DAVID STANLEY HEENAN AND ROBERTA JANE HEENAN V OSCAR THORWALD ALPERS AND OTHERS IN PARTNERSHIP AS WESTON WARD & LASCELLES HC CHCH CIV 2001 409 000842 [2009] NZHC 663 (3 June 2009)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
                                                             CIV 2001 409
000842



               BETWEEN                  DAVID STANLEY HEENAN AND
                                        ROBERTA JANE HEENAN
                                        Plaintiffs

               AND                      OSCAR THORWALD ALPERS AND
          
                             OTHERS IN PARTNERSHIP AS
                                        WESTON WARD & LASCELLES
          
                             Defendants


Hearing:       18 May 2009

Appearances: D S Heenan in Person
             K Foley for
Defendants

Judgment:      3 June 2009 at 2PM


               JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE OSBORNE
                            As
to a Stay




Descriptions


[1]    Mr D S Heenan is a co-plaintiff with his former wife, Mrs R J M Heenan. I
will refer to Mrs Heenan
for convenience as Mr Heenan's "wife".


[2]    The proceeding was commenced by Mr Heenan and his wife in 2001 "for
themselves and
as trustees for the Heenan Family Trust".


[3]    Mr Heenan is an undischarged bankrupt, adjudicated on 11 December 2000.
The only
capacity in which he may appear in this proceeding is as trustee of the
Heenan Family Trust.

DAVID STANLEY HEENAN AND ROBERTA JANE
HEENAN V OSCAR THORWALD ALPERS AND
OTHERS IN PARTNERSHIP AS WESTON WARD & LASCELLES HC CHCH CIV 2001 409 000842 3 June
2009
Introduction


[4]    Mr Heenan and his wife were disastrously affected by frauds committed by
one Michael Anderson and others.         An advance
of $900,000.00 made to the
Anderson interests was lost. One of the defendants (partners at one time or another
of Weston Ward & Lascelles)
acted for the Anderson interests. In this proceeding
the plaintiffs claimed against the defendants, in negligence, damages on account
of
the lost monies together with additional sums for exemplary and general damages.


[5]    The way in which the plaintiffs' substantive
case has been put is set out in
more detail in the interlocutory judgment of Panckhurst J dated 21 November 2002
in this proceeding
(paragraphs [3] to [10]).


The stay


[6]    In July 2002 the defendants applied for a stay of the proceeding, having
regard to
Mr Heenan's bankruptcy.              In his 21 November 2002 judgment
Panckhurst J found that the loan documents involved in the
Anderson advance
referred to the lenders as Mr and Mrs Heenan with nothing to indicate that the
investment was made to them in a
trustee capacity, either in whole or in part. His
Honour ordered that the proceeding be stayed until such time as affidavit evidence
was provided sufficient to establish who advanced the loan funds of $900,000.00.
The Court required proof by documentary evidence
as opposed to assertions. The
Court ordered that the lifting of the stay would be conditional on payment of the
costs of the application
on a 2B basis. Such costs amounted to $2,470.00.


[7]    Mr and Mrs Heenan applied to remove the stay.           Each filed affidavit
evidence. The defendants opposed the application. The hearing of the application
took place in June 2003. At that hearing Mrs Heenan,
the defendants and the
Official Assignee in the bankruptcy of Mr Heenan were represented by counsel. Mr
Heenan appeared for himself
as a trustee of the Heenan Family Trust 1960. In a
judgment dated 7 August 2003 Panckhurst J fully reviewed the evidence as to the
Anderson advance and consequently the ownership of the chose in action which is
the subject of this litigation. The Court held ­


               (a) A family trust was not involved in the Anderson advance
                   (paragraph [29]).


            
  (b) The original beneficial interests of Mr and Mrs Heenan
                   respectively in the advance were equal (paragraph
[30]).


               (c) With the Official Assignee neither asserting nor assigning that
                   part of the cause
of action which formerly belonged to Mr Heenan
                   in his personal capacity, Mrs Heenan had no right other than to
                   the extent of
her half share in the Anderson advance.


               (d) Mrs Heenan was excused from responsibility to meet payment of
     
             the ($2,470.00) costs, but the costs order remained extant and Mr
                   Heenan was the party liable to
make payment (paragraph [40]).


