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Hobson v Attorney-General HC Auckland CIV 2003-404-6960 [2004] NZHC 1071; [2005] 2 NZLR 220 (23 September 2004)

Last Updated: 30 January 2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV 2003-404-6960


BETWEEN
TAI HOBSON
Plaintiff

AND
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)
Defendant

Hearing: 17 and 18 May 2004

Appearances: J C Pike and F E Guy for Attorney-General (in support)

B P Henry, D Watson and D Garrett for Mr Hobson (in opposition) Judgment: 23 September 2004

2004_107100.jpg

JUDGMENT OF HEATH J

Solicitors:

Crown Law Office, PO Box 5012, Wellington Jefferies & Raizis, 101 Lambton Quay, Wellington Counsel:

B Henry, D Watson, D Garrett, PO Box 4070, Shortland Street, Auckland

TAI HOBSON V THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) HC AK CIV 2003-

404-6960 23 September 2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Para

  1. Summary of claim and result [1]
  1. Background facts [9]
  1. Strike out principles [19]
  1. Causes of action

(a) The negligence claim [22]

(b) The claim based on breach of statutory duty [31]

(c) The claim based on misfeasance in public office [34]

  1. Approach to analysis of issues raised [39]
  1. Negligence
(a) Introductory comments [41]

(b) The “duty of care issue” [42]

(i) Nature of statutory scheme [51]

(ii) Proximity considerations [61]

(iii) Foresight [74]

(iv) Likelihood of Mr Bell offending in

manner that led to death of Mrs Hobson [83]

(v) Additional policy issues [86]

(c) Negligence – conclusion [95]

  1. Breach of statutory duty [96]
  1. Misfeasance in public office
(a) What do the authorities say? [103]

(b) Can Mr Hobson sue for the tort of misfeasance

in public office [117]

(c) Justiciability [122]

(d) Omissions and requisite knowledge [136]

(e) Application to pleading in this case [145]

  1. Conclusions [151]
  2. Summary of claim and result

a) First, the legislative scheme creates duties of a public nature to be undertaken by probation officers for the benefit of the community as a whole. The public nature of the statutory duties militates against the proposition that (in the absence of specific knowledge of a particular risk that might be posed by the offender to a particular person or class of person) the additional duties should be superimposed by the Courts.

b) Second, it is not feasible to differentiate logically between those who were working at the place where Mrs Hobson was killed from those living or working in the vicinity of those premises. That distinction, drawn by counsel for Mr Hobson, was necessary to create the requisite degree of proximity between the probation officer and Mr Hobson for the purpose of imposing a common law duty of care.

  1. Third, it would be wrong in principle and undesirable in practice to impose on probation officers duties to warn third parties which were, of themselves, unpredictable in nature.

a) The tort of misfeasance in public office has its origins in claims based on misuse of public office. It is entirely appropriate that the tort be available in cases involving public, as opposed to private, duties.

b) The tort is available if a public official acts with targeted malice towards a particular individual (or group of individuals) or is recklessly indifferent as to the consequences of his or her decision on the party (or parties) concerned. The tort is also available to deal with

omissions. However, to be actionable, a failure to act must be deliberate; not the result of negligence, inadvertence or a misunderstanding of the law.

  1. Claims for misfeasance in public office can be brought when a decision is taken in respect of a legal obligation justiciable by the Courts; but not (save, perhaps in rare or exceptional cases of a type not presently in issue) in respect of decisions of a budgetary, managerial, political or policy nature arising out of a Chief Executive’s responsibility to his or her Minister under s32 State Sector Act 1988.

2. Background facts

a) To make an appointment within 72 hours of release with the Departmental psychologist and keep such appointment and thereafter attending counselling as directed by the probation office;

b) To undertake such employment as directed by the probation officer;

  1. To complete an assessment for the straight thinking programme as directed by the probation officer;

d) To make an appointment within 72 hours of release for alcohol and drug assessment, to keep such appointment and following assessment, to undertake counselling as recommended and directed by the probation officer;

e) To reside at a specified address or an address approved by the probation officer.

a) The probation officer knew (or was reckless if he or she did not know) that Mr Bell had a propensity for violent crime.

b) The probation officer knew (or was reckless if he or she did not know) that Mr Bell was attending at the RSA Club as part of the liquor licensing course he was undergoing.

  1. Had proper inquiry been made, the probation officer would have known that both Mr and Mrs Hobson worked at the RSA Club.

3. Strike out principles

in the light of the present state of evolution of the common law that the cause of action sought to be relied on is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed”. See, also, Takaro Properties Ltd v Rowling [1978] 2 NZLR 314 (CA) at 317 and Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267.

