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District Court of New Zealand |
Last Updated: 6 November 2024
EDITORIAL NOTE: CHANGES MADE TO THIS JUDGMENT APPEAR IN [SQUARE BRACKETS]
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SUPPRESSION ORDERS EXIST IN RELATION TO ASPECTS OF THIS
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO S 202 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011: SEE PARAGRAPHS [67]
AND
[68].
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT AT CHRISTCHURCH
I TE KŌTI-Ā-ROHE KI ŌTAUTAHI
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CRI-2023-009-003097
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MARITIME NEW ZEALAND
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Prosecutor
v
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LYTTELTON PORT COMPANY LIMITED
Defendant
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Hearing:
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31 July 2024
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Appearances:
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S Solarte and C White for the Prosecutor G Gallaway and S Riley for the
Defendant
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Judgment:
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31 July 2024
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NOTES OF JUDGE P R KELLAR ON SENTENCING
[1] Mrs Grant and the family, I want to start by acknowledging the profound sadness and grief that your family have experienced and will continue to experience. I am afraid that nothing that I can do today will go anywhere towards making up for the loss that you have suffered.
MARITIME NEW ZEALAND v LYTTELTON PORT COMPANY LIMITED [2024] NZDC 18193 [31 July 2024]
[2] The Lyttelton Port Company Limited appears for sentence having entered a plea of guilty to one charge under ss 36(1), 38(1) and 48 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (the Act).
[3] The charge arises following an incident on 25 April 2022 in which Mr Don Grant, an employee of the company, was carrying out the role of the hatchman and directing the coal loading operation for a vessel during which he was struck, buried in coal and received fatal injuries.
Victim Impact
[4] Don was a much-loved husband to Judith and father to his daughters, Sarah, Cathrine, Ginny and Louise. He was a beloved grandfather. I had noted that Don and you, Judith, had been married for 48 years. I think you told me it would have been 49 years in May of this year. You were inseparable and you were clearly soulmates. It is also obvious from the very moving statements which you have just bravely read that Don was an amazing man. He was caring, kind, loving and thoughtful, and his loss is going to be profoundly felt not just by the family but the wider community, his work mates and friends.
[5] I want to just talk about [name deleted – person A] for a moment. He was the ship loader operator at the time of the incident. Although he was not exposed to the same risks as Mr Grant, the prosecutor submits that he is a victim on the basis that the company’s failures in respect of their health and safety duties resulted in [person A] being involved in the events that led to his colleague’s death.
[6] The prosecutor submits that because [person A] was more than a mere bystander and was present and working under the same conditions as Mr Grant, he is a person against whom the offence was committed. Reparation is sought for [person A] whose victim impact statement discloses consequential loss of approximately
$56,000 through the loss of income as a result of being unfit for work. His victim impact statement outlines that [person A] has been diagnosed with PTSD following the incident, leaving him suffering sleepless nights and an inability to concentrate. As with Don, I must readily acknowledge none of this is his fault. No one has suggested that.
[7] Section 32(1) of the Sentencing Act 2002 outlines the circumstances where reparation may be paid. Section 32(2) provides that the court cannot impose a sentence of reparation “unless the person who suffered the emotional harm is a person that is described in para (a) of the definition of victim in s 4” which relevantly defines “victim” as “a person against whom an offence is committed by another person and a person who, through, or by means of, an offence committed by another person, suffers physical injury, or loss of, or damage to, property”.
[8] As Mr Gallaway has just correctly told me, the High Court in Pegasus Engineering Ltd v WorkSafe New Zealand held in summary that: “There needs to be some evidence that the individual was actually exposed to the same hazard.”1 [Person A] does not meet the criteria to be a victim under the Sentencing Act and ineligible for reparation. I note though that the company has made payments to [person A] representing 80 per cent of his wages since 23 May 2022 and a contribution towards his legal costs. The company has also met the costs of medical appointments and assessments in relation to the incident and funded his retraining for vocational independence.
Background
[9] The defendant company is owned by the Christchurch City Council near Christchurch City Holdings Ltd. The Lyttelton Port Company has facilities for loading and/or unloading cargo, including shipping containers, coal, bulk petroleum, LPG and chemical liquids, logs and imported cars. It operates primarily out of the marina at Cashin Quay in Lyttelton.
