Canterbury Regional Council v Rooney Earthmoving Limited [2021] NZDC 4035 (8 March 2021)

Last Updated: 19 March 2021

IN THE DISTRICT COURT AT TIMARU I TE KŌTI-Ā-ROHE KI TE TIHI-O-MARU

CRI-2018-076-001427, -01429 [2021] NZDC 4035

CANTERBURY REGIONAL COUNCIL Prosecutor

v

ROONEY EARTHMOVING LIMITED PLAINS IRRIGATORS LIMTED HAMISH McKAY Defendant(s)

Hearing:	At Timaru on 1 October 2020
Appearances:	M Zarifeh and W Taffs for prosecutor F Pilditch for defendant Rooney Earthmoving Limited C Shannon for defendants Plains Irrigators Limited and Hamish McKay
Judgment:	8 March 2021

DECISION ON COSTS OF JUDGE D A KIRKPATRICK

Background

[1] The events relating to the charges against these three defendants occurred on a farm at 319 Andrews Road, Glenavy, South Canterbury, about 2.5 kilometres north of the mouth of the Waitaki river. The farm is owned by Papamoa Enterprises Limited and managed by Mr Jeff Phillips.

[2] In May 2018, Papamoa engaged Plains Irrigators to design and supply four pivot irrigators on its farm and separately engaged Rooney Earthmoving to undertake

Canterbury Regional Council v Rooney Earthmoving Limited & Ors

associated earthmoving works. Hamish McKay is an employee of Plains Irrigators Limited. Papamoa was responsible for obtaining any necessary resource consents.

[3] The part of the farm where the works were to occur is traversed by the Whitney Creek. Close to the coast, the Whitney Creek has formed a donga, a dry gully formed by erosion. At the coast, the creek flows into a hāpua, a shallow lake separated from the sea by a bank of sand or shingle, known as the Waitaki Mouth Lagoon.

[4] Works on the farm commenced on or about 6 June 2018. The prosecutor became involved approximately one month later when asked by Mr Phillips, the farm manager, about whether he could straighten a section of the Whitney Creek. Mr Phillips had asked Mr Craig Matheson, a director of Rooney Earthmoving, about doing that and had been told by Mr Matheson that a consent was needed, and that Rooney Earthmoving would not do such work without a consent. Mr Phillips then called officers of the prosecutor on 29 June and 2 July 2018 to ask what he could do and was advised that officers would come to the property and have a look.

[5] On 6, 9 and 19 July 2018 officers of the prosecutor inspected the farm and the works taking place there. The officers spoke with Mr Phillips and Mr McKay. At the request of an officer, work was stopped on 9 July 2018. An abatement notice was issued to one of the directors of Papamoa on 1 August 2018 requiring him to cease the excavation and vegetation clearance in or under the bed and within the riparian margins of the Whitney Creek, all other flowing bodies of fresh water and all wetland areas.

[6] A formal investigation started on 28 September 2018. On 16 November 2018 Plains Irrigators and Mr McKay were asked for a written explanation, which on 29 November 2018 was that they had not engaged Rooney Earthmoving and had not done anything wrong. Mr Phillips was interviewed on 21 November 2018. On 30 November 2018 the prosecutor requested information from Rooney Earthmoving, which provided a statement from Mr Matheson. A full interview with Mr Matheson took place on 13 December 2018 in the presence of Ms Lisa Smith, the in-house lawyer for Rooney Earthmoving. As part of that, Mr Matheson offered to conduct the site visit for officers of the prosecutor, which occurred the same day.

The charges

[7] The charges were filed in the District Court at Timaru on 19 December 2018 and first called on 19 March 2019. The charges against each defendant were laid under the Resource Management Act 1991 in relation to:

• (a) Permitting the conduct of earthworks within five metres of the bed of the Whitney Creek which earthworks exceeded an area of 500 square metres or 10% of the area, whichever is the lesser;
• (b) Permitting the diversion of Whitney Creek when that was not expressly allowed;
• (c) Permitting the discharge of sediment onto or into land and circumstances which may result in the contaminant entering the Whitney Creek when the discharge was not expressly allowed;
• (d) Permitting the discharge of sediment onto or into land in circumstances which may result in it entering the Waitaki Mouth Lagoon when that discharge was not expressly allowed;
• (e) Permitting the diversion of water other than open coastal water from a wetland by diverting it into the Waitaki Mouth Lagoon when that was not expressly allowed;
• (f) Permitting the reduction of an area of wetland for construction of new infrastructure for water distribution when that use was not expressly allowed;
• (g) Permitting the excavation/disturbance of the bed of Whitney Creek when that was not expressly allowed, namely by permitting earthworks that resulted in vegetation clearance, contouring of land including the Whitney donga, depositing excavated materials in the bed of the Whitney Creek, cutting a channel in the bed of the Whitney Creek, infilling it, and realigning the Whitney Creek.
  

[8] All three defendants pleaded not guilty to all of the charges.

[9] Disclosure was completed during July 2019 and on 31 July 2019 a trial was scheduled for 2 December 2019. On 20 September 2019 detailed particulars clarifying the charges were provided by the prosecutor. On 26 September 2019 the trial date was vacated by the Court. On 26 November 2019 a trial was set down in the Timaru District Court for the weeks of 9 and 16 March 2020. A judicial telephone conference occurred on 29 January 2020 to address matters of trial preparation.

[10] On 11 February 2020 Mr Phillips was re-interviewed. On 18 February 2020 the prosecutor advised that as a result of new evidence it had received, it would be seeking the Court’s leave to withdraw all charges against the defendants. The new evidence referred to in the prosecutor’s memorandum was an acknowledgment by Mr Phillips in his latest interview that he had been doing works in the diversion area to which two of the charges related, although he said that what he had done was not a diversion but a cleaning out of the creek. These admissions did not affect the other charges in relation to the wetland.

[11] The defendants opposed the granting of leave to withdraw and said that if the prosecutor was not in a position to proceed the charges should be dismissed. The trial was accordingly vacated on 19 February 2020.

[12] On 11 March 2020, Rooney Earthmoving applied for the charges against it to be dismissed and for indemnity costs against the prosecutor, with affidavits in support. On 12 March 2020 the prosecutor sought a 3-4 day fixture for hearing the costs application and associated timetable and directions. On 13 March 2020 Plains Irrigators and Mr McKay filed applications for costs.

[13] Arrangements were put in place for a hearing of the costs application on 20 March 2020. That hearing did not proceed because of restrictions put in place to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. The applications were finally able to be heard on 1 October 2020.

Withdrawal or discharge

[14] The prosecutor seeks the leave of the Court to withdraw the charges under section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (CPA). The defendants seek the dismissal of the charges under section 147 of the CPA.

[15] The prosecutor submits that there is little if any practical difference between the two, as the limitation period for bringing charges under section 338(4) of the RMA, being 12 months after the date on which the contravention giving rise to the charge first became known, or should have become known, has long passed, so there is no jeopardy for the defendants. Further, counsel for the prosecutor submits that the evidential issues it faced affected only two of the eight charges and it could have proceeded on the remaining charges, in respect of which he submitted that there was sufficient evidence to show a case to answer. Notwithstanding that, in reviewing the case in light of the Solicitor-General’s Guidelines for the conduct of prosecutions, the prosecutor decided that it should not proceed at all.

[16] The defendants oppose the granting of leave and seek the dismissal of all charges under section 147 of the CPA. They submit that if the prosecutor has decided that the evidence is insufficient to warrant proceeding to trial, then the proper course is not to offer such evidence as it may have, but to allow the charges to be dismissed. They point out that under section 147(6) of the CPA, the dismissal of a charge is deemed to be an acquittal of the defendant on that charge and that in all the circumstances they should be able to say to the world that they have been acquitted.

[17] I accept that the outcome of a dismissal of a charge, being a deemed acquittal, can remain a significant matter for a defendant even where the passage of time and a statutory limitation would prevent a withdrawn charge from being laid again. In some cases where leave is sought to withdraw a charge but one or more similar charges remain, that outcome may not be so significant and so the court may decide that withdrawal is appropriate and grant leave accordingly.

[18] The outcome may also be important where there is some issue about the appropriateness of the charge being laid, in terms of whether that was done in a manner

consistent with the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines so that public prosecutions are conducted in a manner that is professional, open, fair and responsible, to quote the Attorney-General’s introduction to those guidelines.