4. Causes of action

(a) The negligence claim

standards of care of a probation officer”. In particular, it is alleged that the probation officer had a duty to ensure that Mr Bell complied with the terms of his parole; as set out in para [12] above.

a) Failed to ensure that Mr Bell attended any of the psychiatric, alcohol or drug programmes set out in the conditions.

b) Failed to supervise Mr Bell in any material way.

  1. Failed to ensure that Mr Bell was living in suitable accommodation.

d) Permitted Mr Bell to undertake a liquor licensing course and to work at the RSA Club.

e) Failed to warn Mr and Mrs Hobson (or anyone else working at the RSA Club) of the fact that Mr Bell had a propensity for violent crime and advise them of his conviction for aggravated robbery.

a) The probation officer’s failure to ensure that Mr Bell underwent the psychiatric, alcohol and drug assessment and counselling expressly directed by the Parole Board.

b) The failure of the probation officer (and, more generally, the Probation Service) to ensure that Mr Bell complied with the remaining terms of his parole.

(b) The claim based on breach of statutory duty

(c) The claim based on misfeasance in public office

a) Failed to ensure that Mr Bell undertook an induction process at the commencement of his parole.

b) Failed to make appointments with a psychologist or psychologists employed by the Department, and failed to ensure he attended for an alcohol and drug assessment as required by the conditions of his parole.

  1. Failed to visit the specified address at which Mr Bell was to live.

d) Failed to act appropriately when he or she became aware of Mr Bell’s unauthorised change of address.

e) Breached the Department’s standard policy by changing Mr Bell’s reporting to fortnightly reports some six weeks into the parole period.

f) Breached the Department’s standard policy by allowing Mr Bell not to report for more than four weeks following the switch to fortnightly reporting.

g) Failed to place Mr Bell on the “Offender Warning Register” on or immediately after 14 November 2001 (when the Department became aware Mr Bell had been charged with male assaults female).

h) Failed to initiate recall proceedings after becoming aware of the assault charge.

a) Failed to ensure that the Mangere Centre (where Mr Bell’s probation officer was located) was adequately resourced.

b) Failed to respond to pleas by the Acting Manager of the Mangere Centre in the months prior to the murders for further resources for that office.

  1. Allowed or acquiesced in the mismanagement of the Mangere Centre by the predecessor of the Acting Manager of the Mangere Centre.

d) Failed to insist on standard practice being followed in the Mangere Centre when informed that serious departures from standard practice were occurring at the Mangere Centre.

e) Introduced the Integrated Management of Offenders Scheme (IMOS) in the northern half of the North Island and, in particular, at the

Mangere Centre, which diverted already scarce human resources from the business of managing Mr Bell and others.

f) Caused or knowingly allowed officers to be absent from the Mangere Centre for the purpose of IMOS training, resulting in the Mangere Centre being unable to function, or even open, on more than one occasion.

g) Failed to ensure that psychologists were available to carry out the assessments such as those Mr Bell was required by the conditions of his parole to undertake;

h) Failed to respond to unauthorised industrial action at the Mangere Centre in September 2001 despite being informed by the Acting Manager that such action was causing the Mangere Centre to be “non- functioning”.

5. Approach to analysis of issues raised

6. Negligence

(a) Introductory comments

(b) The “duty of care” issue

a) First, at 294, Cooke P said the inquiry into whether a duty of care existed is undertaken by reference to two broad questions: namely (a) the degree of proximity or relationship between the alleged wrongdoer and the person said to have suffered loss and (b) whether other policy

considerations existed tending to negative or restrict a duty of the type alleged. Cooke P continued, at 294-295:

(i) A broad two-stage approach or any other approach is only a framework, a more or less methodical way of tackling a problem. How it is formulated should not matter in the end. Ultimately the exercise can only be a balancing one and the important object is that all relevant factors be weighed. There is no escape from the truth that, whatever formula be used, the outcome in a grey area case has to be determined by judicial judgment. Formulae can help to organise thinking but they cannot provide answers.

