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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 21 December 2015
This case has been anonymized
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY
CRI 2009-488-33
CRI
2009-488-35
B
Appellant
v
THE POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 15 July 2009
Appearances: Appellant in person (accompanied by K B as McKenzie friend) B
M O'Connor for respondent
Judgment: 20 July 2009
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF ALLAN J
In accordance with r 11.5 I direct that the Registrar endorse this
judgment with the delivery time of 3.30 pm on Monday 20 July
2009
Solicitors/Parties :
R T B , PO Box 171, Kaikohe
Crown Solicitor
Whangarei
B V THE POLICE HC WHA CRI 2009-488-33 20 July 2009
[1] The appellant faces trial on an indictment in the Kaikohe
District Court which contains two counts of cultivating cannabis
and one of
possession of cannabis for supply. He was committed for trial in respect of
count 1 on 4 February 2009, following a
preliminary hearing.
Subsequently, on 24 March 2009, he was committed for trial in respect of
counts 2 and 3, following
a second preliminary hearing.
[2] During the course of the second hearing the appellant
challenged the jurisdiction of the Court on Maori sovereignty
grounds. Judge
Harvey rejected the appellant’s argument as to jurisdiction and directed
that the depositions hearing proceed.
The Judge’s ruling is the subject
of appeal CRI 2009-488-035.
[3] Following the first committal, the appellant made a pre-trial
application in the Kaikohe District Court, in respect of count
1. Again, he
challenged the jurisdiction of the District Court to try him. That application
was heard and determined by Judge
McDonald on 26 March 2009. The appeal to this
Court, CRI-2009-488-33, relates to Judge McDonald’s ruling.
[4] In each appeal the appellant sought orders reversing the decisions
made in the District Court. That is, he sought orders
from this Court declaring
that the District Court had no jurisdiction to try him on
indictment.
[5] The appeals were set down for hearing on 15 July 2009, the trial
itself having been scheduled to commence the following
day in the Kaikohe
District Court before a Judge and jury. The appellant appeared with a McKenzie
friend, Mr Ken B .
[6] Ms O’Connor for the Crown submitted that there was no right of appeal to this Court from the decisions taken by the respective Judges in the District Court, and that the appeals were a nullity. She is plainly right. I therefore dismissed the appeals and indicated to the parties that I would provide written reasons later. This judgment contains my reasons.
[7] The appeals were brought pursuant to s 116 of the Summary
Proceedings Act
1957. A defendant in criminal proceedings in the District Court has a
general right of appeal to this Court: s 115 of the Summary
Proceedings Act,
which relevantly provides:
115 Defendant's general right of appeal to High Court
(1) Except as expressly provided by this Act or by any other
enactment, where a District Court determines any information or
complaint,
and—
(a) Convicts any defendant; or
(b) Makes any order, including—
(i) An order for the payment for costs; or
(ii) An order declining an application for the payment for such costs;
or
(iii) An order for the estreat of a bond,—
the person convicted or against whom the order is made may appeal to the
High Court.
[8] The scope of s 115 was discussed in detail by Fisher J in
Herewini v Ministry of Transport [1992] 3 NZLR 482 at 488:
In this case the appellant must rely upon s 115(1) of the Summary
Proceedings Act 1957 which provides:
Defendant's general right of appeal to High Court -- (1) Except as
expressly provided by this Act or by any other enactment, where on the
determination by a District Court of any information
or complaint any defendant
is convicted or any order is made other than for the payment of costs on the
dismissal of the information
or complaint, or where any order for the estreat of
a bond is made by any such Court, the person convicted or against whom any such
order is made may appeal to the High Court."
The scope of the jurisdiction conferred by s 115 has been the subject of
numerous decisions, recent examples including Police v S [1977] 1 NZLR 1;
Black v Fulcher [1988] 1 NZLR 417; and Davies v Ministry of Transport
[1989] NZCA 157; [1989] 3 NZLR 300. As I understand s 115(1) and those decisions, at least
three conditions must be satisfied before there will be
a right of appeal other
than an appeal against orders for the estreat of a bond.