The Plant
[10] The company exports 1.2 million tonnes of coal each year. The coal arrives at the port and is loaded onto and exported by coal ships. The coal is loaded onto coal ships by travelling on conveyors to a ship loader. It travels up the boom of the ship loader on conveyor belts before dropping down chutes and onto the jet slinger which is a conveyor belt that fires the coal into the hold of a ship.
1 Pegasus Engineering Ltd v WorkSafe New Zealand [2019] NZHC 2257.
[11] The equipment used to load the coal was dated. The ship loader was originally installed in 1973 as a multipurpose loader. It was aligned specifically for coal in 2002. Since then, the only changes made to the ship loader and jet slinger have been designed to improve efficiency of performance. This includes a “fast coal” project in 2004 and 2005 which involved the ship loader operator’s cabin from above the ship loader’s boom, where the operator had direct line of sight towards the jet slinger as coal was loaded, to the cabin’s current location at the base of the ship loader boom. The ship loader chutes and jet slinger were replaced in 2018 due to mechanical issues.
[12] The age of the ship loader means that it was designed as a time when ships were smaller. However, with the increase in the size of ships over time, the ship loader boom is no longer able to reach the centre of the larger ships requiring coal to be slung at a higher trajectory to reach the far side of the hatches.
The Work System
[13] The ship loader and jet slinger were operated through the combined work of a hatchman and ship loader. The hatchman was stationed on the deck of the vessel observing the coal being loaded into the hatches. Usually, the hatchman was positioned directly next to the hatch. The role of the hatchman was to direct the loading of coal, managing the placement of coal within the hatches and keeping the loading even. The hatchman did not have any direct control over the ship loader or the jet slinger. Rather, a ship loader operator was stationed in the cabin located at the base of the ship loader’s boom.
[14] The operator used a computer to monitor the coal conveyor system and to operate the ship loader and jet slinger as instructed by the hatchman by radio. The hatchman would inform the ship loader where coal needed to be poured and the ship loader would alter the direction and angle of the jet slinger by using mouse click commands on the computer screen.
[15] There were significant issues with the plant and system of work:
- (a) There were no engineering controls preventing the jet slinger firing coal outside the hatch and onto the deck of the ship. This was most common
when hatches were being filled closer to 100 per cent and during trim pours where coal was directed to either port or starboard in order to correct any list of the ship. When combined with the lack of any exclusion zone for the hatchman, or crew for that matter, this meant that there was an increased risk of being hit with coal.
(b) The company did not have any policies or limits on the feed rate, that is the tonnage per hour of coal that was fed along the conveyor belts and flung by the jet slinger or the Luff angle, that is the trajectory which coal could be flown or flung from the jet slinger. There were no exclusion zones around the hatch at the time of loading.
(c) The ship loader operator was often not able to see the loading area where coal was being poured or where the hatch was positioned. There were no cameras or monitors to give the ship loader operator a view of the loading area. This was often compounded by the company not ensuring sufficient, adequate safe places for the hatchman to stand while inspecting the hatch. The available viewing platforms may position the hatch and closer to the line of fire.
(d) The jet slinger could not just be operated from the ship loader operator’s cabin. It could also be operated from five other computer terminals within the coal terminal. These computers could control the jet slinger as well as the feed rate of the coal.
(e) Functions of the ship loader operating system also contributed.
(f) The hatchman did not have an emergency stop control. If there was an emergency stopping, the loading was dependent on being able to communicate this to the ship loader operator, but they did not have a dedicated radio channel. The emergency stop was rarely used. Workers knew that the emergency stop was cumbersome and time-consuming.
[16] PPE was inconsistently provided and monitored. Training was inadequate and the risks were not adequately monitored by the company as required by their own risk management system.
The Incident
[17] I apologise to the family for having to outline the details of the incident in some detail.
[18] On 25 April 2022, Mr Don Grant was working as a hatchman on the vessel, ETG Aquarius. [Person A] was working as the ship loader. The vessel was a new ship on its maiden voyage. It was a large vessel, meaning that the ship loader boom was not long enough to reach the centre of the hatch. The coaming around the hatches was so high that it was not possible to see into the hatch while standing on the deck.
[19] Shortly after 8 am, the ship loader was moved to hatch 1 to complete a trim pour of the final 1,000 tonnes of coal. The loading plan was for hatch 1 to be loaded to 95 per cent full. Due to the list of the ship, the crew had requested that more coal be loaded on to the far side of the hatch.