[19] As I have found and will explain below, the circumstances in relation to these charges indicate that, on a full investigation, they might may never have been laid against the defendants had there been a careful inquiry into the role of the farm manager, Mr Phillips, at the outset.

[20] On that basis, I conclude that dismissal of the charges would be more appropriate than granting leave for them to be withdrawn. This conclusion is not by itself a dispositive factor in the application for costs, but the underlying reasons for it will be addressed further when I consider that application.

Costs in criminal cases

[21] The Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 relevantly provides:

5 Costs of successful defendant

(1) Where any defendant is acquitted of an offence or where the charge is dismissed or withdrawn, whether upon the merits or otherwise, the court may, subject to any regulations made under this Act, order that he be paid such sum as it thinks just and reasonable towards the costs of his defence.

(2) Without limiting or affecting the court’s discretion under subsection (1), it is hereby declared that the court, in deciding whether to grant costs and the amount of any costs granted, shall have regard to all relevant circumstances and in particular (where appropriate) to—

• (a) whether the prosecution acted in good faith in bringing and continuing the proceedings:
  
• (b) whether at the commencement of the proceedings the prosecution had sufficient evidence to support the conviction of the defendant in the absence of contrary evidence:
  
• (c) whether the prosecution took proper steps to investigate any matter coming into its hands which suggested that the defendant might not be guilty:
  
• (d) whether generally the investigation into the offence was conducted in a reasonable and proper manner:

• (e) whether the evidence as a whole would support a finding of guilt but the charge was dismissed on a technical point:
  
  • (f) whether the charge was dismissed because the defendant established (either by the evidence of witnesses called by him or by the cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise) that he was not guilty:
    
  • (g) whether the behaviour of the defendant in relation to the acts or omissions on which the charge was based and to the investigation and proceedings was such that a sum should be paid towards the costs of his defence.
    

(3) There shall be no presumption for or against the granting of costs in any case.

(4) No defendant shall be granted costs under this section by reason only of the fact that he has been acquitted or that any charge has been dismissed or withdrawn.

(5) No defendant shall be refused costs under this section by reason only of the fact that the proceedings were properly brought and continued.

[22] Section 5 confers a general discretion on the Court, listing seven particular circumstances to which regard must be had but not restricting the Court’s consideration to those. Section 5 also makes it clear that there is no presumption to be applied.

[23] As Hardie Boys J observed in R v Margaritis1 the section really means that the Court is to do what it thinks is right in the particular case and that its consideration should include whether the prosecution was reasonably and properly brought and pursued and whether the accused brought the charge on their own head.

[24] Endorsing that approach, Panckhurst J in Cavanagh v Police2 added that it is helpful to note the difference between civil proceedings where costs normally follow the event and criminal proceedings where there is no such presumption, citing as a statement of principle the observation of Devlin LJ in Berry v British Transport Commission:3

A plaintiff brings an action for his own ends and to benefit himself; it is therefore just that if he loses he should pay the costs. A prosecutor brings proceedings in the public interest, and so should be treated more tenderly.

1 R v Margaritis HC Christchurch T66/88, 14 July 1989, Hardie Boys J.

2 Cavanagh v Police [2013] NZHC 2332 at [16] – [19].

3 Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306 at 327.

[25] It has been noted that some care should be exercised in applying this dictum to the circumstances in New Zealand given that an indemnity regime generally applies to civil litigation in England.4

[26] A scale of costs is prescribed by the Costs in Criminal Cases Regulations 1987 as amended in 2013. The maximum fees allowed in Schedule 1 to those regulations for trials are $226 for each half day or part half day occupied in court for conducting a prosecution or defence in a case and $113 for each half day or part half day occupied in court where for any reason the charge is withdrawn or dismissed without a trial. Section 13(3) of the Act provides, however:

Where any maximum scale of costs is prescribed by regulation, the court may nevertheless make an order for the payment of costs in excess of that scale if it is satisfied that, having regard to the special difficulty, complexity, or importance of the case, the payment of greater costs is desirable.

