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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY CIV 2009-404-002648 IN THE MATTER OF Habeas Corpus Act 2001 BETWEEN PAWEL MARIAN MISIUK Applicant AND THE PRISON MANAGER, MT EDEN REMAND PRISON Defendant Appearances: AJH Witten-Hannah for the Applicant M A Woolford for the Defendant Judgment: 8 May 2009 ORAL INTERIM JUDGMENT OF PRIESTLEY J Counsel: AJH Witten-Hannah, Magna Carta Chambers, 187 Hurstmere Road, Takapuna, North Shore City 0622. Email: witten-hannah@xtra.co.nz M A Woolford, Meredith Connell & Co, P O Box 2213, Auckland 1140. Fax: 09 336 7629 PAWEL MARIAN MISIUK V THE PRISON MANAGER, MT EDEN REMAND PRISON HC AK CIV 2009- 404-002648 8 May 2009 [1] This is an application properly brought under the Habeas Corpus Act 2001. There are disturbing and perplexing aspects about it. [2] The applicant has been competently and vigorously represented by Mr Witten-Hannah to whom the Court is obliged. [3] To some extent the application during the course of today has hovered above a constantly changing landscape. The Habeas Corpus application was filed yesterday afternoon. The Registry promptly, and in accordance with the statutory obligation contained in s 9, listed it for hearing before me at 10 o'clock this morning. [4] Out of an abundance of caution the Registry also issued an order to produce a prisoner (under s 26 of the Corrections Act 2004) which I suspect was the major reason why the applicant appeared in court this morning. [5] Mr Witten-Hannah informed me this morning that yesterday he served the defendant, the Prison Manager of Mt Eden Remand Prison, with the Habeas Corpus application and the supporting affidavit. For some reason, however, the prison authorities did not adopt the normal procedure of immediately informing their superiors in Wellington and/or the Crown solicitors that this application was pending. Initially therefore there was no appearance by the defendant this morning. However, as a result of inquiries made by counsel and the Court staff Mr Woolford appeared at short notice. [6] The Habeas Corpus application was originally founded on this basis: a) The applicant was arrested on Friday 24 April 2009 on two charges, being contravention of a protection order and threatening to kill his wife. b) He entered not guilty verdicts before Judge Paul and was remanded on bail to 2 June 2009. c) This appearance took place on the same day as the applicant's arrest (24 April). d) Whilst the applicant was being held in police custody, that day he was interviewed by an officer of the Immigration Service and was served with a removal order. e) This immigration intervention was known to Judge Paul. The Judge appears to have been informed that the applicant was to be removed from New Zealand to Poland early in the following week. f) Despite that, and for reasons which are not apparent (but which may well have something to do with pending charges) the Immigration Service then decided not to proceed with implementing the removal order. An application was made to withdraw the Warrant of Commitment which the Service had obtained. The removal order thus lapsed on Monday 27 April. g) That afternoon there was a further hearing in the Auckland District Court at which the applicant's counsel sought the applicant's immediate release. The basis for that request is obvious. The Warrant for Commitment no longer existed. Bail, which had been granted on Friday 24 April, was thus operative. The application was adjourned to the following day, Tuesday 28 April. This is the core of the Habeas Corpus application. [7] On 28 April the applicant again appeared, this time before Judge de Jong. By that stage the police appear to have made further inquiries. Various files relating to the applicant had been assembled. It now seems to be the position that, in addition to the two charges to which I have referred, the applicant was also being prosecuted on seven other charges laid under the Summary Offences Act and the Domestic Violence Act, and a single charge under s 37 of the Bail Act of failing to answer court bail. [8] Common ground emerges at this point between the above recital of the applicant's Habeas Corpus application and an apparent narrative. Judge de Jong embarked on a bail application de novo. This process was strongly resisted by Mr Witten-Hannah in the District Court (he appears to have had some support of an immigration nature from another counsel, Mr E Orlov, but that is immaterial). Mr Witten-Hannah's position, which he maintains here, is that bail had been granted; he was not re-applying for bail; the District Court was functus officio; there was no fresh bail application before it; and thus the applicant should be released forthwith. [9] Since the hearing began this morning counsel have been able to obtain a copy of Judge de Jong's 28 April bail minute. They have also obtained a copy of a warrant of commitment signed by Judge de Jong and dated 28 April 2009. [10] The Judge rejected a submission of the prosecution that there had been no bail hearing on 24 April. What he said was: In my view the strength of the argument is a change of circumstances and for the Court to consider today whether it is appropriate for the defendant to be released on bail. [11] Mr Witten-Hannah's point, which has jurisdictional force, is that in the absence of any fresh bail application before it, or indeed some formal application for revocation of bail, the District Court had no bail application to determine. It follows, submits Mr Witten-Hannah, that the warrant which the Judge subsequently signed is a nullity, there being no jurisdiction to issue it. [12] The way which counsel for the applicant