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Last Updated: 4 December 2015
This case has been anonymized
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CRI 2009-404-67
C
Appellant
v
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 8 June 2009
Appearances: M J Harte for Appellant
P Singh for Respondent
Judgment: 8 June 2009
JUDGMENT OF KEANE
J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Auckland
C V POLICE HC AK CRI 2009-404-67 8 June 2009
[1] On 2 February 2009, after a defended hearing, Lana C was
convicted of failing on 14 May 2008 to permit a blood specimen
to be taken from
her without delay, having been requested to do so by a medical
officer.
[2] On this appeal she takes a single point. It is that the evidence
establishes that some quantity blood was taken from her
with her consent. The
prosecution failed to establish that it was insufficient for analysis and
therefore that there was a material
failure on her part to permit blood to be
taken.
[3] This point was not taken at the hearing. Accordingly, it is
contended, if the charge is not to be dismissed outright, the
case ought to be
remitted to the District Court for a rehearing on that issue.
Context
[4] On 14 May 2008 at 9.27 pm Ms C was stopped at a compulsory check
point on Great South Road, Takanini. She underwent a
passive test and then a
breath screening test, each of which she failed and she was required to go to
the bus nearby to undergo an
evidential breath test. When that test was
administered she made several attempts to comply, as many as ten. The test
proved incomplete.
She was required to supply a specimen of blood.
[5] The medical officer called, a registered nurse with eight years
experience of taking blood from motorists, as she says literally
thousands,
first attempted to take it from Ms C ’ right arm. Her evidence and that
of the constable was that Ms C frustrated
that by pulling her arm away. The
nurse then attempted to take blood from Ms C ’ left arm. This time she
succeeded in beginning
to take blood. The constable supported Ms C ’
right elbow to hold it secure. Once again, their evidence was, Ms C pulled
her
arm away.
[6] At the hearing in the District Court the only issue was whether Ms C failed or refused to permit blood to be taken. She put that in issue quite starkly. She maintained that it was the nurse who frustrated the attempt, not her. She was always willing, she said, to have blood taken. She would have preferred to have had it taken
from her hand but she tolerated the two attempts made. She called her
general practitioner to confirm how difficult it was to take
blood from her arms
and that it was preferable to take it from her hands.
[7] The Judge, in finding the offence proved, accepted the
evidence of the constable and the nurse. She found that
Ms C withdrew her
arm, not once but twice, and in such a way that the nurse was not able to take a
blood specimen from her.
Sufficient specimen
[8] On this appeal the single point Mr Harte takes, and he was not
counsel at the hearing, is that the nurse gave evidence sufficient
to confirm
that Ms C did permit blood to be taken and it was for the prosecution to show
that it did not suffice.
[9] In this Mr Harte relies principally on Auckland City Council v
Bostock (HC AK, M61/81, 3 June 1980), where Mahon J held that a specimen of
blood, then for the purpose of s 58B(2) of the Transport Act 1962,
need only be
‘any appreciable quantity of blood withdrawn from a suspect’; though
he did to on to say that, whether
it was sufficient for analysis was of
primary importance. That was why s 58B(2) permitted the taking of a second
sample if the first
proved insufficient to be divided into two. Goddard J
adopted this analysis in Hilton v New Zealand Police (HC WN, AP 105/01,
23 August 2001).
[10] The final case on which Mr Harte relies is Smith v
Lower Hutt City Corporation (HC WN, M 556/75, 18 February 1976), where
Quilliam J warned against accepting uncritically the assurance of an enforcement
officer
that he or she has complied with the prescribed process. The nurse is
not to be assumed to have appreciated that she might have taken
sufficient blood
for analysis.
Three immediate issues
[11] There are three issues that arise and the first is that this is a new point on the
appeal and, though s 75 of the District Courts Act 1947 makes an appeal by
way of rehearing, this Court on appeal must reconsider
a matter already decided.