(ii) Sometimes it is suggested that a certain formula, for instance that of Lord Wilberforce in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1977] UKHL 4; [1978] AC 728, 751-752, creates a prima facie presumption of a duty based on reasonable foresight. I am of the school of thought that has never subscribed to that view, largely because of Lord Wilberforce's reference to a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood. It would be naive, and I believe absurd and dangerous, to assert that a duty of care prima facie arises whenever harm is reasonably foreseeable. Even quite unlikely consequences may be reasonably foreseeable (compare the kind of issue in criminal law considered in Chan Wing-Siu v R [1984] UKPC 27; [1985] AC 168). Naturally the degree of likelihood and the seriousness of the foreseeable consequences can be important factors in the balancing exercise. (my emphasis)

b) Second, at 305-306, Richardson J put the ultimate question as follows: in light of all the circumstances of the case, is it just and reasonable that a duty of care of the type alleged be imposed? His Honour continued:

... It is an intensely pragmatic question requiring most careful analysis. It has fallen for consideration in numerous cases in this Court over recent years and, drawing on Anns v Merton London Borough Council, we have found it helpful to focus on two broad fields of inquiry. The first is the degree of proximity or relationship between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage. That is not of course a simple question of foreseeability as between parties. It involves consideration of the degree of analogy with cases in which duties are already established and, as I shall develop shortly, reflects an assessment of the competing moral claims. The second is whether there are other policy considerations which tend to negative or restrict - or strengthen the existence of - a duty in that class of case. (my emphasis)

  1. Police authorities (in situations where the Police are said to have incompetently investigated the commission of crimes or to have failed to take logical and sensible precautions to prevent a particular crime being committed), see for instance Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 (HL), Osman v Ferguson [1992] EWCA Civ 8; [1993] 4 All ER 344 (CA) and the sequel, Osman v UK (1998) 5 EHRC 293.
  1. Prison authorities (who are said to have negligently permitted prisoners to escape to commit further offences or to have failed to protect prisoners from violent offending from other prisoners), see for instance Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] UKHL 2; [1970] AC 1004 (HL).
  1. Social welfare authorities (who have failed to take adequate precautions to protect children from violence from those who have direct custody and control of them) see for instance Attorney-General v Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) and Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [1999] UKHL 25; [1999] 3 All ER 193 (CA).
  1. Medical authorities, including doctors (who are said to have negligently failed to prevent mental health patients from committing further offences), see for instance W v Counties Manukau Health Ltd [1995] 2 NZLR 560, van de Wetering v Capital Coast Health (High Court, Wellington CP 368/98, 19 May 2000, Master Thomson), Maulolo v Hutt Valley Health Corporation

Ltd [2001] NZHC 1166; [2002] NZAR 375 and Palmer v Tees Health Authority [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep (Med) 351 (CA).

  1. Recognised (or should have recognised) that the offender in question posed particular threat to a particular individual or small group of individuals; or
  1. Had a pre-existing duty to the victim of the offence.

... permitting a mentally ill patient, with known propensities to violence, to be at large in the hospital premises without adequate control or supervision of his movements.

With respect, I adopt William Young J’s analysis. Specifically, I adopt the formulation set out in para [22] of his judgment, on which I cannot improve. I regard William Young J’s analysis as a convenient summary of the issues arising from South Pacific in a case of this type.

  1. Does the nature of the statutory scheme exclude the possibility of a claim based on negligence?
  1. Are there compelling and logical reasons for differentiating Mr Hobson (whether as the husband of the late Mrs Hobson or as an employee of the RSA Club) from other members of society so that there is sufficient proximity between Mr Hobson and the probation officer to found a duty of care?
  1. Was it foreseeable to the probation officer that Mr Hobson would suffer the type of loss for which he now claims compensation?
  1. What was the likelihood of Mr Bell offending in the manner that actually caused the death of Mrs Hobson?
  1. Save for issues arising from consideration of the statutory scheme, what policy reasons exist to support or reject imposition of an actionable duty of care in negligence? I refer to those as additional policy issues.

(i) Nature of statutory scheme

(c) To co-ordinate and arrange community involvement (including the use of volunteers) in the administration of any particular community-based sentence, or any particular release on conditions under Part 6 of this Act, where appropriate, and in accordance with any instructions issued by the Manager Community Corrections:

(d) To arrange and monitor courses of social education or counselling or personal services directed at the social re-integration of offenders and the reduction of the likelihood of re-offending, where appropriate, and in accordance with any instructions issued by a controlling officer:

Similar duties (now expressed as “functions”) are found in s25 of the Corrections Act 2004. While the Corrections Act has been passed, s25 is not yet in force and s125 of the Act continues to apply meantime.

Council. The Privy Council did not consider afresh whether a duty of care of the type found in Prince had been correctly imposed as a matter of law; rather, the Privy Council determined B based on an application of the Court of Appeal judgment in Prince: see B v Attorney-General at 150, para [12]. Both Prince and B involved consideration of the Children and Young Persons Act 1974. Section 5 of that Act placed an affirmative duty on the Director-General of Social Welfare “to take positive action and such steps under this Act as in his opinion may assist in preventing children or young persons from being exposed to unnecessary suffering or deprivation”: s5(1). Further, the Director-General was required to arrange for prompt inquiry when he or she knew, or had reason to suspect, that any child or young person was suffering or likely to suffer from ill treatment or inadequate care or control: s5(2)(a).

