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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 1 December 2015
This case has been anonymized
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WANGANUI REGISTRY
CRI-2008-083-101
THE QUEEN
v
M
Hearing: 31 March 2009
Counsel: H C Mallalieu for Crown
D M Goodlet for Accused
Judgment: 1 April 2009
RESERVED JUDGMENT OF DOBSON J (On s 344A application for inclusion of evidence)
[1] Mr M is facing a charge of sexual violation of the complainant,
with whom he was living at the time, by unlawful sexual
connection occasioned by
the introduction of a kitchen whisk held or manipulated by him into the
complainant’s anus.
[2] The charge relates to conduct alleged to have occurred between 30 November and 15 December 2007. It appears that in early 2008, as a result of difficulties in their relationship, the complainant required Mr M to move out. The events
leading up to that request included conduct on or about 29 December 2007
in which
R V M HC WANG CRI-2008-083-101 1 April 2009
Mr M assaulted the complainant and indecently assaulted her, to which
charges he has pleaded guilty.
[3] After Mr M had moved out, in early January 2008 he
engaged in numerous email communications with the complainant,
apparently
intended to urge her to have him back. Part of the content of these emails to
the complainant revisited the events that
had occurred on the night to which the
sexual violation charge relates. The couple had an evening out of drinking and
dancing. When
they were delivered home, the complainant was disinclined to stay
at home but instead wanted to go to another house they had passed
in their
street on the way home, and at which there appeared to be a party in progress.
It appears the complainant has no clear
recollection of what occurred at the
party. She appears, after the event, to have an impression that she
participated in sexual
activity with a number of men at the party, excluding Mr
M . It appears they went home together, and the next morning she woke
to
discover a kitchen whisk lodged in her anus.
[4] In the discussions between the couple shortly after that night as
to what may have occurred and how it occurred, the notion
was discussed that at
least the complainant’s, and possibly Mr M ’s, drinks had
been spiked at the party.
Mr M was very uncomfortable with the
complainant’s conduct, indicated he was disgusted by it, but wanted to put
the incident
behind them.
[5] In early January 2008, Mr M accessed images from a pornographic movie in which a female participant bore what is apparently a strong resemblance to the complainant. On 5 January 2008, he attached four images taken from the pornographic movie, cropped and transformed from colour into black and white so as to increase the likeness between the complainant and the woman portrayed in the images, and emailed them to the complainant. In a subsequent email on 7 January
2008, he sent one further image of the same activity to the
complainant.
[6] The text of another email on 5 January 2008, sent immediately before that conveying the images, gave an explicit account of the complainant’s conduct during the evening in question, and in particular the sexual activities described by Mr M as occurring at the house down the road from where they were living. That email
admits the actus reus of the sexual violation charge in terms
implying that the complainant consented to that occurring.
[7] The Police interviewed Mr M on 11 January 2008, at which time the
sexual violation charge had not been raised. There,
he admitted that he had
falsely represented to the complainant that it was she in the images he had sent
her. He explained that
it was all done in an attempt to win back her affection
by demonstrating the extent of his loyalty to her, notwithstanding the nature
of
what she had done with other men. Mr M has been charged with blackmail in
relation to threats to disclose these images to others,
and has pleaded guilty
to that charge.
[8] The Crown argues for the admissibility of these images on the
remaining charge on the basis that their use by Mr
M constituted a
lie as to the circumstances in which the sexual violation occurred. An
indication of opposition to their
admissibility has provoked the present
application under s 344A of the Crimes Act 1961.
[9] Mr Mallalieu submits that the images have considerable probative
value in challenging Mr M ’s claim that either the
complainant did
consent to the sexual violation, or that in the circumstances at the time it was
reasonable for him to believe that
she did so consent. In essence, the Crown
intends to submit that this first reconstruction of what occurred depended on a
lie.
The jury should know that, to allow it to assess whether the subsequent
reconstruction (once Mr M was charged with sexual violation)
also involved him
lying about the complainant’s consent to the conduct in
question.
[10] This situation is different from many cases in which the Court has to consider the admissibility of photographs, classically taken by the Police to record the scene of the crime or a reconstruction of it. An authority cited by the Crown on the present application was R v Wen Hui Cui CA333/05 20 June 2006. In that case, the defence had objected unsuccessfully to the prosecution adducing photographs that showed how a homicide victim’s throat had been cut by the accused. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision on their admissibility, treating the photographs as directly and highly relevant to the partial defence of provocation and to the defence of self-
defence. The Court of Appeal accepted that what was conveyed by the
photographs could not have adequately been conveyed to the jury
by other means.
The Court of Appeal did recognise that photographs revealing the gruesome
features of a crime may be excluded if
the Court considers they will prejudice
the jury against the accused to an extent out of proportion to their
probative
value. That test for exclusion is now reflected in s 8 of the
Evidence Act 2006.