A new point can be entertained but only if arguable on the evidence as it is and
without any evidence in
rebuttal: Savill v Chase Holdings (Wellington) Ltd
[1988] NZCA 113; [1989] 1 NZLR 257; Paulger v Butland Industries Ltd [1989] NZCA 190; [1989] 3 NZLR
549.
[12] Secondly, in the two cases on which Mr Harte relies primarily,
Bostock and Hilton, the issue was materially different from that
arising here. Each concerned whether it was permissible to take more than
two
specimens of blood from a motorist in order to obtain a sample
sufficient for analysis. In each, it was held, only two are
expressly
permitted and that remains the case still. Section 72(4) now
applies.
[13] In Bostock one cc of blood was taken on a first attempt,
another on a second and then apparently more on a third, the three together
constituting
the specimen divided, and analysed, resulting in the analysis on
which the charge was founded. Mahon J held that the blood extracted
on the first
two occasions each constituted a specimen for the purpose of s 58B(2). The third
was impermissible and the charge was
rightly dismissed. In Hilton there
were more than two attempts but blood was only extracted on two. The converse
resulted.
[14] The question is here whether the quantity of blood taken from Ms C
on the second occasion was enough to enable her to avoid
culpability for failure
to permit a blood specimen to be taken; a specimen sufficient for the purpose of
analysis, as that is prescribed,
sufficient to divide into two.
[15] The third issue is this. Can the evidence as it is be held on this appeal insufficient to resolve the point if the point was not taken at the hearing or put to the nurse? The Smith case, which may be understood to suggest that, if there is a void in the prosecution evidence that is fatal, even if the point resulting was never put, does not state the law. Contrast Auckland City Council v Scale (1985) 1 CRNZ 544, CA and see also now s 92(1) of the Evidence Act 2006.
Conclusions
[16] It is against those principles that I must resolve this appeal and I
do so on the basis that the whole purport of the prosecution
was that Ms C had
failed to supply a specimen, when requested to do so by a medical officer; and
that the specimen that she failed
to permit to be taken was one sufficient in
the sense that it was capable of being divided into two.
[17] If there had been any concern about that proposition it should have
been at the forefront of the defence. The defence, by
contrast as I have said,
came at it rather from the opposite premise, implicitly accepting that the
sample was insufficient. The
whole focus was on whether there had been a failure
to permit. The question then becomes whether such evidence as there is actually
contradicts that assumption. I do not consider that it does.
[18] It is true the nurse did say she extracted some blood from Ms C
’ right arm. She was not asked to state how much.
She at first said that
when she was getting blood Ms C became upset. She continued to take blood
until Ms C pulled her arm away,
causing the needle to come out, and pushed the
syringe away. It was only then that the nurse spoke about quantity. She
said:
after she pushed the syringe away I said I considered that a refusal because
it was putting everyone in danger because there was blood
in the syringe that
could have been knocked out of my hand and gone into somebody else.
[19] It is material to this issue that, as the Judge said, the
nurse was very experienced. Not only had she been
a registered nurse for 24
years, she had been taking blood from motorists for eight and a half years and
had trained other nurses
in the procedure. One would have expected then that, if
she had considered there was enough blood to divide into two for the purpose
of
analysis, she would have stopped short and not simply deemed this to be a
failure.
[20] If that were to be put in question she would have had to be tested more particularly than she was. Moreover, there was a medical practitioner who gave evidence for the defence. He might have assisted had there been a point to take. I see then no warrant on this appeal for allowing the point taken any force. The evidence
does not suffice. Nor do I consider that it ought to be a point revisited at
a rehearing, though Mr Harte strongly invites me to.
[21] The Judge was entitled to conclude, as she did, that Ms C had failed to permit a specimen of blood to be taken. As to that, the evidence of the constable and nurse was more than sufficient on its face. Whatever quantity of blood the nurse obtained on the second attempt, it is clear she would have had to make a third attempt to obtain enough to divide into two. But by then Ms C ’ position was plain. She could not tolerate that happening. Any further attempt would have been
met by a further failure. The appeal is
dismissed.
P.J. Keane J
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URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2009/681.html