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Chen v Huang [2024] NZCA 38 (1 March 2024)
Last Updated: 4 March 2024
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW
ZEALANDI
TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA
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|
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BETWEEN
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XIAOLIN CHEN First Appellant
WAIHOPAI VALLEY VINEYARD
LIMITED Second Appellant
YI LU Third Appellant
DON
CHEN Fourth Appellant
JINPING HUANG Fifth Appellant
QI
YANG Sixth Appellant
ADELAIDE EDUCATION GROUP PTY LIMITED Seventh
Appellant
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AND
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HONGZHAO HUANG First Respondent
JIEYU LU Second
Respondent
MATAKANA WINES LIMITED Third Respondent
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Hearing:
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1 and 2 November 2023
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Court:
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Wylie, Mander and Muir JJ
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Counsel:
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A R B Barker KC, S R G Judd and P W G Ahern for Appellants M D
O’Brien KC and M D Pascariu for Respondents
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Judgment:
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1 March 2024 at 11 am
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
- Leave
is granted to the respondents permitting them to adduce by way of further
evidence [1] and [2] of Ms Lu’s affidavit of
27 October 2023. Leave is
declined to the respondents to adduce in evidence the remainder of the
affidavit.
- The
first appellant is granted leave to amend his prayer for relief as set out in
[245] of this judgment.
- The
respondents are granted leave to amend their prayer as set out in [246] of this judgment.
- The
appeal is allowed in part:
(a) The award of equitable damages made in respect of the first, second and
third causes of action is set aside.
(b) The principal sum awarded in respect of the fourth cause of action is
reduced from $2,376,261, to $1.2 million.
(c) The principal sum awarded in respect of the fifth cause of action is
reduced from $2,376,261, to $1,176,271.
(d) The orders made in respect of the seventh cause of action are set aside.
(e) The orders made in respect of the eighth cause of action are amended, by
setting aside the direction that Waihopai pay Mr Huang,
Ms Lu and Matakana
Wines $2,376,271. In all other respects, the relief granted in respect of the
eighth cause of action is upheld.
- The
orders for the payment of interest in respect of Mr Chen’s third
counterclaim and in respect of the respondents’ fourth,
fifth, sixth and
eighth causes of action are set aside.
- Interest
on each relevant cause of action/counterclaim is awarded pursuant to s 24(2)(b)
of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016,
from the date of each advance to the
date of judgment at the rate of 5 per cent per annum and from the date of
judgment to the date
of payment pursuant to ss 10 and 12 of that Act.
- In
all other respects the appeal is dismissed.
H There is no
order as to costs.
__________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Wylie
J)
Table of Contents
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Para No
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Introduction The factual background The
parties The Chen interests (the appellants) The Huang
interests (the
respondents) 2006-2012 2013 2014-2016 2017 2018-2021 The
pleadings The High Court judgment Credibility The
status of the payments made by Mr Huang/Ms Lu Was there a
partnership? Estoppel Misrepresentations The JV
agreement The causes of action pleaded The Matakana causes
of action The Counterclaims The Waihopai
claims The affirmative defences Summary The
appeal Analysis Was there an Integration Scheme and/or a
partnership based on such a scheme? Submissions Relevant
law What did the parties say and do?
Mr Huang’s initial investment and the Integration Scheme
documents The conduct of the parties from 2014 to 2016
The conduct of the parties following the breakdown of their relationship
in 2017 The OIO correspondence and interview Mr Chen’s
actions in selling Waihopai and distributing its
assets Conclusion Other issues related to the alleged
partnership
If there was a partnership, was it vitiated by misrepresentations or
misleading conduct?
If the Integration Scheme or partnership was agreed and was not
vitiated, is the appropriate remedy to order an accounting?
If the Integration Scheme or partnership was not agreed or it was
vitiated, what are the appropriate remedies? Should Mr Huang and Ms Lu
be permitted to adduce further evidence? Should all three parties to
the JV agreement be required to perform the terms of the agreement and if so
when, or should the assets
remain with the respondents? The
submissions The JV agreement The applicable
law The Matakana land — Chinese law Has the JV
agreement been cancelled? The consequences of
non-cancellation Should the damages award against Mr Chen for the
increased building costs of the proposed Matakana development due to delay be
set
aside? Submissions Analysis Were the payments
made by the respondents in relation to the Waihopai Vineyard loans to Mr Chen
only, or to both Mr Chen and Waihopai? Submissions
Analysis Should the orders made against the third to
seventh appellants under s 348 of the Property Law Act be set
aside? Submissions Analysis Should the interest
award to the respondents on the Waihopai claims be set
aside? Submissions Analysis Applications for
leave to amend claims to seek
interest Costs Result
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|
Introduction
- [1] The
primary (but not the only) issue in this appeal is whether a joint venture
agreement (the JV agreement) dated 19 April 2012
between the first appellant,
Xiaolin (Chris) Chen (Mr Chen), and the first and second respondents,
Hongzhao (Alex) Huang (Mr Huang)
and his wife, Jieyu (Chrissy) Lu (Ms Lu),
remains in force, or whether it was replaced by a subsequent partnership
agreement, based
on an “Integration Scheme”, in or about May/June
2013.
- [2] In a
comprehensive judgment issued on 4 August 2022, Gordon J, in the High Court
at Auckland, found that the Integration Scheme
was never agreed between the
parties and that there was no partnership based on it or
otherwise.[1]
In the alternative, the Judge held that if a partnership agreement had been
reached, it was vitiated ab initio by various misrepresentations
made by Mr
Chen.
- [3] The
appellants submit that the Judge’s findings were incorrect. They argue
that the overwhelming weight of the evidence
was to the effect that Mr Chen,
Mr Huang and Ms Lu did enter into a partnership and that they
abandoned the JV agreement. They deny
that either Mr Huang or Ms Lu was
misled or deceived. They seek a declaration that there was a partnership,
together with an accounting
to determine the respective entitlements of the
parties in the partnership assets.
- [4] Mr Huang and
Ms Lu support the findings made by the Judge. They say that the Integration
Scheme was never finalised and that
what was discussed was simply a proposal.
They also deny that there was a partnership created by the conduct of the
parties. They
say that the governing document remains the JV agreement and that
it applies to the unwinding of much of their business relationship
with Mr Chen.
The factual background
The parties
- [5] The
proceeding arises following a falling out between two couples who were initially
friends and who became increasingly involved
in business dealings with each
other.
The Chen interests (the appellants)
- [6] Mr
Chen first came to New Zealand in 1996. He has been a New Zealand citizen since
2001 and he now lives in this country. Since
about 2006, Mr Chen and the fifth
appellant, his wife Jinping Huang (Jackie Huang), have worked in the wine
industry, including by
promoting New Zealand wines in China. They both have
wine industry qualifications. Gordon J recorded that Mr Chen’s and Jackie
Huang’s first language is Mandarin but they can both speak, read and write
English. Mr Chen is more proficient in English
than Jackie
Huang.[2]
- [7] The second
appellant, Waihopai Valley Vineyard Ltd (Waihopai), was incorporated by Mr Chen
and the third appellant, Yi Lu, in
August 2006. Mr Chen held 40 per cent of the
shares in Waihopai; his brother, the fourth appellant, Xiaodong Chen (Don
Chen), held
20 per cent of the shares; Yi Lu held the remaining 40 per cent of
the shares.
- [8] The sixth
appellant, Qi Yang, is Yi Lu’s wife. She lives with her husband in
Auckland.
- [9] The Judge
recorded that the seventh appellant, Adelaide Education Group Pty Ltd (AEG),
carries on an education business. It has
its registered office in Australia.
At relevant times, it had three shareholders, including Don Chen. He was also a
director of
the company.[3]
The Huang interests (the respondents)
- [10] Mr
Huang is a businessman. He lives in China. At all relevant times he would
travel from China to New Zealand, stay a few days
and then return. He typically
spent less than a month a year in New Zealand. He obtained residency in January
2015, based on his
marriage to Ms Lu. Mr Huang was, at all relevant times,
an overseas person as defined in the Overseas Investment Act 2005 (the
OIA).[4] He does not speak English.
- [11] Ms Lu came
to New Zealand in 2004 to study English. She has since obtained New Zealand
residency. She met Mr Chen’s wife,
Jackie Huang, in China in 2003 or
early 2004. Jackie Huang then operated a business helping Chinese students in
New Zealand and
she arranged accommodation and schooling for Ms Lu. She
and Ms Lu became friends and Jackie Huang introduced Ms Lu to her (Jackie
Huang’s) husband, Mr Chen.
- [12] The third
respondent, Matakana Wines Ltd (Matakana Wines) was incorporated by Mr Chen in
2012. He was initially its sole director.
As is explained below, its shares
were initially in Mr Chen’s name but, by the time of the hearing before
Gordon J, the shares
were held by an entity known as Kiwi Club Ltd
(Kiwi Club), a company controlled by Ms Lu.
2006–2012
- [13] There
was no dispute between the parties as to what happened pre-late 2012. All
agreed that the Judge was correct in her summary
of the relevant facts prior to
this date. We gratefully adopt her analysis.
[30] In 2006 Mr Huang came to Auckland for business. By that stage he and Ms
Lu were in a relationship. Ms Lu acted as his interpreter
while he was here.
She introduced Mr Huang to Mr Chen.
Matakana Villa Lots
[31] At about that time Mr Chen was interested in buying a property in
Matakana, north of Auckland. He had been introduced to the
land by
Paul Vegar, a real estate agent. Mr Chen says that Mr Vegar explained that
the land was owned by his family company. It
adjoined land owned by the
Vegar family’s Matakana Estate winery at 568 Matakana Road. Mr Chen
says he discussed this with
Yi Lu.
[32] The land for sale at Matakana was, at that stage, bare land and was in
seven lots numbered 8 to 14. Mr Chen says Mr Vegar’s
proposal was that
his companies would plant grapes on the properties except for an area reserved
to build a house on each lot. The
Vegars would maintain the vines and use the
grapes in their winery and the purchasers of the lots would pay a small amount
to the
Vegars for maintenance. The neighbouring properties (Lots 4–7)
would continue to be owned by the Vegars. The Matakana Estate
winery itself was
on Lot 4.
[33] Mr Chen’s evidence was that at the time he had no experience in
property investment or in the wine industry but was attracted
to the idea of
living on a property in Matakana surrounded by grapes. Mr Chen discussed this
idea with Mr Huang and Ms Lu while
Mr Huang was in New Zealand and they went to
see the properties together.
[34] The upshot was that in late 2006 Mr Chen’s wife, Jackie Huang,
purchased Lot 8 and his brother, Don Chen, purchased Lot
14. Yi Lu’s wife
purchased Lot 9 and Yi Lu’s brother-in-law purchased Lot 13. Mr Huang
purchased Lots 11 and 12, and
Ms Lu purchased Lot 10. Ms Lu’s evidence
was that Mr Chen and Yi Lu borrowed from Mr Huang to fund their purchases.
There
was evidence of at least some repayments by Mr Chen.
[35] Additionally, Mr Huang, Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Yi Lu entered into a written
agreement signed and dated 15 March 2007 relating to
all seven lots. It appears
from that agreement that the parties intended to work together to develop the
seven lots and in particular
to build a lodge. They commissioned an architect
to prepare concept plans but otherwise the 15 March 2007 agreement was not
advanced.
[36] ... The parties referred to [the lots they had purchased] as ... the
“villa” lots. ...
Waihopai
[37] Mr Chen said at about the time he was introduced by Mr Vegar to the
villa lots, Mr Vegar and his brother Peter talked to him
and Yi Lu about
investing in a new vineyard development in Marlborough on land owned by a
company associated with the Vegar family.
Mr Huang and Ms Lu were not involved
in the acquisition that followed.
[38] Mr Chen says that the Vegars’ proposal was that he and Yi Lu would
buy the land and the Vegars would provide services to
develop the then bare land
as a vineyard and to manage and maintain the vineyard including by arranging to
sell the grapes. The
Vegars’ initial proposal was for a property in
Waihopai Valley. That was replaced by another offer by the Vegars for a
different
piece of land nearby under essentially the same arrangement. The
replacement property was known as Kintyre, a name that appears
on a number of
the documents. The company name Waihopai reflected the land in the original
proposal made by the Vegars.
[39] On 11 October 2006 Waihopai purchased the Kintyre property from the
Vines Development Company Ltd, one of the Vegars’ companies,
for
$5.2 million. Waihopai then entered into two contracts: a Vineyard
Management Agreement with the Vines Development Company Ltd
and a Grape Supply
Agreement with Goldridge Estate Ltd. The latter was a company also owned by the
Vegars. Both contracts were
later assigned to another Vegar family company,
Savvy Vineyards 3550 Ltd (Savvy).
[40] Waihopai was planted with grapes in 2007 and 2008 and it began supplying
grapes to Savvy, some of which were sold by Savvy to
the ... Matakana Estate
winery.
Chateau Kiwi
[41] Also in 2006, Mr Chen and others started a business called
Chateau Kiwi which exported New Zealand wine to China. Wine was purchased
from a number of New Zealand wineries, including the ... Matakana Estate winery,
and sold at a number of Chateau Kiwi outlets in
cities and towns in China.
[42] Chateau Kiwi Headquarters, the name used for the franchisor, franchised
the brand to 15 to 20 franchisees in China. From 2009
Ms Lu was a franchisee in
her home town of Zhongshan, China.
Willow Flat
[43] The friendship between the two couples (Mr Huang and Ms Lu, and Mr Chen
and Jackie Huang) continued. In 2009, Mr Huang and Ms
Lu visited Marlborough
with Mr Chen and looked at another piece of bare land owned by a Vegar family
company at Willow Flat. It
was 21.60 hectares in area. The Vegars were selling
the land on the same basis as they had sold the land to Waihopai in 2006,
including
the vineyard development, vineyard management and grape supply
agreements. Ms Lu was very keen to invest in a vineyard. Mr Chen
referred her
to his then lawyer, Brad Botting, who gave her advice on the sale and purchase
agreement and the three other agreements.
Ms Lu waived privilege in that
correspondence. The advice was comprehensive and raised a number of issues and
risks with proceeding
with the transaction, including the risk of losing the
deposit. ...
[44] Notwithstanding Mr Botting’s advice, Ms Lu signed the agreement
for sale and purchase and paid the deposit of $114,500,
not to the Vegars’
solicitor, nor to the vendor company, but to another company owned by the
Vegars. Ms Lu incorporated Kiwi
Club for this venture. She was the sole
director with 100 per cent shareholding. It appears from Ms Lu’s evidence
that her
concern at the time was to obtain residency and she hoped that the
purchase of Willow Flat would fast track her residency application
through the
immigration consultant she was using at the time. However, her residency
application did not succeed, the company to
which Ms Lu paid the deposit went
into liquidation, and Ms Lu lost the deposit. ...
Long-term business visa application – Ms Lu and Mr Huang
[45] After the failed immigration application, Ms Lu and Mr Huang engaged a
new immigration consultant. In May 2011 they applied
to Immigration New Zealand
(INZ) for a long-term business visa. Ms Lu was the principal applicant. The
application was based on
a business plan under which Ms Lu intended to set up a
business in New Zealand to export wine to China. She relied on her experience
as a franchisee of Chateau Kiwi in Zhongshan, China and ownership of the villa
lots in Matakana.
...
Acquisition of Matakana Estate
[47] In or around 2011 Mr Chen became aware that the corporate owners of
Matakana Estate were in liquidation and receivership and
that the winery and
land (Lots 4–7) [the Matakana land] were for sale. Mr Chen says this
created a potential problem for the
owners of the villa lots because the Vegar
companies had set up the development on the villa lots and continued to manage
those properties.
He says the receivership was also a potential problem for
Waihopai because some of the grapes Waihopai produced were supplied to
Matakana
Estate indirectly through Savvy.
[48] Mr Chen says he could not afford to purchase the Matakana land and
winery business himself, so he discussed the issue with Mr
Huang and Ms Lu
in September 2011.
[49] The Matakana land and winery business were being sold in three parts:
(a) Three lots were being sold together as a package (Lots 5, 6 and 7).
Those lots were used for growing grapes;
(b) Another lot was being sold separately (Lot 4). This lot (the winery
lot) contained the main winery buildings used for the Matakana
Estate business;
and
(c) The Matakana winery business itself was being sold together with the
stock.
[50] Mr Huang agreed to provide all of the funding to buy the Matakana land
and winery business. The plan was that Mr Huang, Ms Lu
and Mr Chen would
own and operate the business together. It was agreed Mr Huang would lend
Mr Chen his contribution towards the
purchase and Mr Chen would repay Mr Huang.
[51] Mr Huang and Ms Lu did not have residency at that stage; they lived in
China and were accordingly both “overseas persons”
not eligible to
purchase the Matakana land under the overseas investment rules. It was decided
that Mr Chen would buy the land in
his own name and the business through his
company Matakana Wines; Mr Huang and Ms Lu would acquire 65 per cent of Matakana
Estate
(55 per cent to Mr Huang and 10 per cent to Ms Lu) once they had approval
from the [Overseas Investment Office (the OIO) under the
OIA]. Mr Chen would
have a 35 per cent share for his contribution of $1.47 million loaned to him by
Mr Huang which was to be repaid
on specified future dates.
[52] On 30 September 2011 Mr Chen entered into an agreement to purchase Lot 4
for $1.2 million and an agreement to purchase the winery
business for $950,000.
The agreement for the purchase of the winery business was later varied and the
purchase price was ultimately
$1,400,938.94.
[53] On 21 October 2011 Mr Huang, Ms Lu and Mr Chen entered into and signed a
“Joint Venture Contract” which, ... all
parties agree was superseded
by the later JV agreement.
[54] The 21 October 2011 agreement contemplated a total purchase price of
$3.5 million dollars to be paid by Mr Huang. Mr Chen would
later pay
$1.4 million and Ms Lu would later pay $350,000. Mr Huang would therefore
have a 50 per cent share, Mr Chen would have
40 per cent and Ms Lu would
have 10 per cent.
[55] On 26 October 2011 the purchase of Lot 4 settled. Mr Huang paid the
full purchase price and Mr Chen acquired the land in his
name.
[56] On 2 November 2011, as part of the agreement reached with Mr Huang
and Ms Lu, Mr Chen entered into an agreement to purchase Lots
5, 6 and 7 for
$1.25 million. That transaction settled on 27 March 2012. Mr Huang again
provided the funds for the purchase. As
agreed, Mr Chen acquired the land in
his own name and the business assets were acquired by Mr Chen’s company,
Matakana Wines.
The JV agreement
[57] After all the transactions had settled Mr Huang prepared an updated and
more formal version of the 21 October 2011 agreement
with the assistance of his
lawyers in China. The agreement was in the Chinese language and was signed in
China on 19 April 2012
by Mr Huang, Ms Lu and Mr Chen. ...
[58] I will discuss the terms of the JV agreement later in this judgment.
For present purposes the following summary suffices:
(a) The cost of acquisition of the Matakana Estate project was agreed at
$4.2 million;
(b) $1.47 million of this was to be treated as a loan from Mr Huang to
Mr Chen, repayable in three instalments on particular dates
between 2013 and
2015;
(c) Mr Huang was to have a 55 per cent share, Ms Lu 10 per cent and Mr Chen
35 per cent;
(d) Due to the requirement for Mr Huang and Ms Lu to obtain [OIA] consent,
Mr Chen would acquire the assets as nominee of the three
parties, but the actual
buyers were Mr Huang, Ms Lu and Mr Chen; and
(e) Mr Chen would be appointed [Chief Executive Officer (CEO)] of the
business.
[59] The parties took possession of the Matakana land and winery business
from February 2012 and continued to employ the existing
chief winemaker. Mr
Chen was employed as the CEO and General Manager of Matakana Wines.
...
Amended INZ application – Ms Lu and Mr Huang
[61] In mid-2012 Mr Chen transferred all the shares in Matakana Wines to Ms
Lu’s company, Kiwi Club. ...
[62] ... [T]he transfer was documented on 29 June 2012 and registered with
the Companies Office on 10 September 2012.
[63] On 28 June 2012 Ms Lu was appointed a director of Matakana Wines.
[64] On 23 October 2012 Mr Huang and Ms Lu’s immigration adviser wrote
to INZ to amend their immigration application to rely
on the Entrepreneur Plus
category. This category requires the applicant to be a self‑employed
entrepreneur who owns and operates
their own business. The letter and
subsequent formal application said that Ms Lu was the sole owner of Matakana
Wines and was responsible
for managing the business.