... In an inquiry into an abuse allegation the interests of the alleged perpetrator and of the children as the alleged victims are poles apart. Those conducting the inquiry must act in good faith throughout. But to impose a common law duty of care on the department and the individual professionals in favour of the alleged victims or potential victims and, at one in the same time, in favour of the alleged perpetrator would not be satisfactory. ... The decision in Prince’s case rests heavily on the feature that the duty imposed on the Director-General by s5(2)(a) of the 1974 Act is for the benefit of the particular child. Self-evidently this statutory duty was not imposed for the benefit of alleged perpetrators of abuse. To utilise the existence of this statutory duty as the foundation of a common law duty in favour of perpetrators would be to travel far outside the rationale in Prince’s case. (B v Attorney-General at 154-155, para [30])

(ii) Proximity considerations

a) The distinction adds nothing to the first pleaded duty – namely the duty not to depart from ordinary standards of care required of a probation officer. The probation officer, by s125 of the Act, was required to supervise Mr Bell’s compliance with conditions of parole as part of the process by which risk of re-offending was to be managed.

b) In the case of the alleged duty to warn those who worked at the RSA Club of Mr Bell’s propensity for violence, there is no logical basis on which to distinguish workers at the RSA Club from others living or working in the vicinity of the Club.

  1. If a duty to warn existed, where and how would one draw the line between those required to be warned and those not? For example, it is easy to posit an example of a service station nearby and to query whether the management or employees of that service station ought to be warned, given the fact that Mr Bell’s conviction for aggravated robbery arose out of an armed robbery at a service station. And, if such management and staff ought to be warned, within what radius of
the RSA Club would that duty to warn arise? And what about motorists passing through the service station from time to time?

individual or a small group of individuals. That proposition accords with category

(1) of para [22] of William Young J’s judgment in S. Nevertheless, I note that the (English) Court of Appeal declined to follow Doe recently on the basis that the rationale for the decision conflicted with the policy considerations enunciated by the House of Lords in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 (HL): see Osman v Ferguson [1999] 4 All ER 344 (CA) at 353-354 per McCowan LJ (with whom other members of the Court agreed).

(iii) Foresight

But here the ground of liability is not responsibility for the acts of the escaping trainees; it is liability for damage caused by the carelessness of these officers in the knowledge that their carelessness would probably result in the trainees causing damage of this kind. So the question is really one of remoteness of damage. And I must consider to what extent the law regards the acts of another person as breaking the chain of causation between the defendant's carelessness and the damage to the plaintiff.

It is plain that vital characteristics which were present in the Dorset Yacht

case and which led to the imposition of liability are here lacking. Sutcliffe

was never in the custody of the police force. Miss Hill was one of a vast number of the female general public who might be at risk from his activities but was at no special distinctive risk in relation to them, unlike the owners of yachts moored off Brownsea Island in relation to the foreseeable conduct of the borstal boys. It appears from the passage quoted from the speech of Lord Diplock in the Dorset Yacht case that in his view no liability would rest on a prison authority, which carelessly allowed the escape of an habitual criminal, for damage which he subsequently caused, not in the course of attempting to make good his getaway to persons at special risk, but in further pursuance of his general criminal career to the person or property of members of the general public. The same rule must apply as regards failure to recapture the criminal before he had time to resume his career. .... But, if there is no general duty of care owed to individual members of the public by the responsible authorities to prevent the escape of a known criminal or to recapture him, there cannot reasonably be imposed on any police force a duty of care similarly owed to identify and apprehended an unknown one. Miss Hill cannot for this purpose be regarded as a person at special risk simply because she was young and female. Where the class of potential victims of a particular habitual criminal is a large one the precise size of it cannot in principle affect the issue. All householders are potential victims of a habitual burglar, and all females those of an habitual rapist. The conclusion must be that although there existed reasonable foreseeability of likely harm to such as Miss Hill if Sutcliffe were not identified and apprehended, there is absent from the case any such ingredient or characteristic as led to the liability of the Home Office in the Dorset Yacht case. Nor is there present any additional characteristic such as might make up the deficiency. The circumstances of the case are therefore not capable of establishing a duty of care owed towards Miss Hill by the West Yorkshire police. (my emphasis)

  1. In this case there was adduced as a body of conflicting, purportedly expert, evidence and statistical evidence about the propensity of escapees to

commit crimes and on the propensity of persons with convictions for non violent offences to escalate their criminality. The conflicts in this evidence were not resolved by the trial judge. In any event, I found the evidence distinctly unhelpful.

