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Roe v University of Waikato [2021] NZCA 612 (18 November 2021)
Last Updated: 23 November 2021
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW
ZEALANDI
TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA
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BETWEEN
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KELLY ALEXANDRA ROE Applicant
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AND
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UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO Respondent
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CA488/2021
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BETWEEN
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KELLY ALEXANDRA ROE Applicant
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AND
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UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO Respondent
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Counsel:
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Applicant in Person J A MacGillivray for Respondent
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Judgment: (On the papers)
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18 November 2021 at 10.30 am
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JUDGMENT OF BROWN J
(Review of Deputy
Registrar’s decision)
- The
application to review the Deputy Registrar’s decision declining to
dispense with security for costs is declined.
- Security
for costs of $7,060 is payable by 9 December
2021.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
Introduction
- [1] On 23 July
2021 Ms Roe filed an appeal against a judgment of the High Court dismissing her
application for judicial review relating
to the examination of her thesis by the
respondent, the University of Waikato, and the outcome of that
examination.[1] The High
Court’s subsequent costs judgment was the subject of a separate notice of
appeal filed on 6 August 2021.[2] On
17 September 2021 it was directed that the appeals be heard together with only
one payment of security for costs being required.
- [2] Ms Roe
applied under r 35(6)(c) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005
(the Rules) for dispensation from the requirement to
pay security for
costs, which had been fixed in the sum of $7,060, on the ground that the
substantive appeal involves a matter of
considerable public interest. In a
decision dated 22 September 2021 the Deputy Registrar declined the application
for dispensation.
- [3] Ms Roe now
seeks a review of that decision.
The relevant principles
- [4] The
principles applicable to dispensation from security for costs were reviewed by
the Supreme Court in Reekie v
Attorney-General.[3] The Court
stated that the Registrar should dispense with security if of the view that it
is right to require the respondent to defend
the judgment under challenge
without the usual protection as to costs provided by
security.[4] The Court
explained:
[35] ... we consider that the discretion to dispense with
security should be exercised so as to:
(a) preserve access to the Court of Appeal by an impecunious appellant in
the case of an appeal which a solvent appellant would reasonably
wish to
prosecute; and
(b) prevent the use of impecuniosity to secure the advantage of being able
to prosecute an appeal which would not be sensibly pursued
by a solvent
litigant.
A reasonable and solvent litigant would not proceed with an appeal which is
hopeless. Nor would a reasonable and solvent litigant
proceed with an appeal
where the benefits (economic or otherwise) to be obtained are outweighed by the
costs (economic and otherwise)
of the exercise (including the potential
liability to contribute to the respondent’s costs if unsuccessful). As
should be
apparent from what we have just said, analysis of costs and benefits
should not be confined to those which can be measured in money.
- [5] The Court
also ruled that the review function of the judge in relation to security for
costs is to be exercised de
novo.[5]
The Deputy
Registrar’s decision
- [6] Having
correctly cited the relevant principles from Reekie, the Deputy Registrar
first recorded that Ms Roe did not claim to be impecunious and did not make her
application on that ground.
Instead her application was advanced on the basis
that the appeal against the substantive decision is one of public interest.
- [7] The Deputy
Registrar rejected Ms Roe’s submission that her substantive appeal
involved a matter of considerable public interest,
observing that the appeals
turned on their particular facts given that the respondent’s decision
related to Ms Roe’s
enrolment and examination results. The Deputy
Registrar saw little prospect of success in the appeals and did not consider
that
a reasonable and solvent litigant would proceed with
them.
Discussion
- [8] In support
of the review Ms Roe explained that her appeal is “intertwined” with
other litigation she has with New
Zealand Vice-Chancellors Committee, contending
that her treatment is not simply an issue between herself and the respondent but
rather
an issue with how all New Zealand universities treat their graduate
research students. She suggested that her appeal will be of
interest to
domestic and international students when they are deciding whether they want to
invest in a New Zealand university education.
- [9] In her
submissions Ms Roe engaged at some length with the merits of her case, in
particular the requirement that she re-enrol,
stating:
This was not
an academic decision. The University administration decided to demand (demand a
bribe payment and an additional period
of unpaid therefore slave labor) without
academic grounds. They do this always. It is systematic. They believe they
are entitled.
- [10] She
described the issue in this way:
16) The issue is what it is or
means to have a degree from a NZ University. University administration thinks
that all NZ University
degrees are honorary degrees to be granted or withheld at
the discretion of the University administration. That is to say they can
decide
whether you paid enough money to university editing services or whether you
lived in your supervisors house for long enough.
Whether you carried their
groceries with joy on your face. Whether you did what they said when they said
because they said. The
University administration has total discretion to grant
or withhold University Degrees quite aside from internationally accepted
standards of scholarship.
- [11] As I
explained in a previous review sought by Ms Roe, the beliefs she holds
concerning the practices of various academic institutions
does not have the
consequence of converting proceedings, that concern facts and processes that
pertain only to her and her academic
pursuits, into a broader issue of public
interest.[6] As the Supreme Court
recently observed in relation to that case (and two others), they involved very
particular litigation where
the underlying disputes are personal to Ms Roe
and do not raise issues of general or public
importance.[7]
- [12] Like the
Deputy Registrar I do not regard her appeal as qualifying as genuine public
interest litigation of the nature recognised
in Banks v Ports of Auckland
Ltd.[8] Consequently there are no
grounds on that account for dispensation from the requirement to pay security
for costs.
- [13] Notwithstanding
that impecuniosity was not a ground for her application for dispensation, Ms
Roe’s submissions also stated
that she does not have funds to pay security
for costs. However she did not provide any details of her financial
circumstances in
support of that contention. Indeed her submissions made it
clear that she is opposed to doing so:
3) I am opposed to presenting
my financial records to the court as I am opposed to presenting a film to the
court of me doing various
things in the bathroom or the bedroom. Privacy.
There is nothing wrong with picking one’s nose but there is something
wrong
with people forcing things like that to take up the time of the courts. I
have attested to my financial position and there is no
reason to think me a
liar.
- [14] Ms
Roe’s veracity is not the issue. There was simply no information in her
application which would have provided a basis
for dispensation on the grounds of
impecuniosity.
Result
- [15] The
application to review the Deputy Registrar’s decision declining to
dispense with security for costs is declined.
- [16] Security
for costs of $7,060 is payable by 9 December
2021.
Solicitors:
Tompkins Wake, Hamilton for
Respondent
[1] Roe v University of
Waikato [2021] NZHC 1808 [Substantive decision].
[2] Roe v University of Waikato
HC Hamilton CIV-2020-419-235, 30 July 2021.
[3] Reekie v
Attorney-General [2014] NZSC 63, [2014] 1 NZLR 737.
[4] At [31].
[5] At [23].
[6] Roe v New Zealand Vice
Chancellors Committee [2021] NZCA 437 at [15].
[7] Roe v New Zealand
Vice-Chancellors Committee [2021] NZSC 158 at [5].
[8] Banks v Ports of Auckland
Ltd [2015] NZCA 150, (2015) 22 PRNZ 461.
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