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Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Alinizi [2016] NZCA 468 (28 September 2016)

Last Updated: 6 October 2016

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
BETWEEN
 Appellant
AND
 Respondent
Hearing:
19 September 2016
Court:
Harrison, Brown and Brewer JJ
Counsel:
C A Brook for Appellant P H H Tomlinson for Respondent
Judgment:


JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A The appeal is allowed.

  1. An extended supervision order is made against Mr Alinizi for a period of six years commencing on 29 September 2016.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Brown J)

Introduction

[1] The purpose of an extended supervision order (ESO) is to protect members of the community from those who, following release from serving a determinate prison sentence, pose a real and ongoing risk of committing serious sexual or violent offences.[1] Under s 107I(2) of the Parole Act 2002, the Court may grant an ESO if satisfied that the offender has, or has had, a pervasive pattern of serious sexual or violent offending and either or both of the following apply:
[2] This appeal concerns the meaning of the word “displays” where it first appears in s 107IAA of the Parole Act. That section specifies the prerequisites for a determination of the level of risk sufficient to justify the making of an ESO:

107IAA Matters court must be satisfied of when assessing risk

(1) A court may determine that there is a high risk that an eligible offender will commit a relevant sexual offence only if it is satisfied that the offender—

(a) displays an intense drive, desire, or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence; and

(b) has a predilection or proclivity for serious sexual offending; and

(c) has limited self-regulatory capacity; and

(d) displays either or both of the following:

(i) a lack of acceptance of responsibility or remorse for past offending:

(ii) an absence of understanding for or concern about the impact of his or her sexual offending on actual or potential victims.

(2) A court may determine that there is a very high risk that an eligible offender will commit a relevant violent offence only if it is satisfied that the offender—

(a) has a severe disturbance in behavioural functioning established by evidence of each of the following characteristics:

(i) intense drive, desires, or urges to commit acts of violence; and

(ii) extreme aggressive volatility; and

(iii) persistent harbouring of vengeful intentions towards 1 or more other persons; and

(b) either—

(i) displays behavioural evidence of clear and long-term planning of serious violent offences to meet a premeditated goal; or

(ii) has limited self-regulatory capacity; and

(c) displays an absence of understanding for or concern about the impact of his or her violence on actual or potential victims.

Factual background

[3] In 2006 Mr Alinizi was found guilty of sexual violation by rape and kidnapping of a 15 year old female and was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. While he was in prison, offending against a previous partner’s nine year old daughter came to light. Consequently in 2013 Mr Alinizi was convicted of two charges of doing an indecent act on a child and he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment to be served cumulatively with the earlier sentence.
[4] Mr Alinizi was released on parole on 18 January 2016 with a statutory release date of 30 March 2016. The Parole Board imposed post-release conditions that expire six months after his statutory release date, which is on 29 September 2016. The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (the Chief Executive) applied for an extended supervision order on 13 November 2015 in anticipation of Mr Alinizi’s imminent release from prison.

High Court judgment

[5] On 25 July 2016 Gilbert J dismissed the Chief Executive’s application,[2] reasoning that the Court has no jurisdiction to make an ESO unless satisfied that each of the four matters in s 107IAA(1) exists at the time an order is made. He held that Mr Alinizi did not currently display an intense drive, desire or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence with the consequence that the first of the statutory prerequisites for an ESO was not met.
[6] The Judge commenced by noting that Parliament has used different tenses and terminology in defining the statutory test to be applied when determining whether an extended supervision order can be made,[3] observing that those important differences had to be respected in considering whether there was jurisdiction to make an ESO in a particular case.
[7] The Judge proceeded to distinguish a number of authorities cited by the Chief Executive in support of the application,[4] before expressing agreement with the following observations of Wylie J in Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Martin:[5]

[37] Pursuant to s 107IAA(1)(a), I am required to be satisfied that Mr Martin “displays an intense drive, desire or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence”.

[38] The sub-section uses the present tense — “displays”. What is required is an assessment as at the date of the hearing for the extended supervision order, informed by what has occurred in the past, in an endeavour to anticipate what might happen in the future. The statutory language — “intense drive, desire or urge” — is strong. It conveys a sense of immediacy. What is in issue is whether or not the offender displays an intense drive, desire or urge as at the date of the hearing, and not what drive, desire or urge he or she displayed in the past.

[8] Turning to address the question whether Mr Alinizi “presently displays” the characteristics in s 107IAA(1)(a), the Judge observed that Dr Juanita Smith, a clinical psychologist retained by the Chief Executive:[6]

He noted that Dr Smith confirmed in cross-examination that there was no evidence that Mr Alinizi currently displayed that characteristic.

