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<u>Hearings</u> 22nd and 25th August, 1972 -<u>Counsel</u>: Grove for Flaintiff Holland for Defendant

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JUDOMETT OF WOODBOUGE, J.

This is an action for the recovery of amounts paid in respect of an agreement relating to a motor vehicle. The emount claimed at the time when the writ was issued was \$2,250 but the claim embraces certain payments ands by the plaintiff to the defendant company since that time. The allogation is that the agreement is in breach of regulation 8 (b) of the Mire Purchase and Gredit Sales and Stabilization Regulations 1957 (reprinted as 1967/192). The regulation provides that:-

"A person shall not .

(b) Enter into any transaction or make any contract or arrangement, whether orally or in writing, for the purpose of or having the effect of, in any way, whether directly or indirectly, defeating, evading, avoiding, or preventing the operation of these regulations in any respect."

The contention is that the transaction entered into by the parties was illegal by reason of that provision.

The facts of I find then to be are as follows. The plaintiff is a young carpentar. He had been purchases an inempenative Singer motor vehicle under a hire purchase agreement and by Pebruary, 1970 the payments due by him under that agreement were completed, or almost completed. He valued the car at about \$500 and that seems to have been a realistic figure. He desired to murchase a comeshat botter vehicle and

so on the evening of 11th February he drove in his Singer car to the promises of Cord Motors Limited, a licensed notor vehicle dealer in Auckland. There he examined a 1958 Buick notor oar which was standing in a dealer's yard. While doing so a Mr. Honaldoon, the manager of the company at the time, approached him and encouraged him to take the Buick away for a short trial drive. On plaintiff's return he enquired the price of it and was told \$2,800. His reaction was to tol Ronaldson that such a price "was completely out of sy price rango"t and he explained that his only asset was the Singer cor then standing in the street outside the Cord Motors procises. Ronaldson then suggested discussing the matter and the mlaintiff replied that "if there was a change of owning the car I would like to discuss it". At this point Nonaldson indicated to the plaintiff that it would be possible to obtain the Duick for \$2,800 by transferring the Singer car at a figure of \$800 and making monthly payments of \$60 for four years with a residual payment at the end of that period. In the result the plaintiff decided to proceed with the transaction. He passed across his Singer to the Cord com pany and signed the agreement. It was all done on the same evening and the plaintiff thereupon drove away in the Buick motor car.


At a later stage, in mid 1977, the plaintiff returned to the ford premises where again he saw Homaldoon. He had been having difficulty in meeting the monthly payments of 460 and enquired whether the transaction could be ended and the car sold on his behalf. It was then left in the Cord yard on display for sale and was there two months or so until the plaintiff decided by take it book. In the meantime he had carried on with the monthly payments. It seems that about this time he first becaus aware that the written agreen/ak contemplated that he could nover become the enter of the vehicle and he therefore consulted his solicitore.

A.

No was asked in evidence about his understanding of the transaction when he migned the agreement and he agreed that he had noticed that the printed heading of the document contained the word "lease" but he explained that he had understood that the whole arrangement involved a new way of purchasing a motor vehicle. As to that explanation I as entiofied (from this and other statements he made in evidence) that he had equated the word "lease" with the rather losse understanding mony poople have of the implications of the word "hire" in a hire purchase agreement. What is more I am in no doubt that when the matter was being discussed Ronaldoon was deliberately very careful to say nothing to the plaintiff that would distilluation the latter in this respect. Indeed I accept completely the plaintiffe evidence that he had apoclfically asked Ronaldoon on the original occasion if he would become the owner of the car at the end of the period and was told in mover to that question that he would have to pay 5390 as a residual value on the car "and then by signing a transfer of ownership form, registration or something, the car would cove back to me from Gredit Services" (the defendant company) "and would be mine", The plaintiff also said that he definitely would not have entered into the agreement if he had known that he was merely renting or loaning the vehicle since he could not afford to pay out the ound of money involved (which included, of course, the transfor of his modest but hard-won Singer car) and at the end have nothing loft.

But the agreement he signed is, in fact, no more than a locating agreement and it contains a provision which states in specific terms that the locate can never become the owner. Yet morely for its use during four years the document commits the plaintiff to a payment of more than 54,000. Whatever the legal effect of that written agreement taken by itself I have not the slightest doubt that the plaintiff believed that he had entered upon a transaction whereby he would alowly acquire the car on a capital accet; he was actively encouraged in that understanding of the transmotion by Donaldoon; and he certainly would not have enbarted upon it otherwise.