               (e) The Court directed that the stay be lifted as against Mrs Heenan
           
       (paragraph [36]) but the Court found that it was appropriate that
                   the stay remain in relation to the Official
Assignee's interest in the
                   cause of action (paragraph [37]).


[8]    This judgment was not appealed.


Mr Heenan's
interlocutory application filed 21 April 2009


[9]    Mr Heenan filed the present application as "trustee of the Heenan Family
Trust
1960". The application is grossly defective in its non-compliance with r 7.19
High Court Rules and Form G31. It is in parts extremely
difficult to understand.
However, what it does do under a heading "Parties to be Added or Deleted are as
Follows" is indicate that
the following orders were sought:
               (a) The addition of "Heenan Family Trust 1960 through David
                  
Stanley Heenan" as a second plaintiff.


               (b) The deletion of Mrs Heenan as a plaintiff.


               (c) The addition
or renaming of fifteen persons or entities as
                   defendants (the first nine being the defendants already named in
                   this proceeding, with the additional entities being the firm Weston
                   Ward & Lascelles, the valuer
involved in the Andersons' frauds
                   B.P. Roberts, and four members of the Anderson family).


               (d)
Removal of the stay of proceeding.


               (e) Retention of the existing proceeding and repetition of the original
    
              statement of claim in the proceeding.


[10]   Mr Heenan filed an affidavit in support. It contained some material
in the
nature of evidence. At the same time it contained to a gross extent matters of
submission together with allegations and language
of a scandalous nature.


[11]   On the day of the hearing Mr Heenan provided to the Court an additional
document dated 16 May 2009
headed "Notice of Oppositions, against these
Defendants who are Opposing the Joining of Other Persons and Making All of these
Judgment
Orders, on Applications 17.4.09". The defendant had filed no application
so the document in question had no function as a notice
of opposition. I treated it for
the purposes of hearing as a document in the nature of a written submission.


[12]   The document
was accompanied by a further affidavit of Mr Heenan sworn
18 May 2009. Ms Foley for the defendants did not object to the affidavit's
late
production, notwithstanding that again there were gross aspects of submission and
scandalous language and allegations within
it. Mr Heenan was therefore able at the
hearing to speak to that affidavit also.
Background ­ other proceedings


[13]   Within
the evidence or in the course of submissions, I was referred by Mr
Heenan and counsel for the defendants to some of the other proceedings
which have
involved Mr Heenan. I note particularly these in chronological order:


              (a) A judgment of Chisholm J (HC
Dunedin CIV-2002-425-15
                  hearing dated 1 July, 16 October 2003).         Mr Heenan takes
                  Chisholm
J to have found (amongst other findings) that Mr
                  Heenan had suffered an injustice. A reading of the judgment
 
                indicates that what was in fact said was that Mr Heenan had
                  pleaded with the Court to annul his
bankruptcy and remedy the
                  injustice he had suffered. The Court was quoting Mr Heenan's
                  submissions.
The Court went on to uphold the bankruptcy.


              (b) A judgment of the District Court (DC Dunedin 1 December 2006,
                  Judge Somerville) in which
Mr Heenan was described by the
                  Judge as a broken man who had lost everything including all of
                
 his household chattels and personal effects.


              (c) A judgment of Panckhurst J (CIV 2002-425-15) dated 20
        
         December 2006, dealing with a dispute between the Official
                  Assignee and Mr Heenan as to ownership of two
Buick cars. The
                  Court was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Heenan
                  (and not the
Heenan Family Trust 1960) was the owner of the cars
                  when Mr Heenan was adjudicated bankrupt. The Court found no
                  evidence that the 1960 trust existed let alone that it had owned the
                  subject vehicles.


   
          (d) A judgment of Associate Judge Gendall (CIV 2006 ­ 412 ­ 1023
                  and CIV 2006 ­ 412 ­1031) dated 8 October
2007. In those
                  proceedings Mr Heenan for three trusts identified as the Heenan
                  Family Trust 1960,
The Amended Heenan Family Trust 1960 and
                 the Amended Heenan Family Trust No.2, sued thirty one
               
 defendants. The Associate Judge was dealing with a defendants'
                 strike out application. The Court concluded (paragraph
[89]) that
                 the three trusts named as plaintiffs did not exist. The claims were
                 struck out.