  1. The issues that arise on this evidence concern the size of the risk, i.e. how likely is the behaviour. This is a matter which arises on the question of breach when determining what, in the particular circumstances of the case, the reasonableness standard required. (See Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40 at 47-48). The Appellant, by conceding breach, disenabled itself from raising such qualitative issues in that regard.
  1. The evidence relating to this matter is not of a character which is likely to turn on an assessment of the witnesses. Accordingly, it is appropriate for this court to assess the evidence, even in the absence of findings of fact.
  1. The statistical evidence does suggest a relatively low level of risk that an escapee will commit offences of violence. Indeed, the Appellant relied on this evidence against the suggestion that the State would incur an intolerable burden if liability of this character were to be recognised.
  1. The record of this particular offender suggested that he may commit crimes, including, possibly, armed robbery, after an escape, but again not at a particularly high level of probability given the fact that such would involve an escalation of his criminality. The evidence of the former police officer, even if admissible, does not rise above the level of an opinion that "it would be more probable than not", that Mr Hoole would commit more serious crimes than housebreaking, including armed robbery. ...
  1. This, and other such evidence does not involve such a high degree of predictability as to constitute a significant factor in determining whether a duty of care exists.

As this case is being considered on a strike-out application the type of evidence to which the Chief Justice of New South Wales referred is not before me. Yet, it is possible to apply the analysis to inferences that may be open from pleaded facts.

(iv) Likelihood of Mr Bell offending in manner that led to death of Mrs Hobson

(v) Additional policy issues

people. In such circumstances, a duty to warn would arise in respect of those specifically at risk: see S (at para [22]), Swan and Doe.

The pleading assumes that we are all neighbours now, Pharisees and Samaritans alike, that foreseeability is a reflection of hindsight and that for every mischance in an accident-prone world someone solvent must be liable in damages.

(c) Negligence - conclusion

7. Breach of statutory duty

... It all depends, [counsel] submits, on whether he belongs to a class which the statutory provision was intended to protect and has suffered a detriment in consequence of a breach of the duty of a kind from which the provision was intended to protect him. If so, then in the absence of any other specific provision in the statute, such as a criminal penalty, to enforce performance of the statutory duty, it necessarily follows, Mr Sedley submits, that the law affords a remedy in damages for its breach. Hence the question of statutory construction is not the broad question whether an intention to give a cause of action can be inferred from the provision in question read in its context, but the narrower question whether the provision is intended to protect the interests of a class of which the plaintiff is a member. This then leads on to

the conclusion that certain provisions of the Prison Rules 1964, which were intended to protect the interests of prisoners, and in particular r 43(2) which was intended to protect prisoners from unlawful segregation, must give rise to a cause of action in favour of any prisoner who suffers a detriment from a breach of the duty imposed.

a) At 731 His Lordship said:

The basic proposition is that in the ordinary case a breach of statutory duty does not, by itself, give rise to any private law cause of action. However a private law cause of action will arise if it can be shown, as a matter of construction of the statute, that the statutory duty was imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public and that Parliament intended to confer on members of that class a private right of action for breach of the duty.

b) And, at 732-733, he added:

Although the question is one of statutory construction and therefore each case turns on the provisions in the relevant statute, it is significant that your Lordships were not referred to any case where it had been held that statutory provisions establishing a regulatory system or a scheme of social welfare for the benefit of the public at large had been held to give rise to a private right of action for damages for breach of statutory duty. Although regulatory or welfare legislation affecting a particular area of activity does in fact provide protection to those individuals particularly affected by that activity,

the legislation is not to be treated as being passed for the benefit of those individuals but for the benefit of society in general.

In any topic which avowedly depends on the construction of legislation, it is unwise to expect firm principles. Accordingly, all the presumptions and tests formulated by the courts are the weakest of guides and do little to produce certainty. Here matters are even less certain than usual, for the question involved is often a question of construction in only the loosest sense. If the words of the statute are unhelpful, a point is rapidly reached where it is difficult to disentangle how much has been objectively gleaned from the statute and the circumstances surrounding its passing, and how much is attributable to judicial policy. ...

8. Misfeasance in public office

(a) What do the authorities say?

Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No. 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 (CA and HL)) and Canada (Estate of Odhavji v Woodhouse [2003] 3 SCR 263 (SCC)). The tort has also been the subject of analysis in New Zealand: eg Garrett v Attorney-General [1996] NZCA 430; [1997] 2 NZLR 332 (CA) and Rawlinson v Rice [1998] 1

NZLR 454 (CA).