[20] In order to continue loading on the far side, it was necessary to operate the jet slinger high in the hatch with the ship loader chutes retracted up as far as they would go and the jet slinger belt luffed up. This allowed the coal to be slung to the far side of the hatch near to the top, but it also meant that the coal was close to being fired over the edge and onto the deck.
[21] At 8:38 am, the feed rate for the coal conveyor system was increased from 1,200 tonnes per hour to 1,500 tonnes per hour at a computer in the staff room of the coal amenities building at the other end of the coal terminal. Nothing was said over the radio about the change. This was a much higher than the usual coal feed rate for trimming a hatch which was a thousand tonnes per hour or even as low as 800 tonnes per hour.
[22] At 8:47 am, there remained a starboard list. Despite Mr Grant advising the coal supervisor that there was, to quote his words, “bugger all” space on the port side, the coal supervisor advised him to keep going.
[23] At 8:55 am, Mr Grant moved from the viewing ladder on the aft side of hatch 1 to the other ladder on the fore side of that hatch. This was the ladder the furthest away from the line of fire of the coal.
[24] At 9:03 am, Mr Grant asked: “Come around clockwise”. A few seconds later, he said: “That was good”, and CCTV footage shows the jet slinger rotating and then stopping in response to his instructions. CCTV footage shows the jet slinger rotating anti-clockwise into short movements in response to Mr Grant’s directions.
[25] A minute later at 9:04 am, the jet slinger began to rotate clockwise without any instruction from Mr Grant. It rotated for seven seconds moving approximately 45 degrees. Mr Grant did not have an emergency stop control so would not have been able to stop the coal even if he did have time. Coal began almost immediately to shoot over the coaming and onto the deck at a rate of 1,500 tonnes per hour. The jet slinger stopped rotating when the stream of coal was directed exactly at where Mr Grant was standing on the ladder. The stream of coal struck him causing him to fall from his viewing area. The coal continued to pour over the side of the hatch quickly burying him. The ship loader operator was unable to see what had occurred because he did not have a direct line of sight to the loading zone or did not have a CCTV camera which showed the loading area. [Person A] could not even see from his screen that the jet slinger had unexpectedly rotated.
[26] At 9:06 am, the foreman asked the ship loader operator to turn the jet slinger clockwise. By then it had been firing coal towards Mr Grant’s position for more than two and a half minutes. As soon as the coal supervisor realised that Mr Grant may be under the pile of coal, he called for all hands on deck. Workers digging with shovels found Mr Grant under the pile of coal. Tragically he was unable to be revived.
Sentencing under the Act
[27] I need to talk about sentencing and the sentencing mythology.
[28] The key relevant purposes of the Act are three-fold:
- (a) Protecting workers against harm to their health, safety and welfare by eliminating or minimising risks arising from work.
- (b) Securing compliance through effective and appropriate enforcement measures.
- (c) Providing a framework for continuous improvement and progressively higher standards of work health and safety.
[29] Section 151 of the Act provide specific guidance for sentencing for offences under ss 48–49.
[30] Sections 7–10 of the Sentencing Act set out the purposes and principles of sentencing and the aggravating and mitigating factors which a sentencing Court must take into account. Those provisions are well-known to me of course as they are to counsel, and I do not intend to outline them.
Approach to Sentencing
[31] The guideline decision for health and safety sentencing remains Stumpmaster and Others v WorkSafe New Zealand.2 Sentencing requires a four-step process:
- (a) Assess the amount of reparation.
- (b) Fix the amount of the fine by reference, first, to the guideline bands and then having regard to personal aggravating and mitigating factors.
- (c) Determine whether further orders under ss 152–158 of the Act are required.
2 Stumpmaster and Others v WorkSafe New Zealand [2018] NZHC 2020.
(d) Making an overall assessment of proportionality and appropriateness of the “combined packet of sanctions”, including by reference to the defendant’s financial capacity.
Step One: Assessing Quantum of Reparation
[32] Reparation is compensatory in nature. The purpose of reparation is to recognise the emotional harm to Mr Grant’s family and to compensate them for their loss. The company has provided the family with financial support, including a payment in lieu of a life insurance policy to which Don was not eligible because of his age. The company has also made reparation payments for emotional harm and consequential loss. It has also contributed towards the payment of legal fees for assisting the family throughout the investigation and the duration of the legal proceedings. The sums, to which I am not going to refer in court, would equal or exceed the amount the Court would otherwise order.