 
            (e) A judgment of Heath J (CIV 2005 - 425 - 76) dated 12 May 2009
                 in a proceeding between Mr Heenan
and the Official Assignee.
                 The Court was dealing with Mr Heenan's application to review a
                 decision
to refuse him an annulment of his bankruptcy and an
                 application to join fifty seven parties to the bankruptcy
 
               proceeding. Heath J refrained from finding that the 1960 Trust
                 did not exist.   After a detailed
review of the history of Mr
                 Heenan's bankruptcy, the various property issues involved and
                 Judgments
which had been given in that context, Heath J held
                 both that the Court had no power to review, rescind or vary the
                 refusal and that on the facts no order of annulment could be made
                 under the Insolvency Act 1967.
The application to join fifty seven
                 defendants, which had been sought on the basis of their alleged
           
     complicity in criminal activity designed to lock Mr Heenan into a
                 fraudulently obtained bankruptcy and to prevent
him from
                 recovering what is rightfully the property of the 1960 Trust, was
                 dismissed in its entirety.
The Court urged Mr Heenan to accept
                 the Court's decision and to co-operate with the Official Assignee
         
       in attempting to resolve bankruptcy issue. The judgment of Heath
                 J was delivered in the week immediately
preceding the hearing of
                 the present application.


The hearing before me ­ oral joinder application


[14]   At
the commencement of the hearing I noted that the "Notice of Oppositions"
document handed to me by Mr Heenan contained a request that
the Court join as
additional defendants not only those named in the previous notice of application but
also "Kerry Graeme Smith
and Others (who are Parties to these serious offence's see
sec 66 [Crimes Act 1961]".


[15]   When I asked Mr Heenan to clarify
exactly what the reference to "Kerry
Graeme Smith and Others" was intended to request, he indicated that the following
persons or
offices were intended to be joined:


               (a) Official Assignee of New Zealand.


               (b) Rhys Cain.


   
           (c) Megan Johnstone.


               (d) William Todd of Todds Car Auction.


               (e) Her Majesty the Queen.


               (f) The Attorney-General ("as employer of the Official
Assignee and
                   the Police").


[16]   I understood from Mr Heenan that the reasoning behind this application was
in effect parallel to that referred by Heath J in his judgment, namely the complicity
of the intended defendants in criminal activity
designed to prevent Mr Heenan
establishing that the Heenan Family Trust 1960 owned the chose in action which
gave rise to the present
proceeding.


Present applications ­ removal of Mrs Heenan as a party


[17]   From 7 August 2003, when the stay was lifted as regards
Mrs Heenan, Mrs
Heenan in her personal capacity has had all the rights of any litigant.
[18]   Mr Heenan applies to have Mrs Heenan
removed as a plaintiff. He has
produced in evidence a letter dated 9 November 2007 from Anderson Lloyd, in
which that firm states,
in response to an apparent query from Mr Heenan as to
whether Mrs Heenan is pursuing her claim in this proceeding, that "she does
not
want to be involved in these Court proceedings any further".


[19]   Mr Heenan's application is misconceived. It is for Mrs
Heenan, not Mr
Heenan, to take such steps as she wishes in relation to here involvement in the
proceeding. If Mrs Heenan wishes to
have no further part in the proceeding she has
the right to do so by discontinuing her claim. That is for her.


Mr Heenan's other
applications ­ the principles


[20]   The stay of proceeding precludes the parties to the proceeding from taking
any further step
in the proceeding. I must therefore deal first with the application to
lift the stay. My consideration of the application to join
additional defendants will
be required only in the event the stay is lifted.


Lifting of stay ­ the principles


[21]   I adopt
as a correct statement of principle the following passage from
Halsbury's Laws of England 4th ed., (reissue) Vol.37, Practice and
Procedure para
927, as approved by Allan J in Kidd v van Heeren  [2006] 1 NZLR 393 at 404:

       [43] As to general principle, Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed, reissue)
       vol 37, para 927 observes that:

       "A stay of proceedings is not the equivalent of a judgment or of a
       discontinuance, and may be removed if proper grounds
are shown, even if
       the stay is imposed by a consent order. In contrast with a judgment for the
       defendant or the dismissal
or continuance of a claim, in the case of a stay of
       proceedings, whether conditional or absolute, the claim still subsists;
it is
       still `pending', and the stay is therefore always potentially capable of being
       removed.
        A stay may be
removed if good cause or proper grounds are shown or the
        continuance of the stay could cause or produce injustice or prejudice
or
        where there has been a change in the law."