[9] Dr Jon Nuth, another clinical psychologist retained by Mr Tomlinson for Mr Alinizi, provided a report dated 26 April 2016 which stated he was unable to ascertain whether Mr Alinizi had the particular characteristic. He confirmed this in evidence.
[10] The Judge concluded:

[35] It can be seen that there is no contest in the evidence. Both psychologists agree that Mr Alinizi does not currently display an intense drive, desire or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence. There is no evidence that he has done so since he offended in 2005. It follows that one of the statutory pre-requisites for an extended supervision order is not met. Accordingly, the Court has no jurisdiction to make an extended supervision order and the application must be dismissed.

The statutory framework

[11] The rationale for the imposition of an ESO is that an offender who has served a prison sentence for a relevant offence may nevertheless present a high risk of committing a relevant sexual or violent offence following his or her release. The ESO is tailored to the identified risk by the requirement that the term of the ESO must be the minimum period required for the purposes of the safety of the community in light of the level of risk posed by the offender and the likely duration of the risk.[7]
[12] The ESO regime was significantly changed by the Parole (Extended Supervision Orders) Amendment Act 2014 which broadened the scope to include all sexual offenders regardless of their victims’ ages as well as serious violent offenders. Provision was introduced for the renewal,[8] cancellation[9] and review[10] of ESOs.
[13] In its original form s 107F of the Parole Act simply required, in order to impose an ESO, that the Court be satisfied that the offender was “likely” to commit a relevant offence on ceasing to be subject to a sentence of imprisonment. Under the new framework once it is established that an offender is an “eligible offender” the Court is required to engage in a three-step process:
[14] Section 107IAA is concerned with the specified traits and behavioural characteristics of an offender at the date of a relevant application before the Court. It applies both to a first application for an ESO under s 107F and to a renewal application. It is also applicable both on an application to cancel an ESO[11] and on a review of an ESO.[12]
[15] An application for an ESO must be accompanied by a report by a health assessor which responds to the requirements set out in s 107F(2A):

Every health assessor’s report must address one or both of the following questions:

(i) whether—
(ii) whether—
[16] Section 107F proceeds to address the matters which the health assessor may take into account:

(3) To avoid doubt, in addressing any matter to be referred to in the health assessor’s report, the health assessor may take into account any statement of the offender or any other person concerning any conduct of the offender, whether or not that conduct constitutes an offence and whether or not the offender has been charged with, or convicted of, an offence in respect of that conduct.

[17] The breadth of information which the Court may take into account in considering an application for, or for the cancellation of, an ESO is stated in s 107H:

(2) At hearing, the court may receive and take into account any evidence or information that it thinks fit for the purpose of determining the application or appeal, whether or not it would be admissible in a court of law.

(3) At any hearing, the court is entitled to take into account the fact that an offender refused to co-operate with the preparation of the health assessor’s report required under section 107F(2), but it must also take into account any reasons the offender gives for refusal to cooperate with the preparation of the health assessor’s report.

Analysis

[18] The Chief Executive does not challenge the requirement that an offender must possess the prescribed traits and characteristics at the time when the ESO application is determined. Rather the contention is that it is not a requirement of the provision that at the date of determination the trait or characteristic must be “presently manifest”. The Chief Executive’s argument is reflected in the adoption of the observation of Venning J in Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v CJW:[13]

[33] The urge or drive need not be presently manifested. The issue is whether Mr W still has the characteristic, rather than the circumstances in which it might apply. ...

...

[35] I am satisfied that there is evidence that Mr W has an intense drive or urge to commit violent assaults against others. Whether that urge or drive is unleashed will depend on the situations that Mr W finds himself in.

[19] Gilbert J distinguished CJW for the reason that it concerned an application for an ESO based on the risk that the offender would commit serious violent offences in the future, stating:[14]

[18] ... The test in those circumstances is set out in s 107IAA(2) and is different to the test based on the risk of sexual offending set out in s 107IAA(1). There is no requirement under subsection (2) for the offender to “display” an intense drive, desire or urge to commit acts of violence.

Gilbert J similarly distinguished Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Wrigley noting that Heath J omitted the word “displays” when reciting the criterion under s 107IAA(1)(a) and did not address it in his analysis.

[20] We recognise that the use of the transitive verb “display” in association with an object commonly conveys external manifestation, generally to the public at large. Hence there is statutory provision concerning:
[21] However the meaning of a word will depend on the context of its usage. We consider that where a “display” refers not to an inanimate object the subject of public view but to aspects of a person’s personality traits and behavioural characteristics the word necessarily connotes a subtly different shade of meaning.
[22] The first point we would make is that the general public is unlikely to be the relevant audience of such a “display”. As the proposed criteria in a Regulatory Impact Statement which preceded the Parole (Extended Supervision Orders) Amendment Act stated:[19]

A psychological assessment of the offenders would be necessary to determine whether they have the characteristics that identify a person as being at a high risk of serious sexual offending or very high risk of serious violent offending. This will include a comprehensive risk assessment.

