R v Meads HC Hamilton CRI 2009-019-8828 [2011] NZHC 1238 (31 March 2011)

Last Updated: 30 March 2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY

_{CRI 2009-019-8828}

THE QUEEN

v

GREGORY HOWARD MEADS

Hearing: 31 March 2011

Appearances: R Douch for Crown

M McKechnie for Meads

Judgment: 31 March 2011

_{SENTENCING REMARKS OF ALLAN J}

Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor Hamilton [e-mail]

_{M McKechnie, Rotorua, [e-mail]}

R V GREGORY HOWARD MEADS HC HAM CRI 2009-019-8828 31 March 2011

[1] Mr Meads, on the morning of 23 September 2009, you took a loaded shotgun from your house near Matamata, walked across the paddocks to the stables at the rear of the house, and there shot your wife Helen in the throat. She died instantly. At your trial you said you did not intend to pull the trigger. In other words it was an accident. The jury rejected that explanation and found you guilty of murder. You appear for sentence on that charge this morning.

[2] You are nearly 56 years old. You and Helen had been married since 1997. You had previously been married during the 1980s, and there were two children of that marriage. You retain a cordial relationship with each of them and with your former wife.

[3] Helen had also been in earlier relationships. She had two children when you married. At the time of her death her younger child, Kimberley, was living with you as part of the household; so was Samantha, who was the child of your marriage to Helen. Samantha will shortly turn 11, Kimberley is 19.

[4] For the most part your marriage to Helen was tolerably happy. There was evidence of mutually affectionate behaviour between you right up until the days leading to Helen’s death. You shared a love of horses; your particular interest was in thoroughbreds, Helen’s passion was pony club activities where she held important administrative posts. A number of horses were kept at your rural property. The stables where Helen met her death were modern and extensive.

[5] A few days before she died, Helen disclosed that she intended leaving you. For you that was a bolt from the blue. Your evidence was that you had no warning at all that she was unhappy, or at least there was nothing to indicate that she wanted to leave. It is however appropriate to note that there was one occasion in 2008 upon which you seriously assaulted her, having wrongly understood that she was in a relationship at that time with another man.

[6] Having said that, there was a trip to Europe in the early part of 2009, when Samantha accompanied you both on a journey which seems to have been outstandingly successful.

[7] Although you were stunned by Helen’s disclosure of a desire to leave, it seems she had been contemplating that step for some time. There was evidence at your trial to the effect that she had discussed her situation with one or two close friends. Reading between the lines, it seems that she had concluded that you were trying to control her life to an unacceptable degree, and that she had become tired of a rigorous routine of horse breeding and racing.

[8] Helen’s disclosure occurred on the night of Saturday 19 September 2009. You gave evidence of what transpired over the next few days. On the surface, life went on as normal, although you took immediate steps to accommodate Helen’s concerns by arranging the sale of certain horses, so as to reduce the family’s working commitments. There were several discussions between you and Helen which were, by and large, amicable. Arrangements were made about the care of Samantha, about Helen obtaining a rental property to live in, and about transport and associated financial matters.

[9] But you continued to brood about what had happened. When an opportunity presented itself you downloaded text messages from Helen’s cell phone onto your own. The contents of those messages led you to believe that Helen intended to be difficult about custodial arrangements for Samantha, and about relationship property issues. You also formed the view that Helen was in a relationship with another man. In other words, Helen was not being straight with you.

[10] On the morning of Wednesday 23 September, you took the girls to school and then returned to your property at Banks Road. There, after mulling over the contents of the text messages, you decided to go to the stables to get the truth out of Helen. You made the fatal decision to take your shotgun with you. It had been used to shoot pigeons a few days earlier, and you had left it loaded in a cupboard. Your intention was to use it in order to scare Helen into disclosing the truth about her intentions and

her relationships. At trial you accepted that you knew the shotgun was loaded, albeit that the safety catch was on.

[11] You made your way across the paddocks to the stables where you heard Helen engaged in conversation on her cell phone. You waited outside until the call was finished. Then you walked into the stables and confronted her. On your account, you raised the gun without saying anything at all to her. When the end of the barrel was no more than a few centimetres from her throat, the gun discharged. Helen received massive injuries to the area of her throat and neck, and died instantly.