- [14] Some of
what happened thereafter (and certainly the interpretation to be placed on
various documents and on the parties’
conduct) is in dispute. We discuss
first what occurred and, later in this judgment, the interpretation to be placed
on and the conclusions
to be drawn from various of the documents produced and
the parties’ conduct.
2013
- [15] Waihopai
had become involved in a dispute with Savvy around mid-2012 and, by early 2013,
Waihopai was in financial difficulty.
Mr Chen travelled to China in late
2012/early 2013 and spoke with people he thought might be interested in
investing in Waihopai.
Yi Lu introduced him to Changjiang Sun. Mr Sun was
interested and he, Mr Chen, Don Chen, Yi Lu and Yi Lu’s brother-in-law
entered into a letter of intent recording how they might refinance Waihopai.
- [16] Waihopai
remained under pressure from its bank. Receivers were appointed on 4 February
2013.
- [17] Mr
Chen nevertheless still hoped to resolve the situation. He offered
Mr Huang the opportunity to invest in Waihopai. Mr Chen
thought that
Waihopai’s grape growing business would fit in well with Matakana
Wines’ wine making business and with his,
Mr Huang’s and Ms
Lu’s overall plan of exporting New Zealand wine to China. Mr Chen
sent Mr Huang a copy of the letter
of intent with Mr Sun on
23 February 2013. Mr Huang could not remember receiving it but, through
his personal assistant, Su Huimin
(Ms Huimin), he sent Mr Chen a document in
Mandarin on the same day. The heading on the document has been variously
translated;
one translation is “Vineyard Reform Suggestions”. The
document set out Mr Huang’s proposals for refinancing Waihopai.
It
recorded that the shares in Waihopai were worth $8,425,000. It set out Mr
Chen’s shareholding in the company and then
set out what the new
shareholdings would be “[i]f Mr HUANG buys 20% shares from
[Mr] CHEN”. It also recorded:
This plan may reject [Mr]
SUN’S investment, or [Mr] SUN’S investment may belong to Yi LU.
- [18] Mr
Huang sent a WeChat message to Mr Chen on 23 February 2013. It has been
translated as follows:
I’m in the company, I can tell
you.
- [19] Mr Huang
then drafted various proposals for a possible Integration Scheme. Drafts were
sent to Mr Chen on or about 1 March 2013,
11 March 2013, 27 May
2013 (including a 26 May draft) and 26 June 2013 (two drafts — one more
detailed than the other).
- [20] Broadly, it
appears from the drafts that Mr Huang’s proposal was that he would
purchase shares in Waihopai from Mr Chen,
that Matakana Wines would integrate
its business with Waihopai’s business, that the assets of the two
companies would be combined,
that Mr Huang, Mr Chen and Yi Lu would each make
cash injections into the integrated business and that the shares in Waihopai
would
be held between Mr Chen, Yi Lu and Mr Huang/Ms Lu.
- [21] In the 11
March 2013 draft, one of the effects of integration was described as
follows:
Establish a 3-way decision making board of directors and a
platform for the Matakana Estate brand, make good use of Yi LU’s
sales
network in China, [Mr] CHEN’s operations and management in New Zealand and
Mr Huang’s advantages amongst high-end
communities, and reach our
goal of taking our assets to the next level.
- [22] The
draft sent on 27 May 2013 recorded what Mr Chen said were the assets of each of
the various entities and the planned cash
injections, including $1.088 million
it was then proposed would be advanced by Mr Huang. It noted the proposed
shareholdings —
Mr Chen, 40 per cent, Mr Huang, 50 per cent
and “Jie Jie” (Ms Lu), 10 per cent. The draft also
recorded as follows:
The above figures are approximations, accurate
figures will need to be confirmed. A new joint venture agreement should be
signed
in relation to the Matakana Integration Scheme, and local Auckland
lawyer(s) should be employed to draft and witness the legal documents.
- [23] On
25 June 2013, Mr Huang paid $1.2 million into Mr Chen’s solicitor’s
(Mr Botting) trust account. The entry on
Mr Botting’s trust account
statement records “[p]art of Funds for Shareholders Loan Advance to
Waihopai”. In addition,
$499,975.00 was paid into the trust account by Mr
Sun, $300,000 by Yi Lu,[5] and
$25 by Mr Chen.
- [24] On 28 June
2013, the funds were transferred to solicitors, who, we presume, were acting for
Waihopai’s banker. In any
event it is clear that the monies were used to
repay Waihopai’s indebtedness to its bank and to take the company out of
receivership.
- [25] Also
on 28 June 2013, Mr Chen and Yi Lu as directors of Waihopai signed a board of
directors’ resolution recording that
they had managed to procure
$2 million of “new shareholders’ loans for the Company”
and that the company should
enter into an acknowledgment of debt to record the
“new Shareholders’ Loan”. The acknowledgment of debt is dated
the same day. It recorded that Waihopai was indebted to Mr Chen and Yi Lu in
the sum of $2 million.
- [26] WeChat
messages were exchanged between Mr Huang and Mr Chen on 25 June 2013. The
following exchange occurred:
[Mr Chen]:
Mr HUANG, funding has arrived, all of it arrived! The lawyer will arrange
for us to take back the vineyard tomorrow.
[Mr Huang]:
Thank you for the trouble of having to do the practical arrangements.
[Mr Chen]:
Now it feels like we are a real wine company, with the back up to do
promotions. Success is the only option for Matakana !
[Mr Huang]:
Still need an estate, more efforts required !
- [27] On
26 June 2013, Ms Huimin circulated two further versions of the proposed
Integration Scheme. The covering email read:
Ho[w] are you!
Attached is the <<Matakana Estate Integration Scheme>> which has
just been sorted[.]
Both versions recorded the capital in Waihopai at $8.435 million and
Mr Chen’s 60 per cent share of that capital at $5.061
million.
These figures had been provided by Mr Chen. The documents also
recorded that the equity or shareholding ratio in the integrated
entity would be
Mr Chen, 30 per cent, Jackie Huang 10 per cent, Mr Huang 44 per cent and Ms
Lu, 16 per cent. One draft referred
to the payment of $1.2 million made by Mr
Huang the previous day as “[t]he NZD 1.2 million first advanced
payment from Alex
Huang to acquire [Waihopai]”. The other draft contained
a similar statement.
- [28] Also
on 26 June 2013, Mr Huang sent a WeChat message to, inter alia, Mr Chen.
It read as follows:
I have sent the Matakana Estate integration
plan to everyone’s mailboxes, please make amendments.
- [29] On
28 June 2013, the receivership of Waihopai was terminated. On
1 July 2013, Mr Chen in a WeChat message sent to Mr Huang,
Ms Lu and
Jackie Huang the following:
[Waihopai] Vineyard has been
officially taken back on 28 June. Matakana also officially owns [Waihopai]
vineyard, from now on it
will be promoted as the Matakana Marlborough vineyard.
- [30] On
2 August 2013, Ms Huimin sent an email to Mr Huang, Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Jackie
Huang attaching one of the 26 June 2013 Integration
Scheme drafts. The covering
email said as follows:
Please see attached the newly organised
<<Matakana Estate Integration Scheme>> first draft and its
attachment(s), please
check you have received it! If you have questions about
the attachment(s) you can enquire with the corresponding contact person,
mr
Huang, will arrive at Auckland on 9th August to discuss this integration
scheme with [other] shareholders. Thank you!
- [31] On
11 October 2013, Mr Chen forwarded Ms Huimin legal advice received by Waihopai
in relation to its dispute with Savvy.
- [32] On
22 October 2013, Ms Huimin circulated an English translation of one of the 26
June 2013 Integration Scheme drafts to Mr Huang,
Ms Lu, Mr Chen and
Jackie Huang. The accompanying email read:
How are You!
Attached is the <<Matakana Estate Integration Scheme>> which has
just been translated ... Wishing you success
in business!
- [33] Mr Chen was
in China at the time. He forwarded the English translation to his New Zealand
solicitor, Mr Botting. He asked Mr
Botting to draft an agreement for the
shareholders of Matakana Wines.
- [34] Mr
Botting prepared draft heads of agreement and sent them to Mr Chen for his
perusal. A revised version was sent by Mr Botting
to Mr Chen on 23 January
2014. The document prepared by Mr Botting recorded that the parties (Mr Huang,
Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Jackie
Huang) were to enter into a limited liability
partnership, to be known as Matakana Wine LLP. The draft agreement contained a
number
of conditions, namely:
(a) Mr Huang and Ms Lu ceasing to be overseas persons for the purposes of the
OIA or the partnership being otherwise permitted to
own the assets.
(b) Each of the Chen group and the Huang group, or the parties who formed those
respective groups, acquiring ownership or an unconditional
right to acquire
ownership of the assets which were to form part of their initial capital.
(c) Each party procuring all consents and approvals required from third parties
for the transfer to the partnership of those assets
forming part of that
party’s initial capital.
(d) The parties approving the form of the partnership agreement and the
constitution for the general partner.
Settlement was to be the later of 40 working days from the date of
satisfaction of the conditions, or 20 working days after the partnership
was
registered as a limited liability partnership. The draft provided that the
parties would, prior to settlement, incorporate a
limited liability company for
the purposes of being the general partner, procure the preparation of a
partnership agreement and each
execute all necessary documents.
- [35] Mr Chen
sent the heads of agreement prepared by Mr Botting to Mr Huang and Ms Lu.
Neither responded. It is common ground that
the heads of agreement were neither
completed nor signed. Nor were any of the steps set out in the draft
undertaken.
2014–2016
- [36] On
24 March 2014, Ms Huimin sent Mr Chen, Jackie Huang and Ms Lu a document headed
“Matakana Estate management structure”.
This document recorded that
Mr Huang was to be a director and that the board of directors would comprise
Mr Huang, Ms Lu, Mr Chen
and Jackie Huang. Mr Chen was named as the
CEO. One of the entries in a “wiring” diagram setting out the
management
structure was headed “South Island management team”.
- [37] The
Matakana Estate management structure was approved at a “board
meeting” held on 15 April 2014. Mr Huang was present,
along with
Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Jackie Huang. An accountant, Bin (Bernice) Lin,
was also present. There were further board meetings
in July and November 2014.
At the November 2014 meeting, the South Island Vineyard financial report for
2013–2014 was presented
along with forecasts for 2014–2015. The
South Island Vineyard financial report for July 2014 to July 2015 was presented
at
a meeting in March 2015. All present signed a record of this meeting as
directors. It recorded that slight adjustments to the Matakana
Estate
management structure were proposed and that the Waihopai Vineyard was
starting to produce an income. There was a further
meeting in August 2015 where
the South Island Vineyard financial report was discussed.
- [38] Mr Chen and
the accountant, Ms Lin, forwarded cash flow documentation for Waihopai to
Mr Huang and Ms Lu. Mr Chen, Jackie Huang,
Ms Lu and Mr Huang also
received emails from the accountant advising them that further funds were
needed. Proposed funding arrangements were sent out and financial
projections were distributed.
- [39] Mr Huang
and Ms Lu made a series of additional advances to Mr Chen and/or Waihopai (we
discuss this issue below) from various
sources. The accountants circulated
reports giving details of the funds injected into Waihopai.
- [40] Mr
Chen and Yi Lu were becoming increasingly concerned about Waihopai’s
situation with Savvy. Both companies were locked
in litigation against each
other. To try and protect against the perceived risk of losing any further
advances to Waihopai, it was
decided that such advances should be made by way of
loans through Ms Lu, who would act as a third party lender. A document headed
“Memorandum of Corporate Trusteeship” was drafted in
Chinese.[6] The first paragraph of
the memorandum recorded that the existing shareholders in Waihopai, Mr Chen and
Yi Lu, had “invited”
Mr Huang to become a new shareholder
with a cash contribution. The document continued that each investing party
confirmed that the
updated shareholding structure for Waihopai would be amended
as follows — Mr Chen 24 per cent, Mr Huang
36 per cent and Yi
Lu 40 per cent. This document was signed by
Mr Huang, Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Yi Lu in New Zealand in March 2015.
- [41] By late
2016, Mr Chen was suffering from burnout and he took time off to recover. By
this stage, relationships had begun to
sour. In December 2016, Mr Huang and
Ms Lu terminated Mr Chen’s employment. Mr Chen ceased to be the
CEO and General Manager
of Matakana Wines and Ms Lu took over.
2017
- [42] In
late 2017 and early 2018, Mr Huang and Mr Chen exchanged various WeChat messages
and written proposals about how they could
best separate their respective
business interests. Mr Chen’s position is that the various proposals
drafted by Mr Huang were
all based on the premise that the Integration Scheme
applied, namely that Mr Huang and Ms Lu were entitled to 60 per cent of the
integrated assets and that Mr Chen and Jackie Huang were entitled to
40 per cent. Mr Huang’s position is that he was entitled
to be
repaid the various advances he had made to Mr Chen to enable the Matakana
transaction to proceed as well as the various advances
he had made to
Mr Chen and/or Waihopai in relation to Waihopai. None of these various
discussions and proposals resulted in agreement.
2018–2021
- [43] On
11 May 2018, Mr Huang, via his New Zealand solicitors, made demand on
Mr Chen for the loan advances made pursuant to the JV
agreement. Mr Chen
says that this was the first time that Mr Huang had ever demanded he repay these
advances. Mr Huang says that
he had made oral demands prior to the letter. The
letter also alleged that Mr Chen had breached his obligations under the JV
agreement
to obtain consents under the OIA for Mr Huang and Ms Lu and, further,
that Mr Chen owed Mr Huang and Ms Lu the monies they say that
had
advanced to assist Waihopai. The letter demanded that Mr Chen pay
$4,536,651.15 to Mr Huang and Ms Lu by 21 May 2018.
- [44] The demand
was not met by Mr Chen.
- [45] When Ms Lu
took over the operation of Matakana Estate from Mr Chen, she and Mr Huang had
still not obtained consent under the
OIA in relation to the Matakana land. They
asked their solicitors to advance this issue and the solicitors advised the OIO
about
the acquisition of the Matakana land. The OIO began an investigation into
the transaction which lasted some two years. Mr Chen
corresponded through his
barrister, Alan Lear, with the OIO. Mr Chen was also interviewed in the course
of the investigation. We
return to the detail of this correspondence and the
interview below.
- [46] Mr Huang
and Ms Lu commenced proceedings against Mr Chen in January 2019. The
initial claim was based on the alleged failure
by Mr Chen to repay the loans
made under the JV agreement and the alleged Waihopai loans. In an amended
statement of claim filed
subsequently, Mr Huang and Ms Lu further sought to
recover the costs said to be associated with Mr Chen’s alleged failure to
obtain OIA consent for them. They also sought specific performance in relation
to Mr Chen’s alleged failure to transfer title
of the Matakana land
to them in breach of the JV agreement.
- [47] Mr Chen
filed a statement of defence. In his statement of defence, he asserted that the
advances made to Waihopai were shareholder
advances in accordance with the
Integration Scheme and not loans. He denied that he was responsible for
arranging for Mr Huang and
Ms Lu to obtain OIA consent and he asserted that he
was not required to transfer title in the Matakana land to them.
- [48] On 16
September 2020, retrospective consent was granted to Mr Huang and Ms Lu
permitting them to acquire the Matakana land.
The consent was subject to a
number of conditions. Inter alia, Mr Huang and Ms Lu had to develop the land
and register an easement
that allowed for public walking and cycling access
across the property. Title to the Matakana land was still in Mr Chen’s
name. Mr Huang and Ms Lu’s solicitors wrote to Mr Chen asking
for his consent to carry out this work. Mr Chen’s solicitor
responded refusing to consent without further information.
- [49] The parties
attended a mediation on 21 December 2020, but no agreement was reached.
- [50] Shortly
before the mediation, and unbeknown to Mr Huang and Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Li
Yu caused Waihopai to enter into an agreement
to sell its land and business.
Immediately after the sale was completed, Mr Chen distributed the net proceeds
totalling $7,476,766.27;
he received $1,138,000 (15.2 per cent of the proceeds);
Don Chen received $3,348,059.76 (44.8 per cent); Yi Lu received
$2,990,706.51
(40 per cent). The payments were purportedly made to repay
loans each was said to have made to Waihopai. Mr Huang and Ms Lu received
nothing.
- [51] The
sale of the Waihopai assets was only disclosed to Mr Huang and Ms Lu on 22
February 2021. Mr Huang and Ms Lu immediately
brought proceedings against
Waihopai and they obtained, on a without notice basis, freezing orders in
respect of its assets.[7] However,
the sale proceeds had already been distributed.
- [52] Having been
served with notice of Mr Huang’s and Ms Lu’s application seeking
freezing orders, Mr Chen, Don Chen and
Yi Lu, each further distributed the
monies they had received as follows:
(a) Mr Chen discharged a loan secured against his home;
(b) Don Chen made various payments, including to his family and to the seventh
appellant, AEG; and
(c) Yi Lu transferred the sale proceeds to his wife, Qi Yang, the sixth
appellant.
- [53] When they
became aware of this, Mr Huang and Ms Lu obtained further without notice
freezing orders against Mr Chen, Don Chen,
Yi Lu, Mr Chen’s family trust
and Qi Yang on 26 February 2021. By this time however, a significant
portion of the sale proceeds
had been transferred out of the reach of Mr Huang
and Ms Lu.
The pleadings
- [54] The
pleadings are lengthy. What follows is very much a summary.
- [55] Mr Huang,
Ms Lu and Matakana Wines pleaded the acquisition of the Matakana land and the JV
agreement dated 19 April 2012. They
referred to the OIA consent and asserted
that it had been Mr Chen’s responsibility to arrange for Mr Huang and
Ms Lu to obtain
that consent. They said that Mr Chen had failed to do so. They
then referred to Waihopai and to it coming under financial pressure
in the
second half of 2012. They asserted that, as part of a rescue plan to take the
company out of receivership, Mr Chen and Yi
Lu were required to inject $2
million by way of further capital into the company, but that Mr Chen did not
have sufficient funds
to make a capital contribution. They alleged that
Mr Chen asked Mr Huang to lend him the required funds and that Mr Chen and
Mr
Huang agreed orally that the funds would be advanced as a loan,
repayable on demand. It was asserted that the $1.2 million paid
by Mr Huang to
Mr Botting on 25 June 2013 was paid pursuant to this arrangement. It was
also asserted that subsequent funding for
Waihopai provided by Mr Huang was
advanced by way of loan, repayable on demand (the total advances to or for
Waihopai are referred
to in this judgment as the Waihopai advances).
- [56] It was
pleaded that Mr Huang, Mr Chen and Yi Lu discussed the possibility of
integrating the assets of Matakana Wines and Waihopai,
and that a number of
draft proposals for an Integration Scheme were exchanged. It was said that none
of those drafts was ever agreed
or executed and that none was binding or
enforceable. The treatment of the Waihopai advances in Waihopai’s
accounts was pleaded,
as was the sale of the Waihopai land in late
December 2020/early January 2021. There was then a reference to the
settlement of the
agreement for sale and purchase, and to the dissipation of the
sale proceeds.
- [57] The first
cause of action was against Mr Chen. Mr Huang and Ms Lu asserted that he held
the Matakana land on constructive trust
for them. They said that Mr Chen had
retained legal ownership of the land, that it was unconscionable for him to do
so and that
they had been unable to replant grape vines, increase the
profitability of the land, or develop the land as anticipated and as required
in
their OIO consent. It was asserted that they suffered loss and damage as a
result. They sought a declaration that the Matakana
land was held on
constructive trust for them, an order requiring Mr Chen to transfer the title to
the Matakana land to them (free
from any encumbrances) and orders for equitable
damages and interest.
- [58] The second
cause of action was also against Mr Chen. It alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
Mr Huang and Ms Lu claimed that Mr
Chen had obtained the Matakana land as a
fiduciary and that he held it in their favour as principals. Again they sought
an order
requiring Mr Chen to transfer the Matakana land to them,
unencumbered. They also sought equitable damages and interest.
- [59] The third
cause of action alleged breach of the JV agreement by Mr Chen. Mr Huang
and Ms Lu asserted that Mr Chen had failed
to repay the Matakana loan, refused
to transfer the Matakana land to Matakana Wines and that they had suffered loss
and damage as
a result. The same orders as are detailed above were sought.
- [60] As a fourth
cause of action Mr Huang and Ms Lu alleged that Mr Chen had failed to repay the
Waihopai advances in the total sum
of $2,376,261. They sought judgment against
him in this sum together with interest.
- [61] As an
alternative, and as a fifth cause of action against Waihopai, they asserted that
if the Waihopai advances had not been
advanced by way of loan to Mr Chen, then
they were by way of loan to Waihopai and that Waihopai had failed to repay the
same. The
same relief as in the fourth cause of action was sought.
