M v Police HC Wellington CRI 2008-485-162 [2009] NZHC 304 (11 March 2009)

Last Updated: 27 November 2015

This case has been anonymized

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

_{CRI 2008-485-162}

M

Appellant

v

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing: 10 March 2009

Counsel: Appellant in Person

M Snape for Respondent

Judgment: 11 March 2009

JUDGMENT OF SIMON FRANCE J (Appeal against conviction and sentence)

[1] On 8 December 2008 there was a hearing in the District Court of three charges against Mr M . The charges were driving a motor vehicle while suspended, failing to comply with a lawful requirement to pull over, and failing to comply with a lawful direction of the Police (the provision of fingerprints). Mr M was convicted of the first two matters, but acquitted on the third.

[2] Prior to the commencement of the District Court hearing Mr M objected to the jurisdiction of the Court. He provided the Court with a document headed “Kanohi Kite Kanohi”. In that document Mr M claims his customary rights

_{and notes that he has no contractual agreement with various persons or bodies}

M V NEW ZEALAND POLICE HC WN CRI 2008-485-162 11 March 2009

including the Court. He requests to be shown a contract in written form if one exists. The document then noted Mr M provided then recorded:

Under Tikanga, YOU don’t exist.

Under Commerce, I have no contract with YOU.

Therefore, I have come, by special invitation, in peace, and want you to know my intention is to leave in the same manner.

[3] The thrust of the document, and Mr M ’s claims, was that the Court had no jurisdiction over him. The District Court ruled on this first, noting that a series of cases have held that such challenges cannot succeed. The Court noted that such decisions were binding on it, and that the case must proceed.

[4] On appeal, Mr M says that he thereafter continued under duress, the

Court having made it clear he would be otherwise arrested.

[5] Before me today, this and other matters were raised. Concerning the jurisdiction point, there are numerous decisions of this Court, and the Court of Appeal, which are of course binding on me, that required the District Court to decide the point exactly as it did. There is nothing I can add to them.

[6] I note for the record some of the other matters raised by Mr M . In the course of his presentation, Mr M traversed a history of interactions between him and either the Crown, or the Police. Mr M considers a 1999 civil claim brought in this Court, of which I have no knowledge other than what Mr M said today, is in his mind still unresolved. As noted, I am unaware of what its formal status is.

[7] Mr M is aggrieved by what he considers to be Police harassment. It seems as if the primary grievance is that his car has been impounded on at least two occasions. Why it has been impounded I am unsure, but I assume it is in relation to continued breaches of traffic laws which, of course, Mr M does not recognise.

[8] The other matter of primary focus by Mr M was the fate of three other charges he was initially facing. At the conclusion of the District Court hearing

which is the subject of this appeal, the Court agreed to a Police request to dismiss these three remaining informations. The unusual situation that arose was that Mr M , the accused person, did not want them dismissed. He was unhappy with the circumstances that underlay them, which I gather was an incident at his home, and wished there to be a hearing so the issues could be explored.

[9] An accused resisting acquittal cannot be a situation that arises very often. On reflection, I consider that the District Court must be right that it cannot require a prosecutor to pursue a prosecution. If the informant wishes to not proceed with a prosecution, then that must be the end of the matter. If consequences flow from that decision e.g. costs in the case of a represented defendant, or a civil action, then they are consequential matters that can be addressed when and if such applications are made or proceedings brought.

[10] The focus of a Court proceeding is very much to pigeon-hole matters in the sense that the Court, for good reasons, inquiries into only those issues that are formally before it. Thus the Court looks at the correctness of the charge of driving while suspended but not at the consequent impounding of the car, or the events that occurred prior to the driving when a demerits notice was served. Although a very necessary approach, it is one which can cause frustration to those who wish a broader enquiry into the background circumstances to a particular matter. This would appear to be one of those situations. I am not aware of the circumstances in which the car came to be impounded at least on two occasions, and not in a position to comment on it. If I had further information, it would probably still not be the right thing for me to do. I do note, however, that I was not assisted in this, and the Crown was not put on notice to provide the Court with assistance, because Mr M ’s notice of appeal referred solely to the jurisdiction point

[11] I finally note that a document known as the Declaration of Independence of New Zealand 1835 featured prominently in Mr M ’s submissions. Mr M ’s submission on this was that it had legal status, and is the source of his status as a free man. He hopes the United Nations will have an opportunity to rule on it. As I understood it, in Mr M ’s submission all laws passed in New Zealand subsequent to its signing are in breach of it and of no effect.

Conclusion

_{[12] The appeal is dismissed.}

Simon France J

Solicitors:

M Snape, Luke Cunningham & Clere, PO Box 10357, Wellington, email: [e-mail]