It is well established that individuals in the position of the depositors cannot maintain an action for compensation for losses they suffered as a result of the Bank's breach of statutory duties: Yuen Kun-Yeu v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1987] UKPC 16; [1988] AC 175; Davis v Radcliffe[1990] 1 WLR 821. Judicial review is regarded as an adequate remedy. Similarly, persons in the position of the depositors cannot sue the Bank for losses resulting from the negligent licensing, supervision or failure to withdraw a licence: Yuen Kun-Yeu v Attorney General of Hong Kong; Davis v Radcliffe. The availability of the tort of misfeasance in public office has been said to be one of the reasons justifying the non-actionability of a claim in negligence where there is an act of maladministration: Calveley v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police[1989] AC 1228, 1238F. It is also established that an ultra vires act will not per se give rise to liability in tort: X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council[1995] UKHL 9; [1995] 2 AC 633. And there is no overarching principle in English law of liability in tort for "unlawful, intentional and positive acts": see Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2)[1982] AC 173, 187G in which the House refused to follow Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith [1966] HCA 49; (1966) 120 CLR 145, which was subsequently overruled by the Australian High Court in Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 69 ALJR 527. The tort of misfeasance in public office is an exception to "the general rule that, if conduct is presumptively unlawful, a good motive will not exonerate the defendant, and that, if conduct is lawful apart from motive, a bad motive will not make him liable": Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 15th ed (1998), p 55; Bradford Corpn v Pickles [1895] AC 587; Allen v Flood[1897] UKLawRpAC 56; [1898] AC 1. The rationale of the tort is that in a legal system based on the rule of law executive or administrative power "may be exercised only for the public good" and not for ulterior and improper purposes: Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 54, 85F, per Nourse LJ; a decision reversed on the facts but not on the law by the House of Lords [1990] 1 WLR 1453, 1458. The tort bears some resemblance to the crime of misconduct in public office: R v Bowden [1996] 1 WLR 98. (my emphasis)

See also Mengel at 345-348 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), 355-359 (Brennan J)) and 371-373 (Deane J) and Odhavji at paras [16]-

[32] (inclusive).

Proceedings for the tort of misfeasance in public office, also known as abuse of public office, have never been common. Early in its development an essential ingredient was malice on the part of the defendant: a deliberate and vindictive act by a public official involving a breach of duty and directed towards the plaintiff. This has come to be known as "targeted malice". But the tort is no longer so confined. It can also be committed by an official who acts or omits to act in breach of duty knowing about the breach and also knowing harm or loss is thereby likely to be occasioned to the plaintiff. As will appear from the following discussion, "knowing" in relation to both the breach and its effect on the plaintiff includes acting recklessly, in the sense of believing or suspecting the position and going ahead anyway without ascertaining the position as a reasonable and honest person would do.

Some formulations of the ingredients of the tort are rather more relaxed than this about the element of damage: it is said that it is sufficient to establish the tort if the plaintiff has suffered harm or loss as a result of a knowing breach of duty by an official who foresaw or ought reasonably to have foreseen that consequence. Phrased in this way the tort would resemble a claim for negligent breach of duty although there would remain an additional requirement that the official must have known he or she was acting in breach of duty or must have been reckless as to that.

... inadvertence or negligence will not suffice; a mere failure to discharge the obligations of the office cannot constitute misfeasance in a public office.

In light of the allegation that the [Chief of Police’s] failure to segregate the officers was deliberate, this is not a sufficient basis on which to strike the pleadings.

knowing breach of duty by a public officer. Rather, Blanchard J (delivering the judgment of the Court) said at 349-350:

The plaintiff, in our view, must prove that the official had an actual appreciation of the consequences for the plaintiff, or people in the general position of the plaintiff, of the disregard of duty or that the official was recklessly indifferent to the consequences and can thus be taken to have been content for them to happen as they would. The tort has at its base conscious disregard for the interests of those who will be affected by official decision making. There must be an actual or, in the case of recklessness, presumed intent to transgress the limits of power even though it will follow that a person or persons will be likely to be harmed. The tort is not restricted to a case of deliberately wanting to cause harm to anyone; it also covers a situation in which the official's act or failure to act is not directed at the injured party but the official sees the consequences as naturally flowing for that person when exercising power. In effect this is no more than saying the tort is an intentional tort. In this context, a person intends to bring about the known consequences of his or her actions or omissions, even if other consequences form the primary motive. ... The concept of attributing intention by necessary inference in this way is well established.