- [62] As an
alternative, and as a sixth cause of action — for moneys had and received
— Mr Huang and Ms Lu alleged that
the appellants had all been unjustly
enriched at Mr Huang and Ms Lu’s expense and that it would be
unconscionable for the appellants
to retain the benefit of the Waihopai
advances. They sought judgment in the sum of $2,376,261 together with interest.
- [63] As a
seventh cause of action against Mr Chen, Don Chen, Jackie Huang and AEG, they
said that the various dispositions of Mr Chen’s
share of the sale proceeds
from the sale of Waihopai had been made with the intent to prejudice Mr Huang
and Ms Lu as creditors of
Mr Chen and in breach of s 348 of the Property Law
Act 2007. They sought orders pursuant to that provision.
- [64] As an
alternative eighth cause of action against all appellants, Mr Huang and Ms Lu
asserted that the dispositions were made
with the intent to prejudice them as
creditors of Waihopai and again they sought orders under s 348.
- [65] There was a
ninth cause of action (wrongly noted in the pleadings as the tenth cause of
action) alleging unjust enrichment.
- [66] Mr Chen and
the other appellants raised two affirmative defences. They first raised
estoppel and asserted that Mr Huang and
Ms Lu had represented to Mr Chen, Jackie
Huang and Yi Lu, by words and conduct, that they were bound by the Integration
Scheme.
As a second affirmative defence, they alleged that Waihopai owed Mr
Chen a debt and that, to the extent that payments had been made
by Waihopai to
Mr Chen, they were in satisfaction of that debt.
- [67] Mr Chen
(and in some cases the other appellants) also brought six counterclaims.
(a) There was a counterclaim against Mr Huang and Ms Lu for alleged breach of
the JV agreement and the Integration Scheme. Mr Chen
asserted that he and Mr
Huang had agreed that Mr Chen was to receive an interest in the company
incorporated in China — Matakana
(Zhongshan) Wines Ltd. Mr Chen said that
Mr Huang and Ms Lu failed to provide any interest in the company to him and
that they had
failed to account to him for its profits. Mr Chen sought
specific performance and an account of the profits made by Matakana Zhongshan
Ltd.
(b) Mr Chen alleged breach by Ms Lu of the JV agreement and/or the
Integration Scheme.
(c) Mr Chen alleged that Matakana Wines had failed to repay him advances that he
had made to that company between 8 May 2015 and
29 March 2016, in the total sum
of $540,000. He sought judgment in this sum, together with interest.
(d) Mr Chen alleged that at all material times he was the registered proprietor
of the Matakana land, that a written deed of lease
had been entered into between
the parties to the effect that Matakana Wines agreed to least part of the
Matakana land and that Matakana
Wines had failed to pay the rental and other
outgoings due under the lease.
(e) Waihopai alleged that it had repaid $120,000 to Ms Lu in October 2016, in
repayment of an advance of $100,000 she had earlier
made to the company and by
way of a further advance of $20,000 to Ms Lu. Repayment of the further advance
was sought, with interest.
(f) Mr Chen and Jackie Huang sought a declaration of partnership. They asserted
that since on or about 25 June 2013, they, together
with Mr Huang and Ms
Lu, had been partners in the Integration Scheme partnership. They sought
declarations they were in partnership
and that the partnership had been
dissolved, together with an order for the taking of the accounts of the
partnership.
Mr Huang and Ms Lu for their part denied these various allegations and filed
an affirmative defence to the sixth counterclaim (declaration
of partnership),
alleging misleading and deceptive conduct by Mr Chen.
The High Court judgment
- [68] The
judgment is lengthy and very thorough. What follows is, again, very much a
summary.
Credibility
- [69] After
recording the factual background, largely as above, Gordon J turned to
credibility issues.[8] She referred
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Deng v
Zheng,[9]
noting the caution there sounded in cases where one or more of the parties has a
cultural background which differs from that of the
Judge. She recorded that the
Supreme Court nevertheless commented that most of the usual ways that Judges
assess credibility remain
available.[10] The Judge noted her
view that there were credibility issues for all three main witnesses: Mr Huang,
Ms Lu and Mr Chen.[11] She also
commented adversely on Yi Lu’s
evidence.[12] She recorded that she
had exercised “a degree of caution in accepting the word of any of [these]
witnesses on important issues
unless there [was] other documentary support or
support from other
witnesses”.[13]
The status of the payments made by Mr Huang/Ms Lu
- [70] The
Judge next turned to consider the status of Mr Huang’s payment of
$1.2 million into Mr Botting’s trust account
on 25 June 2013 and the
later advances, totalling $1,176,261.00. The Judge dealt with this issue first
because, if she found in
favour of Mr Chen on the Integration Scheme issue,
anything owing by Mr Chen under the JV agreement would be subsumed into the
Integration
Scheme.[14]
- [71] After
recording the views of the parties, the Judge noted that before Mr Huang
advanced the $1.2 million, he was aware that Waihopai
was in
receivership.[15] She noted that Mr
Huang said in evidence that issues with Waihopai had the potential to result in
Mr Chen’s bankruptcy and
that the Matakana land would then be at risk
because it was in Mr Chen’s name. Further, Matakana and Waihopai had
a joint
interest in grape supply, because Waihopai was supplying grapes used by
Matakana Wines for its wine production. The Judge considered
that Mr
Huang’s concerns could be “reasonably
understood”.[16]
- [72] The Judge
noted that while the $1.2 million was advanced when discussions between Mr Huang
and Mr Chen about integration were
underway, that the advance was made did not
necessarily mean that an agreement had been reached over
integration.[17]
- [73] The Judge
considered that Mr Chen’s position was contradictory. On the one hand, Mr
Chen was saying that the Waihopai
advances were a capital investment by Mr
Huang. If that was so, Mr Huang and Ms Lu would receive nothing from Waihopai
because it
was insolvent. On the other hand, Mr Chen was acknowledging that
Mr Huang and Ms Lu should receive a payment of approximately $2.4
million.
The Judge took the view that these assertions were
inconsistent.[18]
- [74] Leaving the
Integration Scheme issue aside, the Judge considered that the Waihopai advances
were loans, noting the
following:[19]
(a) The advances made by Mr Chen and Yi Lu to Waihopai were by way of loan.
(b) An investment in Waihopai by another person, Lucy Wang, was by way of loan.
(c) An indirect advance from Mr Jiang (a personal friend of Yi Lu) made via
Yi Lu, was by way of loan, as were other advances from
Yi Lu’s
family and friends.
(d) The $2 million paid out to take Waihopai out of receivership was recorded as
a loan in Waihopai’s board of directors’
resolution and in a deed of
acknowledgment of debt, signed by Mr Chen and Mr Lu.
(e) It would be inconsistent to treat Mr Huang’s proportion of the
$2 million advance ($1.2 million) recorded in the deed of
acknowledgment of
debt differently from the funds contributed by Yi Lu ($800,00).
(f) The $2 million advance was recorded in Waihopai’s accounts from 2014
onwards as a loan.
(g) The later advances from Mr Huang and Ms Lu were recorded in Waihopai’s
accounts as loans.
- [75] The Judge
was satisfied that the accounts were authentic. She considered that they
evidenced what was intended and that Waihopai’s
shareholders had advanced
funds to the company by way of
loan.[20]
- [76] The Judge
also referred to the letter written on Mr Chen’s behalf to the OIO when it
was investigating Mr Huang’s
and Ms Lu’s retrospective application.
The Judge considered that the letter supported the assertion that Mr
Huang’s
advances were not capital payments, but rather were
loans.[21]
Was
there a partnership?
- [77] The
Judge then turned to consider whether or not there was a partnership, as
Mr Chen had asserted. She noted that while Mr Chen
was relying on the
Integration Scheme, his argument that a partnership had come into existence
did not depend on that scheme
alone.[22] She also noted that it
was agreed between the parties that New Zealand law applied to the partnership
issue and that there was little,
if any, disagreement as to the relevant
principles that govern whether or not there was a
partnership.[23]
- [78] The Judge
noted that it was Mr Chen’s evidence that, from the time he received Mr
Huang’s first response on 23 February
2013, he regarded Mr Huang as
committed to investing in Waihopai. The Judge considered that it could not be
said that Mr Huang was
committed as from that date, based on what was plain
from the document.[24]
- [79] The Judge
next recorded that Mr Chen placed weight on the WeChat message sent by Mr Huang
on 23 February 2013, noted above at
[18]. She accepted Mr Huang’s
explanation that, correctly translated, the message meant “I’m in
the company, can communicate
via phone”. She considered that this was a
reasonable explanation, given the documents
tha[25]followed.25
- [80] The Judge
observed that between February and June 2013, there were a number of documents
drafted by Mr Huang in relation to the
proposed Integration Scheme and
that, under cross-examination, Mr Chen had asserted that the parties had reached
a concluded agreement
on the Integration Scheme in May
2013.[26] The Judge held that it
was clear from the contemporaneous documents that the parties had not reached an
agreement as at that date.[27] She
noted that the drafts continued after May 2013; the values for the Waihopai
Vineyard and other assets set out in the drafts
were based on figures given by
Mr Chen which needed to be verified; there were various emails from
Ms Huimin which suggested that
there were further discussions yet to occur;
Mr Chen acknowledged under cross‑examination that, as at
23 October 2013, it was
Mr Huang’s and his own intention to get a
document drafted up under New Zealand law by a New Zealand lawyer for
he and Mr Huang
to consider; Mr Botting’s email to Mr Chen on
23 January 2014 revealed that Mr Botting did not consider that
agreement had
been reached at that stage and the draft agreement prepared by Mr
Botting made it clear that there was no final
agreement.[28] The Judge also noted
that under cross‑examination, Mr Chen accepted that there was never any
formal partnership agreement,
that no general partner was established, that
there was no formal assumption of responsibility for the specified percentages
of the
Waihopai debt, that Mr Huang plainly wanted a written formal agreement
and that the heads of agreement were not signed by any of
the
parties.[29]
- [81] The
Judge went on to consider the cultural context. She referred to the Chinese
concept of guānxi and to the decisions
given by both this
Court, and the Supreme Court in Deng v
Zheng in regard to this
issue.[30]
The Judge referred to expert evidence given by a Dr Zhixiong Liao in
relation to guānxi. It was Dr Liao’s evidence that
there was no
“one-size-fits-all approach” to the concept of guānxi and that
much depends on the type of relationship
and the nature and value of the
transaction.[31]
- [82] The Judge
recorded that:
(a) Mr Huang and Mr Chen had previously entered into formal written agreements
with each other, noting that in 2007 they signed a
written agreement in relation
to the intended development of the Matakana villa lots. In October 2011,
they entered into a joint
venture agreement, which was later superseded by the
more formal JV agreement in April 2012. These agreements were in writing,
prepared
with legal assistance, witnessed, signed and fingerprinted by each of
the three individuals involved. Additionally, Mr Chen had
a written
employment agreement in his capacity as General Manager of Matakana Wines.
The Judge considered that the history of the
business relationships between
the parties indicated that each expected negotiations to conclude with a formal,
written and signed
agreement.[32]
(b) The value of Mr Chen’s financial interest in Waihopai had not been
confirmed. This was not a mere detail but rather a
critical issue going to the
heart of the Integration Scheme. Both Mr Huang and Mr Chen agreed
that Mr Chen did provide Mr Huang
with financial forecasts. It was
Mr Huang’s position however that he wanted to see the underlying
financial accounts. Under
cross‑examination, Mr Chen accepted that he did
not give Mr Huang a copy of Waihopai’s accounts. While he asserted that
Mr Huang did not ask for them, Mr Chen did agree that it would have been normal
for Mr Huang to want to see
them.[33]
For these various reasons, the Judge concluded that the parties were not in
agreement on the Integration Scheme as at 23 January 2014
and there was no
partnership agreement.[34]
- [83] The Judge
went on to consider the conduct of the parties. She noted Mr Chen’s
assertion that the conduct of the parties
between early 2014 and late 2016
indicated that in fact they had integrated their respective businesses and that
accordingly, a partnership
was
formed.[35] The Judge took the view
that there were indications that pointed both
ways.[36] She referred to the
Matakana Estate management structure document, noted above at [36], and to the Memorandum of Corporate
Trusteeship dated 23 March 2015 and signed by the parties, noted above
at [40]. She set out the detail
of the latter document and held that it did
n[37] record integration.37
Although it referred to Mr Huang’s shareholding of 36 per cent,
consistent with the percentage attributed to him in the draft
Integration Scheme
documents, the document also referred to an “invitation” to Mr Huang
to join as a new shareholder.
The Judge noted the evidence that Mr Huang never
became a shareholder. The Judge also noted that, in addition, Ms Lu was not
invited
to be a shareholder of Waihopai, but that, on Mr Chen’s
version of events, she was meant to have a percentage interest in the
integrated
business as well. Further, the Judge noted that the document did not provide
that Mr Huang’s cash contributions
were to be by way of equity rather
than by way of loan. She also considered it important that the memoranda did
not record any pre‑existing
integration of
Waihopa[38]and Matakana
Estate.38
- [84] The Judge
noted that Mr Chen also relied on emails sent by the accountant for Matakana
Wines and Waihopai, Ms Fu, to Mr Huang,
Mr Lu, Mr Chen and Jackie Huang,
which were addressed to them as “shareholders”. She noted however
that under cross-examination,
the accountant said that she had been told by
Mr Chen and Mr Huang that Mr Huang either had a share in Waihopai or was
intended to
have a share.[39]
- [85] The Judge
referred to various other factual matters, but she considered that none of them
pointed unequivocally to a partnership
agreement. She considered that they were
equally consistent with the parties working together and even hoping for an
agreement,
but without agreement having been
concluded.[40]
- [86] In summary,
the Judge did not consider that the evidence indicated that Mr Huang had
given up on his position that he required
that the Integration Scheme be
formally documented. In the Judge’s view, the evidence overall indicated
that while the parties
may have been working towards and planning to integrate
their assets in each of the two operations, Matakana and Waihopai, actual
agreement had not been reached. The Judge concluded that there was no
partnership, whether based on the Integration Scheme or
otherwise.[41]
Estoppel
- [87] The
Judge then turned to deal with Mr Chen’s first affirmative statement of
defence — estoppel. Her findings in
this regard were not challenged
before us and accordingly, we do not deal with the Judge’s findings in
relation to the matter
in any detail. Suffice to say that the Judge found that
Mr Chen and Jackie Huang had failed to establish an
estoppel.[42]
Misrepresentations
- [88] The
Judge then turned to consider whether, if she was wrong in her finding and there
was a partnership between Mr Chen and Mr
Huang, there were any
misrepresentations made by Mr Chen to Mr Huang, and if so, their legal effect.
- [89] The
representations pleaded by Mr Huang and Ms Lu were that Mr Chen had represented
to them that he had a 60 per cent share in
the equity of Waihopai, which had a
value of approximately $5.061 million, and that he was willing to give
60 per cent of his share
in the equity in Waihopai to Mr Huang and Ms
Lu in exchange for a 40 per cent interest in Matakana
Estate.[43]
- [90] The Judge
recited the relevant law and turned to consider whether or not representations
had been made as pleaded.[44] She
noted that there was no dispute that Mr Chen had represented to Mr Huang that
the value of his 60 per cent interest in Waihopai
was approximately $5.061
million and that he was willing to give 60 per cent of this interest
to Mr Huang in exchange for a 40 per
cent interest in Matakana Estate. It was
Mr Chen’s position however that this was all
true.[45]
- [91] The Judge
recorded that the respondents had called an expert accountant, Jason Weir, who
had been able to reconstruct from the
general ledger Waihopai’s balance
sheets for the years 2012–2014. Mr Weir considered that, when the
shareholder’s
loans were treated as liabilities, the bottom line changed
significantly. Waihopai was insolvent from at least 2013 onwards. The
Judge
noted that the expert evidence was clear — shareholder’s loans are
not equity but debt.[46] The Judge
considered therefore that the value attributed by Mr Chen to his interest in
Waihopai was misleading, because it overlooked
the fact that company’s
shareholders did not control all of the
loans.[47] She noted that it was Mr
Huang’s evidence that had Mr Chen told him that his shareholding in
Waihopai had a negative value,
there would have been no further discussions
about integration.[48]
- [92] The Judge
therefore found that Mr Chen represented to Mr Huang that he had equity in
Waihopai to the value of approximately $5.061
million and that this was not
true.[49] The Judge also found that
Mr Chen’s interest in Waihopai was not 60 per cent. Rather it was 40 per
cent and his brother,
Don Chen, held the other 20 per
cent.[50]
- [93] In relation
to Mr Huang and Ms Lu’s assertion that Mr Chen was willing to give 60 per
cent of his equity in Waihopai to
Mr Huang and Ms Lu in exchange for a 40 per
cent interest in Matakana Estate, the Judge considered that there were two
relevant representations.
First, Mr Chen’s willingness to make a formal
exchange and secondly, Mr Chen’s assertion that he had equity in
Waihopai.[51] There was no dispute
that Mr Chen was willing to give 60 per cent of his interest in Waihopai to Mr
Huang and Ms Lu, on the basis
set out in the Integration Scheme. Accordingly,
the Judge did not consider that Mr Chen’s willingness was in
issue;[52] rather if Mr Chen
made a statement of his intention which was founded on a misrepresentation as to
the nature and value of his actual
interest in Waihopai and he knew when he made
the statement that he could not fulfil his intention as expressed, then the
representation
of his intention was false. The Judge found that Mr Chen must
have known that he was unable to fulfil his intention as
expressed.[53]
- [94] The Judge
found that s 9 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 was
satisfied;[54] Mr Huang was
misled or deceived and Mr Chen’s conduct was an effective cause of Mr
Huang’s resulting loss.[55]
The Judge observed that even if she was wrong and that there was a partnership
as from 23 June 2013 as alleged by Mr Chen, the partnership
was vitiated ab
initio by Mr Chen’s misrepresentations as to the value of Waihopai
and his interest in the company.[56]
The JV agreement
- [95] The
Judge then turned to consider the JV agreement in greater detail. It stated
that it had been concluded within the territory
of the People’s Republic
of China and that it was governed by and was to be construed in accordance with
the laws of China.
The Judge referred to the evidence of the two experts called
by the parties, Dr Andrew Godwin by Mr Chen and Dr Zhixiong Liao
by
Mr Huang and Ms Lu. Both experts agreed that principles of good faith and
fairness are applicable to the interpretation of contracts
in China, but there
were some areas of disagreement. The Judge referred to the evidence as to
how the JV agreement would be interpreted
under Chinese law. She noted the
various provisions in the JV agreement and found that because Mr Chen had not
repaid the monies
advanced to him by Mr Huang under the JV agreement, Mr Chen
was in breach of the agreement.[57]
The Judge noted that as of the time of the hearing, Mr Chen remained the sole
registered proprietor of the Matakana land and that
he had refused to transfer
the land or any portion of it to Mr Huang and Ms Lu. The Judge also found
that because Mr Chen had not
paid his financial contribution, he was, as matters
stood at the time, not entitled to his 35 per cent of the joint
venture
assets.[58]
The
causes of action pleaded
- [96] The
Judge then turned to the various causes of action pleaded by Mr Huang and Ms Lu,
noting that the first three were against
Mr Chen in relation to the Matakana
land and that the other six were against Mr Chen and the other appellants and
arose out of the
Waihopai advances and the distribution of the net proceeds from
the sale of Waihopai’s
assets.[59]
The
Matakana causes of auction
- [97] In
relation to the Matakana land causes of action, the Judge noted that
Mr Huang, Ms Lu and Matakana Wines said they held a beneficial
interest in
the Matakana land on two
bases:[60]
(a) pursuant to a constructive trust (the first cause of action); and
(b) in accordance with the JV agreement:
(i) pursuant to fiduciary obligations owed by Mr Chen (the second cause of
action); and
(ii) pursuant to contract (the third cause of action).
The Judge dealt with these matters in reverse order.
- [98] Before
doing so, she turned to consider whether New Zealand law or Chinese law should
be applied. Mr Huang said New Zealand
law should apply. This was not
contested. The Judge noted that the courts in this country can apply remedies
under New Zealand
law to match substantive rights determined by foreign
law.[61] The evidence indicated
that equity is not part of Chinese law unless incorporated by statute, which was
not the case in the present
situation; further, estoppel and resulting and
constructive trusts have not been adopted in Chinese statutes; nor have
fiduciary
relationships.[62] The
Judge recorded the observations of Chadwick J in Arab Monetary Fund v
Hashim as
follows:[63]
... in
cases involving a foreign element in which an English court is asked to treat a
defendant as a constructive trustee of assets
which he has acquired through a
misuse of his powers, the relevant questions are: (i) what is the proper law
which governs the relationship
between the defendant and the person for whose
benefit those powers have been conferred, (ii) what, under that law, are the
duties
to which the defendant is subject in relation to those powers, (iii) is
the nature of those duties such that they would be regarded
by an English court
as fiduciary duties and (iv), if so, is it unconscionable for the defendant to
retain those assets.