[12] You ejected the spent shell, catching it as it emerged before dropping it near Helen’s body. You checked to see whether she was alive and were satisfied that she was not. You then left the stables, leaving her where she lay, and encountered an employee with whom you discussed routine horse management issues before telling him he was not to go into the stables because you had just killed Helen.

[13] Thereafter the police were called and you waited until they arrived. In the meantime you made telephone calls to members of your own family.

[14] From the outset you accepted you were responsible for Helen’s death, but you

believe that what occurred was in effect an accident.

Pre-sentence report

[15] To the probation officer you indicated that you had only limited recall of the events in the stables, but said that you were not angry at the time. On the contrary, you described the events as being like a dream. A degree of remorse was expressed to the probation officer, in that you bitterly regretted taking the decision to go to the barn while carrying a shotgun.

[16] You have no previous criminal convictions, and indeed, might be thought by some to have been a pillar of the community. You certainly have been a man of some standing in the racing and thoroughbred industry. These are matters to be

taken into account in a general sense, although there is limited scope for explicit recognition of them when imposing a sentence for murder.

Victim impact reports

[17] I do not propose to dwell on the consequences for your family of the terrible events of 23 September. The Court has heard this morning of the impact of Helen’s death upon those who were close to her, including of course Kimberley and Samantha, Helen’s parents, her son, and in the papers that have been filed, brother and sister. This morning we have been privileged to hear moving readings by Mr White and Kimberley of their victim impact statements. It takes great courage to do that in a time of great sadness and difficulty. The picture that emerges is of a vibrant and greatly loved woman who was very much the focal point for those who were close to her. Kimberley and Samantha, in particular, have lost their mother, not only a source of love and emotional support, but also someone to whom they could turn for guidance and financial assistance. Helen’s parents, Mr and Mrs White, have lost their much loved daughter, but their burden is so much the greater because they have been obliged to take over the full time care of Samantha and in some way to provide for her what previously she received in abundance from Helen. So they must carry a double burden at a time in their lives when they might otherwise have looked forward to peaceful retirement.

[18] Kimberley’s situation is slightly different, but no less poignant. She is now engaged in tertiary studies. She was particularly close to her mother and is at a time when she is in need of financial assistance. Again, her plight adds to the burden resting on her grandparents, albeit that I am sure their first concern is for Kimberley and Samantha.

[19] I will return to the question of the impact of this offending a little later, but in the meantime I express the hope that this hearing, and the victim impact statements which have been prepared and read out so movingly, will assist in some small way to provide an element of closure at this most difficult time.

Murder – sentencing principles and discussion

[20] Upon a conviction for murder a Court must impose a sentence of life imprisonment unless to do so would be manifestly unjust. It is rare to impose a lesser sentence and it is not suggested that it would be appropriate to do so here. At the conclusion of these sentencing remarks I will therefore be imposing a sentence of imprisonment for life.

[21] In addition, I am obliged to consider what minimum period of imprisonment must be served. At this point I want to make it clear that the minimum period of imprisonment ultimately imposed will simply represent the period of time before which you will be entitled to be considered for parole. It does not in some way represent a cap on the sentence of the Court. That sentence is life imprisonment and your ultimate release date will be determined by the Parole Board. The media, in particular, is asked to bear that in mind.

[22] The assessment of an appropriate minimum period of imprisonment involves a two stage process. The first stage involves a consideration of whether the provisions of s 104 of the Sentencing Act 2000 apply. If they do, then I must impose a minimum period of imprisonment of 17 years, unless to do so would be manifestly unjust.

[23] Section 104 sets out a number of factors which Parliament has determined will be relevant to the imposition of a minimum period of imprisonment of 17 years. In general the presence of any one or more of those factors will be sufficient to justify a minimum term of imprisonment of that length.1

[24] Mr Douch for the Crown submits that the requirements of s 104 are met here, and that in consequence I must make an order under s 103 imposing a minimum period of imprisonment of at least 17 years, unless it would be manifestly unjust to do so. The requirements of s 104 are met, he submits, because this murder involved a high level of brutality, depravity and callousness. Callousness is defined in the

_{cases as connoting a hardened state of mind, a want of feeling, or a numbness of the}

1 R v Williams [2004] NZCA 328; [2004] 21 CRNZ 352.

soul.2 Here, Mr Douch argues that your action in placing the barrel of the firearm at, or very near, Helen’s throat and deliberately pulling the trigger knowing that death would ensue, was particularly callous. The Crown also makes reference to your subsequent actions in catching the shell as it was ejected from the shotgun, and then making phone calls and interacting with an employee on routine matters before disclosing to him what had occurred. Mr Douch also maintains that there was an element of brutality in what you did, in that it amounted to unreasoned or senseless behaviour.