[33] The company submits, and I think the prosecutor accepts, that no further order of reparation for emotional harm or consequential loss is required.
Step Two: Quantum of the Fine
[34] A two-step sentencing methodology applies:
- (a) The first step calculates the adjusted starting point, incorporating aggravating and mitigating features of the offence.
- (b) The second step incorporates all aggravating and mitigating factors personal to the defendant company, together with any guilty plea discount, all of which need to be calculated as a percentage of the adjusted starting point.
Culpability Factors
[35] Culpability should be assessed by reference various factors:
- (a) Identification of the operative acts or omissions as issue.
[36] Identification of the operative acts or omissions usually involves the clear identification of the practicable steps which the Court finds it was reasonable for the offender to have taken.
[37] Once the assessment of culpability is complete, the offending should be categorised into a number of bands with corresponding starting points. The full Court of the High Court predicted that under the new bands, a starting point of $500,000 to
$600,000 (near the top of the medium culpability band) would be common. The Court noted that the starting point taken in the case of average culpability may well be higher depending on the degree of departure and the actual harm caused.
Identification of Culpability Factors
The Identification of The Operative Acts or Omissions at Issue
[38] The company failed to ensure the health and safety of its workers and ships’ crew and failed to ensure its plant was without risks to the health and safety of other persons. It was reasonably practicable for the company to have done these things:
[39] The prosecutor submits that the failure to take those reasonably practicable steps demonstrates a serious failure to consider the high risk posed by the plant to the hatchman and crew of the vessel.
[40] The company has accepted that its systems, procedures and plant were not sufficient to ensure the safety of its workers at the time of the incident. The risk of a
hatchman being struck by a projectile or fall has been identified and there has been training to mitigate the risk. The company’s Coal Risk Register identified “projectile” as a hazard. The risk and controls such as wearing PPE, standing outside the line of fire, and reducing flow or trajectory were identified and discussed with trainee hatchmen during their training. There were additional operational controls that mitigated the risk that were controlled by the ship loader operator.
[41] The systems which the company had in place demonstrated an awareness of the risks. The company acknowledges, however, that there were gaps in its systems and training procedures that exposed its workers to the risk of serious harm.
Nature and Seriousness of the Risk of Harm and the Realised Risk
[42] The risk was that the hatchman or crew of the vessel would be seriously injured or killed during the coal loading process. Tragically, that risk was realised in this case and resulted in the death of Mr Grant. The ship’s crew had also been exposed to that risk when they walked in front of the trajectory of the jet slinger only three minutes prior to the move that resulted in Mr Grant’s death.
The Degree of Departure from Relevant Industry Standards/Obviousness of Hazard/What the Company Knew or Ought to Have Known About the Hazard
[43] The company was aware of the risk. The risk of projectiles and the hatchman being hit by flying objects was identified as a high risk but the risk register did not identify additional controls. The risk itself was obvious. The jet slinger fired coal out of the conveyor at a feed rate of anything between 800 and 1,500 tonnes per hour. The controls allowed the jet slinger head to rotate 360 degrees. The ship loader chutes or the boom itself could be raised higher and the jet slinger head could be tilted or luffed to allow the coal to be flung further distances. There was nothing stopping a hatchman being struck by coal.
[44] Features of the operating system made the risk even more dangerous, including the ability for the jet slinger to swing. There was a possibility of operator error when inputting any requested movement. There were delays or lags not only between the hatchman’s request and the ship loader operator responding but also in the operating
system itself. The operation could be controlled by five other live computer terminals throughout the port. The most obvious steps to take would have been to remove the need for the hatchman to be positioned in the trajectory of the jet slinger. The company was aware that a port in New South Wales operated without the hatchman position and instead with CCTV cameras and additional lighting.
[45] The company had not implemented any exclusion zones for the hatchman or crew and both would work within the trajectory of the jet slinger firing significant amounts of coal at speed. Failure to establish exclusion or safe zones constitutes a significant departure from relevant industry standards in the face of an obvious hazard.
[46] The company acknowledges that, internationally, there are coal loading facilities that have advanced technology allowing the coal loading operations to operate with sensor technology, eliminating the need for the hatchman. The company did not have the advanced capabilities and the submission is made it was not easy to incorporate or install a system that could operate at that level. Despite the risks and the shortcomings of the systems, there have been no other incidents or near misses in the coal loading area as far as the company is concerned.