This statement of the legal principles was in turn approved by the Court of
Appeal as
the appropriate test on whether a stay should be lifted: see Kidd v van Heeren (CA
191/05, 23 March 2006, at paragraphs
[3] and [9] ­ decision reported at  [2006] 3
NZLR 520n, but not on this point).


[22]    The concept that the stay is always potentially capable of being removed is
subject to the following
reservation, set out as a footnote (4) to the same paragraph in
Halsbury's Laws of England (above paragraph [21]) ­

        In some
cases, however, the restrictions or conditions imposed by the order
        to stay have the effect of bringing the entire proceedings
to an end, in which
        event the stay will operate as a dismissal; and it may thereafter be necessary
        to examine closely
the form of the order to determine whether the stay was
        intended to be permanent in the sense that no proper grounds can
be adduced
        for its removal.

[23]    Some situations giving rise to a stay are inherently changeable and are
subject to fresh
developments which may alter the justice of the stay ­ stays of
proceeding issued pending arbitration or in relation to forum conveniens
are of this
nature. In Ghose v Ghose  (1997) 12 PRNZ 149 at 157, Paterson J in granting a stay
made this comment as to the change of circumstances which might justify the lifting
of a stay:

        I am therefore prepared to stay these proceedings. However, the stay should
        not necessarily be permanent. If for
any reason it is not possible to resolve
        all the outstanding issues between the parties in Wales, or if there is a change
        of circumstances which makes it more appropriate for the matter to be
        resolved in this country, then either party
should have the right to apply to
        this Court to revoke the stay. A revocation however is unlikely to be
        considered
unless circumstances arise after the date of this judgment which
        make it appropriate to revoke the stay.

[24]    Even in
cases where there has not been a change in circumstances after the
issuing of a stay, the Court has power to remove a stay in the
interests of justice.
The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Cooper v Williams  [1963] 2 QB 567
is an example of the exercise of that jurisdiction. An infant's negligence claim under
the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (UK) in relation
to her father's death was settled by a
Tomlin Order. By virtue of the regime of the Fatal Accidents Act, which deemed the
infant's
and the widow's actions to be "one action", the effect of the consent order
was to stay the widow's action. The Court unanimously
upheld the decision of
Megaw J allowing the widow to proceed. The circumstances identified by those
members of the Court were put
variously as mistakes by the widow's and the
infant's separate solicitors; a risk taken by the defendants in taking a consent order
without the presence of the widow; a breach of natural justice; and deficiencies and
irregularities in the action. Davies LJ was
of the view that a sufficient case for
interfering with the stay had not been made out but his views were not sufficiently
strong
to lead him to dissent.


[25]   Cooper v Williams confirms the jurisdiction of the Court in special
circumstances to revisit a stay.
It is not, however, a charter for the parties or the
Court to take a second view akin to an appeal from a judgment following a hearing
which was regularly conducted.


[26]   The footnote (1) to Halbury's Laws of England, paragraph 927 (above [21])
cites Cooper v
Williams as authority for the proposition that "an order for the stay of
proceedings does not have the effect of a res judicata".
Care must be taken with that
statement. The footnote comment arises in the context of a discussion as to whether
a stay is conditional
or absolute. Cooper v Williams is authority for the proposition
that a stay is not absolute. But it is not authority for the proposition
that the
judgments of fact reached upon the basis of evidence by a Court before imposing a
stay by a regular process are subject
to review. The emphasis of the majority in
Cooper v Williams was upon the irregularity of the process which had occurred.


Application
of the principles ­ non-payment of costs


[27]   Mr Heenan has not paid the costs which he was ordered to pay as a condition
of
removal of the stay.
[28]   There was no evidence put before the Court to indicate that after the stay
issued there was any development
or change of circumstance to justify an
interference with that condition.