First, the information or complaint in question must have been determined by the District Court. Ordinarily this will require that the prosecution be brought to an end by conviction or dismissal (Black v Fulcher at p 420) or be otherwise disposed of in a final way by the Judge's exercise of his or her judicial functions (Davies v Ministry of Transport at p 302). In the summary criminal jurisdiction, there is no provision for interlocutory appeals. If a ruling or order does not determine an information, the proper course is to
hear the information on the merits so that if necessary the same point can be
taken again in the context of an appeal against the
conviction itself: Black
v Fulcher at p 420; Police v S at p 5.
Secondly the appellant must have been convicted or an order must have been
made against him or her: see concluding words of
the subsection and
Delaney v Police at p 649. For this purpose, an order is made against a
person if a judicial determination has resulted in a state of affairs which
is
adverse to his or her interests: Police v S at pp 4 and 5.
Thirdly, if it is an order which is appealed against, the order may have
preceded the conviction but must have been made in the course
of determining the
information or complaint: Police v S at p 4. It is sufficient if the
order is so closely linked with the process of deciding the information that it
can properly be described
as being made in the course or process of so doing:
ibid; Black v Fulcher at p 428.
[9] In essence, three conditions must be satisfied before a right of
appeal arises under s 115:
a) The information must have been determined in the District Court by
way of conviction or dismissal, or have been otherwise
disposed of in a final
way by the exercise of judicial functions;
b) The appellant must have been convicted, or an order made against
him or her in the sense of a judicial determination resulting
in a state of
affairs which was adverse to his or her interests;
c) Where the appeal was against the making of an order, that order may
have preceded the conviction, but must have been made
in the course of
determining the information or complaint.
[10] Here, the informations against the appellant have not been
determined by way of conviction or dismissal or otherwise disposed
of in a
final way by the exercise of a judicial function. This Court therefore had no
jurisdiction to determine the appeals.
[11] There is a further basis upon which the High Court is unable to entertain these appeals. The provisions of s 115 of the Summary Proceedings Act are simply inapplicable to the criminal proceedings brought against the appellant. His right of appeal, if any, is to the Court of Appeal. His forthcoming jury trial in the District
Court is governed by the provisions of Part 2A of the District Courts Act
1947. Section 28D(3) of that Act provides that where any
person is committed to
a District Court for trial, the provisions of Parts 12 and 13 of the Crimes Act
1961, so far as they are applicable
and with the necessary modifications, shall
apply until the matter is finally disposed of.
[12] Part 13 of the Crimes Act provides for appeals to the Court of
Appeal, and to the Supreme Court (not to the High Court).
Section 379A of the
Act sets out the circumstances in which, before trial, an accused person may
appeal with leave of the Court
of Appeal from a pre-trial ruling.
[13] The appellant’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the District
Court to try him on indictment is not among the matters
which may be the subject
of an application for leave to appeal under s 379A. The appellant must stand
trial. If he is convicted
then he has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.
It is at that stage of the trial process that he may exercise his right to
appeal on jurisdictional grounds.
[14] It was for these reasons that I dismissed the appellant’s
appeals to this Court.
[15] Immediately following my indication that the appeals were dismissed,
Mr B sought to make an oral application for a succession
of orders under the
Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. In particular, he sought an order
referring the question of jurisdiction
to the Maori Appellate Court pursuant to
the provisions of s 61(1)(b) of that Act. I declined that application, both
because there
were no valid proceedings before the Court, and because the
provisions of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act have absolutely no application
to the
issues which the appellant seeks to raise.
[16] The scope of the criminal jurisdiction enacted by the District
Courts Act
1947, the Summary Judgments Act 1957 and the Crimes Act 1961, is not a matter
within the purview of the Maori Appellate Court.
C J Allan J
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