[25] Mr McKechnie has, in his written material, referred me to expert evidence given at trial to the effect that the barrel of the shotgun may well have been a little further away from Helen at the time of the shooting than is now contended by the Crown. I accept that the precise distance is uncertain, but it was certainly very close, and indeed, so close that there was little evidence of the discharge on the clothing Helen wore around her throat. Viewed in its entirety, the expert evidence satisfied me that the barrel of the gun, if not actually touching Helen’s throat at the time of discharge, was no more than a few centimetres away.

[26] Moreover, there can be no doubt that you deliberately disengaged the safety mechanism before the shotgun was fired. At trial, having conceded that the safety catch was on when you collected the gun, you were unable to offer any other explanation. So there was an element of preparation before you confronted Helen.

[27] Having said all that, it is to be remembered that there is no such thing as a murder which is not in some sense, brutal, depraved or callous.3 The Court of Appeal has emphasised that what is needed is clear evidence of conduct falling within s 104 before the Court could contemplate invoking that section and imposing a 17 year minimum period of imprisonment.

[28] In my opinion, this case does not come within the section, and it would not be proper to impose a minimum period of imprisonment at that level. Many of the

cases upon which the Crown relies (including Frost,4 Fenton,5 and Fraser6) are all in my opinion significantly worse cases than this.

[29] In R v Lane7 the prisoner had shot his victim in the temple with a pistol from a range of about 60 cm. The shooting was done in a casual way, and for no good reason. The prisoner was under the influence of class A drugs. There, Miller J declined to impose a minimum period of imprisonment of 17 years. The facts of that case which included the kidnapping of two other victims, were in my opinion significantly more serious than the present case.

[30] Your shooting of Helen was undoubtedly horrific and indeed, incomprehensible. But I am satisfied that it did not involve the high degree of brutality, depravity or callousness required to engage the provisions of s 104(e).

[31] I therefore turn to s 103 which provides that the minimum term of imprisonment must not be less than 10 years, but must be the minimum term that the Court considers necessary to satisfy all or any of the purposes set out in that section. There are four such purposes. First there is the need to hold you accountable for the harm you have done to your wife, to those she loved and who loved her, and to the community as a whole. Second, the minimum period imposed must be sufficiently adequate to denounce your conduct. Third, there is the element of deterrence – in other words the minimum period imposed must be sufficient to deter you and others from committing the same, or a similar offence in the future. Finally, I am obliged to have regard to the need to protect the community from you in the light of your offending. It is appropriate to say that I do not regard this last factor as relevant in this case. I am satisfied that this was something that, of its very nature, will never

_recur.

4 _{Fn 2. NZCA 406;}

5 _{R v Fenton HC Whangarei CRI-2006-088-3599, 28 February 2007.}

6 _{R v Fraser HC Christchurch CRI-2009-061-244, 9 July 2009.}

7 R v Lane HC Wanganui CRI-2008-069-1389, 23 September 2009.

[32] In determining whether it is necessary to impose a term of imprisonment beyond the minimum period of 10 years, the Court must assess the level of culpability inherent in the crime.8

[33] I have considered a number of comparable cases. I referred earlier to R v Lane. There the prisoner was in a car with three women. He had been taking class A drugs and was under their influence. Two of the women alighted from the car. The prisoner produced a pistol and asked the remaining woman how long she had known the others. When she responded he accused her of lying and shot her in the temple from a distance of 60 cm. Having declined to impose a minimum term of 17 years, Miller J concluded that the murder was “utterly senseless and shocking” and that the need for denunciation and accountability was very high. He took a starting point of

15 years, reduced in the end to 14 years because of mitigating factors. It is to be noted however that the prisoner had been charged also with kidnapping the remaining two women, so the starting point would have reflected the totality of the offending.

[34] I mention that case because, as here, it involved a completely, unprovoked, senseless shooting at very close range.