That observation is reflected in the requirement in s 107F(2A) that the s 107IAA prerequisites are to be addressed in the health assessor’s report.

[23] Of course even such suitably qualified health assessors are dependent on available information. Sometimes information pertinent to those prerequisites will be available where an offender elects to provide information as s 107F(3) contemplates by the reference to statements of the offender. However such information will not be available if the offender elects not to cooperate. Such an eventuality is anticipated by s 107H(3) which provides that the Court is entitled to take into account the fact that an offender refused to cooperate with the preparation of the report required under s 107F(2).
[24] The ability for the Court to proceed in that manner is especially important in a situation where, as Gilbert J noted,[20] both psychologists agreed that there is currently no reliable test that can be administered to determine whether at a particular time someone possesses an intense drive, desire or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence. The Judge acknowledged that in those circumstances psychologists rely on selfreporting or subsequent behaviour to ascertain whether that criterion is satisfied. Unless the word “displays” is given a wider meaning it would have no utility for an offender such as Mr Alinizi who denies his offending and is most unlikely to selfreport and who has been living for a number of years in a closed environment where he had no opportunity to display an intense drive, desire or urge to commit a sexual offence against a female or a child. Hence, absent selfreporting or the commission of further offending, the consequence of the Judge’s interpretation of the “displays” requirement might well be that the object of protection of the community would be defeated.
[25] While we agree with Gilbert J that the use of the present tense is significant, we do not consider that the use of different verbs (“displays” and “has”) in relation to the several characteristics listed in s 107IAA(1) and (2) is significant. We note that in s 107F(2A) concerning the content of the health assessor’s report, which is intended to address the s 107IAA requirements, the word “displays” is used with reference to all of the traits and behavioural characteristics of the offender specified in the subsections.
[26] We consider that the word “displays”, particularly in the more generic usage in s 107F(2A), is intended to convey that the relevant traits and behavioural characteristics must be currently possessed by the offender. However we do not consider that the word “displays” used in the ESO context imports the connotation of external expression associated with manifestation to the public at large. We consider that a similar approach may be appropriate for the word “exhibits” in s 13(2) of the Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Act 2014, which legislation is addressed in s 107GAA of the Act.
[27] Consequently we agree with Ms Brook’s submission for the Chief Executive that the variable usage of “displays” in the sections does not import a requirement that the particular traits and behavioural characteristics, while required to be “present”, must be externally manifested at the time of application.
[28] Were it otherwise the task of proving those requirements could be rendered quite impossible in circumstances where as s 107F(3) anticipates the source of evidence may rely on selfreporting. An offender who elects not to engage either in whole or in relevant part with the assessment process could with comparative ease ensure that an application was unsuccessful. That point can usefully be demonstrated by considering the requirement to demonstrate an external manifestation of the negative states of mind in s 107IAA(1)(d) of a lack of acceptance of responsibility for past offending or an absence of understanding for or concern about the impact of offending on victims.

The present ESO application

[29] As Ms Brook notes, while in some cases offenders do in fact selfreport, for obvious reasons many do not. Indeed some will deny ever having the characteristic in the first place, as in cases where an offender continues to deny the offending occurred. In such instances Ms Brook suggests there is an available inference that the offender still has the characteristic in question. The present is said to be such a case.
[30] In that regard we note that in Dr Smith’s initial health assessment report of 29 July 2015 Mr Alinizi denied any role in or responsibility for his sexual offences and consequently reported limited detail about them.
[31] The report included:

[17] Mr Alinizi has not completed treatment to address his dynamic risk of sexual or violent offending. Due to his categorical denial of his sexual offending, Mr Alinizi has been found unsuitable for sexual offender treatment programmes and he has been unwilling to undertake treatment to discuss sexual offending ... .

The report also noted that Mr Alinizi maintained that the sexual offence allegations were falsely made against him by the victims and their families to exact revenge on him and as a result he does not verbalise remorse. In fact he was noted to blame his victims and make statements to discredit them.

[32] In an updated report of 20 June 2016 Dr Smith recorded that Mr Alinizi continued to deny his sexual offending which impacted on his ability to discuss and engage in effective risk management. Dr Smith considered that Mr Alinizi’s risk of further relevant sexual reoffending while in the community remained high.
[33] In the High Court[21] Gilbert J analysed a section of Dr Smith’s updated report, noting that with reference to the first mandatory criterion Dr Smith had confined observation to the time of the 2005 offending and said nothing about Mr Alinizi’s current presentation which the Judge recognised as the critical issue under the Parole Act. However Dr Smith in her report went on to say:

Nonetheless, Mr Alinizi’s failure to engage in treatment, despite acknowledging problems with alcohol and drug use and high levels of sexually compulsive and antisocial behaviour at the time of the offending, suggests that he is, at least, not willing to recognise and manage his sexual recidivism risk in the community.

