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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY CIV 2006-404-1974 BETWEEN ELDERS NEW ZEALAND LTD Plaintiff AND PGG WRIGHTSON LTD Defendant Judgment: 26 March 2007 COSTS RULING OF ALLAN J Solicitors: Stace Hammond (K J Crossland), Hamilton Fax (07) 838 2052 Chapman Tripp (P Jagose), Wellington Fax (04) 472 7111 ELDERS V WRIGHTSON HC AK CIV 2006-404-1974 26 March 2007 [1] In a judgment delivered on 1 December 2006, I determined in the defendant's favour a question of law, formulated pursuant to Rule 418, concerning the legal consequences of an amalgamation effected under Part 15 of the Companies Act 1993. I ruled that the defendant was entitled to costs and invited counsel to file memoranda if they were unable to agree. [2] The parties have been unable to reach agreement. Counsel have filed memoranda accordingly. For PGG Wrightson, Mr Jagose contends in a series of alternative arguments that the defendant ought to have: a) Indemnity costs totalling $63,925.10; or b) Costs calculated throughout in reliance on category 3C but increased, where appropriate, in order to take account of the allegedly meritless argument advanced by Elders; c) Scale costs calculated in accordance with category 3C but increased (to a more limited extent than in paragraph (b) above) in order to take account of the substantial time involved; d) Scale costs calculated in accordance with category 3C but upon the basis that the proceeding be treated as an application for defendant's summary judgment which, Elders argues, more accurately captures the nature and scope of the proceeding. [3] For Elders, Mr Crossland agrees that by reason of its complexity, it would be appropriate to place the proceeding in category 3, but he argues that the appropriate award of costs should simply be scale costs on a category 3B basis. [4] In order to place in context Mr Jagose's argument that costs should be awarded as on a summary judgment application, it is necessary to recount briefly the early history of the proceeding. [5] It commenced on 6 April 2006 as a commercial list proceeding to which PGG Wrightson filed a defence on 16 May 2006, accompanied by an application for summary judgment and a supporting affidavit. [6] On 23 May 2006, Elders sought leave to bring its own application for summary judgment and on 9 June 2006, it filed a notice of opposition to PGG Wrightson's application. [7] On 29 June 2006, PGG Wrightson filed a notice of opposition to Elders' application for leave. Those applications came before Harrison J on 7 July 2006. The learned Judge thought that the most appropriate procedural vehicle was an application for the determination of a question pursuant to Rule 418 and accordingly the proceeding was set down for hearing before me on 25 August 2006 for determination of a question agreed by counsel. [8] In the result, therefore, it became possible to determine the proceeding without reference to the competing summary judgment applications but the parties had, of course, incurred the prior cost of preparing and filing those applications. [9] In my view, the appropriate award is to be reached by calculating steps 2 and 5.1 in the schedule at a category 3C level, with the balance to be calculated on a category 3B footing. [10] I am satisfied that the case was complex and of some significance, and further, that an adverse outcome for PGG Wrightson carried very serious consequences. Moreover, there being no direct New Zealand authority on the point, it was necessary, as Mr Jagose points out, for the defendant's solicitors and counsel to engage in the early stages of the proceeding in substantial and detailed legal research, extending well beyond New Zealand authority. A number of the authorities cited in argument were Canadian. [11] In the early stages of the proceeding, therefore, there was ample justification for PGG Wrightson to devote senior legal resources to the issue over a relatively extended period, so justifying a Band C classification for those early steps. The balance of the preparatory work and the hearing itself was relatively confined and the factual background which provided the context for the legal argument was relatively simple. I do not consider an increased award of costs to be warranted, beyond the two steps identified above. [12] Mr Jagose seeks an uplift from scale for step 5.2A, from one to four days' preparation. Rule 48C(3)(a) empowers the Court to make such an order if: The nature of the proceeding or the step in the proceeding is such that the time required by the party claiming costs would substantially exceed the time allocated under Band C ... [13] I take the view that the bulk of the necessary work in this case must have arisen in the early stages as PGG Wrightson came to grips with the issues raised by Elders and reviewed the law in this and other jurisdictions. I have made due allowance for that in assigning steps 2 and 5.1 to Band C. Beyond that, it is not necessary to go, in my opinion. It is important that issues of complexity and significance not be double-counted, both in respect of the initial classification and then again in a subsequent uplift: Hobbs v Gilbert HC NEL CIV 1992-442-002, 12 May 2005. [14] Neither do I accept that the conduct of Elders has been such as to justify an uplift in costs. Mr Jagose submits that Elders' case was essentially without substance, that its alleged lack of merit was pointed out in writing by the defendant's solicitors at an early time, and that the proceeding ought never have come to trial. That being so, he contends, there ought to be an uplift in party and party costs. Indeed, he goes so far as to argue that this is an appropriate case for indemnity costs to be awarded. [15] I do not accept Mr Jagose's submissions. There was no New Zealand authority on the point raised by the plaintiff which turned, in large part, on a relatively complicated issue of statutory interpretation. Elders' case was by no means unarguable. That much is reflected in the decision of Harrison J, before the substantive hearing took place before me, to grant leave to the unsuccessful party to appeal to the Court of Appeal. [16] Elders has raised a point of some significance which it was entitled to refer to the Court for resolution. There is something in Mr Crossland's argument to the effect that it is somewhat contradictory of PGG Wrightson to argue, on the one hand, that the case was so complex that it ought to be assigned in toto to category 3C for costs purposes, and, on the other hand, to contend that it was hopeless from the outset. [17] I agree with Mr Crossland when he says that this case falls well short of that class of "rare and exceptional" cases in which it is proper to award indemnity costs: see Hedley v Kiwi Co-op Dairies Ltd (2002) 16 PRNZ 694 at [8]. [18] Counsel were agreed that, although the hearing ultimately proceeded as a r 418 application, costs were to be calculated on the basis of the documents actually prepared and filed. [19] In the result, I award the defendant costs against the plaintiff totalling $24,073.00. That figure is calculated as follows: Steps Days Rate 2 Commencement of Defence (16 May) Band C 6.0 5.1 Preparing and filing summary Judgment application and supporting affidavits (16 May) Band C To 31 May 2.0________ 8.0 $2,150 $17,200 4.13 Preparing and filing opposition To interlocutory application for Leave and supporting affidavits (29 June) Band B 0.6 4.11 Appearance at case Management conference (7 July) Band B 0.3 5.2A Preparation for hearing of defended interlocutory application Band B 1.0 5.3 Arguing defended interlocutory Application for sole or principal Counsel (25 August) Band B 1.0________ From 1 June 2.9 $2,370 $6,873 TOTAL $24,073.00 [20] The defendant is also entitled to payment by the plaintiff of its proper disbursements, to be fixed by the Registrar if necessary. C J Allan J
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URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2007/194.html