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Smith v Fletcher Construction Company Limited [2022] NZCA 107 (1 April 2022)
Last Updated: 5 April 2022
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW
ZEALANDI
TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA
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BETWEEN
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JOHN GOODWIN SMITH Applicant
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AND
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THE FLETCHER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED First
Respondent
ELECTRIX LIMITED Second Respondent
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Court:
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Cooper and Brown JJ
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Counsel:
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Applicant in Person C T Walker QC and M N Rathod for First
Respondent K M Quinn and T McKenzie for Second Respondent
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Judgment: (On the papers)
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1 April 2022 at 12.30 pm
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
- The
application for an extension of time to appeal is declined.
- The
applicant must pay one set of costs to the respondents for a standard
application for leave in band A and usual
disbursements.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Brown J)
Introduction
- [1] Mr Smith
applies under r 29A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 (the Rules)
for an extension of time in which to appeal
from a judgment of Palmer J dated 9
September 2020 declining a second application by Mr Smith for access to
documents in litigation
between the
respondents.[1] The application is
opposed by both respondents.
Background
- [2] During the
trial of the proceeding between the respondents in October 2019 Palmer J granted
a media organisation access to various
documents in the
proceeding.[2] The documents to be
provided comprised the pleadings, the opening submissions (except for
redactions), the briefs of evidence of
witnesses of fact (subject to
redactions), the notes of evidence and the closing submissions.
- [3] Following
delivery of judgment in the proceeding on 6 May
2020[3] Mr Smith applied to access the
court file in the proceeding. The reason for his request was to assist with
research for his paper
on the construction of the Justice and Emergency Services
Precinct in Christchurch. On 13 June 2020 Palmer J granted Mr Smith access
to
the same material as that permitted in the October 2019 decision.
- [4] On 19 August
2020 Mr Smith made a second application for access to a substantial number of
documents which had been referred to
by a number of witnesses in the proceeding.
Mr Smith provided a spreadsheet listing what appeared to be around 1,000
documents.
The application was declined on 9 September 2020 by Palmer J who
considered that the time and expense to the parties involved in
assessing that
volume of documents for redaction would be significant. The Judge
explained:[4]
I do not
consider the principle of open justice requires so much when the documents
constituting the essence of the case have been,
or are being, made available.
To require that would be disproportionate and may inhibit commercial parties
using the courts to resolve
disputes. That is particularly so after the
substantive hearing has concluded and judgment has issued.
The Judge considered that limiting access to the documents previously
disclosed was a reasonable limit prescribed by law which was
demonstrably
justified in terms of s 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
- [5] Mr
Smith’s third request seeking approximately 135 documents was resisted by
both respondents. In a minute dated 5 October
2020 the Judge declined the
application as he considered it was effectively dealt with by the 9 September
2020 judgment. There was
a delay in releasing that minute with the result that
Mr Smith did not receive it until the prescribed period for filing an
appeal
to this Court had
expired.[5]
- [6] Mr
Smith’s application to this Court for an extension of time to appeal
against the 5 October 2020 ruling was dismissed
in a judgment dated 15 March
2021.[6] The major barrier recognised
by the Court was that the High Court Judge had clearly been correct in
viewing the further request
as essentially the same as that refused in the
9 September 2020 decision. The subsequent request was an abuse of
process which could
not have succeeded and any appeal against the October 2020
minute would be hopeless.[7] The
Court concluded by
observing:[8]
Mr Smith is,
of course, still entitled to apply under r 29A for an extension of time to
appeal the 9 September 2020 decision. That
observation obviously says nothing
about the likely outcome of such an application.
- [7] Mr Smith
then applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal against
this Court’s 15 March 2021 judgment. His application
was dismissed
on 16 June 2021.[9] The
Court drew attention to this Court’s observations concerning an
application for extension of time in respect of the September
2020
judgment.
- [8] The appeal
in the Electrix/Fletcher Construction litigation (CA293/2020) was argued
on 9 June 2021, with Mr Smith present at the hearing, but shortly afterwards it
was abandoned.
Subsequently on 10 September 2021 Mr Smith applied for access to
the entire Court of Appeal file. That request was declined in
a minute dated
17 September 2021.
- [9] On 30
September 2021 Mr Smith filed the present application for an extension of time
to appeal from the 9 September 2020 judgment.
Relevant
principles
- [10] The
principles applicable to applications for extensions of time under r 29A of
the Rules were explained by the Supreme Court
in Almond v
Read.[10] The ultimate question
when considering the exercise of the discretion is what the interests of justice
require. Factors identified
as likely to require consideration
include:[11]
(a) the length of the delay;
(b) the reasons for the delay;
(c) the conduct of the parties, particularly of the applicant;
(d) any prejudice or hardship to the respondent or to others with
a legitimate interest in the outcome; and
(e) the significance of the issues raised by the proposed appeal, both to the
parties and more generally.