- [99] Following
this approach, the Judge dealt first with the third cause of
action — breach of the JV agreement. She found
that Mr Chen had
breached his contractual obligations under the JV agreement in accordance
with the laws of China because he had
failed to make the stipulated payments on
the due dates, he had failed to pay interest and he had failed to transfer title
of the
land to Mr Huang and Ms Lu. The judge found that the third cause of
action was established.[64]
- [100] As for the
second cause of action — breach of fiduciary duty — Mr Huang argued
that, while Mr Chen’s obligations
under Chinese law were purely
contractual, Mr Chen also owed him and Ms Lu a fiduciary obligation in
respect of the acquisition and
ownership of the Matakana land. The JV agreement
was governed by the law of China, which does not recognise fiduciary
relationships
in the same way as New Zealand. However, the principle of
good faith is a fundamental principle enshrined in the Civil and Contract
Codes
under Chinese law. The Judge considered that Mr Chen owed Mr Huang and
Ms Lu fiduciary obligations arising from the circumstances
of the
relationship. The JV agreement provided that the parties were contracting on
the basis of honesty, mutual benefit and friendly
cooperation. Further, Mr
Huang and Ms Lu were in a vulnerable position; they were not
New Zealand residents at the relevant time;
they trusted Mr Chen with
Mr Huang’s money and with legal ownership of the Matakana land; they
were not familiar with New Zealand
law or business dealings; and they had no
experience managing a winery. It was therefore reasonable for Mr Huang and Ms
Lu to repose
trust and confidence in Mr Chen. There was a fiduciary
relationship and by excluding Mr Huang and Ms Lu from legal ownership of
the Matakana land, Mr Chen had breached his fiduciary
obligations.[65]
- [101] Turning to
the first cause of action — constructive trust — Mr Huang was
claiming an equitable proprietary interest
in the Matakana land and a
constructive trust was the appropriate relief. Although purchased with Mr
Huang’s funds, legal
title was in Mr Chen’s name and Mr Chen
had refused to transfer the property to Mr Huang and Ms Lu. The Judge
considered that
New Zealand law should apply to this
claim.[66] She noted that, to
establish a constructive trust, a claimant must show contributions (direct or
indirect) to the property, the
expectation of an interest, that such expectation
was reasonable, and that the defendant should reasonably expect to yield the
claimant
an interest.[67] The Judge
found that all elements were established and that Mr Chen held the land on
constructive trust for Mr Huang and Ms
Lu.[68]
- [102] Mr Huang
and Ms Lu had argued that any attempt by Mr Chen to belatedly repay the $1.47
million loan in order to acquire a share
of Matakana Estate was barred by the
equitable doctrine of laches.[69]
The Judge observed that, given the dispute between the parties, it would be
problematic if Mr Chen was to be permitted to belatedly
repay the loan and
acquire a share of Matakana Estate. She ventured that it would be pointless for
Mr Chen to pursue such a claim
and that he would likely be barred by the
doctrine of laches.[70]
- [103] Mr Huang
and Ms Lu had sought equitable damages in relation to the three Matakana Estate
claims. They said Mr Chen’s
failure to transfer title has delayed the
development, which was required under the OIO consent conditions. They called
an expert
witness, Patrick Hanlon, who said that the development costs had
increased by approximately $3 million between 2020 and
2022.[71] Mr Chen’s position
was that the damages claimed were not foreseeable and thus not
recoverable.[72] The Judge was of
the view that Mr Chen ought to have foreseen that Mr Huang and Ms Lu
would want to start developing the Matakana
land at the earliest opportunity.
She found that Mr Huang and the other respondents were entitled to damages
as a result.[73]
The
counterclaims
- [104] The
Judge then considered the counterclaims to the Matakana causes of action.
- [105] First, Mr
Chen claimed that Mr Huang and Ms Lu had breached the JV agreement by
failing to provide him any interest in Matakana
Zhongshan Ltd. The Judge
noted the JV agreement provided that a subsidiary of Matakana Wines was to
be set up in China and that
Mr Huang accepted that Mr Chen had been entitled to
a share in Matakana Zhongshan Ltd, conditional on Mr Chen performing his
obligations
under the JV agreement, including repaying Mr Huang. The Judge
accepted Mr Huang’s arguments and concluded that this counterclaim
failed.[74]
- [106] The second
counterclaim was against Ms Lu. Mr Chen said he was the sole shareholder when
Matakana Wines was first incorporated.
In September 2012, he transferred 100 per
cent of the shares to Kiwi Club, a company owned by Ms Lu, to assist in her
immigration
application. Mr Chen said that it was an implied term in their
agreement that she would procure the transfer to him of 40 per cent
of the
shares in Matakana Wines once her immigration application was approved. This
40 per cent was sought under the Integration
Scheme. Alternatively, if the
JV agreement was still in force, Mr Chen claimed 35 per cent of the shares
in Matakana Wines. The
Judge accepted that the transfer of the shares was
to assist Ms Lu with her immigration application. However, Mr Chen was not
entitled
to 35 per cent of shares as he was in breach of the
JV agreement. This counterclaim also
failed.[75]
- [107] Thirdly,
Mr Chen argued that Matakana Wines had failed to repay advances he had made
totalling $540,000 and he sought to recover
this sum. He also claimed interest
on this sum and on earlier repaid advances. The Judge found that the amount
owed to Mr Chen
was
$530,784.[76] However, the claim
for interest was rejected due to a lack of evidence regarding agreed practice
and because there was no pleading
referring to the Interest on Money Claims Act
2016.[77]
- [108] Mr
Chen’s fourth counterclaim relied on Mr Chen being the registered
proprietor of the Matakana Land. He said that Matakana
Wines had occupied the
premises since March 2012 and had failed to pay rent or outgoings since at least
January 2015. He said that
if Mr Huang and Ms Lu were entitled to enforce the
JV agreement, he was entitled to payment from Matakana Wines under the
strict
terms of the lease. The Judge held this was not a tenable position and
said that “[b]ecause Mr Chen has failed to repay the
amount he owes to Mr
Huang under the JV agreement, he was at all relevant times holding the Matakana
land on a bare trust for Mr
Huang and
Ms Lu”.[78] This claim
failed.[79]
The
Waihopai claims
- [109] The
Judge held that both the fourth and fifth causes of actions brought by
Mr Huang and Ms Lu
succeeded.[80] The fourth cause of
action was against Mr Chen for his failure to repay the Waihopai advances/loans.
The fifth was an alternative
claim against Waihopai for the failure to repay the
loans.
- [110] The sixth
cause of action was brought by Mr Huang and Ms Lu to recover the Waihopai
advances in equity. They had pleaded moneys
had and received. They said they
had made the advances as loans to remove Waihopai from receivership.
Mr Chen and Yi Lu then caused
Waihopai to sell its assets and
dissipated the sale proceeds without repaying the advances/loans. Mr Chen and
others were therefore
unjustly enriched at Mr Huang’s and Ms Lu’s
expense and it would be unconscionable for them to retain that
benefit.[81] Mr Chen pleaded there
was no debt due to the Integration Scheme, a defence which the Judge found had
failed.[82] In the circumstances,
the Judge considered that the claim for money had and received was an
appropriate response. This cause of
action also
succeeded.[83]
- [111] The
seventh cause of action was in the alternative to the preceding causes of
action. The eight cause of action was in the
alternative to the seventh. The
Judge addressed both together. Mr Huang and Ms Lu claimed that the
payments of the sale proceeds
of Waihopai’s assets were “prejudicial
dispositions” pursuant to the Property Law
Act.[84] Mr Chen’s
position was that Mr Huang and Ms Lu were not creditors of Mr Chen or Waihopai
because of the Integration Scheme,
an argument that had been rejected by the
Judge.[85] The Judge discussed the
claim by reference to subpt 6 of pt 6 of the Property Law Act. She
accepted that Mr Huang and Ms Lu were
creditors of Mr Chen and/or Waihopai in
respect of the Waihopai advances. The Judge concluded that Mr Chen and the
other appellants
had received property through a prejudicial disposition, having
received monies from the sale of
Waihopai.[86] These claims
succeeded.[87]
- [112] The ninth
cause of action was founded on unjust enrichment. However, having found in
favour of Mr Huang and Ms Lu in relation
to the sixth and eighth causes of
action, the Judge did not consider it necessary to determine this cause of
action.[88]
The
affirmative defences
- [113] The
Judge finally turned to the affirmative defences raised by Mr Chen. He had
pleaded that payments he had received were partly
owed to him. The Judge found
there was a lack of underlying evidence regarding the debt owed and the
affirmative defence failed.[89] The
Judge also addressed a counterclaim brought by Mr Chen against Ms Lu,
which pleaded that Ms Lu owed him $20,000. Again, there
was an absence of
evidence and the Judge rejected this
counterclaim.[90]
Summary
- [114] The
Judge held as follows:[91]
(a) There was no partnership agreement based on the Integration Scheme or
otherwise.
(b) The advance of $1.2 million and the subsequent advances totalling $1,176,261
made by Mr Huang and Ms Lu to Mr Chen and/or Waihopai
were loans.
(c) The business relationship between Mr Huang, Ms Lu and Mr Chen was governed
by the JV agreement dated 19 April 2012.
(d) Mr Chen had breached the JV agreement by failing to make the payments
required for his share of Matakana Estate and by failing
to transfer title to
the Matakana land to Mr Huang and Ms Lu.
(e) Mr Huang and Ms Lu succeeded on the first to eighth causes of action
(inclusive). The ninth cause of action did not require
determination.
(f) Mr Chen succeeded in part on his third counterclaim. The other five
counterclaims failed.
- [115] The Judge
ordered relief in regard to the Matakana claims as
follows:
Matakana claims (first to third causes of action):
relief in favour of [Mr Huang and Ms Lu]
[348] I grant the following relief on the first, second and third causes of
action:
(a) A declaration that Mr Chen holds the Matakana land on a constructive trust
for Mr Huang and Ms Lu (first cause of action);
(b) An order requiring Mr Chen to transfer the title to the Matakana land,
unencumbered, to Mr Huang and Ms Lu (first, second and
third causes of action);
and
(c) An order for equitable damages against Mr Chen in the sum of $3 million
in favour of the plaintiffs as a consequence of the delay
suffered by the
plaintiffs in developing the Matakana land (first, second and third causes of
action).
Matakana claims (third counterclaim): relief in favour of Mr Chen
[349] I make an order that the third plaintiff, Matakana Wines, pay
Mr Chen the sum of $530,784.00.
- [116] The Judge
ordered relief in respect of the Waihopai advances claims as follows:
(a) Fourth and fifth causes of action: judgment in the sum of $2,376,261 in
favour of Mr Huang and Ms Lu against Mr Chen or, in
the alternative, against
Waihopai, together with interest on that sum from the date on which each of the
individual advances making
up that sum was made, calculated under s 12 of the
Interest on Money Claims
Act.[92]
(b) Sixth cause of action: in the alternative, judgment in favour of
Mr Huang and Ms Lu for moneys had and received by all appellants
in the sum
of $2,376,261 together with interest on that sum on the basis set out
immediately above.[93]
(c) Seventh cause of action: in the further alternative, an order under
s 348 of the Property Law Act requiring Jackie Huang, Don
Chen and AEG each
to repay the funds received by them through prejudicial dispositions back to Mr
Chen and an order requiring Mr
Chen to pay Mr Huang and Ms Lu $2,376,261.
The Judge awarded interest on this sum in the same terms as described
above.[94]
(d) Eighth cause of action: as a further alternative, an order under s 348 of
the Property Law Act requiring Mr Chen, Yi Lu, Don
Chen, Jackie Huang, Qi
Yang and AEG to repay the proceeds of the sale of Waihopai’s assets
received by them to Waihopai and
an order requiring Waihopai to pay the
respondents $2,376,261 together with interest in the terms described
above.[95]
The appeal
- [117] Not
all matters decided by the Judge were challenged. Counsel agreed that the
following issues were raised by the appeal:
- Was
an integration scheme and/or a partnership based on such a scheme agreed as
alleged [by Mr Chen]?
- If
so, was it vitiated by misrepresentations or misleading conduct?
- If
the integration scheme or partnership was agreed and was not vitiated, then is
the appropriate remedy to order an accounting?
- If
the integration scheme or partnership was not agreed or it was vitiated, then
what are the appropriate remedies? In
particular:
4.1. Should all three parties to the [JV
agreement] be required to perform the terms of that agreement and if so when, or
should
the assets remain with the respondents?
4.2. Should the damages awarded against the first appellant, Mr Chen,
for increased building costs of the proposed Matakana development
due to delay,
be set aside?
4.3. Were the payments made by the respondents in relation to the [Waihopai
Vineyard], loans to Mr Chen only or to both Mr Chen and
[Waihopai]?
4.4. Should the orders made against the third [to] seventh appellants under
s 348 of the [Property Law Act] be set aside?
4.5. Should the interest award to the respondents on the Waihopai [c]laims
be set aside?
4.6. Should Mr Chen be granted leave to amend his third counterclaim to seek
interest under the [Interest on Money Claims Act] on
amounts owing to him by the
third respondent and if leave is granted, should interest be awarded?
- [118] There are
two additional matters raised that also require resolution:
(a) Should Mr Huang and Ms Lu be granted leave to amend their prayer for relief
in respect of the fourth to eighth causes of action
to seek interest under the
Interest on Money Claims Act?
(b) Should Mr Huang and Ms Lu be permitted to adduce further evidence on
questions of fact by way of an affidavit sworn by Ms Lu
on
27 October 2023?
Analysis
- [119] We
deal with each issue, summarising, when required, the arguments advanced by the
parties.
- [120] In
considering the appeal, we have borne in mind that, while the appellants bore
the onus of satisfying this Court that it should
differ from the decision under
appeal,[96]
they are entitled to judgment in accordance with the opinion of this Court, even
though that opinion calls for assessments of fact
and degree and entails value
judgments.[97] This Court must come
to its own conclusions in assessing the merits of the case, although it is
entitled to bear in mind the advantages
that the Judge had in assessing the oral
evidence.[98]
- [121] We
acknowledge the Judge’s comments regarding the credibility of the key
witnesses noted above at [69]. Her
comments accord with our own reading of relevant parts of the notes of evidence.
We have followed the same approach as the
Judge — we have
exercised considerable caution in accepting the word of key witnesses on
important issues unless there was
documentary support or support from other
witnesses whose evidence appeared to us to be credible
an[99]reliable.99
Was there an Integration Scheme and/or a partnership based on
such a scheme?
Submissions
- [122] The
primary argument advanced by Mr Barker KC for the appellants was that the
relationship between Mr Huang, Ms Lu, Mr Chen
and Jackie Huang was a
partnership, governed by the terms of the Integration Scheme. The appellants
relied primarily on the draft
scheme prepared by Mr Huang and sent by him,
via Ms Huimin, to Mr Chen on 26 June 2013. They acknowledged that this
draft was not
signed and that the parties intended, at least initially, that a
more formal signed document would be executed in the future, but
nevertheless
they said that the 26 June 2013 draft recorded the agreement of the parties on
all essential matters and that all operated
in accordance with its terms over
the four and a half years that followed.
- [123] Mr Huang
and Ms Lu through their counsel, Mr O’Brien KC, denied these assertions.
They pointed to the evidence that there
were a number of draft proposals for an
Integration Scheme circulated by them and that none was concluded or signed.
They said that
each was no more than a proposal, that the figures in them were
approximations, that the parties contemplated that a new joint venture
agreement
would be signed in relation to any Integration Scheme and that an Auckland
lawyer was to be employed to draft and finalise
the requisite documentation.
They argued that Mr Chen’s assertions to the contrary were contradicted by
the contemporaneous
documents and that the parties did not agree to be
immediately bound, because all essential terms of the contract between them had
not been agreed, let alone signed.
Relevant law
- [124] At
the relevant time, a partnership was defined as the relation which subsisted
between persons carrying on a business in common
with a view to
profit.[100] In determining
whether or not a partnership existed, regard was required to be had to various
rules, none of which of itself evidenced
a
partnership.[101] Broadly, the
rules dealt with the co-ownership of property, the sharing of gross returns and
the receipt of profits. None has any
particular application in the present
case.
- [125] It was
common ground before us that partnership is a form of
contract;[102] any partnership is
rooted in agreement, express or implied, between the
parties.[103] If there is no
agreement, there cannot be a
partnership.[104]
- [126] The
prerequisites to the formation of an agreement were summarised by this Court in
Fletcher Challenge Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New
Zealand.[105] Blanchard J
there stated as follows:
[50] The question whether
negotiating parties intended the product of their negotiation to be immediately
binding upon them, either conditionally
or unconditionally, cannot sensibly be
divorced from a consideration of the terms expressed or implicit in that
product. They may
have embarked upon their negotiation with every intention on
both sides that a contract will result, yet have failed to attain that
objective
because of an inability to agree on particular terms and on the bargain as a
whole. In other cases, which are much less
common, the intention may remain but
somehow the parties fail to reach agreement on a term or terms without which
there is insufficient
structure to create a binding contract. ...
[51] A contract is not legally incomplete merely because consequential
matters have been omitted, particularly when they relate to questions
of
contingency and risk allocation. The parties may have thought it unnecessary to
the essence of their bargain to reach agreement
upon such matters or it may have
been difficult or even impossible to predict what might arise in the future,
particularly under
a long-term contract. It may therefore have been thought
satisfactory — and it would often be more economically efficient
—
to leave such matters to be worked out if necessary in the course of the
performance of the contract.
[52] But even where the parties are ad idem concerning all terms
essential to the formation of a contract — the basic structure of
a
contract of the type under negotiation is found to have been present in the
terms which have been agreed — they still may
not have achieved formation
of a contract if there are other unagreed matters which the parties themselves
regard as a prerequisite
to any agreement and in respect of which they have
reserved to themselves alone the power of agreement. In such cases, what is
missing
at the end of the negotiation is the intention to contract, not a
legally essential element of a bargain. ...
[53] The prerequisites to formation of a contract are therefore:
(a) An intention to be immediately bound (at the point when the bargain is
said to have been agreed); and
(b) An agreement, express or found by implication, or the means of achieving
an agreement (eg an arbitration clause), on every term
which:
(i) was legally essential to the formation of such a bargain; or
(ii) was regarded by the parties themselves as essential to their
particular bargain.
A term is to be regarded by the parties as essential if one party maintains
the position that there must be agreement upon it and
manifests accordingly to
the other party.
[54] Whether the parties intended to enter into a contract and whether
they have succeeded in doing so are questions to be determined objectively.
In
considering whether the negotiating parties have actually formed a contract, it
is permissible to look beyond the words of their
“agreement” to the
background circumstances from which it arose — the matrix of facts. This
can include statements
the parties made orally or in writing in the course of
their negotiations and drafts of the intended contractual document.
- [127] Where,
subsequent to the preparation of an unexecuted document, which the parties
intended should constitute a contract between
them, the parties have acted
consistently with its provisions, it can be concluded that they have entered
into an informal or implied
contract in terms of that document, from the date
identified from the conduct in
issue.[106] As against this,
there is a presumption that, where the parties have agreed to prepare a formal
written document to record the terms
of their agreement, they do not intend to
be bound until that document is drawn up and signed by both, irrespective of
whether all
of the terms have otherwise been
agreed.[107]
This presumption is particularly strong where the agreement involves the
disposition of an interest in land, or where the agreement
is a complex business
transaction involving substantial
sums.[108]
- [128] Whether a
partnership exists is a legal question to be determined by the Court on the
basis of what the parties said and
did.[109] Limited assistance can
be derived from the authorities, because the analysis is highly fact
specific.[110] Regard should be
had to the true intention of the parties as appearing from the whole facts of
the case.[111]
- [129] The
decisions in Deng v Zheng are a good example of the relevant
principles.[112] The Courts were
there required to determine whether two property developers, originally from
China, were working in partnership
in New Zealand, or through various corporate
and contractual structures they had put in place but with no overarching
partnership.