[35] The next case is R v Moala.9 That case involved a gang altercation in the street. The victim advanced with his arms in the air towards the prisoner, inviting a one on one fight. The prisoner raised his shotgun and fired at the victim’s face from close range. That was a case of organised gang retaliation and so there were different considerations there. But I mention it because the physical act involved was similar, namely, a shooting at the head from very close range when the victim was unarmed and vulnerable. Courtney J took a starting point of 13 years imprisonment reduced by one year to take into account the prisoner’s guilty plea and genuine remorse.

[36] Several other cases involved domestic homicides. The first is R v Rukuata.10

There, the victim had told her husband that she was going to leave him. The prisoner went into the kitchen, picked up a large knife and stabbed her a number of times. One of the stab wounds at the back of the neck entered her spinal cord and killed her instantly. The two young children of the marriage were present in the house at the time of the attack. The prisoner admitted having a controlling relationship with his wife. He had previously been convicted of assaulting her.

[37] There were several aggravating features, but the sentencing Judge ultimately imposed a minimum term of 10 years imprisonment. A compelling mitigating factor in that case was the degree of the prisoner’s remorse, which extended to a serious suicide attempt.

[38] In R v Rajamani11 the victim had sought to end her marriage with the prisoner. He assaulted her with a brick and when she attempted, despite serious injuries to call the police, he slit her throat with a knife. He then sought to cover up what he had done. A minimum term of imprisonment of 12 years was imposed.

[39] In R v Fennell,12 the prisoner had been found guilty by a jury of the murder of his wife. He had pleaded a lack of murderous intent. The offender had been drinking heavily; an argument developed. He took a shotgun and fired a non-fatal shot at his wife. A second fatal shot was fired at extremely close range at the back of her head, and a third, after reloading, at close range in the chest area. The Crown sought a minimum period of 12 years imprisonment but in the event, Clifford J imposed a minimum period of 10 years imprisonment. I agree with Mr Douch’s submission that, on the facts, that sentence could well be regarded as merciful.

[40] In R v Taumalu,13 the prisoner had stabbed his partner to death. There were major stab wounds to the upper body and the front and back of the deceased. The

_{Crown had sought a 17 year minimum period, but Clifford J ultimately imposed a}

10 _{R v Rukuata HC Auckland CRI-2005-092-13891, 29 May 2007.}

11 _{R v Rajamani HC Auckland CRI-2005-004-1002, 28 March 2006.}

12 R v Fennell HC Wellington CRI-2007-085-238, 13 June 2008.

minimum non-parole period of 14 years, referring to several cases including

Rajamani.

[41] In R v Rogers,14 the prisoner, who was severely intoxicated, stabbed his partner and attempted to stab others at the same time. His partner died. She had some 10 stab wounds to her neck, upper back and scalp. The prisoner left the scene. He had not long been released from prison for sexual offending and had a long list of previous convictions, many involving violence.

[42] The Crown did not seek a 17 year minimum period. Ultimately, the Judge imposed a minimum non-parole period of 11 years.

[43] In R v Seau,15 the prisoner had killed his wife by inflicting 11 stab wounds with a large kitchen knife. The victim died when her carotid artery and jugular vein were severed. Subsequently the prisoner took a shower before leaving the house. Although accepting that the attack involved a degree of determination, the Judge took into account the prisoner’s sincere and extreme remorse and imposed a non- parole period of ten years.

[44] Here, the Crown contends that a starting point of the order of 14 years imprisonment is appropriate. Mr Douch maintains that there are three principal aggravating factors, namely, the use of a shotgun fired at point blank range, the extent of loss, damage or harm resulting to others, and the level of premeditation.

[45] I accept that there was an element of callousness in the way in which you raised the shotgun to a point at which it was merely centimetres away from Helen’s throat. During the last few seconds of her life she must have been utterly terrified.

[46] At this point it is appropriate to say that the jury’s verdict is consistent only with a deliberate decision on your part to pull the trigger, when the shotgun was aimed directly at Helen’s throat. That being so, it is very difficult to accept that your intention when you entered the stables was simply to use the shotgun to scare Helen

_{into revealing precisely what her plans were. If that had been your intention, then}

14 R v Rogers HC Auckland CRI-2006-0-92-4995, 8 April 2008.

there was no need to take a loaded shotgun with you. The mere presence of the weapon would surely have been sufficient.