[27] Where s 13(3) of the Act applies, there is no maximum level of costs that may be awarded.5 Hardie Boys J said that the existence of the scale makes it clear that there is no intention that a successful applicant should receive a full indemnity,6 but that general statement has been said not to be of invariable application and held not to apply where the court found that the prosecutor ought to have known that the defendant was innocent of wrongdoing and should never have been charged.7 There are other decisions where an indemnity award has been considered without any doubt as to the jurisdiction to do so.8

[28] The cases are similarly in tension as to whether the adequacy of the scale amounts is a relevant factor. There are authorities that an award of costs above the scale cannot be justified on grounds of the level of costs actually incurred,9 or the perceived inadequacy of the scale,10 or the subjective or personal importance of the

4. Registrar of Companies v Feeney HC Auckland, CRI-2011-404-000014, 21 June 2011, Asher J at [35].

5 Ham v R (1998) 16 CRNZ 199 at 205.

6 R v Margaritis fn 1.

7 Reriti v Police DC Christchurch, CRN 3009023671, 18 April 1994, Erber DCJ.

8. T v Collector of Custonms HC Christchurch AP 167/94, 28 February 1995, Tipping J; Morris v Police [2013] NZHC 1336.

9 Bennett v MacDonald HC Auckland, A76-02, 13 August 2002, Rodney Hansen J at [14].

10 Solicitor-General v Moore [1999] NZCA 269; [2000] 1 NZLR 533 (CA) at [29]

case to the defendant.11 There are also authorities which state that the amount of costs actually incurred is undoubtedly a relevant factor12 and that the scale is “obsolete”13 and “hopelessly out of date”.14 While these comments may pre-date the 2013 replacement of the schedule, a daily rate of $452 is still substantially below the lowest daily recovery rate of $1,270 for costs in category 1 civil proceedings as set out in Schedule 5 to the District Court Rules 2014 and of the corresponding figure of $1,590 in Schedule 2 to the High Court Rules 2016.

[29] There are also cases which touch on the issue of whether a defendant has incurred costs as a result of their own lack of openness or co-operation with the prosecutor. While a defendant has the right to silence and to put the prosecutor to proof, where there is legitimate suspicion with an evidential basis on which to proceed, then doing nothing to assuage that will be a relevant factor in the exercise of the discretion to make any award.15

Bringing and continuing the proceedings

[30] I recognise that the public power to prosecute, including the power of a local authority to do so in the context of its duty under s 84 of the RMA, is within the role of the executive. Mindful of the importance of the separation of powers to our constitutional arrangements and in particular to the rule of law, the judiciary generally do not judge a public prosecutor’s discretion in the exercise of that power in the absence of an abuse of power or other exceptional circumstances.16 The following discussion is intended only to clarify certain aspects of that discretion for the purposes of my decision on the applications for costs.

[31] The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines set out two tests which ought to be applied to a decision to prosecute: the evidential test and the public interest test.

11 R v Rust [1998] 3 NZLR 159 (CA).

12 Registrar of Companies v Feeney fn 4 at [29].

13. Pawson v Heavylift Cargo Airlines Pty Ltd HC Auckland, CRI-2005-404-278, 1 March 2006, Baragwanath J.

14 Morris v Police fn 7

15 Morris v Police fn 7 at [36]; Banks v R [2017] NZCA 69 at [22]; Otago Regional Council v Nichol

[2015] NZDC 15849 at [10].

16 Osborne v Worksafe New Zealand [2017] NZSC 175; [2018] 1 NZLR 447.

[32] The evidential test is whether there is sufficient evidence which can be adduced in court to provide a reasonable prospect of conviction. The elements of this test are that there be:

• (a) the commission of an offence;
  
• (b) an identifiable individual who committed the offence;
  
• (c) credible evidence that a court could reasonably rely on of the commission of the offence;
• (d) evidence which the prosecution can adduce at trial – that is, evidence that is both available and legally admissible;
• (e) an objectively reasonable prospect of a conviction on the evidence; and
  
• (f) evidence sufficient to prove the offence as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
  

[33] The public interest test is to be applied following the application of the evidential test. It may be simply stated as whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. The Guidelines make it clear that it is not the rule that all offences for which there is sufficient evidence must be prosecuted: there will be circumstances where the offence is not serious or for some other reason there is no public interest in prosecuting the offence.