This Court, and subsequently the Supreme Court, disagreed with the
High Court Judge and found that, on the evidence, there had been
a partnership
between the two parties in respect of all but one of the projects in which they
were jointly involved.[113] Both
Courts relied on the internal accounts and on a document providing for the
separation of the parties’ respective business
interests. The Courts
found that these documents revealed a personal relationship between the two men
and that the various companies
were their
nominees.[114] This Court and the
Supreme Court emphasised a number of matters:
(a) A written partnership agreement is not required and a partnership can be
implied from the
circumstances.[115]
(b) The focus is on the substance of the parties’ arrangements as revealed
by their conduct over time.[116]
(c) The evidence of the parties must be assessed against the contemporaneous
documents and the nature of the relationship which emerges
from those
documents.[117] There is however
nothing unusual about the absence of express evidence from one or other party
about matters such as mutual loyalty,
reliance and trust, or the absence of
reference to these concepts in contemporaneous
documents.[118]
(d) Any internal accounts between the parties can provide evidence of what they
agreed, even if unusual or idiosyncratic and even
if inconsistent with external
accounts.[119]
(e) Documents recording the principles for separating their interests based on
the terms of the partnership is strong evidence of
a
partnership.[120]
(f) It is not inconsistent with a partnership for one or more of the partners to
hold shares in a company on behalf of the
partnership.[121]
(g) The court should not give undue weight to the use, or absence, of particular
language or terminology, especially when dealing
with documents translated from
another language.[122]
(h) The focus should be on the conduct of the parties over time, viewed
objectively, rather than on the possible meaning of particular
words used.[123]
- [130] Against
this background and with these observations in mind, we turn to consider the
evidence in this case.
What did the parties say and
do?
- [131] Counsel
in their respective submissions focused on five different periods/series of
events: Mr Huang’s initial investment
and the Integration Scheme
documents; the conduct of the parties between 2014 and 2016; the conduct of the
parties following the
break down in their relationship in 2017; the OIO
correspondence in April 2018 and Mr Chen’s OIO interview June 2018; and Mr
Chen’s and Yi Lu’s actions in selling Waihopai’s assets and
distributing the net proceeds of sale in December 2020/early
2021. We
follow the same course. We do not refer to every piece of correspondence or act
done by the parties and referred to by
counsel but only to the principal
documents and actions.
- [132] Before
doing so, we note that Mr Chen’s position as to when the
Integration Scheme, and any partnership based on that
scheme, was finalised
has varied.
(a) Mr Chen (and Mr Barker) asserted that Mr Huang acknowledged on
23 February 2013 that he would invest in Waihopai.
(b) In cross-examination at trial, Mr Chen said that the parties reached
agreement on the integration of their business interests
in May 2013.
(c) In his pleadings, Mr Chen asserted that he, Jackie Huang, Mr Huang and
Ms Lu, had been partners since on or about 25 June 2013.
(d) Mr Barker in his submissions before us relied on one of the documents
exchanged on 26 June 2013 and asserted that it was the
foundation for the
alleged partnership.
In our view, this apparent confusion is telling. It is for Mr Chen, as the
party asserting that there was a partnership, to prove,
on the balance of
probabilities, when the bargain between the parties is said to have been agreed
and when the intention to be bound
by that bargain was manifested.
Mr Huang’s initial investment and the Integration Scheme
documents
- [133] On
23 February 2013, Mr Chen sent Mr Huang a copy of the letter of intent with Mr
Sun that outlined a proposal for investment
in Waihopai. Mr Huang responded on
the same day by sending Mr Chen a document in Mandarin, the heading of which has
been translated
as “Vineyard Reform Suggestions”. We have discussed
this document above at [17]. As noted,
it was suggested that this document was effectively an acknowledgment that Mr
Huang would invest and that Mr Chen should
reject Mr Sun’s proposal.
- [134] We
disagree.
(a) The letter of intent with Mr Sun was clearly a proposal only. It was headed
“Letter of Intent”; Mr Chen, Yi Lu,
his brother-in-law and
Don Chen, were inviting Mr Sun to join them in establishing a new company
to restructure Waihopai. It recorded
what the new company’s equity would
be following any restructure — $8,425,000 — and that Mr Sun’s
investment
had to be no less than $500,000.
(b) Mr Huang’s vineyard reform suggestions were also just
that — suggestions. Clause 3 expressly recorded that
“[i]f
Mr HUANG buys 20% shares from [Mr] CHEN,” then the share
structure would be as was set out in the document: Mr Huang with
20 per cent of
shares and Mr Chen with 40 per cent. Clause 5 was headed “Issues”.
It set out a number of matters which
needed to be clarified. For example, the
timetable for usage of the funds. While we have endeavoured to avoid putting
undue weight
on particular words used, the document was, in our view, nothing
more than an exploratory proposal. That this was the case is clear
from what
followed thereafter.
(c) The position was not altered by Mr Huang’s WeChat message of
23 February 2013, noted above at [18]. The English translation of that
email was “I’m in the company, I can tell you”. We agree with
the Judge that
the explanation of that English translation advanced by
Mr Huang — “I’m in the company, can communicate via
phone”
— was
[124]sonable,124 given the tenor
of the documents that followed. We consider it more likely than not that Mr
Huang was saying no more than that he
was at work but could communicate with Mr
Chen by phone if required.
- [135] There is
no dispute that Mr Huang drafted a number of further documents and exchanged
them with Mr Chen — dated 1 March
2013, 11 March 2013, 26 May 2013
and 26 June 2013. These documents set out a possible structure for the
refinancing of Waihopai
and for the integration of Waihopai and Matakana Wines.
We do not however consider that any of these documents of itself resulted
in a
contract of partnership being entered into for the following reasons:
(a) A number of the drafts expressly recorded that they were
“suggestions” only.
(b) The drafts referred to an integration “scheme”, to what
investors could do and what they might obtain after any integration.
(c) The draft sent on 11 March 2013 was referred to in the accompanying email as
being “newly amended”.
(d) The various drafts each made suggestions for a share structure following the
injection of additional funds and integration of
the respective businesses.
There were variations between each draft. Figures included in the documents were
updated as matters progressed.
(e) It was expressly recorded in the draft sent on 27 May 2013 that a cash
increase was “planned”, that the figures set
out in the document
were approximations and that accurate figures needed to be confirmed. As noted
at [22], it was also recorded that a
new joint venture agreement should be signed and that a local lawyer or lawyers
should be employed to
draft and witness these documents. A question was posed.
Mr Huang asked “... can the funds be combined and paid to a company,
and
the company will lend it to the [Waihopai] company, then repaid to the bank,
this will pave the way and provide reasoning for
getting the management rights
back next time”.
- [136] We agree
with the Judge (and with the submissions made by Mr O’Brien) that Mr
Chen’s assertion that the parties
reached agreement on an Integration
Scheme and that a partnership based on the Integration Scheme was concluded on
or about 27 May
2013 is contradicted by the contemporaneous
documents.[125] It is clear, in
our view, that Mr Huang considered that the figures which had at that point been
provided by Mr Chen were approximations
only. Mr Huang in evidence said
that he asked for Waihopai’s accounts many times and Mr Chen, when
cross-examined, acknowledged
that he did not provide Mr Huang with the accounts.
Mr Huang said repeatedly in his evidence that he was not prepared to proceed
with any Integration Scheme without the accounts. He was also clear that he
required that a new joint venture agreement be prepared
and signed. His
various assertions in relation to these matters are supported by the
contemporaneous documentation. We accept his
evidence in this regard.
- [137] In our
judgement, the provision of Waihopai’s accounts and the requirement that a
new joint venture agreement be signed
in relation to any Integration Scheme were
essential prerequisites to the formation of any partnership or integration
agreement between
the parties. Mr Huang was clear in regard to these matters,
both in the iteration of the Integration Scheme forwarded to Mr Chen
on 27 May
2013 and in his oral evidence at trial.
- [138] Mr Huang
made a payment of $1.2 million to Mr Botting’s trust account on
25 June 2013. As noted in [23],
that payment was recorded in Mr Botting’s trust account records as being
part of the funds “for Shareholders Loan Advance
to Waihopai”. As
noted at [25], that payment was treated by Mr Chen and Yi Lu, as directors of
Waihopai, as a shareholder
loan from Mr Huang to Mr Chen and then by Mr Chen to
Waihopai. However, two further drafts for the proposed Integration Scheme were
produced and forwarded to Mr Chen the following day, 26 June 2013. The
proposals were drafted by Mr Huang with the assistance of
Ms Huimin. One
version of the 26 June 2023 draft Integration Scheme recorded as
follows:
The NZD 1.2M first advanced payment from [Mr] Huang to
acquire [Waihopai] Estate, less the amount of his additional share, the rest
0.193M should return back to him from the operating revenue of integrated
Matakana Estate.
The other version was in similar terms.
- [139] The
recital in the 26 June 2013 drafts arguably suggests that Mr Huang had
advanced the $1.2 million to acquire shares in Waihopai.
This
interpretation is however inconsistent with the narration in Mr Botting’s
trust account, with the directors’ resolution
of 28 June 2013 and with the
deed of acknowledgment of debt, also dated 28 June 2013.
- [140] The Judge
considered that there was an alternative explanation for the recital in the
drafts. In her view the words “to
acquire [Waihopai] Estate” were
arguably a reference to the taking back of Waihopai from the receivers. The
Judge considered
that this interpretation was consistent with the undisputed
evidence that the $1.2 million advanced by Mr Huang was in fact used,
together with other funds, to take Waihopai out of
receivership.[126]
- [141] We are
inclined to agree with the Judge. It is inappropriate to place undue emphasis
on the particular words used, but the
alternative explanation is consistent with
what happened and with what followed. We also agree with the Judge that, in any
event,
the payment of the $1.2 million does not of itself mean that the parties
had concluded a contract of partnership or that Mr Huang
had advanced the money
to purchase shares in Waihopai from Mr
Chen.[127]
- [142] We accept
that there are other indicia which suggest that agreement had been reached and
that Mr Huang had or was going to enter
into a partnership with Mr Chen and
acquire shares in Waihopai from him. We note the following:
(a) The email from Ms Huimin attaching the two June iterations of the
Integration Scheme, set out above at [27], contained the words
“... which has just been sorted”.
(b) One version of the 26 June 2013 draft started with the following words:
On the basis of the JOINT VENTURE CONTRACT (see Annex 1 for details), in
order to give light to each party’s special advantage,
[Mr] Chen, [Mr]
Huang and [Ms] Lu decide to reintegrate MATAKANA ESTATE. Concrete operations as
follows.
(c) As noted at [29], on 1 July 2013,
Mr Chen sent a WeChat message to Mr Huang, Ms Lu and Jackie Huang, telling
them that Waihopai had been officially
taken back from the receivers, that
Matakana officially owned Waihopai and that from then on, it would be promoted
as the Matakana
Marlborough Vineyard.
(d) As noted at [31], on 11 October
2013, Mr Chen forwarded to Ms Huimin legal advice that Waihopai had
received in relation to its dispute with Savvy.
(e) As noted at [32], on 22 October
2013, Ms Huimin sent an email to Mr Huang, Mr Chen, Jackie Huang and Ms Lu,
attaching the translated version of the
Matakana Estate Integration Scheme
draft, asking that parties confirm that they had received it, and
“wish[ed] [them] success
in business”.
- [143] There are
however difficulties in maintaining that an agreement had been
finalised:
(a) On 26 June 2013, Mr Huang sent a WeChat message to Mr Chen,
Jackie Huang and Ms Lu, in which he recorded that he had sent the
Matakana Estate integration plan to their respective mailboxes. He asked
them to “please make amendments” — see
above at [28].
(b) While Mr Chen maintained, through Mr Barker, that the partnership was agreed
on or about 26 June 2013, he does not say which
version of the Integration
Scheme circulated on the 26 June 2013 formed the basis for the alleged
partnership. The versions differ.
One version is more detailed than the other.
One was apparently accompanied by a number of annexures (although, as we
understand
it, only one annexure was discovered and produced in evidence).
(c) Both versions relied on values provided by Mr Chen. While it seems that
Mr Chen did provide some financial information to Mr
Huang, there is
nothing to suggest that he complied with Mr Huang’s requests and provided
Waihopai’s accounts by 26 June
2013.
(d) Neither of the 26 June 2013 drafts was expressly accepted or signed by any
of the parties.
(e) On 2 August 2013, Ms Huimin sent an email to Mr Huang, Ms Lu, Mr Chen
and Jackie Huang, attaching one of the 26 June 2013 Integration
Scheme
documents. The text of the covering email has been set out at [30]. We agree with the Judge that the
expression “first draft” indicates that there was not then agreement
on the Integration
Scheme or on any resulting
p[128]nership.128 So do the words
“newly organised” and the invitation to discuss the attachments with
Mr Huang when he was in this country.
(f) As noted in [32], on 22 October
2013, Ms Huimin sent an email to Mr Huang, Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Jackie
Huang, attaching a translated version of one
of the 26 June 2013 Integration
Scheme drafts. Mr Chen promptly emailed Mr Botting from China, saying that
he would be back in New
Zealand at the end of the month and that he wanted Mr
Botting to draft an agreement for the shareholders of Matakana Wines.
(g) On 5 November 2013, Mr Chen forwarded the email from Ms Huimin dated 22
October 2013 and the attached translated version of the
Integration Scheme draft
to Mr Botting.
(h) Mr Chen accepted under cross‑examination that, at this point, it was
his and Mr Huang’s intention to get a document
drafted up under
New Zealand law by a New Zealand lawyer for the parties to consider. Mr
Botting prepared a draft. He sent the
draft to Mr Chen for comment.
(i) Mr Botting then returned a revised draft of the heads of agreement to
Mr Chen on 23 January 2014. We have discussed the draft
heads of agreement
above at [34]. They were conditional
on a number of matters and they imposed various obligations on the parties. As
Mr Botting recorded in his
covering email, the document itself was not complete.
He required a place of residence for Mr Huang, a date by which the conditions
were to be satisfied and an address for service for notices on Mr Huang and Ms
Lu. He also advised Mr Chen that Mr Chen’s
accountant’s sign off
was required, before making firm commitments, as there might be significant tax
losses and/or imputation
credits which the entities involved might lose if the
shareholdings changed. He recorded that if Mr Chen wished, this could be added
as a condition.
- [144] In our
judgement, on balance, it is clear that, as at 23 January 2014, no final
agreement had been reached in relation to the
Integration Scheme and there was
no resulting partnership. Rather Mr Huang had made it plain that he wanted a
formal written agreement.
Heads of agreement had been prepared by Mr
Chen’s solicitor on Mr Chen’s instructions, but they had not been
finalised
or signed by any of the four parties. The proposed integration and
the issues canvassed in the heads of agreement were complicated,
with
potentially significant implications for all parties. In our view, the
presumption noted above at [127] was in
play. The parties had agreed to prepare a formal written document to record the
terms of their agreement and they did not
intend to be bound until that document
was drawn up and signed by them.
- [145] We accept
that the concept of guānxi might have been relevant given that all of the
parties are from China. The Supreme
Court explained guānxi as follows in
Deng v
Zheng:[129]
[76] Guānxi
is a complex term with multi-faceted meanings. Guānxi may be understood as
“interpersonal connections”,
“social capital”, or the
“set of personal connections which an individual may draw upon to secure
resources or
advantage when doing business or in the course of social
life”. Important bases of guānxi for an individual include kinship
and co‑working. As will be apparent from our reasons, the relationship
between Messrs Zheng and Deng (and those they worked
with) is consistent
with these concepts: in particular, the apparent significance to them of family
relationships and pre-existing
friendships in terms of whom they did business
with and the relative dearth of formal agreements. For this reason, an
understanding
of guānxi provides some support for Mr Zheng’s
case.
- [146] We have
already noted Dr Liao’s evidence. It was to the effect that assumptions
about Chinese culture and practice should
not be applied across the board, that
there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to the concept of
guānxi and that
much depends on the type of relationship and the nature and
value of the transaction in issue. Dr Godwin, also a Chinese law expert,
cited
this Court’s decision in
Zheng v Deng,[130]
and agreed with Dr Liao that, subject to the specific factual matrix in any
dispute, factors such as the values involved and the parties’
“stickiness” to traditional Chinese culture, as well as any
“interference factors”, could be relevant when
determining the
nature of a transaction between Chinese parties. He did not otherwise disagree
with Dr Liao’s assertions.
- [147] In the
present case, the transaction was not between family members. Mr Huang, Ms
Lu, Mr Chen and Jackie Huang had become friends,
but there was no kinship
between them. While they had earlier entered into various business transactions
together, they had invariably
entered into formal written agreements to document
those transactions. For example, when they purchased the initial Matakana villa
lots in late 2006, they subsequently entered into an agreement (in March 2007).
In October 2011, they entered into a joint venture
agreement in relation to the
purchase and funding of the Matakana land and winery business. This agreement
was superseded by the
April 2012 JV agreement. This latter document was in
writing, prepared with legal assistance, witnessed, signed and fingerprinted
by
each of the three individuals who were parties to it. Mr Chen also had a
written employment agreement with Matakana Wines in
relation to his position as
General Manager of that company.
- [148] As the
Judge noted, the history of the business relationships between the parties
suggested that each expected negotiations
to conclude with a formal written and
signed agreement.[131] Mr
Huang’s various iterations of the Integration Scheme support this
expectation, as do Mr Chen’s actions in referring
one of Mr Huang’s
drafts to Mr Botting, with instructions that he prepare a formal document,
to be governed by New Zealand
law.
- [149] In the
present case, we do not consider that the concept of guānxi advances
matters to any significant extent.
The conduct of the parties
from 2014–2016
- [150] The
appellants relied heavily on the conduct of the parties from early 2014 until
2016. Mr Barker submitted that conduct unequivocally
indicated that the parties
had agreed on integration and that accordingly, a partnership was formed.
Mr O’Brien disagreed.
He argued that it was necessary to look
at the broader picture — while some matters point to integration and
partnership,
others do not.
- [151] In March
2014, Mr Huang prepared a diagram for the Matakana Estate management structure
and it was circulated by Ms Huimin to
Mr Chen, Jackie Huang and Ms Lu. This
document, discussed above at [36], was
consistent with an agreement having been reached for the integration of Waihopai
and Matakana Wines and with the parties getting
on with the conduct of the
integrated entity’s business.
- [152] Other
conduct points to integration from this time onwards. First, Mr Huang,
Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Jackie Huang, attended regular
“board of
directors’ meetings”, where they discussed various issues, some of
which related to Waihopai’s
affairs. Secondly, accounting staff sent
regular updates to each of the main parties. The updates related to both
Matakana Wines
and Waihopai. Thirdly, one of the accountants, Ms Fu, created
spreadsheets recording the injection of “shareholders”
funds.
Further, there was a steady stream of WeChat messages, where the word
“shareholder(s)” was used repeatedly.
Again, all of these
interactions were consistent with a partnership agreement having been concluded,
although we note the acknowledgment
given by Mr Chen in his brief of evidence
— Mr Huang, Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Jackie Huang “were not
legally the ‘board’
of any company”. There is no evidence
that a new integrated company was incorporated or that authorities to act as
directors
were signed or filed with the Companies Office.
- [153] Mr Barker
submitted that there were two documents that were signed by the parties that
confirmed that the Integration Scheme
had been agreed and that there was a
partnership in place. He referred to the following:
(a) A “Meeting contents summary” dated 21 March 2015 signed by
Mr Huang, Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Jackie Huang. This document
referred to sales
goals for the year July 2015 to June 2016 and the need to undertake further
market development. It was noted that
Waihopai Vineyard was starting to produce
an income, but that a profit analysis would need to wait until the end of the
year. There
was a reference to the management and beautification of Matakana
Estate and to Matakana Zhongshan Ltd’s financial reports.
It was recorded
that slight adjustments to the Matakana Estate management structure were
required. As Mr Barker pointed out, Mr
Huang’s explanation under
cross-examination for this document was unconvincing.
(b) The Memorandum of Corporate Trusteeship — noted above at [40]. One translation of this document
recorded as follows:
To resolve [Waihopai’s] investing and financing matters, the original
shareholders [Mr Chen], [Yi Lu] invited [Mr Huang] to
join as a new
shareholder with a cash contribution. Each investing party confirms that the
updated shareholding structure for [Waihopai]
will be amended as follows: [Mr
Chen] represents 24%, [Mr Huang] represents 36%, Yi Lu 40%, and at the
appropriate time the registration
procedures for amending the company
shareholders will be handled.
It was signed by Mr Chen, Yi Lu, Mr Huang and Ms Lu on
23 March 2015. Mr Barker submitted that its clear intent was to
protect the
interests of all investing parties, including Mr Huang, and to
record the agreement between them as to the ownership of the company
and the
status of their respective investments.