[47] Then, there is the fact that the safety catch, which you admit was engaged at the outset, was disengaged at some point before the shooting. Given the expert evidence, and the demonstration of the operation of the safety catch at the trial, I am satisfied as I earlier indicated that it could have been released only by a deliberate action on your part. Again, that is inconsistent with an intention only to scare.

[48] Further, there is the fact that although you say you simply intended to challenge Helen about her future plans, there was no evidence from you at the trial, that you did challenge her at all. Instead, you simply raised the shotgun and killed her without saying a word. In my view, Mr Douch is justified in submitting that this was a case in which there was a degree of premeditation. You had been mulling over the events of the past few days as you returned from dropping the girls at school, and at the trial you told the Court that you sat in the cab in your vehicle, reviewing the collected text messages.

[49] That element of predetermination distinguishes this case from cases such as

Rukuata, Rogers and Seau, in which the attacks occurred in a frenzy.

[50] Finally, there is the extent of the loss arising from your actions. Here I am referring to the dreadful impact of this killing on those who were close to Helen. I do not need to review the detail of that again. Both that consideration and the element of premeditation have been acknowledged as appropriate aggravating

factors to be considered when determining a minimum period of imprisonment.16

[51] In several of the cases I have mentioned, the attack was in a sense more brutal than here, but the attacks were launched in the heat of the moment. Although your attack lacked brutality, it was certainly callous and must be regarded as a deliberate killing. Inherent in that is the degree of preparation involved. While I

_{accept that your intention to kill Helen might have become fully formed at a late}

16 R v Berry HC Auckland CRI-2010-092-2165, 7 December 2010.

stage, a decision to disengage the safety catch must have been a deliberate action, taken in contemplation of what finally occurred.

[52] Mr McKechnie has referred to several mitigating features, the first of which is the contention that, when you left the house you did not have it in mind to shoot your wife. That may, or may not be so, but by the time you confronted Helen in the stables the intention was certainly there. There can be no other explanation for a deliberate decision to disengage the safety catch on a shotgun which you knew to be loaded.

[53] Then Mr McKechnie refers to the considerable strain under which you were placed by Helen’s disclosures, coupled with a degree of sleep deprivation. At trial, you gave detailed evidence about the extent to which your ordinary sleeping patterns were disturbed. Mr McKechnie has calculated that you got no more than about ten hours sleep over the three or four days preceding Helen’s death.

[54] I accept that a lack of sleep might well have affected both your emotional regulation and your motor skills, including hand-eye co-ordination. But having regard to what must have been a deliberate decision to release the safety catch, it is difficult to place any great weight on the sleep deprivation point. There is no evidence that your lack of sleep prevented you from carrying out normal household and farm activities in the period leading up to the shooting, and in particular, you were able to drive a motor vehicle earlier that morning.

[55] Mr McKechnie is on much stronger ground when he emphasises your completely clean record, and submits that there is no possibility that you will offend in the future. I accept that these terrible events were out of character for you, although of course there was the 2008 incident when you physically assaulted Helen for reasons which proved groundless.

[56] I accept also that you made no attempt to abscond or to avoid your legal responsibilities, although it is proper to observe that little would have been achieved had you attempted to leave the scene.

[57] I consider that the appropriate minimum period of imprisonment must be 11 years. The increase above the statutory minimum reflects the aggravating features identified by Mr Douch. I do not consider that there ought to be a reduction from that figure on account of mitigating factors. I accept that there is a degree of remorse. That was evident to some degree during the course of the videotaped interview with the police, not long after the murder. Mr McKechnie has told the Court today that you are truly and deeply remorseful for what occurred, and points out that you said as much in the witness box.

[58] On the other hand, the probation officer seems to entertain reservations as to the extent of your remorse, and I cannot help noting that despite the existence of significant assets, your remorse has not extended to making any offer of financial assistance to those who need it, and whose need has become all the greater by reason of what you did.

[59] So this is not a case in which a separate discount for remorse is appropriate. Neither am I able to reflect in an arithmetical sense the fact that you have never offended before, although I have taken that consideration into account in a general way in fixing the 11 year period.

Reparation

[60] The Crown seeks a sentence of reparation. Mr Douch’s argument is focused, properly in my view, upon reparation for emotional harm suffered by those most seriously affected by what occurred. Where a sentence of reparation is available, the Court must impose it unless satisfied that such a sentence would result in undue hardship to the offender, or dependents of the offender, or that any other special circumstances would make it inappropriate.