[29]   Equally, Mr Heenan's submissions did not identify
any irregularity or breach
of natural justice in relation to the 25 October 2002 hearing which resulted in the
judgment of 21 November
2002 when the payment of the costs was required as a
condition of lifting the stay. Mr Heenan failed to produce evidence for the
25
October 2002 hearing. Significantly in the context of the costs order, when Mr
Heenan was given further opportunity to produce
his evidence that evidence was the
subject of the hearing of 4 June 2003 (leading to the 7 August 2003 judgment), in
relation to
which Panckhurst J made no further order of costs against Mr Heenan.


[30]   The condition imposed as to payment of the costs was
appropriate and
modest in its extent.      There is no suggestion that Mr Heenan at any time
misunderstood the condition. He did
not appeal the judgment. There is no reason to
interfere with the condition.


[31]   On this ground the Court must refuse both Mr
Heenan's application to
remove the stay and therefore his other applications generally.


Application of the principles ­ considerations
of justice


[32]   Had Mr Heenan's application not been declined by reason of the non-
payment of the cross order, I would still
have declined the application upon the basis
that he had not shown proper grounds for the lifting of the stay.


[33]   I first note
in this regard that although the fourth aspect of the interlocutory
application was for removal of the stay, the subsequent ten pages
focused entirely on
the identity of the defendants whom Mr Heenan wishes to have in the proceeding.
They provide no further grounds
for removal of the stay. As best I can summarise
Mr Heenan's application, he asked for the stay to be removed immediately because:
               (a) The stay was illegal.


               (b) The defendants had been guilty of serious offences including
                   obstructing, perverting and
defeating the course of justice,
                   perjury, providing false statements in documents, and other
                
  matters of corruption.


[34]   The affidavit evidence filed by Mr Heenan provides further explanation of
the basis of his application
in that the first affidavit was headed "Affidavit Evidence
to Establish Who Advanced the Loan Funds of $900,000.00.". The affidavit
tracks
through from 1995 the advances made to the Anderson interests and the nature and
activities of the Heenan Family Trust 1960
both in relation to the Anderson advances
and in relation to other property. Mr Heenan exhibited a number of documents
referring
to both the Heenan Family Trust and the Heenan Family Trust 1960.
Several of the documents related to certain Buick cars, but there
were also items of
correspondence, including from the Inland Revenue Department, referring to the
Heenan Family Trust 1960.


[35]
  The further affidavit which Mr Heenan handed up at the hearing also dealt
with the cars, with particular criticism of Panckhurst
J in relation to his
20 December 2006 judgment. It went on to comment upon and develop argument as
to the existence of the Heenan
Family Trust 1960.


[36]   This is an application in the context of civil litigation. It asserts negligence
upon the part of the
defendants in 1996. The proceeding was brought at the outset in
the names of both the plaintiffs personally and as trustees of the
"Heenan Family
Trust" and was issued on 3 August 2001. The defendants filed their defence on 21
September 2001 and their application
for a stay of proceedings on 19 July 2002.
They challenged the right of Mr Heenan to be bringing the claim.             It is that
application which was heard by Panckhurst J on 25 October 2002 and is the subject
of the 21 November 2002 judgment. It is clear from
the judgment that the parties
were fully aware that under the then r 477 High Court Rules, central to the issues
before the Court
was whether any right of action which Mr Heenan may have once
had had in fact vested in the Official Assignee. Given Mr Heenan's
failure to
produce evidence for the hearing, Panckhurst J met the needs of the case by granting
the stay (on condition as to payment
of costs) but by extending the opportunity to the
parties to establish by affidavit evidence who advanced the loan funds of
$900,000.00.
The parties then had the opportunity provided by the Court at the
hearing on 4 June 2003, which resulted in the 7 August 2003 judgment.
Mrs Heenan
filed her affidavit evidence in February 2003, Mr Heenan responded on 11 March
2003 and Mrs Heenan then filed additional
affidavit evidence on 26 May 2003.
Affidavit evidence was also filed on behalf of the defendants.


[37]   It must have been clear
to all parties that 2003 was the opportunity to file all
relevant evidence, including particularly the documentary evidence as opposed
to
simple assertions on oath. The judgment of Panckhurst J of 21 November 2002,
especially at [25], could not have been clearer.


[38]   Mr Heenan's affidavit of 7 March 2003 was purely a narrative affidavit. It
attached no documentary evidence.


