columbia) [1999] 3 SCR 160.
[31] At [68].
[32] At [177].
[33] At [348] per McGrath J.
[34] The Behaviour Management Regime was a programme put in place following serious riots at Auckland Prison. It was intended to incentivise desired behaviour from prisoners with behavioural problems. The programme consisted of four phases, each phase differing in duration and conditions. The most restrictive phase involved solitary confinement, one hour of exercise per day, limited visits and access to a telephone, and no access to television or stereos. There was regular strip-searching.
[35] At [208], [212] and [215]–[216].
[36] Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd ed, NP Engel, Kehl (Germany), 2005) at 245 (footnotes omitted).
[37] Drew v Attorney-General [2002] 1 NZLR 58 (CA) at [48].
[38] Vaihu v Attorney-General [2007] NZCA 574, (2007) 8 HRNZ 403 at [36].
[39] Taunoa, above n 14, at [8].
[40] At [216] and [218].
[41] See at [275] and [292] per Tipping J, [341] and [362] per McGrath J and [384] per Henry J.
[42] At [79].
[43] See the discussion at [294]–[296].
[44] At [296].
[45] At [68].
[46] See at [179] per Blanchard J and at [279] per Tipping J.
[47] At [106]–[107] per Elias CJ, [253] per Blanchard J, [300] per Tipping J and [365] per McGrath J.
[48] At [106]–[107] and [113] per Elias CJ, [256] per Blanchard J, [300] per Tipping J, [364], [366], [369] and [370] per McGrath J and [385] per Henry J.
[49] At [263] per Blanchard J, [300] per Tipping J, [367] per McGrath J and [385] per Henry J.
[50] At [106] per Elias CJ, [253] per Blanchard J, [300] per Tipping J, [366] and [368] per McGrath J and [385] per Henry J.
[51] At [109] and n 187 per Elias CJ, [258] per Blanchard J and [366], [368] and [369] per McGrath J.
[52] At [255], [259] and [261] per Blanchard J and [300] and [318] per Tipping J.
[53] Martin v Tauranga District Court [1995] 2 NZLR 419 (CA) at 428.
[54] See Attorney-General v Udompun [2005] 3 NZLR 204 (CA) at [173].
[55] See the Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act 2005, s 6.
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