[34] Dr Nuth’s report also recorded that Mr Alinizi denied that any of the sexual offences for which he was convicted ever took place and that he maintained that he was wrongly accused and convicted. Because Mr Alinizi denied ever committing a sexual offence his scores on the Child Molest Scale and Rape Scale could not be calculated. Specifically with reference to the first prerequisite Dr Nuth stated:

[38] I am unable to ascertain whether Mr Alinizi has an intense drive, desire, or urge to commit the relevant sexual offence. Mr Alinizi denies any sexual offending and consequently has not taken part in any sexual offending treatment whilst in prison. He denies any prominent sexual interest but this is in contrast to high levels of sexual activities when he was in his late teens/early twenties. I do however concur with the view of Dr Smith who stated: Mr Alinizi’s failure to engage in treatment or develop risk management plans, despite acknowledging problems with alcohol and drug use and high levels of sexually compulsive and antisocial behaviour at the time of the offending, suggests that he is at least not willing to recognise or manage his sexual recidivism risk on release.

[35] Dr Nuth was of the view based on all the information available to him that there was a basis for recommending an ESO. It was his belief that Mr Alinizi presented “at least a moderate to high level of sexual offending risk and a number of ongoing dynamic risk factors that do not appear to have attenuated”.
[36] In our view the general approach adopted in CJW, Wrigley and Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Rimene is sound and we consider that a Court is likely to be satisfied that the statutory prerequisite in s107IAA(1)(a) is present where there is nothing to suggest that such a trait formerly present no longer subsists. A court will very likely come to such a conclusion where, as here, an offender categorically denies the sexual offending for which he was convicted and as a consequence has been unwilling to undertake treatment to discuss sexual offending.
[37] As Ms Brook emphasised in the context of her criticism of the judgment in treating the health assessors’ evidence as being determinative of the issue, the question of whether an offender meets the criteria for the imposition of an ESO is for the Court, not the health assessors, to determine although their expert opinion will no doubt be of assistance. In the present case we are satisfied on the basis of the three psychologists’ reports and Mr Alinizi’s history of offending that the several statutory prerequisites in s 107IAA(1) continue to be present. We conclude that it is appropriate and necessary for an ESO to be made in relation to Mr Alinizi.

Term of order

[38] Because of his conclusion that the first prerequisite was not established, Gilbert J did not address the issue of an appropriate term of an ESO against Mr Alinizi. We must now do so. As earlier noted[22] the term of the ESO must be the minimum period required for the purposes of the safety of the community in light of the matters stated in s 107I(5) of the Parole Act. Where an offender categorically denies previous offending and consequently is unwilling to undertake treatment directed to the sexual offending, it would be open to a Court to direct an ESO of the full 10 year period.
[39] We have carefully considered the alternative courses of making an order of 10 years duration, recognising that it is open to Mr Alinizi to apply at an earlier time for cancellation, or an order of lesser duration in relation to which the Chief Executive could make an application for extension at the appropriate time.
[40] We have concluded that the latter course is appropriate in view of Dr Nuth’s professional opinion that a maximum period of 10 years is not necessarily indicated. In our view a period of six years should provide an adequate opportunity for the development of a safety plan with protective factors which would safeguard the community as well as providing a sufficient time for Mr Alinizi’s behaviour in the community to be monitored and assessed. It would be open to the Chief Executive to apply to extend the order towards the end of that period in the event that the present circumstances, including Mr Alinizi’s categorical denial of his sexual offending, pertain.

Disposition

[41] The appeal is allowed. An extended supervision order is made against Mr Alinizi for a period of six years commencing on 29 September 2016.





Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Appellant

[1] Parole Act 2002, s 107I.

[2] Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Alinizi [2016] NZHC 1693.

[3] “Has had”; “has”; and “displays”.

[4] Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v CJW [2016] NZHC 1082; Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Rimene [2015] NZHC 2721; and Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Wrigley [2015] NZHC 1712.

[5] Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Martin [2016] NZHC 1060 (footnotes omitted).

[6] Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Alinizi, above n 2, at [26].

[7] Parole Act, s 107I(5)(a) and (c).

[8] Section 107F(1)(b).

[9] Section 107M.

[10] Section 107RA.

[11] Parole Act, s 107M(4).

[12] Section 107RA(6).

[13] Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v CJW, above n 4.

[14] Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Alinizi, above n 2, at [18].

[15] Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, s 245(1).

[16] Human Rights Act 1993, s 67(1).

[17] Flags, Emblems and Names Act 1981, ss 11(1)(b), 12(1) and 13(1).

[18] Road User Charges Act 2012, s 24(1).

[19] Department of Corrections Regulatory Impact Statement: Enhanced Extended Supervision Orders (3 November 2014) at 20.

[20] At [28].

[21] At [25].

[22] At [11] above.

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