[47] The company is working towards creating a sensor-operated system for the coal loading operation. The purpose of the system would eliminate the need for there to be a hatchman. The company acknowledges, however, that it was able to eliminate the need for the hatchman to be positioned around the vicinity of the hatch. It also acknowledges that it could have eliminated systems of work that ensured the hatchman was not exposed to the risk of projectiles.
[48] The company also accepts that it fell short of the high standards required despite providing training to its workers in relation to the risks and the controls in place to reduce the risk posed by the jet slinger. However, the company acknowledges there were gaps in the training.
[49] Since the incident, the company has reduced the maximum throughput rate to 1,400 tonnes per hour with a further rate reduction when the hatch approaches 90 per cent capacity.
The Availability, Cost and Effectiveness of the Means Necessary to Avoid the Hazard
[50] The means available to avoid the risk were effective and low-cost. There were many ways in which the company could have avoided or significantly reduced the risk of serious harm or death. The simplest way would have been to implement exclusion zones around the hatch at the time of loading at very low cost. The company has now implemented this measure. The fact that this one simple measure was not implemented compounded all the other issues with the system. The lack of the exclusion zone made it all the more important that the ship loader operator was able to see the loading zone if not directly then with CCTV cameras. This was not the case, but the company has now put this in place. It was also all the more important that the ship loader operator was able to determine from his computer screen the angle of the jet slinger and its movement. In the absence of any visuals, the ship loader operator should have been trained to use the emergency stop as soon as he lost contact with the hatchman.
[51] The company has now taken steps to reduce the risk. Those steps have cost a significant sum, some of which have been administrative controls involving a change in process without any significant cost. For example, the hatchman is now positioned in a safe zone, and if they need to inspect the hatch, the machinery is stopped.
[52] The operating procedures implemented following the incident ensure that the hatchman is not exposed to the risk of being struck by projectiles. The company regrets not having those additional controls in place at the time of the incident.
[53] At the time of the incident, there was an emergency stop system. The emergency stop was enabled by the ship loader operator usually following instructions from the hatchman. The ship loader operator received training relating to the emergency stop. The training has been updated since the incident. The company has considered implementing another portable emergency stop which would be always carried by the hatchman. The company acknowledges that allowing the hatchman immediate control over the emergency stop is a more effective system than requiring the hatchman to instruct the ship loader operator to activate the emergency stop.
The Starting Point
[54] In terms of the starting point for the fine, the prosecutor submits that the company’s liability is towards the top end of the high culpability band such that a starting point of between $900,000 and $950,000 would be appropriate.
Comparable Cases
[55] I must have regard to comparable cases insofar as any two cases are the same.
[56] The first is WorkSafe New Zealand v Toll Networks (NZ) Ltd.3 The court imposed a starting point of $900,000 because the defendant failed to identify the risk that resulted in the accident. The company here submits a lower starting point should be adopted in the present case because the company identified the risk and put measures in place to mitigate the risk eventuated but ultimately failed in its training and supervision of the risk. The company also submits that the factual scenario Toll Networks was an everyday occurrence whereas it was not common for coal to spill over the hatch, although the company acknowledges that occasionally happened. Nonetheless, although the risk was identified and some measures were put in place to mitigate the risk, the risk was obvious and measures which could reduce or eliminate the risk were not onerous. Loading hatches with coal is a frequent occurrence and while coal spilling over the hatch may not have been a common occurrence, there was a real risk of that happening while feeding coal at a high rate near the top of the hatch.
[57] In Maritime New Zealand v Port of Auckland, the Court imposed a starting point of $850,000.4 The company submits that the case is distinguishable because the failings of the defendant were similar to those in a previous fatality and the Court found there were systemic failings. The defendant company had been convicted in relation to a previous fatality, but the company submits those failings were entirely different to the current situation. Of course, any adjustment to the starting point for prior convictions occurs at the second step in the sentencing exercise.
