Blomfield v Police [2018] NZCA 180 (5 June 2018)

Last Updated: 13 June 2018

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

CA603/2017 [2018] NZCA 180

	BETWEEN	ANGELA MAE BLOMFIELD Appellant
	AND	NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing:	17 May 2018
Court:	Asher, Venning and Mander JJ
Counsel:	Appellant in Person E J Hoskin for Respondent
Judgment:	5 June 2018 at 11 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Venning J)

[1] On 11 April 2017 Angela Blomfield was found guilty of one charge of trespass following a judge-alone trial in the District Court.^[1] Judge Maude convicted and discharged her. Ms Blomfield appealed against conviction. Fitzgerald J dismissed the appeal in a judgment delivered on 3 October 2017.^[2] Ms Blomfield now seeks leave of this Court to bring a second appeal against conviction.

Factual background — the contest between the parties

[2] Ms Blomfield and Mr Thomas Aldridge, the first complainant, have been separated for over 12 years. They have two children together. Since separation they have shared care of the children to varying degrees. The children are now teenagers. The second complainant, Dianne Spriggs, is Mr Aldridge’s partner. They shared a home, which is where the children were living at the time of the offending (the Property).
[3] Ms Blomfield and Mr Aldridge’s relationship has been strained for a number of years. Because of the difficulties Ms Blomfield was served with a trespass notice warning her to stay off the Property. As Ms Blomfield still had contact with the children she had to wait outside the Property to collect them on the occasions she saw them.
[4] On 20 January 2017 Ms Blomfield drove to the Property on a matter relating to one of the children. She arrived at the Property in her car at about 6.30 pm. The complainants said that Ms Blomfield drove her vehicle onto the driveway of the Property. This blocked Ms Spriggs’ car. There was then a verbal altercation between Ms Blomfield, Mr Aldridge and Ms Spriggs. Ms Blomfield left the Property to pick up one of the children and later returned to the Property. The complainants said she again parked her car half on the driveway and half on the footpath. There was a further altercation. Ms Spriggs called 111 from inside the Property before Ms Blomfield drove away.

The District Court trial

[5] Ms Blomfield accepted that she had been served with a trespass notice. The sole matter to be determined in the District Court trial was whether Ms Blomfield’s car was parked on the Property and therefore whether she had committed trespass. Ms Blomfield gave evidence that her car was parked on the footpath at the foot of the driveway, but not on the driveway itself. Mr Aldridge’s and Ms Spriggs’ evidence was that Ms Blomfield’s car was partially on the footpath and partially on the driveway of the Property.
[6] Judge Maude identified the sole question for him to determine was whether Ms Blomfield’s car with her in it was driven onto part of the Property on 20 January 2017. Ultimately the Judge accepted the evidence of Mr Aldridge and Ms Spriggs and was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Blomfield’s car was, at least in part, on the driveway of the Property. He found the charge proved.

The High Court appeal

[7] In her appeal to the High Court Ms Blomfield argued that the District Court Judge did not consider her submissions and was wrong to accept Mr Aldridge’s and Ms Spriggs’ evidence in preference to hers. Ms Blomfield argued:^[3]

• (a) Mr Aldridge’s oral evidence was unreliable given he did not want to answer questions and had to be prompted by the Judge at times to answer questions.
• (b) If Ms Blomfield had, in fact, parked on the driveway, Mr Aldridge would have taken a photo. The absence of any photographic evidence weighs against Mr Aldridge’s credibility.
• (c) Given the length of the driveway, the complainants’ evidence about the position of the cars could not be correct.
• (d) There was no reason for Ms Blomfield to park the car on the driveway given she was aware of the trespass order and its consequences.

[8] Ms Blomfield sought to adduce further evidence and material for her appeal to the High Court. The further evidence included:

• (a) annotated notes of the evidence from the District Court;
• (b) information, maps and digital readings and measurements of the driveway and cars;
• (c) emails between the parties; and
• (d) documents relating to a protection order.

[9] Fitzgerald J considered that the annotated notes of evidence provided by Ms Blomfield took the form of submissions rather than new evidence. The evidence of the application for the protection order was credible and fresh but, as the Judge noted, it was not particularly relevant or probative of a matter at issue. With the exception of one email the Judge concluded the emails were not material. The exception was an email in which Mr Aldridge told Ms Blomfield he had a photo of her car parked on the driveway. During the District Court trial Mr Aldridge had denied sending the email and effectively denied taking a photo of Ms Blomfield’s car. Ms Blomfield had not formally adduced the email as evidence.
[10] The Judge ruled the further evidence concerning the dimensions of the Property’s driveway, the lengths of the various cars and positions on the driveway was not fresh evidence.
[11] Fitzgerald J then thoroughly reviewed the evidence before the District Court. She noted the advantage the trial Judge had in assessing credibility. While accepting that Mr Aldridge may have lied when he denied sending the email, Fitzgerald J was satisfied that there had been no error by the trial Judge, and accordingly no miscarriage of justice.^[4] For those reasons Fitzgerald J dismissed the appeal.^[5]

This application for leave

[12] Ms Blomfield now seeks leave to bring a second appeal. Section 237 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 applies:

237 Right of appeal against determination of first appeal court

(1) A convicted person may, with the leave of the second appeal court, appeal to that court against the determination of the person’s first appeal under this subpart.

(2) The High Court or the Court of Appeal must not give leave for a second appeal under this subpart unless satisfied that—

(a) the appeal involves a matter of general or public importance; or

(b) a miscarriage of justice may have occurred, or may occur unless the appeal is heard.

[13] Clifford J directed that Ms Blomfield’s application for leave was to be determined separately from the appeal.^[6]
[14] Ms Blomfield addressed the Court in support of her application. She submitted that Mr Aldridge had been proved to have lied. The case then became an issue of credibility between her evidence and the evidence of Ms Spriggs. She submitted that given the conflict between their evidence the charge could not have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Ms Blomfield emphasised that her practice was to park on the footpath and she had no reason to park on the driveway.
[15] Ms Blomfield also explained the recent steps she had taken to obtain further evidence from a neighbour she believed have witnessed the incident. Her attempts were unsuccessful.

Discussion

[16] No question of general or public importance arises on the proposed appeal.
[17] Ms Blomfield seeks to argue that a miscarriage of justice will occur unless her appeal is heard (and granted). The difficulty for Ms Blomfield is that she still seeks to revisit the factual findings of the District Court and Fitzgerald J’s review of them. As Fitzgerald J observed, the District Court Judge had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.^[7] That is an important advantage in a case like this where the issue was one of credibility and reliability of witnesses. As noted the evidence was then extensively and thoroughly reviewed by Fitzgerald J in the High Court.
[18] All relevant matters that Ms Blomfield seeks to raise were raised before the District Court and the High Court. While Ms Blomfield may still feel aggrieved by her conviction she has not been able to identify any miscarriage of justice that would support an appeal.

Result

[19] The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent

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^[1] Police v Blomfield [2017] NZDC 9225.

^[2] Blomfield v Police [2017] NZHC 2414.

^[3] At [14] (footnote omitted).

^[4] At [52].

^[5] At [53].

^[6] Blomfield v Police CA603/2017, 12 February 2018 (Minute of Clifford J).

^[7] Blomfield v Police, above n 2, at [44].