It happens that a day or two before the day fixed for hearing of the action Mr. Helland on behalf of the defendant company filed an application for its adjournment. The request was argued on the norming of that day and one reason then given for the application was that gince it had been filed in the Court Registry a few days carlier Renaldson (considered by the defendant company to be a necessary witness) had departed for Figi. When the application for the adjournment was made he had been in New Sealand but he had left the country on a Saturday norming with knowledge that the fixture had been made for the following Monday. It seemed that as very strumuous effort had been made to percuade Renaldson to remain here and I was told that it was uncortain whether he would be prepared to return to the country for some time abond. So I decided that the action should MM proceed. However after the plaintiff had given his evidence I was informed that a telephone communication with Figi had ensured that Sonaldoon would return to New Sealand within two days if the further hearing of the case could be adjourned for that period. This application I granted and Honaldson duly appeared. Accordingly the findings of fact that I have outlined take into account his evidence which in a number of respects is directly in conflict with that of the plaintiff. It will be obvious, therefore, that where there is such conflict I have accepted the ovidence of the plaintiff and discarded the contrary version given by Remainson. In doing so it is necessary (though I regret the need) to record my opinion of Renaldson as a glib but unreliable witness. I do not accept Renaldson's attempt to persuade me that the plaintiff understood



productly that the locating exemption involved. For de I telleve inneldeds when he suggests that he use in communication with the defendant company during the parted of the negotisticans which led to the completion of the transaction. These negotisticans began and ended (as I as satisfied) on the observation of the original evening meeting as I have earlier described it. In company during meeting as i have earlier described it. In company during meeting described to as by the uncomplicated and rather unsceptioniented young can whe is now making the present complaint. In my optaion he is to be regarded as an honest without providing an ecounty account of a dealing that we for his one of considerable importance.

The written agreement to which I have been referring is a document generally in the same form as that considered by the Court of Appeal in <u>Gredit Services Manited v. Quartal</u> 1970 8.8.1.8. 933; and it is identical with the smeaded form of the <u>Quartal</u> agreement as it came before the Court of Appeal in <u>Gredit Services Threatmonts Limited v. Carroll.</u> (Judgment delivered 23rd August, 1972). This latter form of the agreement had already some under review by Perry J. in <u>DeAth</u> v. <u>Cord Maters Manited and Gredit Corriges Manited</u> (Augustand Registry Judgment 16th December, 1971).

It will be noticed that in each of those cases the present defendant figures as a principal party, in the first of them it was held that the transaction was in contravention of regulation (3) (b) and judgment went against Credit Services. The second case was decided while the case with which I am concerned was being heard. Here the Court of Appeal held in favour of Credit Services on grounds that the amended form of leasing agreement expressly contemplated that the leases of the car concerned could never become its owner and was not invalidated by the regulation. It is percensary to notice, however, that the leases had clear

knowledge and understanding of that fact. It is in this last respect that the <u>boach</u> case was different. It was concerned with the same smonded form of agreement but Perry . found (as I do myself in this present case) that the lesses une actively encouraged by Cord Hotors to believe that the transaction assumed to a trade-in and purchase; and it was admitted by Gredit Services that Gord Hotors was its agent. That admited on has not been made in the present case although I observe in possing that an both occasions cord Hotors was the desice contents and they took place within a month of one amother. Perry J. found in favour of the plaintiff.

The dactor that distinguished the present case from Carroll in that the present plaintiff was miched by Cord Noters concerning the nature of the leasing agreement. If 14 wore not for this eather the face of the action would of course be determined by the decision of the Court of Appenl in <u>Corrol</u> and the plaintiff could not augocod. However, as there is the distinction two issues require to be deterstand by so. The first is whether the motor dealer was the agent of the finance company when it handled the transaction with the plaintiff. The second issue is whether for the purpose of regulation 8(b)of the Hire Purchase and Credit Saloo and Stabilization Regulations 1997 the transaction to tainted by the accurances given by Recoldeon that promoted empention of the written agreement. In the content of this eneo it is my opinion that the enewer to bobh Longon in "yee".

The question as to whether the motor dealer ected as agent for Gredit Services Limited is seenthing to be determined as a question of fact within the content of this case. But Mr. Belland invited me to hold as a uniter of general principle and on the authority of <u>Branubite V.</u> <u>Harpendum North Floring Limited</u> (1968 3 All E.R. 104) that such a dealer examples a Longing sgreenest between his

ductower and a findage company could not be regarded as the Latter's egent. The case is one is which the House of Larde considered shother is a typical hire-gurehaus irensection a motor-domlar abould be presumed to be the agent of a finance despeny in the absence of robuiling airconstances. And by a majority it was held that there we no such initial informance of agency although the case is distinguished by a forceful disconting speech of Lord Hilberforce in which Lord Neid concurred. The majority accepted that Pearson I. J. had correctly stated the law in <u>inconstile Condit Concerner</u>, institut (1966) 3 All H.R. 992). He and at p. 600re

"There is no rule of law that in a hire-purchase transaction the dealer never is, or always is, acting an agent for the finance company or as agent for the customer. In a typical hire-purchase transaction the dealer is a party in his our right, delling his car to the finance company, and he is acting primarily on his our behalf and not as general agent for either of the other two partice. There is no need to attribute to him an agency in order to account for his participation in the transaction."

An I understand Mr. Helland's submission it expanses to an argument first that the normal activities and the status of the dealer in the conventional hire-purchase type of transaction are to be equated with those of the dealer who promotes a localing arrangement of the type under consideration in the promont power and second that the statement of Peercon L.J. should permade up that the general way in which the present leasting arrangement and courd forward could not give rise to any inference of agency.