would like me to deal with the matter is to release the applicant on interim orders under s 11 of the Habeas Corpus Act. Two deponents (Mr Shapkin and Ms Lanshikova) are prepared to make their home available as a bail address in the interim and are happy to enforce any interim conditions which this Court might be minded to impose under the Habeas Corpus Act. Those two deponents are clearly involved in the applicant's welfare. They have apparently made statements to the police which suggest that the applicant has an alibi in respect of the alleged offending for which he was arrested on 24 April. [13] Mr Woolford for his part opposes the suggested s 11 relief. In his submission the bail matter may be moot because, on his instructions, the police intend to arrest the applicant for further alleged offending. [14] I note in passing that the warrant to which I have referred requires the applicant to be produced to the District Court at Auckland on 12 May 2009. The significance of that date is puzzling since there is no mention of it in Judge de Jong's bail minute. [15] It is trite that Habeas Corpus applications are not to be used as a substitute for bail appeals and/or judicial review applications. Prima facie, of course, if the hearing on which Judge de Jong embarked and the resulting warrant were ultra vires then judicial review would be the appropriate remedy. Mr Woolford, however, has referred me to the recent approach of the Court of Appeal that although judicial review may be the preferred remedy courts should not decline to deal with jurisdictional disputes lurking underneath Habeas Corpus applications if such disputes are capable of summary determination. [16] Mr Woolford's preferred option is that I should adjourn this matter further. He points to s 9(3) of the Habeas Corpus Act which requires three working days for a hearing. I consider that Mr Witten-Hannah is on strong grounds when he points out that s 9(3) is silent on the issue of adjournments and that the hearing on which I embarked today is ultimately the determination of the Habeas Corpus application. [17] That said I have some reluctance to make a final determination today given the constantly shifting terrain to which I have referred. I have yet to see the bail documents. I have no explanation as to why the warrant signed by the Judge refers to 12 May. I do not know whether there are previous extant warrants which might flow from the applicant's alleged failure to answer court bail. There has been some suggestion that there have been previous guilty pleas in respect of which there may or may not be an application afoot in the High Court to vacate such pleas. If there have indeed been guilty pleas then prima facie s 13 of the Bail Act would apply. [18] Mr Witten-Hannah suggested that I should be courageous and deal with the application one way or the other today. The applicant clearly does not want to be returned to prison. Mr Witten-Hannah almost went as far as to suggest he would prefer an unfavourable outcome rather than a further adjournment. [19] The Crown's position is that given what seems a likely appearance on 12 May, and indeed a possible earlier appearance on 11 May if there are further charges to be laid against the applicant, the whole Habeas Corpus issue will be moot and on fresh grounds the whole issue of bail could be considered by the District Court de novo. [20] I said at the outset I found this a perplexing case. I have serious doubts about the legitimacy of the District Court embarking on the bail hearing which it did on 28 April. There is High Court authority which suggests that District Court Judges may not have jurisdiction to revoke bail once it has been granted in some circumstances (Falealupe Palu v New Zealand Police (HC WN CRI 2004-485-26, MacKenzie J and Ngaru Tai Enua v The Police (HC ROT CRI 2006-463-88, Winkelmann J). [21] The stumbling block to Habeas Corpus however, is the warrant signed by the Judge on 28 April. I quite simply do not have sufficient information at the moment to determine, in a summary way, whether that warrant flows from an illegitimate hearing. It may well do, but there are various critical pieces of information and documentation not available to me. [22] I would not hesitate to invoke the strong and potent Habeas Corpus remedy if I were satisfied that this was a blatant and illegal detention. I fall, however, slightly short of that conclusion, quite simply because of the lack of evidence to which I have referred. [23] What I intend to do therefore is to adjourn this matter for reconsideration by the Duty Judge in this Court on Tuesday 12 May 2009. Because on that date I will be sitting on the Court of Appeal in Wellington the matter will have to re-assessed (if it is still a live issue) by the Judge presiding on that list. [24] I direct counsel to inform this Court immediately if the Habeas Corpus issue between now and then becomes moot. I also direct the Crown to obtain the further information to which I have referred (extant warrants and bail bonds). It is also puzzling that there may be guilty pleas afoot. Information is required on that. [25] In all these circumstances, and given that to invoke s 11 would in essence be my granting bail to the applicant under another guise, I decline to extend interim remedy at this juncture. [26] Therefore interim relief is refused. The substantive Habeas Corpus application remains afoot. It is adjourned as I have stated above. Regrettably the applicant will have to remain in custody in the interim. ............................................. Priestley J
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URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2009/513.html