- [11] While the
Court recognised that the merits of a proposed appeal may, in principle, be
relevant to the exercise of the discretion
to extend time, a decision to refuse
an extension of time based substantially on that ground should be made only
where the appeal
is clearly hopeless. The lack of merit must be readily
apparent.[12]
Discussion
- [12] The delay
in seeking to bring the appeal is significant, the application having been filed
more than a year after the date of
delivery of the judgment. Mr Smith
acknowledges that he did not contemplate appealing the 9 September 2020 judgment
within the permitted
period. As he put it:
Why would I pay $1,100
to lodge an appeal plus lawyer’s fee in taking the judgment which I
largely agreed with, to appeal as
against $30 to submit a further application to
access a few documents?
However his attempt to appeal the subsequent 5 October 2020 judgment set in
train a time-consuming series of events.
- [13] Mr Smith
argues that the delay from 5 October 2020 to the Supreme Court’s
decision declining leave on 16 June 2021, a period
of eight and a half months,
should be attributed to actions taken to mitigate the failure of the Auckland
High Court registry to
notify him of the delivery of the 5 October 2020 minute
within the appeal period. While we accept that there was a delay in
notification,
we consider that the period that subsequently elapsed was the
responsibility of Mr Smith.
- [14] Mr Smith
elected only to seek an extension of time to appeal from the 5 October 2020
judgment rather than the 9 September 2020
judgment. When that application for
an extension was dismissed he also chose to pursue an unrealistic application
for leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court. Indeed in his submissions in support
of the application to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal it was stated
that
Mr Smith accepted and acted upon the decision of 9 September 2020, and
“did not, and does not, wish to challenge that
decision”. In the
circumstances we find unconvincing Mr Smith’s contention in his
submissions in support of the present
application that he refrained from seeking
to appeal the September judgment “for fear that my application would
interfere with
the fair and orderly administration of the ongoing justice
(Fletcher appeal) proceedings”.
- [15] Counsel for
the first respondent fairly observes that even after being informed by both this
Court and the Supreme Court that
an application for an extension of time to
appeal was an available course, Mr Smith consciously waited a further
four months. The
present application was only made by Mr Smith once
his application for access to this Court’s file for CA293/2020 was
declined.
- [16] We consider
that there would be a modest degree of prejudice for the respondents in having
to engage with an appeal and the foreshadowed
redaction exercise when the actual
litigation in question was resolved some nine months ago. While there is always
a general public
interest in allowing for the scrutiny of a Court decision, we
consider there is merit in the submission for the respondents that
Mr Smith
has the material he requires for his stated purpose. The additional 1,000
documents he seeks are not necessary in order
to understand the facts, issues
and arguments in the High Court or in this Court where he was an observer at the
hearing.
Conclusion
- [17] As the
Supreme Court observed, the longer the delay in bringing an appeal the more an
applicant will be seeking an “indulgence”
from the Court and the
stronger the case for an extension will need to
be.[13] Notwithstanding that there
was some contribution to the delay as a consequence of the failure to notify Mr
Smith of the 5 October
2020 decision within the appeal period, we consider
that a significant period of time then elapsed prior to the filing of the
present
application while Mr Smith unsuccessfully pursued other procedural
avenues. He elected to do so in the face of guidance by this
Court and
subsequently by the Supreme Court as to the orthodox route. The record suggests
that he has now had a change of mind about
appealing the 9 September 2020
decision. Having weighed the Almond v Read factors, in our view the
interests of justice do not require that Mr Smith should be permitted after
this period of time to launch
a challenge to that decision.
- [18] Consequently
the application for an extension of time to appeal is declined.
- [19] Mr Smith is
to pay one set of costs to the respondents for a standard application for leave
to appeal in band A and usual
disbursements.
Solicitors:
Craig Griffin & Lord, Auckland
for First Respondent
Burton Partners, Auckland for Second Respondent
[1] Electrix Ltd v Fletcher
Construction Co Ltd (No 3) [2020] NZHC 2348 [Electrix (No 3)].
[2] Electrix Ltd v Fletcher
Construction Co Ltd (No 1) [2019] NZHC 2678.
[3] Electrix Ltd v Fletcher
Construction Co Ltd (No 2) [2020] NZHC 918.
[4] Electrix (No 3), above
n 1, at [14].
[5] Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules
2005, r 29(1)(a).
[6] Smith v Electrix Ltd
[2021] NZCA 67.
[7] At [5].
[8] At [5].
[9] Smith v Electrix Ltd
[2021] NZSC 64.
[10] Almond v Read [2017]
NZSC 80, [2017] 1 NZLR 801.
[11] At [38].
[12] At [39(c)].
[13] Almond v Read, above
n 10, at [38(a)].
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