[11] Mr Mallalieu argued that the images here are highly probative
because they demonstrate, in a way that a description of their
contents could
not adequately convey, the extent to which the accused was prepared to go in
attempts to assert that the conduct
in issue had been consented to by the
complainant. He also argued that any prejudice arising from the jury thinking
the worst of
the accused because of his preparedness to use such images could
not be unfair prejudice, because it was all his own conduct, and
not something
that others had done to bolster the case against him. He had been prepared to
use them in a deceitful way to persuade
the complainant she consented to events
she had no sufficient recollection of, and that was directly relevant to
the credibility
of his consistent claim that she had actually consented to the
sexual violation.
[12] For Mr M , Ms Goodlet argued that the images do not have probative value. Mr M misrepresented the source of the images in the course of reconstructing the full extent of the consensual activity that occurred for the purpose of pursuing a reconciliation. His ground of defence raised to a charge of sexual violation only became an issue after this dialogue between the complainant and the accused. Ms Goodlet argues that the connection that the Crown seeks to draw between these two facts is illogical. The Court is required to give directions to a jury about a finding of lies established in respect of matters other than the elements of a particular offence. Consistently with this, Ms Goodlet argued that the jury would give disproportionate weight to the graphic impact of the pornographic images. At least subconsciously, that would suggest an unsubstantiated parallel between the misrepresentation in using the images, and the alleged lie that the complainant consented to the conduct involved in the sexual violation charge.
[13] I am not persuaded that this distinction deprives the images of
probative value. At the very least, the fact that images
of this type were
sent in the circumstances in which they were is a relevant part of the context
of the relationship between the
complainant and the accused. Resort to what the
accused did with the images in his 5 and 7 January 2008 emails is most likely
relevant
to the jury in evaluating whether his defence of consent to the sexual
violation is credible.
[14] Undoubtedly the fact that the images were sent is relevant and that
fact may have considerable probative value for the Crown
in testing the defence
of consent. However, the specific content of the images does not have any
distinct probative value, standing
on its own. Counsel should be able to agree
a factual description of what the three images in the 5 January 2008, and one
image
in the 7 January 2008, email communications show. There is no issue that
Mr M intended the complainant to believe the images
were of her. He had
cropped the images as originally available to him and removed colour from them
to enhance the prospect of that
misrepresentation being successful. Nor is
there an issue that he resiled from the misrepresentation when interviewed by
the Police,
but at a time before the prospect of a sexual violation charge had
been raised.
[15] On this analysis, additional and potentially dramatic impact that the
pornographic images would have on members of the jury
is gratuitous in a sense
that would undoubtedly have a prejudicial effect on the conduct of Mr M
’s defence.
[16] I am not persuaded that that prejudice is not “unfair” merely because the images result from the accused’s own voluntary conduct. One of the uses he intended to make of the images at the time led to the blackmail charge to which he has now pleaded guilty. Ms Goodlet accepted that it will be extremely difficult, and probably impossible, for the jury not to know that the misrepresented use of the pornographic images constituted an element in a blackmail charge to which Mr M had pleaded guilty. The fact that the images are the work of the accused rather than of, say, a Police photographer, should not deprive the accused of a balanced evaluation under s 8 of the Evidence Act as to whether the prejudicial effect of their introduction on the remaining charge would nonetheless be “unfair”.
[17] I have accordingly come to the view that, on the nature
of the issues surrounding consent as they are presently
predicted at the
trial, the images are inadmissible, provided counsel can agree on a
factual description of what
they convey which is to be used in substitution
for their production at the trial.
[18] All rulings given under s 344A of the Crimes Act are necessarily
provisional, and are capable of being reviewed by the trial
Judge. That is an
important factor in the decision I have reached here. The first prospect for it
being revisited is obviously
if counsel are unable to agree on a set of words to
describe what the images convey. Secondly, it is unrealistic to expect the
argument
at this stage to accurately capture all the nuances of matters that may
be put to the jury. In this regard, I note that the Crown
does not propose to
adduce a small number of emails in response from the complainant to Mr M , in
the period between 6 and 7 January
2008. The first of those would tend to
suggest that the complainant thought she was portrayed in the images, but
shortly thereafter
closer inspection of them led to a protest that it was not
her in the images, and that they had been “doctored”. If
aspects of
the complainant’s contribution to these exchanges does arise, then a
reconsideration of the relevance of the content
of the images, rather than the
fact of their having been transmitted, would obviously arise.
Summary
[19] Accordingly, I rule the images attached to the emails sent by Mr M
to the complainant on 5 January 2008 at 12:35:04 and
on 7 January 2008 at
23:05:06 to be inadmissible.
Dobson J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Wanganui for Crown
Debbie Goodlet, Wanganui for Accused
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