[61] Where an offer of reparation has been made, that circumstance must be taken into account in the course of imposing any other sentence. But in this case there has been no offer, Mr McKechnie submitting on your behalf that you are not in a financial position to do so.

[62] As you know this sentencing hearing was originally to have taken place in December last. Regrettably it was necessary to vacate that fixture because although I had directed in October that appropriate reparation reports be obtained, the reports initially furnished to the Court contained insufficient detail to enable the question of reparation to be properly considered. At that time it was considered possible that there might be an offer of reparation which would need to be taken into account on sentence, and so sentencing could not proceed without consideration of reparation issues.

[63] In December I made orders for the filing of declarations by persons who had access to detailed information concerning your financial position. Those people have complied with the Court’s directions, and in particular the Court has received a declaration from Mr Wedlock, a chartered accountant, who has a detailed knowledge of your financial position and that of various entities in which you have an interest.

[64] It must be said at the outset however, that Mr Wedlock’s report is by no means complete, in that he has not had access to the latest accounts for certain entities, nor is there any valuation material to support his figures. Moreover, he has omitted any reference to the detail of outstanding liabilities.

[65] So the material before the Court is significantly less instructive than had been hoped. Nevertheless, it is in my view sufficient for today’s purposes.

[66] Having received copies of the various declarations, your instructions to Mr McKechnie are that you remain unable to make any offer of reparation. The Court must therefore consider whether, despite that, orders ought to be made.

[67] As was observed by Hammond J in Sargent v Police,17 the quantification of emotional harm, particularly for the death of a family member, presents great difficulties. The figure eventually arrived at may simply be an exercise in setting a figure which, while somewhat arbitrary, appears to be adequate to recognise the

_{existence of emotional harm, although of course not to compensate for it.}

17 Sargent v Police (1997) 15CRNZ 454 (HC).

[68] There can be no question of a reparation order unless you are in a position to meet the order either now, or at some identifiable time in the future. As Mr McKechnie points out, you have currently no meaningful income and no prospect of earning anything of significance in the foreseeable future. But that is not necessarily the end of the matter. Mr Wedlock’s declaration implies that several of the assets to which he refers are of little or no value, even though on the face of things, there are significant credit balances in certain instances in your shareholder account.

[69] The position seems to be different in respect of Clifton Strand Ltd. This company owns and operates two motel businesses, one in Whakatane and one in Hamilton. You own 66% of the shares in that company, the balance being held by your parents. Mr Wedlock identifies shareholders’ equity in the company as at March 2010 at $444,332. 66% of that amounts to a figure in the order of $290,000. It is not suggested that there are any countervailing liabilities which stand to reduce that equity. Rather, the submission is that there is no current prospect of realising your current account, because to sell either of the assets of Clifton Strand Ltd is unrealistic at a practical level, given the present economic climate. Neither, it appears, is there any prospect of your being able to sell your shares, or some of them, to a willing buyer.

[70] I accept that the realisation of any such assets would take time, but that can be recognised by postponing the date for payment. On the material provided by Mr Wedlock, I am satisfied that, given time, you have at your disposal assets which could, and should, be realised to meet reparation orders designed to recognise the emotional harm you have caused to those who were dear to Helen.

[71] Having said that, the authorities indicate that reparation for emotional harm will generally be set at relatively modest levels. Figures of between $5-20,000 are normal.

[72] I turn to the position of individual family members. I start with Mr and Mrs White, Helen’s parents. The reparation report sets out in graphic detail the anguish and shock with which they faced Helen’s death and its aftermath. I do not intend to

traverse the detail of the report. You have heard something of that this morning. The consequences of this crime for them at a personal level can readily be imagined.

[73] This was a close family. Mr and Mrs White lived nearby. They saw Helen and the children very frequently. At an emotional level their loss was multi-layered. First of all, they were bereft of a loved daughter who was, by all accounts, a bubbly personality, a delight to be with. But of course they had also to take in Kimberley and Samantha, who by your actions had lost their mother. Naturally enough, Mr and Mrs White did so without question. In consequence they were obliged to bear the brunt of the trauma suffered by the two girls and to help them through the long healing process. Then, at a further level, there was the need to find the financial wherewithal to manage a suddenly increased household without any financial help from you.