- [154] This
latter document is ambivalent. In its terms it is open to a number of
interpretations, but on balance we doubt that it
goes as far as Mr Barker
submitted. Like the Judge, we note that the document recorded an invitation by
Mr Chen and Yi Lu to Mr
Huang to become a shareholder in
Waihopai.[132] It also refers to
Mr Huang joining as a shareholder and to the shareholdings being amended at some
future date. On Mr Chen’s
version of events, why such an invitation
was necessary on 23 March 2015 and why changes were expressed in the
future tense is unclear.
On Mr Chen’s argument, the partnership and
the purchase of the shares had been concluded sometime in 2013. Perhaps more
importantly,
the document is notable for what it does not say. It does not
record that the parties’ interests in Waihopai and Matakana
Wines had
already been integrated. Further there is no reference to Ms Lu becoming a
shareholder although clearly this had been
contemplated in earlier draft
documents.
- [155] We also
consider that there is force in Mr O’Brien’s submission that neither
of the signed documents satisfied the
essential terms required by Mr Huang in
his 26 May 2013 draft of the Integration Scheme and emphasised by him
in his evidence at
trial. Nor do they satisfy the conditions in the draft heads
of agreement prepared by Mr Botting.
- [156] In our
view, there are indicia in the party’s conduct between 2014 and 2016
pointing both ways, that is, toward and away
from an agreed Integration Scheme.
We accept that much of the party’s conduct supports Mr Chen’s
argument but consider
that other conduct does not. Significantly, there is no
evidence of the shareholdings in Waihopai being changed. Rather financial
spreadsheets prepared for the relevant years continued to refer to Mr
Chen’s 60 per cent share in the company and to Yi Lu’s
40 per cent share. There is nothing to suggest that gross returns or
profits were shared. Mr Huang and Ms Lu were providing substantial
funds
to assist Mr Chen/Waihopai, but these funds were recorded in
Waihopai’s accounts as loans.
- [157] In the
round, on the balance of probabilities, we do not consider that the
parties’ conduct establishes a partnership
agreement as alleged. Their
conduct is equally consistent with the parties working towards and even hoping
for a partnership agreement,
but without agreement having been concluded. There
is nothing to suggest that Mr Huang had given up on his essential terms,
namely
that he needed to see Waihopai’s
accounts,[133] and that there
should be a formal agreement in writing.
The conduct of the
parties following the breakdown of their relationship in 2017
- [158] The
relationship between the parties broke down in 2017 and, between September 2017
and March 2018, they discussed how they
might best separate their respective
business interests.
- [159] It was
submitted for Mr Chen that this evidence is consistent with integration and
that, in their various communications, Mr
Huang and Ms Lu sought to separate
their interests and secure an accounting based on the Integration Scheme. It
was claimed that
there was no demand for repayment of the loans under the
JV agreement, because the parties had ceased to rely on that agreement
given
that they were in partnership.
- [160] It was
argued for Mr Huang and Ms Lu that Mr Huang had advanced a lot of money to Mr
Chen and/or Waihopai and Mr Huang and Ms
Lu wanted to work out a way to get it
back. Mr Chen did not have any cash and, given the earlier integration
discussions, Mr Huang
was willing to talk to Mr Chen about the possibility of
Mr Chen repaying him by the transfer of assets.
- [161] There were
numerous WeChat messages exchanged from November 2016 onwards. Initially Mr
Huang was prepared to proceed on the
(it seems hypothetical) assumption that
everyone was a shareholder, with the apparent intention of negotiating a
satisfactory separation
of his business interests from those of Mr Chen. Later
Mr Huang was more direct. For example, in October 2017, he stated in a
WeChat
message to Mr Chen that the parties were involved in “a negotiation
of two major shareholders over assets division”.
In a subsequent message
on the same day, Mr Huang asserted that he was made a shareholder of
Waihopai because of Mr Chen’s
“urgent need”. Jackie
Huang however took a rather softer stance. She sent an email to Ms Lu, thanking
her and Mr Huang
for their “mutual help during our co‑operation,
especially Mr Huang who transferred cash into the company”.
- [162] Several
exit proposals were drafted, mostly by Ms Fu on Mr Huang’s
instructions. It seems that the parties were trying
to ascertain what assets
they had which might be available for any exit agreement. A “Matakana
Assets Value Summary”
was circulated late September 2017/early October
2017. Some of the information in that summary concerning Waihopai was,
according
to Mr Huang, provided by Mr Chen. A further document headed
“Matakana Wine Factory Assets Disposal Plan” set out various
proposals and recorded that regardless of which plan was chosen, inventory and
debts had to be cleared before ownership of the assets
could be finalised. In
another document, dated 20 November 2017, entitled “Assets
Disposal By Way of Reconstruction of Capital
Investments”, it was recorded
under the heading “Investment Evolution”, as
follows:
Based on the Matakana Estate Assets Integration Agreement
signed by [Mr Huang] (includes [Ms] Lu) and [Mr Chen] (includes [Jackie]
Huang) in 2013 ...
This suggests that there was a version of the Integration Scheme signed in
2013. No such document was produced at trial. The Judge
recorded that, to Mr
Chen’s credit, he had not seized on this reference to say that there was
in fact a signed version of the
Integration
Scheme.[134] Mr Barker argued
before us that the significance of the reference was more that it confirmed that
Mr Huang and Ms Lu thought that
the Integration Scheme had been agreed. He also
pointed to various other documents which he argued were only consistent with all
parties believing that the separation of their interests should be in accordance
with the Integration Scheme.
- [163] We do not
refer to each of these documents in detail nor to the evidence given by Ms Fu
relied on by the Judge. We accept that
the various proposals for the
unravelling of the parties’ business interests proceeded broadly on a
60/40 per cent spilt, as
had been proposed in the Integration Scheme. We note
however, that none of the documents was signed by the parties. We consider
that
the various documents are also consistent with the parties endeavouring to reach
agreement on the untangling of their business
interests. In our view, each of
them, Mr Chen and Mr Huang, was jockeying for position and trying to
maximise his financial position.
Nothing was finalised and we do not consider
that the discussions and proposals provide a reliable guide to whether or not
the parties
had earlier reached agreement to carry out their respective
businesses in partnership.
The OIO correspondence and
interview
- [164] In
2017, in the context of a separate property development, Mr Huang and Ms Lu
engaged lawyers in Auckland to obtain advice
on the OIO process. On
20 October 2017, those lawyers, on behalf of Mr Huang and Ms Lu, advised
the OIO about the Matakana land
acquisition. The OIO began an investigation
into that transaction that lasted for some two years. In the course of that
investigation,
the OIO contacted Mr Chen and sought his version of what had
occurred. By letter dated 5 April 2018 from his barrister, Mr Lear,
Mr
Chen stated as follows:
[Waihopai]
- During
early 2013, [Waihopai] was placed into Receivership by its bank which was caused
by the difficult trading conditions created
by the management and supply
contracts with the Vegars. The bank remained supportive of [Mr Chen] and Yi Lu
and agreed to take it
out of Receivership if new shareholder funds were
introduced in order to reduce the Bank's lending facility by $2m. [Mr Chen] and
the other shareholders could only raise $800,000 and went to other friends and
acquaintances to raise the balance. [Mr Chen] advises
that he secured loans for
the balance from acquaintances in China but then thought that he should perhaps
inform [Mr Huang] and [Ms
Lu] given their connection with Matakana and that his
vineyard supplied some grapes to Matakana. On hearing the proposed arrangement,
[Mr Huang] said he would help them out and provide the balance of the funds
to bail the company out of Receivership. [Mr Huang]
advanced $1.2m to [Mr Chen]
and with the other funding provided by the shareholders, [Waihopai] came out of
Receivership.
- Following
the bailout of [Waihopai], [Mr Huang] put forward a proposal that their
respective loans and investments in Matakana and
Waihopai be amalgamated in what
was termed the “Matakana Estate Integration Scheme”. We believe the
OIO has already
been provided with a copy of this document. [Mr Chen] does not
believe this was signed as a formal agreement needed to be prepared.
- At
the end of 2013, [Mr Chen] arranged for his lawyer, Brad Botting, to start
drafting an agreement. Attached is a draft Heads of
Agreement between [Mr Chen]
and his wife, and [Mr Huang] and [Ms Lu] called the Matakana Wine Limited
Partnership. Similar to the
Integration Scheme, this agreement would have
brought together under a 60/40 ownership of [Mr Chen’s] (and his
brother's) interest
in [Waihopai], and their respective interests in the
Matakana properties. This agreement was conditional on obtaining consents under
the Overseas Investment Act if required at the time. [Mr Chen] believes a copy
of the draft was emailed to [Mr Huang] and/or [Ms
Lu] in January 2014 but does
not think it was advanced any further or signed.
- Approximately
10 months after coming out from under Receivership, [Waihopai] became embroiled
in lengthy and very costly High Court
litigation in relation to the disputed
management and supply contracts with the Vegars[.] Additional money was
required to fund
the litigation that went to a full hearing. The shareholders
of the company, along with [Mr Huang], contributed funds, at least
some of which
were loaned to the company via [Ms Lu] and secured by an unregistered second
mortgage, with a caveat registered against
the vineyard property. [Waihopai]
was mainly successful in the High Court case, but both sides appealed. To avoid
more legal costs,
the dispute was finally settled and although it was expensive
for the company the Vegars finally have no involvement with that vineyard.
- [165] Mr Chen
was interviewed by the OIO on 6 June 2018. It was a voluntary interview, but Mr
Chen was told at the outset that it
was an offence to make a false and
misleading statement to the investigating officers, or to make a material
omission in any statement
made. Relevantly Mr Chen:
(a) agreed with an assertion made by the investigating officer that the
$1.2 million received from Mr Huang was a loan;
(b) confirmed that Mr Huang had advanced $1.2 million to him as stated in
para 23 of the letter cited above at [164];
(c) agreed that the integration proposals were merely a “sort of a future
plan”; and
(d) agreed with his barrister’s description of the integration proposals
as being:
... sort of the vision, or whatever, [of] how they were going to put it
together. ... [A] concept scheme ... it’s a scheme,
an integration of a
scheme.
- [166] Clearly,
Mr Chen’s version of events both in his correspondence with the OIO and at
interview is inconsistent with the
later assertion in his pleadings and at trial
that there was a partnership agreement based on the Integration Scheme.
Mr Chen’s actions in selling Waihopai and distributing its
assets
- [167] As
noted above at [50]–[51], on 10 December 2020, unbeknown to Mr
Huang and Ms Lu, Mr Chen and Yi Lu caused Waihopai to enter into an agreement to
sell its land
and business. The sale was settled and, in January and February
2021, Mr Chen and Yi Lu caused Waihopai to distribute the net proceeds
totalling $7,476,766.27 to Mr Chen, Don Chen and Yi Lu. The amounts paid to
each have been noted above.
- [168] The sale
of the assets was only disclosed to Mr Huang and Ms Lu on 22 February 2021
in a brief of evidence from Mr Chen forwarded
to the respondents. At this point
the settlement was complete and the sale proceeds had been distributed.
- [169] Mr Chen
did not treat Mr Huang and Ms Lu as partners. Nor did he treat them as joint
venturers. He did not discuss the sale
of Waihopai with them. No funds from
the sale were transferred to them. Mr Chen’s actions in selling one of
the alleged partnership’s
principal assets, Waihopai, and distributing the
proceeds of sale to himself, his brother and Yi Lu, are completely inconsistent
with any alleged partnership. It is difficult to think of any actions that
could have been more antithetical to the alleged partnership.
We agree with Mr
O’Brien, that, if there was a partnership and a concluded Integration
Scheme as alleged, Mr Chen’s
conduct was either fraudulent or, at the
least, an egregious breach of his fiduciary obligations.
Conclusion
- [170] We
fall back on the burden of proof. Mr Chen and the other appellants were
alleging that there was a partnership based on the
Integration Scheme. The
burden of proving the same rested on them, on the balance of probabilities.
They failed to persuade the
Judge that it was more probable than not that there
was a partnership. They have not persuaded us that there was any material error
in the Judge’s analysis. We have considered the issue afresh on its
merits. While there are factors pointing both ways, we
agree with the
Judge’s overall assessment that there was no partnership arising out of
the Integration Scheme or otherwise.
Accordingly, this aspect of the appeal
fails.
Other issues related to the alleged partnership
If there was a partnership, was it vitiated by misrepresentations or
misleading conduct?
- [171] We
have found that there was no partnership. Accordingly, it is not necessary for
us to address this issue. The Judge found
that if there was a partnership, it
was vitiated by Mr Chen’s misrepresentations and misleading conduct. For
completeness,
we record that we agree with the Judge’s analysis, for the
reasons which she set out in [215]–[258] of her
judgment.
If the Integration Scheme or partnership was agreed and
was not vitiated, is the appropriate remedy to order an accounting?
- [172] Again,
and for the same reasons, it is not necessary for us to address this issue. We
accept that, had there been a partnership,
then prima facie, the appropriate
remedy would have been to order an accounting, but the issue does not arise for
consideration on
our view of the facts.
If the Integration
Scheme or partnership was not agreed or it was vitiated, what are the
appropriate remedies?
- [173] This
aspect of the appeal was dealt with by Mr Judd for the appellants and
Mr Pascariu for the respondents. Before we turn
to consider the various
particularised issues relating to remedy raised by the appellants, there is one
other issue it is convenient
to deal with at this stage.
Should
Mr Huang and Ms Lu be permitted to adduce further evidence?
- [174] On
27 October 2023, the respondents filed an interlocutory application under
r 45 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005
seeking leave to adduce what
was described as “updating” evidence. The evidence comprised an
affidavit from Ms Lu, also
dated 27 October 2023. In that affidavit Ms Lu dealt
with the following matters:
(a) Following delivery of the High Court judgment, Mr Chen transferred title of
the Matakana land to Ms Lu and Mr Huang. Mr Chen
owed $793,971.18 to a bank,
the ASB, which was secured under a mortgage he had registered over the Matakana
land. Mr Chen claimed
that he was unable to repay this debt and Ms Lu and
Mr Huang had to refinance the mortgage. After crediting Mr Chen with the
$530,784.00
owed to him by Matakana Wines, as determined by the Judge (see above
at [114]–[115]), Ms Lu and Mr Huang assumed liability
for the remaining
sum outstanding.
(b) The proposed development of the Matakana land as required under the
retrospective consent granted by the OIO.
- [175] The
appellants objected to this further evidence being received by the Court. They
argued that the application was too late,
that to the extent it related to
events since the High Court trial, it was irrelevant and that to the extent that
it related to events
prior to the High Court trial, it was evidence that could
and should have been given at trial. They protested that it was not possible
to
address the credibility of the proposed evidence and that there was no way of
knowing whether the evidence was a fair and complete
record of what had
happened, particularly in regard to the proposed development.
- [176] The
criteria for the filing of fresh evidence are well established. The evidence
must credible, fresh and cogent. Evidence
will not be regarded as fresh if it
could, with reasonable diligence, have been produced at
trial.[135] Litigants have a duty
to adduce at trial all of their evidence, reasonably
discoverable.[136] The
constraints on the admission of further evidence are strict.
- [177] We accept
that the updating evidence, explaining that the land has been transferred since
judgment and the circumstances in
which it was transferred, is fresh and, prima
facie, cogent and credible. It is concise and it is contained in a sworn
affidavit.
Notwithstanding the appellants’ protests, it could have
readily been corrected if there was any error in it. We are not however
persuaded that the proposed evidence in relation to the proposed development of
the Matakana land is fresh, or necessarily credible
and cogent. It is evidence
which should have been adduced at trial, in support of Mr Huang’s and Ms
Lu’s claim for damages.
It is lengthy and it is accompanied by a
voluminous exhibit. It would not have been easy for the appellants to correct
or take
issue with the proposed evidence at short notice. It is, in our view,
too late for the respondents to try and adduce this evidence
on appeal,
essentially to try and repair an evidential lacuna exposed by the notice of
appeal. To admit it at this stage would be
unfair to the appellants.
- [178] We grant
leave to the respondents permitting them to adduce by way of further evidence
[1] and [2] of Ms Lu’s affidavit
of 27 October 2023. We decline leave to
the respondents to adduce in evidence the remainder of the affidavit dealing
with the proposed
development of the Matakana land.
- [179] We now
turn to the particularised remedy issues raised by the appellants.
Should all three parties to the JV agreement be required to
perform the terms of the agreement and if so when, or should the assets
remain
with the respondents?
The submissions
- [180] Mr
Judd, for the appellants, acknowledged that, if the Court found that there was
no partnership agreement between the parties,
the JV agreement remained in
force. He submitted however that the agreement should be enforced in accordance
with its terms. He
accepted that Mr Chen did not make the loan repayments which
he was required to make in accordance with the JV agreement and that
Mr Chen
held the Matakana land on constructive trust. He asserted however, that Mr Chen
held the land on constructive trust not
just for Mr Huang and Ms Lu, but for all
three joint venturers: Mr Huang, Ms Lu and himself. Mr Judd did not accept
that Mr Chen
had breached the fiduciary duties owed by him, or that he had
otherwise engaged in conduct that disentitled him from requiring performance
of
the JV agreement for his own benefit. It was argued that the appropriate relief
was to order all three parties to perform the
JV agreement, which would require
Mr Chen to repay the loans made by Mr Huang (together with interest) and to
transfer legal ownership
of the assets held under the JV agreement to the
three joint venturers in the agreed proportions.
- [181] Mr
Pascariu, for the respondents, asserted that the JV agreement had been
terminated. He noted that it is subject to the law
in China and that Dr Liao
gave evidence that the Contract Law Act (or Code) in China provides that a party
may unilaterally cancel
a contract if the other party has fundamentally breached
the contract or failed to perform his, her or its obligations after being
demanded to do so. Mr Pascariu accepted that there was no evidence as to
the mechanics of cancellation under Chinese law, but argued
that it was clear
that demand was made on Mr Chen for repayment of the monies advanced under the
JV agreement and for the transfer
of the title to the Matakana land, and that Mr
Chen failed to comply with this demand. It was submitted that the Judge’s
decision
to grant relief under New Zealand law, by way of a declaration of
constructive trust and an order for the transfer of the Matakana
land was
appropriate and supported by authority.
The JV agreement
- [182] The
JV agreement is dated 19 April 2012. It was between Mr Huang, Mr Chen and
Ms Lu. It recorded that, on the basis of “honesty,
mutual benefit and
friendly cooperation”, the parties had reached agreement on the joint
acquisition and operation of Matakana
Estate. Details of the acquisition were
set out, as was the funding for the purchase. Under the heading
“Cooperation Model”,
the total investment required for the project
was said to be $4.2 million. Mr Huang was to invest $2.31 million in the
project,
accounting for 55 per cent of the venture, Mr Chen was to invest
$1.47 million, accounting for 35 per cent of the venture, and Ms
Lu was to
contribute $420,000, accounting for 10 per cent of the venture. The funds to
acquire Matakana Estate were to be paid in
advance by Mr Huang and once OIO
approval had been obtained, Mr Chen was to repay Mr Huang and Ms Lu.
The agreement provided that
the $1.47 million to be invested by Mr Chen was
a loan from Mr Huang to Mr Chen, accruing interest from the date of the loan in
accordance
“with the interest rate on commercial loans in New Zealand over
the same period”. Mr Chen promised to repay $470,000
by 31 December 2013,
$500,000 by 31 December 2014 and $500,000 by 31 December 2015. The JV
agreement expressly recorded as follows:
This Agreement is concluded
within the territory of the People’s Republic of China and is governed by
and construed in accordance
with the laws of China.
The applicable law
- [183] In
the High Court, the Judge accepted submissions advanced for the respondents, and
not challenged by the appellants, that the
Court should apply remedies under
New Zealand law to match the substantive rights determined by Chinese
law.[137]
- [184] Parties
are free to choose the law they wish to be applicable to their agreement and the
courts generally give effect the parties’
intentions.[138]
It is ordinarily the lex causae that determines whether a party is entitled to
relief and whether the Court should grant relief.