Basis for the charges in this case

[34] On my assessment of the evidence put before me for the purposes of the argument about costs, the elements of the factors in s 5(2)(b), (c) and (d) of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 and in Part 5 of the Prosecution Guidelines that are most relevant to the applications is the evidential one of the sufficiency of the investigation in identifying the individual who committed the offence. It appears to me that there was evidence of the commission of an offence or offences and, if the balance of the evidential test could be satisfied, that the nature of the offences warranted prosecution in the public interest. The process of identifying individuals who committed the offences, however, was deficient.

[35] The initial inspections by officers of the prosecutor showed evidence that earthworks had occurred in the Whitney Creek. Interviews were conducted with the directors of Papamoa, the farm manager Mr Phillips, managers of Rooney Earthmoving and Plains Irrigators and with Mr McKay. Further inspections by officers of the prosecutor resulted in statements detailing the nature of the works done and the apparent contraventions of plan rules and the RMA.

[36] The passage of time, changes in personnel and preparation for trial resulted in further reviews of the file. In particular, around 23 January 2020 a new officer in charge was assigned to the case. This person had previously been one of the investigating officers who had inspected the property and interviewed the manager of Rooney Earthmoving. One of his tasks as the officer in charge was to prepare final witness statements for the prosecutor’s witnesses.

[37] As recorded in a file note dated 17 February 2020, on reviewing the statement given by Mr Phillips on 16 September 2019 the officer in charge noticed that there were no photos or diagrams attached to his statement. The officer was sufficiently concerned to instruct other officers to speak again to Mr Phillips to seek clarification. This occurred on 11 February 2018. The other officers subsequently reported that Mr Phillips had made admissions which implicated him in a significant part of the offending for which charges had been laid against the defendants, including admitting to clearing out a channel in the Whitney Creek using a front end loader, being the same area alleged to be a diversion of the creek from its original path. Mr Phillips said this was done of his own accord to stop the stream from backing up and that he hadn’t disclosed this before because he was never asked that question. He claimed that he was unaware that working in the active flow of the creek without a resource consent was an offence. In a subsequent interview on 18 February 2020 Mr Phillips was asked about and addressed other works that were the subject of the charges, saying that this had not been done by him but that he had instructed Rooney Earthmoving to carry out this work.

[38] The question that this review raises is why these concerns of the officer in charge in January 2020 were not addressed during the initial investigation in 2018 or when formal statements were being taken in 2019. In gathering evidence, one would

expect any investigating officer to be focussed on the elements of the evidential test, if not in the specific terms set out in the Prosecution Guidelines then at least at the fundamental level of inquiring into what happened and who caused it to happen.

[39] I can appreciate that it must have seemed straightforward to assume, because Rooney Earthmoving and Plains Irrigators were on the property with their equipment, that it would have been easy for them to do the work in the course of the other work they were doing. But it should also have been clear that a reasonable line of inquiry would have been to follow up on the fact that it was Mr Phillips who had first inquired about doing such works and that as the farm manager he may have had equipment that could have done such work. That line of inquiry would have been reinforced by Mr Phillips’ own statement that the manager of Rooney Earthmoving had told him that he didn’t think he could do that work and so should consult officers of the prosecutor.

[40] This analysis has the benefit of hindsight, and counsel for the prosecutor properly stressed that I should be wary of that. I have reviewed the narrative of events carefully with that in mind and remain troubled by the degree to which the initial interviews with Mr Phillips were limited. In particular, no photographs, maps or diagrams were taken or created during the early part of the investigation and put to Mr Phillips so that he could show, graphically, who did what on the land.

[41] In my judgment, that was an omission in the investigation which amounted to a significant error. Had more detailed inquiries been made at the outset, the extent of Mr Phillips’ role should have been identified. If it had been, then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the prosecutor would have made the decision then not to proceed against these defendants. While acknowledging that other charges may have been pursued against them, I think there is some force in the submission that the earthworks charges were the principal offending, so that if those charges were not to be pursued, a real question would have remained whether the others ought to have been pursued.