The common law has long set its face against any general principle that invalid administrative action by itself gives rise to a cause of action in damages by those who have suffered loss as a consequence of that action. There must be something more. And in the case of misfeasance of public office that something more, it seems to us, must be related to the individual who is bringing the action. While the cases have made it clear that the malice need not be targeted there must, as we have said, be a conscious disregard for the interests of those who will be affected by the making of the particular decision. (my emphasis)

See also the discussion of the tort in Todd at 972-977.

(b) Can Mr Hobson sue for the tort of misfeasance in public office?

a) Whether some or all of the allegations of systemic failures are justiciable?

b) Whether an omission to act can give rise to the tort and, if so, what is the requisite intention on the part of the public official, to be proved?

(c) Justiciability

a) Parliament has decreed what duties are to be fulfilled by the public official responsible for supervising compliance, by a released prisoner, with his or her conditions of parole. At the relevant time Parliament spoke through s125(1) of the Act. When it comes into force, it will speak through s25 of the Corrections Act 2004.

b) The Executive arm of Government is obliged to provide an institutional infrastructure and sufficient resources to enable the functions and duties conferred upon the relevant public official to be performed. Once Parliament has appropriated money, the responsibility for making such decisions rests with the Chief Executive of each Department of State. The Chief Executive’s responsibility is to his or her Minister. The Chief Executive’s responsibilities are set out in s32 of the State Sector Act 1988 as follows:

32 Principal responsibilities

The chief executive of a Department shall be responsible to the appropriate Minister for—

(a) The carrying out of the functions and duties of the Department (including those imposed by Act or by the policies of the Government); and

(b) The tendering of advice to the appropriate Minister and other Ministers of the Crown; and

(c) The general conduct of the Department; and

(d) The efficient, effective, and economical management of the activities of the Department.

  1. If an issue arises over whether a particular public official has acted in a manner that conflicts with his or her public obligation and the aspect under review is one that can be characterised as of a legal nature (as distinct from one of a substantially budgetary, managerial or political nature) the Courts, as the third arm of Government, have responsibility to determine whether the official has acted within or outside the law.

That analysis accords with the succinct observation of Lord Templeman in M v Home Office [1984] 1 AC 377 (HL) at 395. Lord Templeman said:

... Parliament makes the law, the executive carry the law into effect and the judiciary enforce the law.

In that way, the three branches of Government work together to promote what is generally called “the rule of law”.

only for the public good’ and not for ulterior and improper purposes”: Three Rivers

at 190 per Lord Steyn.

I think that the minimum preconditions for basing a duty of care upon the existence of a statutory power, if it can be done at all, are first, that it would in the circumstances have been irrational not to have exercised the power, so that there was in effect a public law duty to act, and secondly, that there are exceptional grounds for holding that the policy of the statute requires compensation to be paid to persons who suffer loss because the power was not exercised.

This was the reasoning by which the majority in Stovin v Wise came to the conclusion that the council owed no duty to road users which could in any circumstances have required it to improve the intersection. But misunderstanding seems to have arisen because the majority judgment goes on to discuss, in the alternative, what the nature of such a duty might have been if there had been one. It suggests that it would have given rise to liability only if it would have been irrational in a public law sense not to exercise the statutory power to do the work. And it deals with this alternative argument by concluding that, on the facts, there had been no breach even of such a duty. The suggestion that there might exceptionally be a case in which a breach of a public law duty could found a private law right of action has proved controversial and it may have been ill-advised to speculate upon such matters.

(d) Omissions and requisite knowledge

The tort has at its base conscious disregard for the interests of those who will be affected by official decision making. There must be an actual or, in the case of recklessness, presumed intent to transgress the limits of power even though it will follow that a person or persons will be likely to be harmed. The tort is not restricted to a case of deliberately wanting to cause harm to anyone; it also covers a situation in which the official’s act or failure to act is not directed at the injured party but the official sees the consequences as naturally flowing for that person when exercising power. In effect this is no more than saying that the tort is an intentional tort. In this context, a person intends to bring about the known consequences of his or her actions or omissions even if other consequences form the primary motive. ... (my emphasis)

See also the extract from Garrett at 344, set out in para [105] above.