[74] Mr and Mrs White had some savings, but the costs associated with Helen’s death and the increased costs of the household have seriously depleted their funds. Mr White was obliged to relinquish his paid employment because he felt constrained to devote himself to the welfare of remaining family members and to issues arising out of Helen’s death. We have heard this morning that he believed he will have to resume employment soon for financial reasons.

[75] They say they have simply coped with the loss of Helen and their additional obligations, and are doing the best they can to bring up their granddaughters, and to giving them “the best life possible”.

[76] As I mentioned earlier in these remarks, Kimberley is now engaged in tertiary education. For her, Helen’s death must have been a staggering blow, suffered at a time when Kimberley was in her mid-teens and about to embark on a new phase in her life. So she was at a stage when a daughter is most in need of everything that a mother can offer by way of emotional and practical support, including financial help. She says that what happened to her mother was terrifying, and she found the need to give evidence at your trial a great burden. Because she is now studying away from home she has to deal with the loss of her mother on her own, to a large degree, and she finds that Helen’s death intrudes all the time, so lessening her concentration

span. She speaks also of nightmares of the type which an 18 year old girl ought not to be faced with. She seems to be a strong young woman, but no-one is strong enough to remain unaffected by this sort of thing.

[77] It is hardly necessary to say anything about Samantha who was, and still is, a child in her formative years. The loss of her cherished mother has produced outcomes which it is unnecessary to detail in open Court, but which can readily be imagined. She is gradually coming to terms with what occurred, and is lucky indeed to have grandparents who have been able to provide an alternative loving environment, albeit at great cost to themselves.

[78] Among those also affected is Helen’s sister Robin. She says as they grew into their adult years, she and Helen became close, and closer still about three years ago when Robin moved down to Matamata to be near to her family and to Helen in particular. She says that she has turned into a different person in consequence of Helen’s death. She has become depressive and indifferent to much of what used to capture her attention. In particular, her relationship with her parents has changed because they are preoccupied with what occurred and with their obligations to Helen’s daughters. She considers that she, and Mr and Mrs White, are suffering from significant on-going stress by reason of what occurred. She details also significant consequential financial losses.

[79] All of this is down, Mr Meads, to your actions. In my opinion the reparation provisions in the Sentencing Act are designed for just such a case as this. I am satisfied that each of the persons to whom I have referred is suffering serious emotional harm as a result of the offence for which you have been convicted, and it is appropriate to make an order for reparation.

[80] I am also satisfied that you presently have insufficient means to pay the total value of the reparation orders which I propose to make, and accordingly it will be necessary for me to make an order directing that the amounts concerned be paid in one lump sum at a later date, pursuant to s 37(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act.

[81] In determining the amount of the respective reparation orders, I have taken into account several authorities which are referred to in my sentencing notes.18

[82] I propose to make orders directing that you pay reparation in the sum of

$15,000 to each of Mr White, Mrs White, Kimberley and Samantha. In the case of Samantha the payment is to be made to Mr and Mrs White jointly to be applied by them in Samantha’s interests as they may determine in their discretion.

[83] There will also be a reparation order in respect of Robin White in the sum of

$5,000.

[84] These sums are to be paid in one lump sum on or before 16 December 2011. Although I am satisfied that you have the means to make ultimate payment of the amounts awarded, I also accept that you do not have the present ability to satisfy the orders. The time allowed is long enough to enable you, or those associated with you, to realise such of your assets as will be sufficient to enable payment to be made.

Sentence

[85] Mr Meads, having been found guilty by a jury of the murder of your wife Helen, you are sentenced to life imprisonment. I impose a minimum period of imprisonment of 11 years. You are further directed to make payments by way of reparation to each of Mr White, Mrs White, Kimberley and Samantha in the sum of

$15,000. In Samantha’s case the payment is to be made to Mr and Mrs White on the conditions earlier outlined. You are directed to make a payment by way of reparation to Robin White in the sum of $5,000. Each of these payments is to be made in a lump sum on or before 16 December 2011.

_{C J Allan J}

18 Schoutens v Police HC Blenheim AP8/02 29 October 2002; R v McWhannell HC Palmerston North CRI-2009-054-1094, 29 July 2010, R v Mears HC Rotorua CRI-2010-069-2211, 2 February 2011 and Te Amo v R [2010] NZCA 307.