This however is not an
invariable principle and the response of the courts can vary depending on the
nature of the relief that is
sought.[139] New Zealand courts
can have jurisdiction to determine a claim even though the substance of the
claim is not governed by New Zealand
law.[140]
- [185] Claims for
equitable relief were traditionally considered to be a matter for the law of the
forum — the lex fori.[141]
However, in Schumacher v Summergrove Estates Ltd, this Court held
that the imposition of a constructive trust was governed by the law applicable
to the obligation, interest or event
giving rise to
it.[142]
- [186] While the
New Zealand courts lack the power to grant a remedy that is unknown to New
Zealand law, where relief available under
the lex causae lacks an equivalent
under the lex fori, the court is still able to grant its own relief, provided it
is sufficiently
similar in nature. The authors of The Conflict of
Laws in New Zealand suggest that the right approach in such cases is to
apply the lex causae to determine whether the relief is available or should be
granted, and then to make an order for the New Zealand form of that relief if
appropriate. They suggest that the courts should ask
themselves the following
— what is the nature of the liability under the foreign law and what
remedy or remedies does New Zealand
law provide for New Zealand law liability
similar or analogous to the kind of liability established under the foreign
law?[143]
- [187] This is
essentially the approach the Judge applied to those causes of action that
related to the Matakana land. This approach
was not challenged on appeal and we
take the issue no further.
- [188] There are
no conflict of laws issues with the Waihopai claims. Each cause of action arose
in New Zealand. Waihopai is a New
Zealand registered company. Its business and
assets were in New Zealand. So were its directors and shareholders (and
presumably
its registered office). By the time the matter was before the High
Court, all of the relevant parties had New Zealand residence.
It was intended
that an agreement would be drawn up in New Zealand, by a New Zealand lawyer and
the draft agreement that was drawn
up was intended to be governed by New Zealand
law.
The Matakana land — Chinese law
- [189] As
already noted, the Judge received expert evidence on relevant Chinese law from
two expert witnesses, Dr Liao and Dr Godwin.
- [190] It was Dr
Liao’s evidence that, as a matter of Chinese law, a party’s
contractual obligations, including what the
obligations are and when a
particular obligation is due, are as agreed by the parties to the contract,
unless otherwise prescribed
by an applicable compulsory law. Dr Liao said that
there was no compulsory law applicable to the JV agreement in respect of Mr
Chen’s
repayment obligations that would change or affect what the JV
agreement said. He also considered that, under Chinese law, once OIO
consent
had been obtained, it was Mr Chen’s obligation under the
JV agreement to transfer ownership of the Matakana land to
Mr Huang and Ms
Lu, proportionate to the capital contributions of each party to the joint
venture. He said that specific performance
is more readily available in China
than in common law jurisdictions and that it would be the preferred relief given
that what was
involved was unique real property.
- [191] Dr Liao
also said that Chinese law provides that a party can cancel a contract in two
situations — first, termination
by agreement or on satisfaction or
fulfilment of agreed conditions, and secondly, unilateral termination under art
94 of the Contract
Law Act (or Code) of the Peoples’ Republic of
China (Contract Law Act). The English translation of art 94 provided by Dr Liao
relevantly states as follows:
A party to a contract may
terminate/cancel/dissolve the contract under any of the following
circumstances:
...
(2) prior to the expiration of the period of performance, the other party
expressly states, or indicates through its conduct, that
it will not perform its
main obligation;
(3) the other party delayed performance of its main obligation, and after
such performance has been demanded, fails to perform within
a reasonable
period;
(4) the other party delays performance of its obligations, or breaches the
contract in some other manner, rendering it impossible
to achieve the purpose of
the contract;
...
- [192] Dr Liao
gave evidence that equity is not part of Chinese law, unless a particular
equitable principle is incorporated by statute.
Estoppel, resulting and
constructive trusts have not been adopted by any statutes to date in China and
fiduciary relationships are
not part of Chinese law.
- [193] Dr Godwin,
called by the appellants, was in broad agreement with Dr Liao’s evidence
that a party’s obligations under
Chinese law are as agreed by the parties
to the contract and also with the proposition that a party’s obligations
can be overridden
by mandatory rules of law. Dr Godwin did not comment on Dr
Liao’s observations regarding cancellation, or on the availability
of
remedies either in equity or otherwise under Chinese law.
Has
the JV agreement been cancelled?
- [194] It
was not disputed that Mr Chen breached the JV agreement. However, breach does
not result in automatic cancellation.
(a) Article 94 of Contract Law Act makes it clear that, when the circumstances
set out in that provision apply, the parties have
a discretion whether or not to
terminate, cancel or dissolve the contract. There was no evidence adduced to
suggest that Mr Huang
and Ms Lu decided to terminate the JV agreement or that
they took any steps to that end. Further there was no evidence adduced as
to
what is required under Chinese law to cancel a contract. While circumstances
have arisen which would entitle Mr Huang and Ms
Lu to cancel the
JV agreement under Chinese law, there is no evidence suggesting that they
have done so.
(b) Similarly, under New Zealand law, it is clear both at common law and under
the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 that a contract
is not automatically
cancelled where it is
breached.[144] The innocent party
has an election. The innocent party may either treat the contract as cancelled
or affirm the contract by treating
it as still in force. If the innocent party
chooses to keep the contract on foot, the status quo is preserved intact. The
contract
remains in force for the benefit of both
sides.[145]
(c) The respondents in their pleading did not allege that the JV agreement had
been cancelled. Rather they sought to enforce it
by seeking an order that
Mr Chen transfer the Matakana land to them.
- [195] We
conclude that the JV agreement has not been cancelled and that it remains in
force.
The consequences of non-cancellation
- [196] Under
New Zealand law, fresh demand could be made and, if it was not complied with, Mr
Huang and Ms Lu could then cancel the
JV agreement. It may be that the same
position applies under art 94(3) of the Contract Law Act in China, although
we do not have
enough information before us to reach a concluded view in this
regard. While the Judge expressed views as to the application of
the doctrine
of laches,[146] those views were
obiter. Mr Chen has not belatedly sought to repay the $1.47 million loan that
he received from Mr Huang under the
JV agreement or interest on that sum.
Additional monies are now owing as a result of the fact that Mr Huang and
Ms Lu were required
to refinance and assume liability for part of the mortgage
Mr Chen had put in place over the Matakana land. Unless and until
Mr
Chen complies with his obligations, issues of laches do not arise.
- [197] The
appellants seek a direction from the Court that all three parties to the
JV agreement should be required to perform the
terms of that agreement and
a further direction as to when they should do so. In the circumstances, these
matters are academic.
Mr Chen cannot expect the Court to declare what his
rights might be in the event that he decides to belatedly honour his obligations
under the agreement and at law. We decline to take this issue any further.
Should the damages award against Mr Chen for the increased
building costs of the proposed Matakana development due to delay be set
aside?
- [198] The
Judge ordered “equitable damages” of $3 million against Mr Chen for
losses she found had been suffered by the
respondents because they were not able
to commence the proposed development of the Matakana land when they otherwise
intended to
do so.[147]
- [199] At trial,
the respondents alleged that Mr Chen’s failure to transfer the Matakana
land to Mr Huang and Ms Lu, and Mr Chen’s
obstructive approach to the
proposed development, delayed, by around two years, the development of the
Matakana land as required
under the OIO consent conditions. Mr Huang and Ms Lu
asserted that the development costs increased significantly during that delay.
They called evidence from a chartered quantity surveyor, Patrick Hanlon, who
said that the development costs increased by approximately
$3–$3.2 million
between late September 2020 (when the OIO consent was issued) and 2022. The
appellants did not call evidence
in an endeavour to rebut Mr Hanlon’s
evidence; nor did they cross‑examine him.
Submissions
- [200] For
the appellants, Mr Judd argued that there was no evidential basis for awarding
equitable damages, because there was no evidence
of the factual assumptions
relied on by Mr Hanlon. He also asserted that the loss was not reasonably
foreseeable, that it was too
remote and that the quantum of the award should be
reduced to reflect Mr Chen’s entitlement to a 35 per cent in the
joint venture.
- [201] Mr
Pascariu, for the respondents, submitted that this was a new argument, which Mr
Chen was seeking to raise for the first time
on appeal. He suggested that the
issue was not pleaded and that it was not put to either Mr Huang or Ms Lu in
cross‑examination.
In the alternative, he asserted that Ms Lu provided
evidence, albeit brief, of the fact that Mr Chen’s failure to transfer
the
land to her and Mr Huang had delayed the development of the Matakana land and
that she was not cross-examined on this aspect
of her evidence. It was
submitted that this uncontested evidence was a sufficient basis for Mr
Hanlon’s loss assessment.
Analysis
- [202] The
respondents, in their pleadings, alleged loss and damages as a result of
Mr Chen retaining the ownership of the Matakana
land. They asserted that
they had been unable to develop the land and business as anticipated and as
required by the OIO consent.
In their prayer for relief, they sought equitable
damages “to be detailed before trial”. The appellants, in their
statement
of defence, denied that Mr Huang and Ms Lu had suffered loss and
damage and asserted that, if Mr Huang and Ms Lu had requested that
Mr Chen agree
to work to improve the land, he would have agreed as it would have been in his
interests. In their reply, the respondents
denied these assertions.
- [203] Clearly,
there was an assertion of loss and damage and a corresponding denial. As a
result, it fell for Mr Huang and Ms Lu
to prove the damages they were
claiming.[148] We agree with Mr
Judd that they failed to do so. We have reached this view for the following
reasons:
(a) In his evidence, Mr Hanlon said that he had been “instructed that ...
[the respondents] would have been able to commence
works on approximately
23 September 2020, allowing one week for the transfer of the land to
[them]”. The date 23 September
2020 was one week after the OIO consent
was granted.
(b) There was no evidence from the respondents either that they intended to
start work on 23 September 2020 or that they were able
to do so. There was, by
way of example, no evidence in relation to the financing of the proposed
development, the obtaining of any
resource consents required or the obtaining of
other regulatory approvals, for example building permits. There was no evidence
regarding
possible opposition to the development by neighbours or others. We
were told by Mr Judd that some of the land included in the master
plans for the
proposed development was not owned by the respondents. This assertion was not
disputed by Mr Pascariu.
(c) Ms Lu in her evidence-in-chief simply complained that Mr Chen’s
breaches of the JV agreement had delayed her and Mr Huang’s
plans and that
they had suffered loss. She gave no greater detail. Rather she referred to the
evidence of somebody called Alex
Shi. However, Alex Shi was not called as
a witness.
- [204] Section
25(3) of the Evidence Act 2006 provides that if an opinion by an expert is based
on a fact that is outside the expert’s
knowledge, the opinion may be
relied on “only if that fact is or will be proved or judicially noticed in
the proceeding”.
In this case, the underlying facts relied on by Mr
Hanlon were not proved and they were not matters of which judicial notice could
be taken. Without the factual foundation for his evidence, Mr Hanlon’s
opinion as to an increase in costs could not be relied
on — it was of no
substantial assistance to the
Court.[149]
- [205] As a
result of our finding on this issue, it is not necessary for us to go on and
consider whether or not the Judge erred when
she found that it was reasonably
foreseeable that Mr Huang and Ms Lu would start implementing their proposed
development plan at
the earliest opportunity. Nor is it necessary for us to
consider whether or not a reduction in quantum was appropriate.
- [206] We allow
the appeal in this respect and set aside the award of equitable damages made by
the Judge in respect of the first,
second and third causes of action.
Were the payments made by the respondents in relation to the
Waihopai Vineyard loans to Mr Chen only, or to both Mr Chen and
Waihopai?
- [207] The
Judge found that the Waihopai advances were made to both Mr Chen and
Waihopai.[150] She referred
throughout her judgment to the loans being made to “Mr Chen and/or
Waihopai” and the relief she granted
to the respondents covered both
possibilities.
Submissions
- [208] Mr
Judd advised that Mr Chen accepted that, if the appellants’ primary
argument based on integration was not successful,
the monies paid to him by
Mr Huang were a debt owing by him. He did not however accept that the
Judge was correct to find that Waihopai
was also liable for the debt.
- [209] Mr
Pascariu submitted that it was common ground that Waihopai was the end recipient
of all the advances made by Mr Huang and
Ms Lu, and that whether the advances
were made to Mr Chen on Waihopai’s behalf or to Waihopai direct was
irrelevant; the company
was the ultimate beneficiary.
Analysis
- [210] We
agree with Judge that the initial advance of $1.2 million made by Mr Huang
on 25 June 2013 and the later advances, which
the Judge accepted totalled
$1,176,261,[151] were loans and
not payments for the purpose of acquiring an interest in Waihopai. We concur
with her reasoning in this
regard.[152] These findings
however do not deal directly with the issue of whether or not the loans were to
Mr Chen or to Waihopai or to both.
- [211] In our
view, the initial $1.2 million loan made on 25 June 2013 must be considered
separately from the later advances made from
December 2013 through to February
2017.
- [212] Mr Huang
gave evidence that he lent the monies advanced by him to Mr Chen and not to
Waihopai. When he was questioned about
Waihopai, he claimed that at the time he
lent the monies, he had never heard of the company and that he knew nothing
about it. We
do not accept his assertions that he knew nothing about Waihopai.
They are patently untrue and are clearly inconsistent with the
evidence, some of
which we have set out above. Nevertheless, Mr Huang’s assertion that he
advanced the monies to Mr Chen is
relevant because it is consistent with the way
in which the advance was made. It was made direct to Mr Chen’s
solicitor’s
trust account. It is also consistent with the way in which
the advance was treated. Mr Chen and Yi Lu, as directors of Waihopai,
signed a
resolution dated 28 June 2013 which recorded that they had managed to procure
new loans “for” (not to) the company.
An acknowledgment of debt was
entered into, recording that Waihopai was indebted to Mr Chen and Yi Lu and
the same position was
taken by Mr Chen in his correspondence and interview
with the OIO in mid‑2018. There is no documentary record of any
indebtedness
by Waihopai to Mr Huang. The $1.2 million advance was not recorded
in Waihopai’s financial accounts as being a loan direct
to the company by
Mr Huang. It follows, in our view, that the $1.2 million initial advance was
made by Mr Huang to Mr Chen, who
in turn on-lent it to Waihopai. That
Mr Chen on-lent the monies to Waihopai does not create a debtor/creditor
relationship direct
between Waihopai and Mr Huang.
- [213] The
position with the later advances is more difficult to ascertain, because the
evidence is more limited. Mr Huang and Ms
Lu pleaded that the later advances
were loans to Mr Chen. Mr Chen denied this and said that they were loans to
Waihopai. The loans
commenced in December 2013 and continued on a relatively
regular basis until February 2017. The March 2015 Memorandum of Corporate
Trusteeship recorded that all future advances to Waihopai were to be made by way
of loan through Ms Lu, as a third party lender.
This document was signed by
Mr Chen, Yi Lu, Mr Huang and Ms Lu.
- [214] In so far
as we can glean, the later advances made by Mr Huang, Ms Lu and entities
associated with them, were treated in such
other records as were adduced in
evidence for the period 2014–2018 as loans direct to Waihopai (albeit that
most of the records
produced in the course of the hearing were unsigned). In
its financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2016, Waihopai included
the
later advances to that point comprising two loans — one called the
“Alex loan” and the other the “Chrissy
loan”. They were
shown as being liabilities of Waihopai. The 2017 financial statements do not
assist and in the 2018 financial
statements, the Alex loan and the Chrissy loan
seem to have been consolidated with other loans under the heading
“Shareholder
Loans”. The Waihopai shareholders, Mr Chen and Yi Lu,
were also advancing funds to Waihopai by way of loan. There is no evidence
to
suggest, or reason to find, that the advances by Mr Huang, Ms Lu and the various
entities they controlled, should be treated differently.
The Judge was
satisfied that the accounts were evidence of what was
intended.[153] So are we. On the
balance of probabilities, we conclude that the additional advances over and
above the initial $1.2 million were
made by way of loan to Waihopai.
- [215] The
conclusions we have reached require some amendment to the amounts awarded under
some of the causes of action relating to
the Waihopai advances. The Judge gave
judgment in the principal sum of $2,376,261 against Mr Chen under the fourth
cause of action.
That sum is reduced to $1.2 million. Under the fifth cause of
action, she gave judgment against Waihopai in the principal sum of
$2,376,261.
That sum is reduced to $1,176,261.
Should the orders made
against the third to seventh appellants under s 348 of the Property Law Act be
aside?
- [216] We
have summarised the relevant causes of action above at [111].
Submissions
- [217] Mr
Judd’s submission on this point was straightforward. He argued that
Waihopai did not owe any debt to Mr Huang and
that therefore the judgments
against the third to seventh appellants should be set aside, as Mr Huang (and Ms
Lu) were not creditors
of Waihopai. He accepted however that, if monies were
owing by Waihopai to Mr Huang (and Ms Lu), the proceeds of sale of the vineyard
should be repaid to the company. He challenged the Judge’s direction that
any of the funds received by the appellants from
the sale of the vineyard should
be paid direct to Mr Chen and by him to Mr Huang in satisfaction of the
Waihopai advances. He argued
that the effect of the Judge’s direction in
relation to the sixth and seventh causes of action was to give Mr Huang
priority
over other creditors of Waihopai.
- [218] Mr
Pascariu argued that the appellants’ criticisms were unwarranted. He
argued that Waihopai was a recipient of all the
advances made by the
respondents. He noted that if Mr Chen was the party liable for the Waihopai
advances, he could no longer repay
those advances to the respondents, because he
had rendered himself insolvent through his concealed distribution of the
vineyard proceeds.
He also noted that the distribution rendered Waihopai
insolvent. He submitted the Judge’s finding that the distribution of
the
vineyard proceeds was intended to cause prejudice and had the effect of causing
prejudice to the respondents was supported by
the evidence. He referred to ss
346–348 of the Property Law Act and argued those provisions gave the Court
a discretion to
make an order vesting property in, or requiring a person to pay
reasonable compensation to, an applicant prejudiced by the disposition
of the
property. He submitted that the exercise of the discretion conferred by the
Property Law Act and the “waterfall”
relief granted by the Judge was
appropriately tailored to respond to the appellants’ breaches of the
Property Law Act and the
loss suffered by Mr Huang (and Ms Lu) as a
result.
Analysis
- [219] We
have concluded above that some of the monies advanced by Mr Huang were
loans to Mr Chen and that other of the monies were
loans to Waihopai. There was
no challenge to the Judge’s findings in regard to the operation of ss
346–348 of the Property
Law Act.
- [220] The
seventh cause of action was against Mr Chen, Don Chen (Mr Chen’s
brother), Jackie Huang and AEG. The Judge found
the cause of action was proved
and made an order under s 348 of the Property Law Act requiring each of them to
repay the funds they
received through the prejudicial dispositions back to
Mr Chen’s account and further requiring Mr Chen to pay the
respondents
$2,376,261, together with interest on that sum from the date on
which each of the individual advances making up that sum was
advanced.[154]
- [221] We have
some difficulty with the Judge’s orders in relation to the seventh cause
of action. The monies that were paid
out to Mr Chen, Yi Lu, Don Chen,
Jackie Huang, Qi Yang and AEG came from the proceeds of sale of Waihopai
and its assets. It seems
that some of them were creditors of Waihopai, as were
Mr Huang and Ms Lu. We cannot see that it is appropriate to direct Mr Chen,
Don Chen, Jackie Huang and AEG to repay the funds received by them to
Mr Chen’s account. It was never Mr Chen’s money.
In so far as
we are aware, Don Chen, Jackie Huang and AEG were not creditors of Mr Chen
and they were not paid out on that basis.
In our judgement, it is appropriate
to set aside the orders the Judge made in respect of the seventh cause of
action.
- [222] With one
exception it is however appropriate to retain the orders made by the Judge under
the eighth cause of action. Under
that cause of action, the Judge required
Mr Chen, Yi Lu, Don Chen, Jackie Huang, Qi Yang and AEG to repay the
amounts they received
direct to Waihopai, and for Waihopai to pay the
respondents $2,376,261.[155]
- [223] In our
view, it is not appropriate to require Waihopai to pay the monies direct to Mr
Huang, Ms Lu and Matakana Wines. Waihopai
may have other creditors, including
some of the appellants. The better course is to leave it open to any of the
parties to appoint
a liquidator. Each of the various parties, together with Mr
Huang and Ms Lu and any other creditors, will be entitled to seek to
prove
in the liquidation and to participate pro rata in the distribution of
Waihopai’s assets.
- [224] This
requires us to amend the orders made in respect of the eighth cause of action,
by setting aside the order that Waihopai
pay Mr Huang, Ms Lu and
Matakana Wines $2,376,261. In all other respects we uphold the relief
granted by the Judge in relation to
the eighth cause of action.
Should the interest award to the respondents on the Waihopai
claims be set aside?
- [225] The
Judge awarded interest to the respondents on the Waihopai claims under s 12
of the Interest on Money Claims Act.
Submissions
- [226] Mr
Judd argued that the Judge was wrong to award interest to the respondents,
because they did not, as required, plead a claim
for interest under
s 24(2)(b) of the Interest on Money Claims Act. It was submitted that as a
result, the Judge was prevented by
s 25 of that Act from awarding interest to
the respondents.