... In Three Rivers, ..., Lord Steyn stated, at [190], that “[t]he rationale of the tort is that in a legal system based on the rule of law executive or administrative power may be exercised only for the public good and not for ulterior and improper purposes” as each passage makes clear, misfeasance in a public office is not directed at a public officer who inadvertently or negligently fails adequately to discharge the obligations of his or her office: see Three Rivers at [237] per Lord Millett. Nor is the tort directed at a public officer who fails adequately to discharge the obligations of the office as a consequence of budgetary constraints or other factors beyond his or her control. A public officer who cannot adequately discharge his or her duties because of budgetary constraints has not deliberately disregarded his or her official duties. The tort is not directed at a public officer who is unable to discharge his or her obligations because of factors beyond his or her control but, rather, at a public officer who could have discharged his or her obligations, yet wilfully chose to do otherwise. (emphasis in original)

Three Rivers at 236-237. His Lordship said:

The parties are agreed that there is no conceptual difference between sins of omission and sins of commission. That may be so; but factually there is a great difference between them. It is no accident that the tort is misfeasance in public office, not non-feasance in public office. The failure to exercise a power is not in itself wrongful. It cannot be equated with acting in excess of power. The tort is concerned with preventing public officials from acting beyond their powers to the injury of the citizen, not with compelling them to exercise the powers they do have, particularly when they do have a discretion whether to exercise them or not. There seems to be only one case in the books where a failure to exercise a power gave rise to the tort: R v Dythan [1979] QB 722, 727G, where Lord Widgery CJ said in terms that the neglect must be “wilful and not merely inadvertent”. Ferguson v Earl of Kinnoull [1842] EngR 942; (1842) 9 Cl & Fin 251 and the cases there cited were all cases of wilful breach of duty. Henly v Lyme Corpn 5 Bing 91 was in my opinion a case of breach of statutory duty, not of misfeasance in public office.

In conformity with the character of the tort the failure to act must be deliberate, not negligent or inadvertent or arising from a misunderstanding of the legal position. In my opinion, a failure to act can amount to misfeasance in public office only where:

(i) The circumstances are such that the discretion whether to act can only be exercised in one way so that there is effectively a duty to act;

(ii) The official appreciates this but nevertheless makes a conscious decision not to act;

(iii) He does so with intent to injure the plaintiff or in the knowledge that such injury will be the natural and probable consequence of his failure to act. (my emphasis)

(e) Application to pleading in this case

defendant precisely. Given the dual nature of the allegations more precision may be necessary.

a) The allegations set out in para [35](a)-(d) and (g) and (h) all refer to omissions. It will be necessary for the plaintiff to plead particulars from which an inference could be drawn that those failures to act were deliberate.

b) The allegations summarised in para [37](e) and (f) refer to positive actions on the part of the probation officer. Those allegations will fall to be considered on orthodox principles summarised in the cases to which I have referred.

  1. The basis upon which the allegations of systemic failure are made may require further particularisation. On the basis of the argument I have heard to date, I would limit allegations of systemic failure to those caused by a deliberate decision by an official within the Department of Corrections likely to have the consequence that the relevant probation officer was unable to perform duties cast upon him or her by law under s125 of the Act.

d) Generally, allegations about inadequate resourcing (eg those summarised in para [37](a) and (b)) and allegations as to management of staff within the Department of Corrections (eg the allegations summarised in para [37](e) and (f)) are likely to fall within those categories of duties into which the Court will not inquire, being decisions of a managerial or budgetary nature for which the responsible Minister is answerable in Parliament. Nevertheless, such allegations, if capable of proof, might well assist the plaintiff as particulars tending to suggest failures to act were deliberate rather than inadvertent.

e) The remaining allegations summarised in para [37] may or may not fall within the categories of claim I have held could proceed under the cause of action based on misfeasance in public office. It will be necessary for the plaintiff’s advisers to consider carefully how those particular aspects ought to be characterised.

6 Liability of the Crown in tort

(5) No proceedings shall lie against the Crown by virtue of this section in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by any person while discharging or purporting to discharge any responsibilities of a judicial nature vested in him, or any responsibilities which he has in connection with the execution of judicial process.

9. Conclusions

a) The cause of action based on negligence is struck out;

b) The cause of action based on breach of statutory duty is struck out;

  1. The cause of action based on misfeasance in public office will require amendment.

a) The application to strike out is granted in respect of the causes of action based on negligence and breach of statutory duty but is dismissed in other respects.

b) I direct that a further Amended Statement of Claim shall be filed and served by 5pm on 22 October 2004.

  1. A Statement of Defence to the further Amended Statement of Claim shall be filed and served by 5pm on 19 November 2004.

d) The Registrar shall set this proceeding down for a case management conference on the first available date after 19 November 2004, preferably before a Judge.

e) Leave to apply on 3 days’ notice is reserved to either party.

claim a fresh application can be filed. I am not, however, to be taken as encouraging that course of action.

P R Heath J

Delivered at 2.25pm on 23 September 2004


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