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Clarke v R [2024] NZCA 199 (31 May 2024)

Last Updated: 4 June 2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA
CA504/2023
[2024] NZCA 199



BETWEEN

WAYNE TE AWAWA JOHN CLARKE
Appellant


AND

THE KING
Respondent

Hearing:

20 May 2024

Court:

Wylie, Lang and Campbell JJ

Counsel:

J J Rhodes for Appellant
C P Paterson and L Dalton for Respondent

Judgment:

31 May 2024 at 11 am


JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

  1. The appeal against sentence is allowed in part.
  2. The sentence of five years and one month’s imprisonment is set aside and substituted with a sentence with a sentence of four years and eight months’ imprisonment on the lead charge of being in possession of methamphetamine for supply. The lesser concurrent sentences imposed by the Judge on the remaining charges remain intact.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Lang J)

The offending

The sentence

Analysis

The starting point on the methamphetamine charge

[19] Ms Kincade submitted Mr Joyce's role meant he fell within the description of a lesser offender in the above table because his offending was driven by his addiction to methamphetamine, he had no influence on those above him in the supply chain and he did not have any awareness of the scale of the operation. Ms Hoskin for the Crown contended the offending exhibited several of the hallmarks of a significant offender because it resulted in financial gain well beyond that necessary to fund Mr Joyce's methamphetamine habit.

[20] We do not see Mr Joyce’s role as fitting neatly within either category referred to by counsel because it involves elements referable to both. Mr Joyce appears to have been an independent retail operator who chose to sell methamphetamine both to finance his drug habit and to meet his living costs. Although he managed and ran his own drug dealing business, his was a small operation functioning at a retail level. He was not part of a larger operation. There is no evidence to suggest his addiction to methamphetamine impaired his ability to make a rational choice as may sometimes diminish the culpability of an offender. Furthermore, although his role may be described broadly as that of a street level dealer, it nevertheless involved the sale of reasonably significant quantities of methamphetamine and is likely to have generated a considerable cash income. That is evident from the quantities of both methamphetamine and cash found in his possession on 18 October 2015. The number of firearms in his possession at the time also provides an indicator as to the level of his dealing activities.

The uplift on the firearms charges

[24] We do not accept [appellant counsel]’s submission that a lesser uplift should have been applied for the firearms charges. Mr Joyce was found in possession of three weapons, one of which was a loaded sawn‑off shotgun. As [respondent counsel] points out, this Court has consistently upheld uplifts of between 12 and 18 months’ imprisonment where those involved in drug dealing are found with firearms in their possession.[20] We agree with the Judge’s observation that the charge of being in possession of the sawn‑off shotgun was a serious charge in its own right.[21] Zhang has not altered the approach to be taken in relation to firearms associated with drug offending. We therefore consider the uplift of 18 months’ imprisonment was within the available range.

Attempting to manufacture a firearm

Sending threatening text messages

[32] In your case, the offending involved a number of people. You were in custody at the time. It seems to me from the reports that I have read, that you continue to downplay the effect of that offending on those individuals. I am prepared to accept the uplift of nine months identified by the Crown, but in reality, that could have been higher. The language you used was appalling and the people who received those texts, Mr Clarke, would have had good reason to be fearful for their safety.

Discounts for mitigating factors

[38] The Crown accepts that your background has in part put you on a path to where you are today. They accept that there should be some recognition of your background, although not to the full extent as advocated by your lawyer. They refer to aspects of the psychological report which suggests that there are aspects of your personality which may have influenced your offending falling outside other aspects of your upbringing. The Crown accept that a discount in the order of 10 per cent is available.

[39] Your lawyer submits that a discount more in the order of 25 per cent is available. He argued that you have been subject to an extraordinary disadvantage and that experiences in your life have directly influenced your behaviour.

[40] I take a view which is similar to that of the Crown. This is not a case where there is a direct relationship between your background and the offending. And any discount also has to be tempered to take into account what can be described as fairly calculated offending on your part, Mr Clarke. In the circumstances I am prepared to allow 10 per cent for that factor.

It is also my opinion Mr Clarke’s disorder of personality had a proximal and material contribution to each aspect of his historic and index offending. His antisocial personality structure has been demonstrated by his disregard for, and violation of the rights of others since childhood (prior to his being placed in care). He commissioned antisocial prior to his detention in the BMR, continuing throughout his lifespan. His sense of entitlement to contravene socially accepted norms and rules causing harm to individuals and the community is considered to remain (his having entrenched antisocial attitudes, minimisation of harm caused to others and affiliation with an organised criminal group).

[120] Of course, progressing from precarious poverty to life as [a] habitual offender is not inevitable. Not everybody raised in poverty will eventually offend. As is often said, correlation does not establish causation. But, even if the relationship between poverty and the commission of a particular offence is usually too complex to take matters further than affirming, yet again, the consistent correlation between poverty and offending, that in itself is important. Long run patterns like this demonstrate (if demonstration is still needed) that there is, nonetheless, a meaningful relationship between poverty and crime. As we have said, factors associated with lives in poverty are at least the diffuse drivers of individual offending. That is why circumstances of deprivation can have such powerful explanatory force in terms of revealing how an offender has come to offend and in guiding the court’s assessment of what should now be done about it.

[121] For example, it is rarely possible to establish that placement in state care is the proximate cause of engagement in commercial drug offending. But few would doubt the material or logical connection between the two. It is that connection which must be understood and weighed. If it helps to explain how the offender has come to offend then a relevant “causative contribution” is made out. Whether such contribution, if established, is then displaced by other factors (such as extended periods of offence free living) is of course a matter of judgement. But sentencing judges should reflect on the power of background in the shaping of life opportunities and beware of imposing unrealistic expectations in hindsight.

Result






Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor, Auckland for Respondent


[1] R v Clarke [2023] NZDC 25285 [sentencing notes].

[2] At [20].

[3] At [24].

[4] At [33].

[5] At [25].

[6] At [30].

[7] At [32].

[8] At [36].

[9] At [40]–[41].

[10] At [42].

[11] At [44(f)].

[12] At [46].

[13] Zhang v R [2019] NZCA 507, [2019] 3 NZLR 648 at [125].

[14] Joyce v R [2020] NZCA 124.

[15] At [6].

[16] Footnote omitted.

[17] At [22]–[23].

[18] Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [24].

[19] At [24].

[20] Mills v R [2016] NZCA 245 at [18], citing Fonotia v R [2007] NZCA 188, [2007] 3 NZLR 338 and Haggie v R [2011] NZCA 221.

[21] R v Joyce [2018] NZDC 9544 at [11].

[22] Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [26].

[23] At [27].

[24] Crimes Act 1961, s 311(1).

[25] Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [30].

[26] At [31].

[27] Faaleaga v R [2011] NZCA 495.

[28] At [16].

[29] See sentencing notes, above n 1, at [32].

[30] See Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429 at [60] per Elias CJ, at [220] per Blanchard J, at [298] per Tipping J, at [377] per McGrath J and at [387] per Henry J

[31] Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509 per Williams J (footnotes omitted).

[32] Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2)(a); and Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [41].

[33] Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).

[34] Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].


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