[42] While the problem with the evidence of Mr Phillips was clearly the main issue for the prosecutor, I would add that other aspects of the case would have been problematic. In particular, the fact that Mr McCracken had never been to the site would have at least reduced the weight that could have been given to his expert opinions. The

tenor of Dr Grove’s evidence about issues of terminology raised by the defendants may also be remarked on. While one can understand the impatience of a scientist with laypeople who challenge terms used by experts, one also expects an officer of a regional council to understand the importance of identifying clear boundaries, including clear definitions or at least accepted meanings of terms, for acts for which a person may be prosecuted and which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

[43] On the matter of the standard of proof I also observe, while cognisant and respectful of the prosecutor’s discretion under s 84 of the RMA as to how it may enforce the rules of its plan, that I see nothing in the material to indicate whether any consideration was given to proceeding by way of an abatement notice or an application for an enforcement order under the RMA. Proceeding in either of those ways cannot obtain a conviction or a fine, but can achieve appropriate environmental outcomes and need only be proved on the balance of probabilities.

[44] For those reasons, I am satisfied that the dismissal of the charges and the significant omission in the prosecutor’s investigation justifies the consideration of an award of costs against the prosecutor and in favour of the defendants.

Quantum

[45] The defendants all seek indemnity costs, which are as follows:

• (a) Rooney Earthmoving Ltd $90,572.74
  
• (b) Plains Irrigators Ltd and Mr McKay $67,320.06
  

[46] I was provided with documentary evidence of the expenses making up these sums. The prosecutor did not take issue with that evidence.

[47] Alternatively, the defendants seek a “substantial” award of costs. To assist me, counsel offered calculations of costs according to the scale of costs in civil proceedings in the District Court for a category 2 proceeding, using a daily rate of $1,910. For Rooney, Mr Pilditch calculates attendances amounting to 24.35 days or $46,508.50 plus disbursements of $16,189.37 for a total of $62,967.87. For PIL and Mr McKay,

Mr Shannon calculates attendances amounting to 22.55 days or $43,070.50 plus disbursements of $7,166.35 for a total of $50,236.85.

[48] For comparison, calculations using the full daily rates in Schedule 1 to the Costs in Criminal Cases Regulations 1987 result in figures:

• (a) for Rooney, of $11,006.20 had the matter proceeded to trial or

$5,503.10 on being dismissed; and

(b) for Plains Irrigators and Mr McKay, of $10,192.60 had the matter proceeded to trial or $5,096.30 on being dismissed.

[49] The prosecutor submits that the scale in that Schedule may only be exceeded pursuant to s 13(3) of the Act if the court is “satisfied that, having regard to the special difficulty, complexity, or importance of the case, the payment of greater costs is desirable.” Acknowledging that, and mindful of the dicta criticising this scale to which I have already referred, the degree of specialness needed to meet the threshold of desirability may be assessed in the context of the scale’s relationship to real rates. Awards of $5,000 – $5,500 in this case would not be realistic contributions towards the expense to which these defendants have been put.

[50] In any event, I am satisfied that this case does have special features of sufficient importance to justify awards of greater costs than allowed by the scale. In particular, it is important that prosecutors examine the evidence of informants with special care, as much in relation to offending under the RMA as for offending under legislation which is more generally regarded as constituting the criminal law. If that lesson is assisted by the sting of awards of costs above the scale, then the court will avail itself of that assistance.

[51] I do not consider that indemnity awards would be appropriate in this case. While I have criticised the investigation by the prosecutor and, in particular, the failure to examine the evidence of its main witness with sufficient rigour, I do not find any bad faith on its part or any other reason to require it to meet the defendants’ actual expenditure on an indemnity basis.

[52] I turn to the calculations based on the daily recovery rate for civil proceedings in the District Court. I consider that this scale provides a realistic measure of litigation costs and offers a check against the vagaries of the billing practices of solicitors and counsel. Given the importance of the case which I have identified, I accept that my assessment should not be based on the rate for a category 1 proceeding and should be that for category 2.

Decision

[53] I dismiss all charges under s 147 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.

[54] I make the following awards of costs under ss 5(1) and 13(3) of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967:

• (a) an award of costs to Rooney Earthmoving Ltd in the sum of $46,500, plus disbursements of $16,189.37;
  
• (b) an award of costs to Plains Irrigators Ltd and Hamish McKay in the sum of $43,070, plus disbursements of $7,166.35.
  

Judge D A Kirkpatrick

District Court Judge

Date of authentication: 08/03/2021

In an electronic form, authenticated pursuant to Rule 2.2(2)(b) Criminal Procedure Rules 2012.