3 WorkSafe New Zealand v Toll Networks (NZ) Ltd [2018] NZDC 11132.
4 Maritime New Zealand v Port of Auckland [2023] NZDC 26957.
[58] The final case I want to deal with is WorkSafe New Zealand v Alto Packaging Ltd where the Court adopted a starting point of $800,000 in circumstances where the defendant company was aware of the risk of unguarded rollers due to previous injuries suffered from the rollers.5 Counsel for the defendant company submits that the defendant is less culpable than the defendant in that case because it had measures in place to address the risk. It had developed training manuals and safe work method statements for the hatchman and ship loader operators. While that is so, the measures were inadequate to avoid a recognised and obvious risk. It is also of concern that the company is unclear why the load rate was increased. The fact it was able to be increased without any input from the hatchman or ship loader operator is a significant factor.
Adjustments to the Starting Point for Personal Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
[59] The company has two previous convictions for offending in 2014 against the predecessor to the Act. Both convictions were for failing to take reasonably practicable steps to ensure the health and safety of workers and thereby exposing them to the risk of death or serious injury. The first offence occurred on 28 August 2014 when a worker was killed when he was attempting to jumpstart a straddle crane. The company was sentenced for that offending on 6 August 2015. The second offence occurred on 22 January 2014. The offending involved failing to ensure that workers were not exposed to hazards relating to equipment known as a cherry picker. The company was sentenced for that offending on 5 August 2016.
[60] The prosecutor submits (there does not appear to be an issue about this) that an uplift of 10 per cent is appropriate to reflect those prior relevant convictions, albeit that they occurred approximately eight years prior to the current incident.
5 WorkSafe New Zealand v Alto Packaging Ltd [2022] NZDC 6148.
Mitigating Factors
[61] The company is entitled to a discount for co-operation and remorse. This is a recognition of the steps the company took to make amends to Mr Grant’s family. The company has also facilitated a restorative justice process through a third-party provider. A discount of 15 per cent is appropriate to reflect those factors.
[62] Since the incident, the company has implemented several corrective actions, including CCTV cameras to improve the ship loader operators view of the jet slinger, amended hatchman and ship loader operating systems, limited control of operation of the plant for only one computer terminal system, imposed a limit on the feed rate when filling a hatch between 90 and 100 per cent capacity, limited the Luff angle on the jet slinger; and it is in the process of implementing a portable emergency stop for the hatchman. That may already have occurred. I am not sure.
[63] The prosecutor submits that taking these corrective actions does not warrant any further discount because those actions were taken to ensure that the company took reasonably practicable steps for the safety of its workers which should have existed in the first place.
[64] The company pleaded guilty on 27 November 2023. This is at the first reasonable opportunity in the circumstances and justifies a discount of 25 per cent.
Step Three – Ancillary Orders Adverse Publicity Order
[65] The prosecutor seeks that the court make an adverse publicity order requiring the company to publicise the offence, its consequences, the penalty imposed and any other related matter. There is agreement between prosecutor and defence that such an order may be made, and I make an adverse publicity order in terms that had been provided to me and will be published as outlined per the agreement between the prosecutor and defence. I do that because similar industries around New Zealand are likely to benefit from publication of an adverse publicity order. That can be used to educate and inform the relevant risk factors.
Costs
[66] Costs are also sought. I understand these are agreed in the sum of $35,000, representing a contribution to costs.
Suppression Orders
[67] I make an order suppressing the name and any identifying particulars of [person A]. That order is made pursuant to s 202(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. That is on the basis that publication of [person A]’s name would cause undue hardship to him.
[68] I make an order also suppressing publication of details of the reparation payments made to Mr Grant’s family. I have deliberately not referred to the sums. There may be publication of the fact that reparation has been made but not of the sums.
Step Four: Proportionality
[69] The final step is to make an overall assessment of the proportionality and appropriateness of the combined packet of sanctions.
[70] The sentence is made up of:
- (a) Reparation comprising both consequential financial loss and emotional harm reparation to [person A]. No order of reparation needs to be made in respect of Mr Grant’s family.
[71] I impose a fine:
- (a) With a starting point of $800,000, being the midpoint of the high culpability band.
- (b) I impose an uplift of 10 per cent for relevant previous convictions.
- (c) Adjust that downwards by 15 per cent for co-operation and remorse. I think that should be properly recognised.
$480,000 which is imposed, together with costs of $35,000.
[72] I make the adverse publicity order to which I have already referred.
Judge P R Kellar
District Court Judge | Kaiwhakawā o te Kōti ā-Rohe
Date of authentication | Rā motuhēhēnga: 05/08/2024
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