- [227] Mr
Pascariu pointed to s 26 of the Interest on Money Claims Act and argued that it
expressly preserves the respondents’
right to interest at common law and
in equity. He also said that claim for recovery of the Waihopai advances was
pleaded not only
as a debt, but also by way of claims for monies had and
received and for unjust enrichment. Out of caution he made an oral application
for leave to amend the statement of claim to seek interest under s 24(2)(b) of
the Interest on Money Claims Act.
Analysis
- [228] The
Interest on Money Claims Act came into force on 1 January 2018, well after the
initial $1.2 million was advanced by Mr Huang
and some time after the later
advances, which occurred between 2013 and 2017.
- [229] Section 24
of the Interest on Money Claims Act provides, relevantly, as follows:
- Special
provision for interest or lump sum relating to contracts entered into before
commencement
(1) This section applies to the period before the date of a money judgment if
the judgment is given for an amount under, or for breach
of, a contract entered
into before the coming into force of this Act.
(2) Where this section applies to a period before the date of a money
judgment,—
(a) the court may not award interest under Part
1 for the period; but
(b) the court may—
(i) award interest on all or part of the amount of the money judgment at a
rate not exceeding the rate prescribed for the purposes
of this section,
calculated in the manner (with or without compounding) that the court directs;
or
...
(iii) determine not to award interest ...
- [230] The
maximum prescribed rate is currently 5 per cent per
annum.[156]
- [231] Section
25 of the Act relevantly provides as follows:
- Court
may not award interest unless procedural requirements complied
with
(1) A court may not award interest under a section of this Act for a period
unless the party who claims interest under the section
for that period specifies
the section and, as far as possible, the period in that party’s statement
or notice of claim or counterclaim.
...
(2) If a party claims interest under section ... 24,—
(a) the party must specify in that party’s statement or notice of
claim or counterclaim the amount or rate of interest claimed;
and
(b) the court may not award interest—
(i) exceeding the amount claimed under paragraph (a); or
(ii) at a rate exceeding the rate claimed under paragraph (a).
...
(4) Nothing in this section prevents a court from making an award of interest
where the court has at any time made or accepted an
amendment to a statement or
notice of claim or counterclaim in accordance with the rules of court and where
that statement or notice
of claim or counterclaim, as amended, complies with the
requirements in subsections (1) and (2).
- [232] The
respondents, in their statement of claim, sought interest in respect of the
fourth to eighth causes of action in the following
or similar
terms:
Interest on the above amount in accordance with s 10 of the
Interest on Money Claims Act 2016 from the date of advance or such other
date as
the Court thinks fit; ...
- [233] Section
10, which provides that in every money judgment, a court must award interest as
compensation for a delay in the payment
of money, is contained in pt 1 of the
Act. Pursuant to s 24(2)(a), the Judge had no power to award interest
under s 10, because
the relevant time period was before the Act came into force.
The Judge did not do so — rather she ordered interest from the
date of
each advance, calculated under s 12 of the Act on each of the relevant causes of
action. Section 12 is also in pt 1 of the
Act and again s 24(2)(a) applies.
- [234] Without
amendment, Mr Judd’s argument seems to us to be correct.
Section 25(1) and (2) preclude the Court from awarding
interest, because
the respondents did not specify the section under which interest was sought or
the amount of rate of interest claimed.
They did however, in respect of each of
the fourth to eighth causes of action, specify at least in some part and in so
far as was
possible, the periods in respect of which interest was sought —
namely from the date of each advance or payment.
- [235] For the
sake of completeness, we record that we did not understand
Mr Pascariu’s argument that the position was in some
way affected by
the fact that one of the claims — the sixth cause of action — was
for monies had and received and that
another claim — the ninth cause of
action — was for unjust enrichment. The Judge did not deal with the ninth
cause of
action. As already noted, in the sixth cause of action, interest was
sought under s 10 of the Interest on Money Claims Act. It
suffers from the
same defect regarding interest as the other Waihopai advances claims.
- [236] We now
turn to the final issues raised by the appeal. If they succeed there is no need
to set aside the interest awards although
they will require
amendment.
Applications for leave to amend claims to seek
interest
- [237] Mr Chen
sought leave to amend his third counterclaim to seek interest under s 24 of the
Interest on Money Claims Act on amounts
owing to him by the third respondent.
Mr Huang and Ms Lu sought leave to amend their prayer for relief in respect of
the fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth causes of action
to seek interest, also under s 24.
- [238] We
have set out above an example of the respondents’ pleading seeking
interest in respect of the fourth to eighth causes
of action. The appellants,
in their pleading, sought interest in respect of the third counterclaim as
follows:
Interest of $498,777.53 to 15 July 2021 plus further
interest on any amounts outstanding at a rate of 15% per annum until date of
payment.
- [239] It is
clear that the pleadings do not comply with s 25(1) and (2) of the
Interest on Money Claims Act. It is equally clear
from s 25(4) that the
court can make or accept an amendment to the statement of claim or the
counterclaim.
- [240] Under s
25(4) any amendment must be in accordance with the rules of the court. The
relevant rule is r 1.9 in the High Court
Rules 2016. It provides that the court
can, before, at, or after the trial of any proceeding, amend any defects and
errors in the
pleadings, whether or not there is anything in writing to amend
and whether or not the defect or error is that of the party applying
to
amend.[157] Amendments can be
made that are necessary for determining the real controversy between the
parties.[158]
- [241] Rule
48(2) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules provides that this Court has all the
powers and duties of the court of first
instance concerning procedure, including
in relation to the amendment of pleadings.
- [242] There can
be a late amendment to pleadings provided an applicant can surmount the
“three formidable hurdles” identified
by this Court in
Elders Pastoral Ltd v
Marr.[159] An applicant must
show that:
(a) the amendment is in the interests of justice;
(b) it will not significantly prejudice the other party; and
(c) it will not cause significant delay.
- [243] The
amendment of pleadings to accommodate the requirements of ss 24 and 25 of
the Interest on Money Claims Act has very recently
been considered by Osborne J
in the High Court in Davern v QBE Insurance (Australia)
Ltd.[160] The Judge observed
that s 25(4) permits an amendment “at any time” and that
this contemplates the possibility of very late amendment, including after the
trial of a proceeding. He also commented
that the breadth of the power
accommodates the fact that issues in relation to interest claims are most likely
to arise consequential
upon the substantive
judgment.[161] The Judge
discussed previous cases where parties have failed to comply with s 25 and,
either formally or informally, obtained leave
to amend their pleadings so as to
belatedly comply.[162]
- [244] In our
view, it is appropriate to take the same approach as Osborne J took in
Davern to Mr Chen’s proposed amendment to his third counterclaim
and to Mr Huang and Ms Lu’s proposed amendment to their prayer
for
relief in respect of the fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth causes of action. It
is clear that the omission to properly plead interest
in accordance with the
relevant statutory provisions was a straightforward error. Both Mr Chen in his
pleading, and Mr Huang and
Ms Lu in their pleading, claimed interest, albeit not
in compliance with the Interest on Money Claims Act. There is no prejudice
to
either party. Delay is not in issue. In our clear view, the interests of
justice require that the amendments should be allowed.
- [245] Accordingly,
Mr Chen is granted to leave amend his prayer for relief in respect of his third
counterclaim to claim as follows:
(a) interest pursuant to s 24(2)(b) of the Interest
on Money Claims Act from the date of each advance to the date of judgment, at
5
per cent per annum; and
(b) interest from the date of judgment to the date of payment pursuant to
ss 10 and 12 of the Interest on Money Claims Act.
- [246] The
respondents are granted leave to amend their prayer for relief in respect of the
fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth causes
of action, to claim as follows:
(a) interest pursuant to s 24(2)(b) on the Interest
on Money Claims Act, from the date of each advance as identified in sch 1 to the
statement of claim, to the date of judgment, at 5 per cent per annum; and
(b) interest from the date of judgment to the date of payment pursuant to
ss 10 and 12 of the Interest on Money Claims Act.
- [247] We
vacate the interest awards made by the Judge and award interest in accordance
with the above amendments.
Costs
- [248] Both
the appellants and the respondents have enjoyed a measure of success on this
appeal. We make no order as to costs.
Result
- [249] Leave
is granted to the respondents permitting them to adduce by way of further
evidence [1] and [2] of Ms Lu’s affidavit
of 27 October 2023. Leave is
declined to the respondents to adduce in evidence the remainder of the
affidavit.
- [250] The first
appellant is granted leave to amend his prayer for relief in respect of his
third counterclaim as set out in [245]
of this judgment.
- [251] The
respondents are granted leave to amend their prayer for relief in respect of the
fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth causes
of action as set out in [246] of this judgment.
- [252] The appeal
is allowed in part.
(a) The award of equitable damages made in respect of the first, second and
third causes of action is set aside.
(b) The principal sum awarded in respect of the fourth cause of action is
reduced from $2,376,261, to $1.2 million.
(c) The principal sum awarded in respect of the fifth cause of action is reduced
from $2,376,261, to $1,176,271.
(d) The orders made in respect of the seventh cause of action are set aside.
(e) The orders made in respect of the eighth cause of action are amended, by
setting aside the direction that Waihopai pay Mr Huang,
Ms Lu and Matakana
Wines $2,376,271. In all other respects, the relief granted in respect of the
eighth cause of action is upheld.
- [253] The orders
for the payment of interest in respect of Mr Chen’s third counterclaim and
in respect of the respondents’
fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth causes of
action are set aside.
- [254] Interest
on each relevant cause of action/counterclaim is awarded pursuant to s 24(2)(b)
of the Interest on Money Claims Act,
from the date of each advance to the date
of judgment at the rate of 5 per cent per annum and from the date of judgment to
the date
of payment pursuant to ss 10 and 12 of that Act.
- [255] In all
other respects the appeal is dismissed.
- [256] There is
no order as to costs.
Solicitors:
Morrison
Kent, Auckland for Appellants
Hamilton Locke, Auckland for Respondents
[1] Huang v Chen [2022]
NZHC 1888 [High Court judgment].
[2] At [25].
[3] At [29].
[4]
Overseas Investment Act 2005, s 7 definition of
“overseas person”, para (2).
[5] Before us, Li Yu’s
advance was treated by the parties as amounting in total to $800,000. This sum
presumably included the
monies paid into Mr Botting’s trust account by Mr
Sun.
[6] This document is referred to
as both the “Memorandum of Corporate Trusteeship” and the
“Memorandum of Company
Trusteeship” by the parties. The former
title was used in oral submissions and we adopt the same.
[7] Huang v Waihopai Valley
Vineyard Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2019-404-304, 24 February 2021 (Minute of Duffy
J); and Huang v Waihopai Valley Vineyard Ltd [2021] NZHC 348.
[8] High Court judgment, above n
1, at [108].
[9] Deng v Zheng [2022]
NZSC 76, [2022] 1 NZLR 151 [Deng (SC)].
[10] High Court judgment, above
n 1, at [168], citing Deng (SC),
above n 9, at [78(d)].
[11] At [109].
[12] At [119].
[13] At [121].
[14] At [122].
[15] At [127].
[16] At [127].
[17] At [129].
[18] At [130].
[19] At [131].
[20] At [133]–[134].
[21] At [135]–[137].
[22] At [140].
[23] At [144].
[24] At [151].
[25] At [152].
[26] At [152]–[153].
[27] At [154].
[28] At [155]–[167].
[29] At [168].
[30] At [169], citing Zheng v
Deng [2020] NZCA 614, [2021] NZCCLR 30 [Deng (CA)]; and Deng
(SC), above n 9.
[31] High Court judgment, above
n 1, at [172].
[32] At [173].
[33] At [174].
[34] At [175].
[35] At [176].
[36] At [178].
[37] At
[180]–‑[185].
[38] At [185].
[39] At [186].
[40] At [187]–[203].
[41] At [203].
[42] At [214].
[43] At [217].
[44] At [219]–[224].
[45] At [224]–[226].
[46] At [228].
[47] At [232].
[48] At [233].
[49] At [234].
[50] At [235]–[236].
[51] At [240].
[52] At [241].
[53] At [244].
[54] At [245]–[251].
[55] At [253] and [256].
[56] At [258].
[57] At [279].
[58] At [279].
[59] At [284]–[285].
[60] At [286].
[61] At [288].
[62] At [289]–[290].
[63] At [291], citing Arab
Monetary Fund v Hashim QB 15 June 1994, quoted in Kuwait Oil Tanker Co
SAK v Al Bader [2000] EWCA Civ 160, [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271 at [192].
[64] At [294]–[295].
[65] At [300]–[304].
[66] At [306].
[67] At [307], citing Lankow
v Rose [1994] NZCA 262; [1995] 1 NZLR 277 (CA) at 294 per Tipping J, with whom Cooke P,
Hardie Boys, Gault and McKay JJ agreed.
[68] High Court judgment, above
n 1, at [308]–[310].
[69] At [312].
[70] At [318].
[71] At [319].
[72] High Court judgment, above
n 1, at [320] and [322], citing
Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341, (1854) 156 ER 145 (Exch).
[73] High Court judgment, above
n 1, at [323]–[324].
[74] At [328]–[331].
[75] At [332]–[335].
[76] At [339].
[77] At [343].
[78] At [346].
[79] At [347].
[80] At [355].
[81] At [356].
[82] At [203] and [357].
[83] At [360].
[84] At [362].
[85] At [363].
[86] At [382].
[87] At [384].
[88] At [387].
[89] At [390].
[90] At [392]–[394].
[91] At [406]–[411].
[92] At [395]–[396].
[93] At [397]–[398].
[94] At [399]–[401].
[95] At [402]–[404].
[96] Austin, Nichols & Co
Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 141 at [4].
[97] At [16].
[98] At [13]. See also Deng
(SC), above n 9, at [71].
[99] See High Court judgment,
above n 1, at [121].
[100] Partnership Act 1908, s
4. The Partnership Act was repealed as from 21 April 2020 by s 85 of the
Partnership Law Act 2019. The
2019 Act took effect from 21 April 2020.
[101] Partnership Act, s 5.
[102] P R H Webb (ed) Laws
of New Zealand — Partnership and Joint Ventures (online ed,
LexisNexis) at [4].
[103] At n 1.
[104] At n 1, citing
Matthews v Matthews HC Auckland CP 7/00, 22 August 2003 at [84].
[105] Fletcher Challenge
Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand [2001] NZCA 289; [2002] 2 NZLR 433
(CA) per Blanchard J for himself, Richardson P, Keith and McGrath JJ.
[106] Ambridge Investments
Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baker [2010] VSC 59 at [195], citing PRA Electrical
Pty Ltd v Perseverance Exploration Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 310, (2007) 20 VR 487
at [62] per Ashley JA; aff’d Baker v Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd
(recs app) (in liq) [2011] VSCA 334 at [194]. See also Geebung
Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments (No 8) Pty Ltd [1995] NSWCA 166; (1995) 7 BPR
14,551 (NSWCA) at 14569–14570.
[107] See, for example,
Carruthers v Whitaker [1975] 2 NZLR 667 (CA) at 671‑–673;
Concorde Enterprises Ltd v Anthony Motors (Hutt) Ltd [1981] 2 NZLR 385
(CA) at 388–389; and Wallace v Studio New Zealand Ltd
[2021] NZCA 392, (2021) 22 NZCPR 408 at [50]–[51].
[108] Jeremy Finn, Stephen
Todd and Matthew Barber Burrows, Finn and Todd on the Law of Contract in New
Zealand (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2018) at 279, referring
to Carruthers v Whitaker, above n 107.
[109] Clark v Libra
Developments Ltd [2007] NZSC 16, [2007] 2 NZLR 709 at [51] per
Chambers J; and Deng (CA), above n 30, at [93].
[110] Deng (CA), above
n 30, at [92], referring to Aldridge
v Paterson [1914] NZGazLawRp 84; (1914) 33 NZLR 997 (SC) at 1006.
[111] Davies v Newman
[2000] All ER (D) 620 (Ch) at [8].
[112] Deng (SC), above
n 9; and Deng (CA), above n 30.
[113] See Zheng v Deng
[2019] NZHC 3236; Deng (CA), above n 30, at [127]; and Deng (SC), above
n 9, at [68]–[69].
[114] Deng (SC), above
n 9, at [68]; and Deng (CA),
above n 30, at [99]–[100].
[115] Deng (CA), above
n 30, at [33].
[116] Deng (SC), above
n 9, at [78(d)]; and Deng (CA),
above n 30, at [89].
[117] Deng (SC), above
n 9, at [72], [73] and [77].
[118] Deng (CA), above
n 30, at [119].
[119] Deng (SC), above
n 9, at [60], [68] and [73]; and
Deng (CA), above n 30, at [101]
and [111]‑[112].
[120] Deng (SC), above
n 9, at [61] and [68]; and
Deng (CA), above n 30, at [102].
[121] Deng (SC), above
n 9, at [64]; and Deng (CA),
above n 30, at [96], [103], [111] and
[113].
[122] Deng (CA), above
n 30, at [87]–[88], [105] and
[107].
[123] Deng (SC), above
n 9, at [78(d)]; and Deng (CA),
above n 30, at [89] and
[105]–[107].
[124] High Court judgment,
above n 1, at [152].
[125] High Court judgment,
above n 1, at [154]–[155].
[126] At [158]–[159].
[127] At [159].
[128] At [162].
[129] Deng (SC), above
n 9 (footnotes omitted).
[130] Deng (CA), above
n 30.
[131] High Court judgment,
above n 1, at [173].
[132] At [185].
[133] Some accounts were made
available in late 2015, but Mr Huang considered that they were unsatisfactory
and he requested more information.
[134] High Court judgment,
above n 1, at [190].
[135] Erceg v Balenia Ltd
[2008] NZCA 535 at [15]; Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson
Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190 (CA) at 192–193; and Paper
Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd (Further Evidence) (No 1) [2006]
NZSC 59, [2007] 2 NZLR 1 at n 1, referring to Rae v International Insurance
Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd.
[136] Airwork (NZ) Ltd v
Vertical Flight Management Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) at 649–650.
[137] High Court judgment,
above n 1, at [287]–[291] and
[306].
[138] Maria Hook and Jack Wass
The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2020) at
[1.28] and [4.143].
[139] At [4.210].
[140] Commerce Commission v
Viagogo AG [2019] NZCA 472, [2019] 3 NZLR 559 at [50].
[141] Hook and Wass, above n
138, at [4.210].
[142] Schumacher v
Summergrove Estates Ltd [2014] NZCA 412, [2014] 3 NZLR 599 at [37].
[143] Hook and Wass, above n
138, at [4.216].
[144] Contract and Commercial
Law Act 2017, s 37.
[145] Harbutt’s
Plasticene Ltd v Wayne Tank and Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447 at 464–465
per Lord Denning MR; and see Steven Todd and Matthew Barber Burrows, Finn and
Todd on the Law of Contract in New Zealand (7th ed, Lexis Nexis, 2022)
at [18.3.1].
[146] High Court judgment,
above n 1, at [311]–[318].
[147] At [319]–[324] and
[348(c)]. Strictly we doubt that the damages were “equitable”
damages. Rather they were common
law damages for breach of the
JV agreement. However nothing turns on this.
[148] Clarkson v Whangamata
Metal Supplies Ltd [2007] NZCA 590, [2008] 3 NZLR 31 at [49].
[149] Thomas Cullen v R
[2013] NZCA 328 at [19]; and R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 840 (CA).
[150] High Court judgment,
above n 1, at [352]–[353] and
[355].
[151] At [353]. This figure
was not challenged before us.
[152] At [123]–[138].
[153] High Court judgment,
above n 1, at [134].
[154] High Court judgment,
above n 1, at [399].
[155] At [402]–[403].
[156] Interest on Money Claims
Regulations 2019, reg 4.
[157] High Court Rules 2016, r
1.9(1).
[158] Rule 1.9(2).
[159] Elders Pastoral Ltd v
Marr [1987] NZCA 18; (1987) 1 NZPC 91, (1987) 2 PRNZ 383 at 385.
[160] Davern v QBE
Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2023] NZHC 3543.
[161] At [16].
[162] At [23], referring to
Harvey v Harvey [2021] NZHC 2405; Harvey v Harvey (No 2) [2021]
NZHC 3508; Leondale Ltd v Boyd [2021] NZHC 470; Plumbco New Zealand
Ltd v Plumbco Commercial and Civil Ltd [2023] NZHC 690; Plumbco New
Zealand Ltd v Plumbco Commercial and Civil Ltd [2023] NZHC 1819; and
Swenson v Lawton [2022] NZHC 3544, [2022] NZFLR 847.
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