[39]   There
followed the hearing of 4 June 2003 and the judgment of 7 August
2003 wherein it was concluded that Mr and Mrs Heenan personally
(not a trust) had
been the owners of the chose in action. As is made clear by [37] of the judgment not
only was the stay to remain
in relation to Mr Heenan's interest but it was to remain
while the Official Assignee determined what if anything to do with the interest
in the
cause of action which was vested in the Official Assignee.


[40]   Mr Heenan appealed neither the findings nor the orders
made in that
judgment.


[41]   Against that background I find that Mr Heenan has shown no proper grounds
for the removal of the stay:


               (a) Although the
status of the factual findings in the 7 August 2003
                   judgment may not strictly constitute a res judicata, the parties
   were on notice that the evidence for that hearing needed to be
   comprehensive and fully documented.


(b) No party could have
understood that there would be a continuing
   right by way of some form of review of the stay from time to
   time.      This Court
in the judgment of 21 November 2002
   indulgently offered the opportunity for the further hearing which
   took place in 2003 precisely
because Mr Heenan had failed to
   provide proper evidence in 2002.


(c) I take into account the fact that in subsequent years Mr
Heenan in
   other proceedings with other parties has pursued with varying
   degrees of success and lack of success arguments touching
upon,
   or directly related to the existence of the Heenan Family Trust
   1960. Some of that litigation is the subject of various
judgments
   of this Court and of the District Court to which I have referred
   already.


(d) This is not a case, as sometimes
may happen with stays in relation
   to arbitration proceedings or upon a forum conveniens basis,
   where there has been a change
of circumstances after the ordering
   of stay. Rather, Mr Heenan seeks to adduce further evidence,
   including documentary evidence,
as to matters which by their
   nature occurred before the 2002 and 2003 judgments. He also
   seeks to pray in aid aspects of judgments
delivered since 2003, but
   those themselves are the products of the evidence that was
   produced in Court in those proceeding
relating to pre-2003
   matters.


(e) I also take into account the fact that the judgments to which Mr
   Heenan and Ms Foley referred
me contain findings or point to
   other Court's rulings which bind Mr Heenan. For instance, the
   judgment of Panckhurst J dated
20 December 2006 in which it is
                   found that Mr Heenan was the owner of the two Buick cars with
              
    the consequence that the Official Assignee was entitled to
                   declarations that Mr Heenan's bankrupt estate was
the true owner
                   of those cars. While it is true that the issue estoppel in that case is
                   as between
Mr Heenan and the Official Assignee I cannot ignore
                   the effect of the judgment in the context of the application
before
                   me. The evidence as to the ownership of the motorcars is raised
                   by Mr Heenan as a very
significant part of his present argument
                   for indicating that he should be able to open for exploration in the
                   present proceeding the ownership of property which is not in issue
                   in the present proceeding.
Yet he is bound by the finding of this
                   Court in the Official Assignee's proceeding where the ownership
      
            of the cars in question was directly in issue.


               (f) When issues of justice or injustice for the applicant
are raised,
                   they are not to be considered in a vacuum.           They are to be
                   considered
against the interests of the other parties to the
                   litigation. By applying to have the stay lifted in 2009, Mr
Heenan
                   seeks to bring back to active life a proceeding which is more than
                   seven years old in
relation to a cause of action which is more than
                   twelve years old. I cannot ignore the fact that the application
for
                   removal of the stay now made by Mr Heenan is in reality an
                   exercise in revisiting the 2002
and 2003 judgments without
                   having brought an appeal (whether or not involving an application
                
  for leave to adduce further evidence).


[42]   In considering all matters, I find that Mr Heenan has not established proper
grounds for lifting the stay. I would
decline the application on this basis also.


Joinder of additional parties
[43]     Mr Heenan is not entitled to apply for the
joinder of additional parties or
other interlocutory orders while the proceeding is stayed. To the extent that there are
other applications
filed I therefore decline those applications also.


Result


[44]     For the reasons given, all applications filed by Mr Heenan
are dismissed.


[45]     The defendants are entitled to costs. My present view is that they should be
on a 2B basis. I direct that
the defendants file and serve a memorandum as to costs
within 5 working days, and I direct that Mr Heenan file and serve any memorandum
in reply within 5 working days thereafter, following which I will issue a judgment as
to costs.




_________________________

Solicitors
D S Heenan in Person
Buddle Findlay, Christchurch