I must, of course, recognize the high permanelye enthority of the <u>Dependent</u> degisions although I confere that I find such attraction in the powerful and lucid discussion of the matter in the discenting speech of Lord Wilberforce.

However in the present context I do not think the case is of any decisive sectatores. I think, for example, there are factual distinctions to be drawn between the position of the domlor in the normal hire-purchase transaction and the motordealer who initiates and concludes the cort of leaving arrangement with his customer that is now under review in Hore Honaldoon alone and without prior reference this case. to Credit Services nominated to finality all the essential dotails of the transaction op far as the plaintiff gas concorne Ronaldoon dignlayed the Bulch car: he agreed to take the Singer as a trade-day he varied the size and duration of the periodic payments originally suggested by himt he cave the accommond to which I have referred; he produced the forma that the finnee coopeny had supplied for use on such an occession; he then had then algoed; and having done all this he completed the whole arrangement as I may in a final sense by accopting the Singer and forthwith passing across to the plaintiff possession of the Buich. I am estimated sorecever that it was a routing that had been habitually followed. On. the facts I am loft antistied that whotherer not Cord Hoters and Credit Services recognized in a forsal sense the relationship of principal and agent as existing between thes, the course of dealing examplified by the present transaction clearly establishes what amounts in low to much a relationship and cortainly it was a relationship that applied on the promont occasion. Pearson L.J. rejected the idea that the dealor in hire-surchase transactions should be pressed to be acting as an agent for the finance company but even as he what on to state:-

"Novertheless the deslar is to some extent as intermediany between the sustance and the finance company, and he may well have in a particular case some ad hos agencies to do particular things on behalf of one or the other or 10 may be both of those two partice. For instance, if the car is delivered by the dealer to the

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customer after the hire-purchase agreement has been concluded, the dealer must be making delivery as agent of the finance company." I think Cord Motore acted as agent for the defendant not only in making delivery of the car but also during the whole of the magnitudians that led up to delivery.

The reasining issue is whether the written agreement must stand slone and be given effect on the basis that this case is indistinguishable from <u>Gradit Services</u> <u>Mailed v. Corralls</u> or whether the transaction is invalidated when the associated discubsions that led to it's completion are taken into account.

It will be remembered that Regulation 8 (b) provides that:

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(b) Enter into any transaction or make any continuit or arrangement, whether evally or in writing, for the purpose of an having the offect of, in any way, whether directly or indirectly, defeating, evading, avaiding, or preventing the operation of these regulations in any respect."

On the facts of this case I as in no doubt that the transactic was arranged by both parties for the purpose of discussioning the Hire Purchase and Gredit Sales Stabilization Segulations 1957 and in particular Regulation 3. That lost regulation roadst*

> "Accept as otherwise provided in these regulations, a person shall not dispose of any goods in pursuance of a him mumbres accessent of a credit sales descense is entered into ofter the appointed day where the requirements specified in the First Schedule herets and of have been satisfied in relation to that agreements." (My emphasis).

The plaintiff's cole purpose was to sequire the Buick car and he wished to do an persuant either to a hire-purchase acressent or to a gredit males agreement because he had insufficient funda to purchase it outright. Hor had he the funds to most the requirements of the regulations in respect of a disposition either by hire-purchase agreement or on credit. All of this was understood by Ronaldson who then put forward the transaction under review as one that would overcome the The plaintiff was assured that by payments he could neoblon. most he would have the use of the car during the extended period and eventual ownership of it when the payments had been complete I an antiofied that on both addes the purpose of the written agreesent against the background of discussion that preceded it was to defect, evade, avoid or prevent the operation of the regulations. The plaintiff may not have had on informed approclation of the regulations or their procles offect and he may not have had the conscious surpose of defeating then by the arrengement but that was the real end he had in view just as it was the real purpose or end in view of Sonaldson. And whother or not that autual purpose was enforceable at law is immiterial on North 2, pointed out in the <u>Constel</u> case at p.9 (11.3 and 3.) I add my opinion that I do not think the reference to "transaction" and to "arrangement" in regulation 8 (b) are confined to what lawyers in a common law sense would consider to be the "torms of the contract". In a word the transaction in the present case is evidenced not service by othe written agroement but also by the general circumstances in which it was ando and by the mutual understanding of the partice.

Accordingly the plaintiff is entitled to judgment together with costs, sitnesses* expenses and disturcements. I would be glad to have from councel an agreed selevistion of the precise amount for which judgment should be entered.

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Measure, Grove and Walker of Auckland for Flaintiff Measure, Wynn Williams & Co. of Christohurch for Defendant

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Judge's Chambers, Supreme Court, Box 60 Auckland. 20th October, 1972

The Editor, N. Z. Law Reports, Box 472, WELLINGTON

Dear Sir:

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A. 358/72 Evans v. Credit Services Investments Limited.

On page 10 of this judgment, reference is made to the <u>Quartel</u> case at p. 957. Will you please alter the page number fo 947?

I regret any inconvenience caused you.

Yours sincerely, rel d

Associate to the Hon. Mr. Justice Woodhouse.